Kieran McCarthy nel blog di Eric Goldman segnala l’importante sentenza del tribunale North. Dist. of California, X v. Bright Data, 9 maggio 2024, No. C 23-03698 WHA.
Fatti:
<<Defendant Bright Data Ltd. is a data-scraping company (Amd. Compl. ¶ 6). According
to Bright Data, “[i]ts suite of technologies and services help Fortune 500 companies, academic
institutions, and small businesses retrieve and synthesize vast amounts of public information”
(Br. 3). There are three types of products that Bright Data offers: (1) datasets built from data
that Bright Data scrapes itself, (2) scraping tools that enable their purchasers to scrape data
themselves, and (3) proxy network services that enable their purchasers to scrape data through
proxy servers, using those servers’ IP addresses (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 50–51, 55–58, 63–64; Br. 4).
In this lawsuit, X Corp. alleges that Bright Data scrapes data from X and sells data
scraped from X, using elaborate technical measures to evade X Corp.’s anti-scraping
technology, while facilitating its customers in and inducing them to scrape data from X —
all in violation of the Terms to which Bright Data and its customers are bound (Amd. Compl.
¶¶ 1–2). How so? X Corp. contends that Bright Data and its customers are bound as X users.
Specifically, X Corp. contends that Bright Data is bound (1) by a “browser-wrap” or “browse-
wrap” contract, having used X Corp. services in the act of scraping data from X, impliedly
agreeing to the Terms in the process; and (2) by a “click-wrap” or “click-through” contract,
having registered an account (@bright_data) to promote Bright Data products, expressly
agreeing to the Terms as early as February 2016 (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 39–41; see also Amd.
Compl. ¶ 44). Meanwhile, Bright Data customers are conceivably likewise bound by browser-
wrap and click-wrap contracts, having used X Corp. services in the act of scraping data from
X and, in some instances, having registered accounts (see Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 55, 63)>>.
Due gruppi di censure sono azionati: 1) improperly accessed its systems (p. 8 ss) , e 2) improperly scraped and sold its data, and assisted others in improperly scraping its data , p. 18 ss
Quanto ad 1 e alle quattro azioni ivi inserite, possono interessarci le ultime due (sub C e sub D), relative a “Tortious interference with contract” e alla violazione delle Terms of service di X: queste ultime infatti verosimlmente saranno uguali o simili alle nostre (sarebbe interessante accertarlo).
Quanto a 2, è degna di nota la specificazione della corte circa la “stranezza” per cui X non pretende l’acquisto del diritto pieno sui dati caricati dagli utenti sulla sua piattaforma, ma solo facoltà di uso: per non perdere i safe harbours. Ma al tempo stesso vuole poterne guidare l’uso.
<<But X Corp. disclaims ownership of X users’ content and does not acquire a
right to exclude others from reproducing, adapting, distributing, and displaying it under the non-exclusive license>>
Poi: <<One might ask why X Corp. does not just acquire ownership of X users’ content or grant itself an exclusive license under the Terms. That would jeopardize X Corp.’s safe harbors from civil liability for publishing third-party content. Under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, social media companies are generally immune from claims based on the publication of information “provided by another information content provider.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Meanwhile, under Section 512(a) of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), social media companies can avoid liability for copyright infringement when they “act only as ‘conduits’ for the transmission of information.” Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013); 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). X Corp. wants it both ways: to keep its safe harbors yet exercise a copyright owner’s right to exclude, wresting fees from those who wish to extract and copy X users’ content>>
Però i claims , basati su legge statale, sul divieto di scraping and selling of data inficiano il copyright act federale: quindi la prima legge deve cedere di fronte alla seconda (la corte individua tre modi con cui l’Act federale viene inficiato: qui però non interessanti, attenendo alle peculiarità dell’ordinamento multilivello statunitense ).
La corte ritiene che prevalga la legge federale.
Bright Data aveva in gennaio u.s. ottenuto il rigetto anche della domanda avanzata da Meta nel medesimo ufficio (ma diverso giudice): v. mio post 4 marzo 2024.
V.ne un commento di Jeremy Goldman qui. cjhe posta unb altro link alla sentenza.