Corresponsabilità (contributory infringement) nella violazione del copyright a carico dell’internet provider

L’appello del 5 Distretto 09.10.2024, No. 23-50162, UMG Recordings, Capitol Records ed altre majorts della musica c. Grande Communications Network, decide un caso di corrsponsabilità di tipo P2P, confermando la condanna di prim grado (nell’an, non nel quantum),

Nel caso specifico la correpopnsabilità non era contestabile, dato che l’ISP era stato notiziato della violazione e nulla ha fatto.

Ma cìè staa battaglia comunque su due dei quattro requisiti di legge (<< Plaintiffs had to show (1) that Plaintiffs own or have exclusive control over valid copyrights and (2) that those copyrights were directly infringed by Grande’s subscribers. See BWP Media USA, 852 F.3d at 439. To further prove that Grande was secondarily liable for its subscribers’ conduct, Plaintiffs had to demonstrate (3) that Grande had knowledge of its subscribers’ infringing activity and (4) that Grande induced, caused, or materially contributed to that activity>>): precisamente sul 2 e sul 4. Nessuna invece sul n. 3, implicitamente ammmettendosi la willful blindness.

Qui contano spt. le tattiche di forensics: (1) ad es col software Audible Magic: Plaintiffs’ trade association, the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.
(“RIAA”), used an industry-standard software program called Audible
Magic—which forensically analyzes the contents of digital audio files to
determine if those files match the contents of files in a database that contains
authorized authentic copies of Plaintiffs’ sound recordings—to verify that
Rightscorp in fact downloaded each work at issue,.

(2) Oppure col soggetto terzo incaricato da esse di indagini, Rightscorp: .

“To crack down on copyright infringement, third-party companies
have developed technologies to infiltrate BitTorrent and identify infringing
users by their IP addresses. One such company is Rightscorp, Inc.
(“Rightscorp”). Rightscorp’s proprietary technology:
• Interacts with BitTorrent users and obtains their agree-
ment to distribute unauthorized copies of copyrighted
works
• Records the relevant available details of that agreement,
such as the user’s IP address and what the infringed
content is
• Cross-references the user’s IP address against publicly
available databases to identify which ISP is affiliated
with that IP address
• Generates and sends infringement notices to the rele-
vant ISPs so that they can identify their infringing sub-
scribers and take appropriate action; and
• Frequently reconnects with the identified infringing IP
addresses and downloads copies of the copyrighted
works at issue directly from those users
In other words, Rightscorp identifies infringing conduct on
BitTorrent by engaging with BitTorrent users, documents that conduct, and
uses the information available to it to notify ISPs of its findings so that the
ISP can take appropriate action”.

Sintesi finale:

<< The evidence at trial demonstrated that Grande provided its
subscribers with the tools necessary to infringe (i.e., high-speed internet
access) and that Grande’s subscribers used those tools to infringe Plaintiffs’
copyrights.14 See BMG, 881 F.3d at 306-08. Based on the consistency of the
trial evidence, the district court determined that there was “no question that
[Grande] intentionally continued to provide Internet service” to its
infringing subscribers.
Grande’s affirmative choice to continue providing its services to
known infringing subscribers—rather than taking simple measures to
prevent infringement—distinguishes this case from Cobbler Nevada, LLC v.
Gonzales, 901 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2018), on which Grande relies. There, the
Ninth Circuit considered a claim alleging that a subscriber of internet
services who received infringement notices failed to “secure, police and protect” his account from third parties who used his internet access to
infringe. Cobbler, 901 F.3d at 1145-46. The direct infringers were never
identified. See id. at 1145 n.1. Because the pleading premised liability
exclusively on the subscriber’s failure to take action against unknown third-
party infringers, it was insufficient to state a claim. See id. at 1147-49. Here,
Plaintiffs proved at trial that Grande knew (or was willfully blind to) the
identities of its infringing subscribers based on Rightscorp’s notices, which
informed Grande of specific IP addresses of subscribers engaging in
infringing conduct. But Grande made the choice to continue providing
services to them anyway, rather than taking simple measures to prevent
infringement. Additionally, Cobbler addressed only inducement liability
under Grokster; it did not opine on the evidence required for establishing
material contribution. See id. The court in Cobbler rejected the plaintiff’s
invitation to create “an affirmative duty for private internet subscribers to
actively monitor their internet service for infringement,” id. at 1149; it did
not absolve ISPs like Grande that continue providing services to known
infringing subscribers.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Grande had a simple measure
available to it to prevent further damages to copyrighted works (i.e.,
terminating repeat infringing subscribers), but that Grande never took it. On
appeal, Grande and its amici make a policy argument—that terminating
internet services is not a simple measure, but instead a “draconian
overreaction” that is a “drastic and overbroad remedy”—but a reasonable
jury could, and did, find that Grande had basic measures, including
termination, available to it. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1172. And because
Grande does not dispute any of the evidence on which Plaintiffs relied to
prove material contribution, there is no basis to conclude a reasonable jury
lacked sufficient evidence to reach that conclusion.

In sum, because (1) intentionally providing material contribution to
infringement is a valid basis for contributory liability; (2) an ISP’s continued
provision of internet services to known infringing subscribers, without taking
simple measures to prevent infringement, constitutes material contribution;
and (3) the evidence at trial was sufficient to show that Grande engaged in
precisely that conduct, there is no basis to reverse the jury’s verdict that
Grande is liable for contributory infringement >>.

Interessante infine è la riduzine del quantum, dovendosi determinare il danno statutory non per singolo brano ma per albums., Ma ciò dipende da specifica norma del 17 US Code § 504 (“for the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work”).

 

(Notizia e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)