Il requisito del carattere creativo: originalità e novità

La Court of Appeal inglese sulla creatività come artistic work di una graphic user interface

Si reclama il diritto di autore sul lavoro grafico sottostante (GUIs: graphical user interfaces), creato tramite uso di un software:

La corte di appello 20.11.2023, [2023] EWCA Civ 1354 – Case No: CA-2023-000920, THJ SYSTEMS LIMITED – OPTIONNET LLP Claimants copntro DANIEL SHERIDAN-SHERIDAN OPTIONS MENTORING CORPORATION ravvisa la creatività.

La ravvisa non però secondo la tradizionale concezione inglese dello “skill and labour” , come aveva fatto il giudice in primo grado: << I am satisfied that the work of creating the look and functionality of interface including the arrangements of the tables and graphs did involve the exercise of sufficient skill and labour for the result to amount to an artistic work>>. § 21

La ravvisa invece secondo il concetto del diritto UE , elaborato dalla sentenza Infopaq del 2009 da parte della Corte di Giustizia (<< “… original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation”>>, § 15):

<<23 In my judgment the Defendants are right that the judge did not apply the correct test, which I have set out in paragraph 16 above. This is not because of his reference to “functionality” in [214], which appears to be a slip of the pen having regard to what he went on to say in the last sentence of [215]. It is because the test he applied was that of “skill and labour”, which was the test applied by the English courts prior to Infopaq, including in Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch), [2006] RPC 3 and Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), [2006] RPC 14, and not the test of “author’s own intellectual creation” laid down by the Court of Justice. As can be seen from cases such as Football Dataco and Funke Medien, these two tests are not the same, and the European test is more demanding; although Painer establishes that even a simple portrait photograph may satisfy it in an appropriate case. In fairness to the judge, I should make it clear that he was not referred to any of the relevant case law on this question (although the Defendants cited BSA, they did so in relation to a different issue).

It follows that this Court must re-assess the originality of the R & P Charts applying the correct test. Before turning to consider the evidence, it is important to make five points. First, the test is an objective one. Secondly, the test is not one of artistic merit: section 4(1)(a) of the 1988 Act expressly provides that graphic works qualify as artistic works “irrespective of artistic quality”, and nothing in the case law of the CJEU suggests otherwise. Thirdly, the burden of proof lies on the Claimants. Fourthly, particularly given that we are concerned with graphic works, a key item of evidence is the works themselves. Fifthly, as counsel for the Defendants rightly emphasised, the functionality of the Software is irrelevant to this question. The enquiry concerns the visual appearance of the R & P Charts. Given the informative purpose of the R & P Charts, the visual appearance is primarily a matter of the layout of the R & P Charts.

It can be seen from the example of the R & P Charts reproduced above, particularly when enlarged, that the various component parts of the image have been laid out with some care. Mr Mitchell has designed the display so as to cram quite a large amount of information into a single screen. Moreover, he has made choices as to what to put where, including such matters as which commands to put into the ribbon and in what order. He also selected what fonts and colours to use.

When one turns to Mr Mitchell’s evidence, his statement that “the look and feel of it is my brainchild” was not challenged. Nor were his statements that “[e]verything is original” and “everything on there is my design” because, although he had sourced components from a library, he had put them “into various locations”. The cross-examiner used the analogy of building something from Lego bricks, and in my view the analogy is a good one. As the Court of Justice held in BSA at [48], “the national court must take account, inter alia, of the specific arrangement or configuration of all the components which form part of the graphic user interface”. Mr Mitchell did not enlarge upon the choices he had made, but he was not asked about this. Nor was it put to Mr Mitchell that the visual appearance of the R & P Charts was dictated by technical considerations, rules or other constraints which left no room for creative freedom. Nor did the Defendants adduce any evidence to contradict Mr Mitchell’s evidence, such as similar graphical user interfaces produced by third parties. As the judge observed, the evidence was limited, but nevertheless it was all one way.

