Interessante decisione dell’appello del 2° circuito sul se sia invocabile il diritto di parola ex First Amendment verso la punizione inflitta a due alunni , colpevoli di condotta gravemente offensiva sui social della dignità di altri alunni (per ragioni di discriminazione razziale)
Si tratta US 9th circuit Chen ed altri c. Albany Schhol District+ altri, No. 20-16541, dep. il 27.12.2022.
Il punto interessante è capire 1) se la condotta (aver postato foto di loro compagni su social ritoccate e con riferimenti razzistici), in quanto tenuta off campus, non sia più soggetta a punizione da aprte della Scuola e 2) come si atteggi il diritto di parola degli studenti nel campus .
Circa il punto 1, la corte conferma la decisione di 1 grado: la condotta va ritenuta soggetta al potere disciplinare delle autorità scolastiche, essendo strettamente connessa con il buon andamento delle attività .
<<On November 29, 2017, the district court held in
Defendants’ favor with respect to Epple’s, Chen’s, and four
other plaintiffs’ free speech claims. The district court
reasoned that under C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, 835
F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016), these six plaintiffs’ speech was
susceptible to regulation by the school because (1) the
speech had a sufficient nexus to the school; and (2) it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach the
school and create a risk of a substantial disruption. The
district court then found that under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), these six plaintiffs
were properly disciplined because their speech caused or
contributed to a substantial disruption at AHS and “clearly
interfered with ‘the rights of other students to be secure and
to be let alone’” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). The
court held that the four remaining plaintiffs—none of
whom are involved in this appeal—could not be disciplined
under Tinker because they had not “create[d] a substantial
risk of disruption,” nor had they “interfered with the rights
of other students.” >>, p. 17.
cionferma in apppello del ragionamento:
<<Although the Supreme Court in Mahanoy declined to
articulate “a broad, highly general First Amendment rule
stating just what counts as ‘off campus’ speech” or
identifying when “a school’s special need[s]” as recognized
in Tinker might justify regulating such speech, see 141
S. Ct. at 2045, our caselaw has set forth additional
standards that address that issue. Prior to Mahanoy, we
devised a three-factor test for “determin[ing], based on the
totality of the circumstances, whether [off-campus] speech
bears a sufficient nexus to the school” to allow regulation
by a school district. McNeil, 918 F.3d at 707. “This test is
flexible and fact-specific, but the relevant considerations
will include (1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the
school caused or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach and
impact the school, and (3) the relation between the content
and context of the speech and the school.” Id. (citations
omitted)>>, p. 26.
L’emento soggettivo (intention, o meglio la carenza del medesimo) è irrilevante, p. 27: ci pare ovvio. Infatti era <reasonably foreseeable> la diffusione (pur caricata su account “chiuso” Instagram di 13 persone) (p. 29 ss interssanti osservazioni sul perchè era <reasonably foreseeable> nel casospecififco.
Sul punto 2) diritto di parola degli studenti di un campus ha latitudine minore di quello di un adulto, pp. 19/20
(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)