It is plain that the degree of visual creativity which went into the R & P Charts was low. But that does not mean that there was no creativity at all. The consequence of the low degree of creativity is that the scope of protection conferred by copyright in the R & P Charts is correspondingly narrow, so that only a close copy would infringe: see Infopaq at [45]-[48]. (It is sometimes suggested that Painer at [95]-[98] is authority to the contrary, but all that passage establishes is that the protection conferred by copyright on portrait photographs as a category is not inferior to that enjoyed by other categories of works, including other kinds of photographs.) It does not mean that the R & P Charts are not protected by copyright at all, which would have the consequence that even an identical copy would not infringe.

I therefore conclude that, even though the judge applied the wrong test, he was correct to find that the R & P Charts were original. I would therefore dismiss the Defendants’ appeal, save that I would restrict the declaration made by the judge to the R & P Charts>>.

(notizia e link a Bailii da Jeremy Blum e Toby Headdon in Kluwer Copyright law).

Disegno frattale creato con software portato in Cassazione: la quale però non entra nel merito ma dichiara il ricorso inammissibile perchè eccezione mai trattata in precedenza

Alina Trapova su Linkedin segnala Cass. sez. 1 del 16 gennaio 2023 n. 1.107, rel. Scotti.

La quale ad es. dice che <<la protezione del diritto d’autore postula il requisito dell’originalità e della creatività, consistente non già nell’idea che è alla base della sua realizzazione, ma nella forma della sua espressione, ovvero dalla sua soggettività, presupponendo che l’opera rifletta la personalità del suo autore, manifestando le sue scelte libere e creative; la consistenza in concreto di tale autonomo apporto forma oggetto di una valutazione destinata a risolversi in un giudizio di fatto, come tale sindacabile in sede di legittimità soltanto per eventuali vizi di motivazione (Sez. 1, n. 10300 del 29.5.2020; Sez. 1, n. 13524 del 13.6.2014; Sez. 1, n. 20925 del 27.10.2005)>>.

Però i due cocnetti sono in realtà uno solo: la creatività (art. 6 l. aut).

Si può semmai discutere della <<novità>>, però non menzionata però dallla legge.

Il punto intressante sarebbe stato quello dell’immagine non tutelabile perchè creata col software (in che misura e modo?). Però la SC rigetta perchè non esaminato nella fase di merito.

Diritto di autore su fiabe , anzi su una loro particolare modalità editoriale-rappresentativa

Appello Firenze n. 669/2023 del 03.04.2023, RG 1132/2022, rel. Nicoletti, sul tema in oggetto conferma la sentenza di 1 grado circa la tutela come opera dll’ingegno della innovativa modalitàò edutoriale di rapprestnazione di fiabe tradizionali:

<<Il giudicante, poi, correttamente, dopo aver esemplificato i dati terminologici di
cui sopra, ha ritenuto che l’oggetto di causa non fosse l’idea, ma l’opera
compiuta. Infatti, ha affermato che “nel caso di specie, l’opera di cui si chiede la
protezione è rappresentata dai cofanetti della collana “Carte in tavola”. Ora, è pacifico
che il contenuto dei cofanetti sia costituito dalle fiabe tradizionalmente raccontate ai
bambini. Tuttavia, applicando i suesposti principi, occorre guardare non all’idea in sé,
al contenuto dell’opera, bensì alla sua forma espressiva. Dalla disamina delle opere, il
cui deposito cartaceo è stato autorizzato in sede istruttoria, emerge come il suo autore abbia voluto rappresentarle mediante una visione personale delle stesse: il cofanetto,
ciascuno avente ad oggetto una fiaba, è composto da una serie di schede sulla quali
da un lato vi è il racconto della storia e, dall’altro, il disegno corrispondente, così che
poi poggiando tutte le carte in sequenza emerge la rappresentazione in disegni
dell’intera fiaba. Ebbene, si ritiene che una tale rappresentazione delle tradizionali
fiabe per bambini sia caratterizzata da innovazione ed originalità, distinguendosi dai
differenti libri con immagini colorate, per essere stampato sui due lati di singole
schede.”.
La ricostruzione del Tribunale, quindi, è del tutto in linea con l’interpretazione
costante fornita dalla giurisprudenza della normativa di riferimento.
E’ poi condivisibile l’affermazione secondo cui l’opera “Carte in tavola” presenta
un contenuto creativo, rappresentato dal fatto che il Faglia ha inteso
rappresentare e narrare delle fiabe tramite una nuova metodologia comunicativa,
ovvero quella della sequenza di carte contenenti delle illustrazioni, che nella loro
successione raccontano la storia. Tale metodologia di racconto, infatti, si presenta
come innovativa rispetto alla tradizione, differenziandosi dalla narrazione tramite libri e manuali.
L’innovazione creativa determinata dalla differente metodologia narrativa,
pertanto, connota il Faglia quale autore dell’opera, in quanto tale legittimato a
richiedere il riconoscimento della paternità della stessa.

E’ poi irrilevante il fatto che altri soggetti siano gli autori del testo e delle
illustrazioni>>

E poi:

<<L’art. 4 della legge sul diritto di autore, infatti, prevede che “senza pregiudizio dei diritti esistenti sull’opera originaria, sono altresì protette le elaborazioni di carattere creativo dell’opera stessa, quali le traduzioni in altra lingua, le trasformazioni da una in altra forma letteraria od artistica, le modificazioni ed aggiunte che costituiscono un rifacimento sostanziale dell’opera originaria, gli adattamenti, le riduzioni, i compendi, le variazioni non costituenti opera originale.”.
In tale ambito può essere calata anche l’opera di cui si discute, rientrando nel
concetto di “trasformazione da un’altra forma letteraria o artistica” anche la
narrazione di fiabe tradizionali mediante carte illustrate, in relazione alle quali
l’aspetto di creatività va rinvenuto proprio nella modalità di rappresentazione
della storia.
Quello che viene tutelato nel caso in esame, infatti, non è una mera idea, come
afferma l’appellante, ma l’ideazione di una forma di rappresentazione delle storie avente carattere innovativo>>

interessante applicazione dell’art. 1304 cc, poi , da parte della Corte , avendo l’altro convenuto stipulato in precedenza una transazione con l’attore.

Per il Tribunale di Parigi c’è diritto di autore sui font tipografici (anche se non c’è violazione nel caso specifico)

Interessante decisione (in francese) segnalata da Kevin Bercimuelle-Chamot su IpKat del 28 marzo 2023.

Si tratta di Trib. Parigi , N° RG 20/06208, del 31 Mars 2023 che deide la lite tra il font « Le Monde Journal » e « Spectral » , creato per conto di Google (che è parte in causa).

Si tratta di opera tutelabile:

<<28. Aucun de ces choix n’est inédit et chacun se rerouve dans certaines autres typographies
traditionnelles ou polices de caractères récentes . En particulier, le remplacement de la goutte
par une terminaison qui se finit vers une pointe en bas cassée par un trait court, présentée par
M. X comme un parti pris esthétique constituant l’essence même du caractère typographique
Le Monde Journal, se retrouve dans des typographies du XVIII siècle et aussi des polices
actuelles (Charter, Swiss works,ème Malabar). Toutefois, la typographie Le Monde Journal
présente un aspect particulier obtenu par différents parti-pris tels que le dégraissage des
verticales au profit des horizontales, la taille respective des hauteurs d’œil d’une part,
majuscules et ascendantes d’autre part, ainsi que les détails d’empattements trapézoïdaux et le
dessin particulier des gouttes. Cette combinaison, qui permet d’atteindre l’objectif de gains de
lisibilité et d’espace mais qui aurait pu être obtenu par d’autres moyens, est originale, révèle
des choix arbitraires et reflètent l’empreinte de la personnalité de son auteur.

29. Dès lors la combinaison des caractéristiques énumérées au point 27 ci- dessus fait de la
police Le Monde Journal une œuvre typographique originale protégeable en tant que telle par
le droit d’auteur>>.

(da google translate: < 28. Nessuna di queste scelte è nuova e ciascuna si trova in certe altre tipografie
caratteri tipografici tradizionali o recenti. In particolare, la sostituzione della gotta
da un finale che termina in un punto in basso spezzato da una breve linea, presentato da
Mr. X come pregiudizio estetico che costituisce l’essenza stessa del carattere tipografico
Le Monde Journal, si trova nelle tipografie del XVIII secolo e anche nei caratteri
corrente (Carta, opere svizzere, th Malabar). Tuttavia, la tipografia di Le Monde Journal
ha un aspetto particolare ottenuto da diversi pregiudizi come lo sgrassaggio di
verticali a favore degli orizzontali, la rispettiva dimensione delle altezze degli occhi da un lato,
capitelli e ascendenti dall’altro, così come i dettagli di serif trapezoidali e il
particolare disegno delle gocce. Questa combinazione, che permette di raggiungere l’obiettivo di guadagni di
leggibilità e spazio ma che avrebbe potuto essere ottenuto con altri mezzi, è originale, rivela
scelte arbitrarie e riflettono l’impronta della personalità del suo autore.

29. La combinazione delle caratteristiche elencate al precedente paragrafo 27 rende quindi il
font Le Monde Journal un’opera tipografica originale tutelabile come tale da
diritto d’autore>>).

Però Google/Spectal non lo viola, data la sufficiente distanza grafica.

Contraffazione musicale (negata) dal distretto sud di New York

Mark Jaffe dà notizia di South. Distr. of New York 24 marzo 2023, Case 1:21-cv-04047-VM, EMELIKE NWOSUOCHA c. DONALD MCKINLEY GLOVER II,
JEFFEREY LAMAR WILLIAMS ed altri.

Interessante esame delle questioni proprie delle liti su copyright musicale nella sentenza in esame: questioni sempre ostiche per chi non conosce teoria o almeno tecnica musicale.

Il problema di solito -e pure qui- è quello di individuare le parti non originali di una composizione, le quali non sono proteggibili.

In generale:

<<Thus, “copyright protects only that which is original,” and “does not protect ideas, only their expression.” McDonald, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 455. “This principle excludes from copyright the raw materials of art, like colors, letters, descriptive facts, and standard geometric forms, as well as previous creative works that have fallen into the public domain,” and “[i]t likewise excludes the basic building blocks of music, including tempo and individual notes.” Id. at 454 (collecting cases). Further, “words and short phrases, including titles and slogans, rarely if ever exhibit sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection,” and “[l]onger phrases are also not protectable if they are common or cliché.” Id. Similarly, “common rhythms, song structures, and harmonic progressions are not protected” and “[t]hemes fall into the category of uncopyrightable ideas.” Id. at 454-55. Still, “a work may be copyrightable even though it is entirely a compilation of unprotectible elements,” because “the original way in which the author has selected, coordinated, and arranged the elements of his or her work” is protectible. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)>>

In aprticolare nel caso sub iudice:

<<Additionally, the parties agree, and the Court concurs, that the Complaint does not allege infringement of the “overall structure of the songs, order, and number of verse and chorus sections,” or the “instrumentation,” “musical notes,” or “musical production.”5 (See Opposition at 2-6; Memorandum at 4-6; Complaint ¶¶ 39-40.)
The Court finds that the “distinct and unique vocal cadence, delivery, rhythm, timing, phrasing, meter and/or pattern” or “flow” as well as the “lyrical theme” and “structure” of the chorus in Plaintiff’s Composition lack sufficient originality alone, or as combined, to merit compositional copyright protection or are categorically ineligible for copyright protection. (Complaint ¶ 39.) For instance, Nwosuocha asserts copyright over the “lyrical theme” of Plaintiff’s Composition, but a lyrical theme is simply an idea, and ideas are not protectable. Moreover, the idea of a boastful rapper is certainly not original to Nwosuocha.
The Court further finds that although the “content” of the chorus of Plaintiff’s Composition, which the Court understands to mean the lyrics, bears sufficient originality to merit compositional protection, a cursory comparison with the Challenged Composition reveals that the content of the choruses is entirely different and not substantially similar.6 As noted previously, the “question of substantial similarity is by no means exclusively reserved for resolution by a jury” and the Second Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that, in certain circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a matter of law, either because the similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.” Peter F. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 63. Here, no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the lyrics of the chorus of Plaintiff’s Composition and the chorus of the Challenged Composition are substantially similar>>.

Si tratta però di esame ultroneo , condotto dalal corte senza necessità, dato che l’opera nmon era stata retgistrata come richeide il diritto usa per aver tutela in corte. O meglio -particolare assi imporante- l’attore aveva registrato solo il fonogramma (sound recording) e non l’opera muscia /musical registration): inadempimeot palese del suo consulente IP .

Linee guida dello US Copyright Office sulla registrabilità di opere prodotte con intelligenza artificiale

Sono state diffuse le “Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence” , 10-16 marzo 2023.

Fonte: web page dell’Ufficio .

Il passo interessante è sub III:

<<It begins by asking ‘‘whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely beingan assisting instrument, or whether thetraditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musicalexpression or elements of selection,arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.’’ In the case of works containing AI-generated material, theOffice will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of‘‘mechanical reproduction’’ or instead of an author’s ‘‘own original mentalconception, to which [the author] gave visible form.’’ The answer will depend on the circumstances,particularly how the AI tool operatesand how it was used to create the final work. This is necessarily a case-by case inquiry. If a work’s traditional elements of authorship were produced by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the Office will not register it.
For example, when an AI technology receives solely a prompt from a human and produces complex written, visual, or musical works in response, the ‘‘traditional elements of authorship’’ are determined and executed by the technology—not the human user.
Based on the Office’s understanding of the generative AI technologies currently available, users do not exercise ultimate creative control over how such systems interpret prompts and generate material.
Instead,these prompts function more like instructions to a commissioned artist—they identify what the prompter wishes to have depicted, but the machine determines how those instructions are implemented in its output.
Forexample, if a user instructs a text generating technology to ‘‘write a poem about copyright law in the style ofWilliam Shakespeare,’’ she can expect the system to generate text that is recognizable as a poem, mentions copyright, and resembles Shakespeare’s style. But the technology will decide the rhyming pattern, the words in each line, and the structure of the text.
When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship. As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.
In other cases, however, a work containing AI-generated material will also contain sufficient human authorship to support a copyright claim. For example, a human may select or arrange AI-generated material in a sufficiently creative way that ‘‘the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.’’ Or anartist may modify material originally generated by AI technology to such a degree that the modifications meet the standard for copyright protection. In these cases, copyright will only protect the human-authored aspects of the work, which are ‘‘independent of’’ and do ‘‘not affect’’ the copyright status of the AI-generated material itself>>
Mi pare affermazione di buon senso.

Intervento romano sulla tutela d’autore per le fotografie

Trib. Roma 22.06.2022 n. 10.041/2022, RG 21.494/2018, riepiloga i termini della tutela delle fotografie con utili precisazioni.

Si trattava di foto caricate su database on line da fotografo professionista e poi offerte in licenza a potenziale interessato, che non le acquista ma le usa uguialmente su propri articoli giornalistici.

Spunti presenti:

consueta triplice distinzione: i) foto protette da diritto pieno, ii) da dir. connesso o iii) solo documetarie ex art. 87.2 l. aut.
sulla distinzione tra i) e ii) , spesso punctum dolens, si dilunga sulla creatività. Precisa che la professionalità del fotograto e la qualità tecnca delle fotografie sono insufficientei: <<Nel caso in esame parte attrice si è limitata sostanzialmente a rivendicare, in generale, la elevata qualificazione professionale dei fotografi e l’elevata qualità tecnica delle fotografie, senza formulare alcuno specifico riferimento ad alcuna di esse, deducendo a riprova il fatto che esse sono destinate alla cessione a terzi, previo compenso, per la pubblicazione su testate giornalistiche. Ma in base ai principi sopra richiamati la professionalità del fotografo e la qualità tecnica delle fotografie sono insufficienti per il riconoscimento del carattere artistico ed al contrario sono la loro stessa destinazione, al normale circuito dei media, ed il loro genere – personaggi, eventi e tematiche di interesse giornalistico – che le devono fare includere fra le fotografie “semplici”, in assenza di elementi specifici, che dovrebbero essere riferibili singolarmente a ciascuna di esse, che non sono stati neanche dedotti . Ciò si deve affermare anche per quelle relative non a persone o eventi pubblici, ma a edifici sedi di istituzioni o note società, o alla composizione in studio di oggetti “significativi”, quali il modello 730 o biglietti di banca. Queste ultime in particolare non possono essere ricondotte alle fotografie di “scritti, documenti, carte di affari, oggetti materiali, disegni tecnici e prodotti simili”, prive di tutela ex art.87, 2° comma L.A., ma si riferiscono piuttosto a “fatti della vita sociale”, non avendo la funzione di riprodurre il modo di essere di questi oggetti, ma quella di illustrare le tematiche economiche che essi evocano>>
prova del diritto nelle forme di uso ex ar.t 8 l. aut.: <<Nel sito ciascuna fotografia risulta accompagnata dalle indicazioni prescritte dall’art. 90 L.A. Pare evidente del resto che poiché tale titolarità deriva dall’individuazione dell’autore dello scatto, che parte attrice deduce essere il sig. Canino stesso o un fotografo a lui legato da un rapporto i committenza (art. 88 comma 2 L.A.), la contestazione deve essere supportata da elementi specifici, risolvendosi altrimenti nel tentativo di onerare l’attore di una probatio diabolica; tali elementi non sono stati dedotti, essendosi parte convenuta limitata ad affermare, in modo del tutto generico, di avere reperito le fotografie sulla rete>>
errata l’invocazione della “esimente” della ripubblicazione ex art. 91.2 l. aut. di foto tratte da giornali
quantificazione: gli sconti per acquisti cumulativi non contano nella liquidazione del mancato guadagno

Protezione del personaggio di fantasia col diritto d’autore: la sentenza di appello conferma il Tribunale nel caso Clint Eastwood c. Rango

Con post 2.6.2021 avevo dato conto della setnenza di primo grado Trib. Roma 16.04.2021 che rigettava la domanda del produttore de <Per un pugno di dollari>.

Ora è stata emanata la sentenza di appello App. Roma n. 5432/2022, RG 6935/2021, rel. Romandini, che conferma il primo grado , ricalcandone la motivaizone.

Conferma che nel famoso film, riprodotto in minima misura (un minuto o poco più) in particolare nel suo personaggio più noto <L’uomo denza nome> (C. EAstwood) , il personaggio non è tutelabile perchè non disgiungibile dall’attore che lo impersonifica (C. Eastwood appunto).

Il quesito centrale, secondo il tribunale cui aderisce la CdA, sarebbe questo: <<La questione, tuttavia, attiene nel caso di specie, come in modo condivisibile spiegato dal
Giudice di prime cure, alla verifica se il personaggio “l’uomo senza nome”, non più comparso in
alcuna ulteriore opera cinematografica al di fuori dei lungometraggi costituente la c.d. “trilogia
del dollaro”, presenti profili pur minimi della creatività o piuttosto non costituisca “la
rielaborazione personale e non evolutiva (bensì contestualizzata nel mondo western) da parte
di Sergio Leone di prototipi noti alla narrazione letteraria e cinematografica e non ha acquisito
una penetrazione ovvero una permanenza nel pubblico , nella critica cinematografica o nelle
successive opere, così da renderlo qualificabile come opera creativa ed identificabile come tale>>.

Non so se sia esatta la valutazione: bisognerebbe provare a realizzare un corto con altro attore, ma uguale tutto il resto.

In ogni caso, questo aspetto (disgiungibilità) nella disciplina della proteggibilità del personaggio è importante.

Errata invece l’affermazione per cui la risposta al quesito è questione di fatto (<<Il Tribunale ha optato per la seconda soluzione. Si tratta, dunque, di una valutazione in punto di fatto operata che appare alla Corte, peraltro,
sorretta da adeguata e coerente motivazione >>): solo i fatti storici rientrano in essa, mentre il loro inquadramento nel concetto di creatività è giudizio in diritto.

La corte qualifica la brevità di riproduzione come <pura volontà di citazionismo … più che altro per rendere omaggio all’attore ed ad regista Sergio Leone >>. Affermazione assai dubbia, parendo invece voler riprodurre per lucrare, anche se abilmente riducendo il tempo per ridurre i rischi di violazione (difettano i requisiti dell’art. 70 l. aut.).

Significativa anche la discussione sull’eccezione di citazione, condotta però con motivazione non molto appfofondita . E’ invece giusta la critica di uso poco o nulla sorvegliato del termine fair use da parte del Trib.

V. il collage riportato da Girardello con post in IpKat 12.09.2022

e poi il video di RAngo, con link sempre offerto dal medesimo autore.

Banana attaccata con scotch al muro: 1) è opera d’arte ? 2) in caso positivo , riprodurla con leggere differenze viola il copyright?

I distretto sud della Florida risponde positivamente ad entrambe le domande (Southern District of Florida , 6 luglio 2022, Case 1:t21-cv-20039-RNS , Morford c. Cattelan).

Sentenza interssante per il ragionamento condotto sui sempre scivolosi due temi citati.

Si v. le opere a paragone, ben riprodotte in sentenza.

Sub 1: While using silver duct tape to affix a banana to a wall may not espouse
the highest degree of creativity, its absurd and farcical nature meets the
“minimal degree of creativity” needed to qualify as original. See Feist, 499 U.S.
at 345; see also Kevin Harrington Enters., Inc. v. Bear Wolf, Inc., No. 98-CV-
1039, 1998 WL 35154990, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 1998) (Ungaro, J.) (noting
that originality involves “the author’s subjective judgment in giving visual form
to his own mental conception”) (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)). While the Court cannot—and need not—give meaning
to Banana & Orange, at this stage the Court holds that Morford’s choices in
giving form to Banana & Orange are sufficiently original (p. 8).

sub 2: stabilito che ci fu “access potenziale”, secondo il diritto usa, stante la pluriuma presenza in rete (P. 8/9), IL GIUDICE si volge al requisito della substanzial similarity,. che viene ravvisata. Qui occorre tornare alle riproduizioni dele due iopere.

INizia col ricordare la alternativa ideaespression (solo la seconda è tutelabile)., di difficile applicaizone al caso nostro.

e dice: << While Morford is afforded no protection for the idea of a duct-taped
banana or the individual components of his work, Morford may be able to claim
some degree of copyright protection in the “selection, coordination, [and]
arrangement” of these otherwise unprotectable elements. See Off Lease, 825 F.
App’x at 726 (discussing copyrighted works “formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials . . . that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)).

In particular, Morford
can claim some copyright protection in the combination of his choices in color,
positioning, and angling. See Off Lease, 825 F. App’x at 727 (holding that
copyright protection extended to “the outline, the [component’s] shape, and the
elaborate color scheme”); see also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., No. 6:02-cv-1377,
2004 WL 5486639, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2004) (holding that an “artist’s
selection as to how the [model pieces] were arranged in the painting, the colors
associated with the elements, and the overall structure and arrangement of the
underlying ideas” are protectable) (citing Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1216).
Of course, there are only so many choices an artist can make in colors,
positioning, and angling when expressing the idea of a banana taped to a wall.
In general, this is called the merger doctrine—where the idea and the
expression of that idea merge. See BUC Int’l, 489 F.3d at 1142 (holding that the
merger doctrine “provides that ‘expression is not protected . . . where there is
only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression
would effectively accord protection to the idea itself’”) (quoting BellSouth, 999
F.2d at 1442)). However, Cattelan did not argue that the merger doctrine
applies (ECF No. 53 at 14 n.8), so the Court will not consider whether the
merger doctrine precludes any finding of infringement here.
Last, the comparison step. The Court finds, at the motion-to-dismiss
stage, that Morford sufficiently alleges that there is similarity in the (few)
protected elements of Banana & Orange. In both works, a single piece of silver
duct tape runs upward from left to right at an angle, affixing a centered yellow
banana, angled downward left to right, against a wall. In both works, the
banana and the duct tape intersect at roughly the midpoints of each, although
the duct tape is less centered on the banana in Morford’s work than in
Comedian.
Cattelan argues that the presence of additional elements in Banana &
Orange—namely, an orange, the green background, and the use of masking
tape borders—weigh against a finding of substantial similarity. (ECF No. 49
Case 1:21-cv-20039-RNS Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2022 Page 10 of 11 at 13.) However, when determining copyright infringement, courts look to “the relative portion of the copyrighted work—not the relative portion of the
infringing work[.]” See Peter Letterese and Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of
Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that
otherwise defendants would be permitted to copy verbatim as long as they did
not copy an entire work).

In other words, “[t]he extent of copying must be
assessed with respect to both the quantitative and the qualitative significance
of the amount copied to the copyrighted work as a whole.” Id. (citing MiTek, 89
F.3d at 1560 & n.26); see also Newman, 959 F.3d at 1302 (“Quantitatively
insubstantial copying may still be actionable if it is qualitatively substantial.”).
Here, while Banana & Orange contains additional elements that Morford does
not allege were copied, Morford’s duct-taped banana constitutes half of his
work, meaning that it is quantitatively significant to Banana & Orange.
Moreover, given its prominent positioning in Banana & Orange, Morford’s
banana is qualitatively significant as well. See Newman, 959 F.3d at 1310
(holding that “[q]ualitative significance is often apparent on the face of the
copied portion of a copyrighted work”) (citing Peter Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1315).
Therefore, the alleged infringement of Morford’s banana is sufficient,
quantitatively and qualitatively, to state a claim. >>, p. 10-11.

Contraffazione di opera musicale: analitica sentenza inglese

La lite Ed Sheeran c. Sami Chockri (Sami Switch) è stata decisa in data 6 aprile 2022 dalla UK BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST, guiduce Zacaroli,[2022] EWHC 827 (Ch) Case No: IL-2018-000095 .

Il secondo lamenta il plagio della propria canzone “Oh why” da parte del primo con la canzone “Shape of you”.

Impressione nella sentenza il grado di analiticità dell’esame fattual-musicale condotto dal gidice.

Il quale alla fine rigetta la domanda ed anzi concede l’accertamento negativo formale di non copiature, § 207 ss.

Premesse di ordine processual-probatorio:

1. In music cases, it is the sounds that are more important than the notes: see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (18^th ed) at [3-125]. This depends to a large degree on the aural perception of the judge: Francis Day & Hunter v Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, per Upjohn LJ at p.618.
2. While the legal burden rests with the person alleging infringement, in the case of conscious copying the evidential burden shifts to the alleged infringer if there is proof of sufficient similarity and proof of access. There was some debate as to whether what was required was proof of access, or proof of the possibility of access.
3. The weight of authority supports the former: see, for example, Designers Guild (above), per Lord Millett at p.2425E; Baigent v Random House [2007] EWCA Civ 247 at [4], although I do not think anything turns on it in this case. Tens of thousands of new songs are uploaded to internet sites daily. It clearly cannot be enough to shift the burden of proof that a song was uploaded to the internet thereby giving the alleged infringer means of accessing it. In every case, it must be a question of fact and degree whether the extent of the alleged infringer’s access to the original work, combined with the extent of the similarities, raises a sufficient possibility of copying to shift the evidential burden. Where, for example, the original work was highly individual or intricate, and the alleged infringing work was very close to it, then only limited evidence of access may be sufficient in order to shift the burden. The same would not be true, on the other hand, where the original work was simple and involved relatively common elements.
4. Irrespective of where the burden lies, infringement requires there to have been actual copying, which necessarily entails that the alleged infringer not only had access to the original work, but actually saw or heard it.
5. The leading case on subconscious copying is Francis Day & Hunter v Bron (above), in which the Court of Appeal established that, although it was possible to demonstrate that a person had infringed copyright without intending to do so, it was nevertheless necessary to establish “proof of familiarity” with the allegedly copied work, as a prerequisite to establishing infringement: and that there was a causal link between the alleged infringing work and the original work: see Wilmer LJ at p.614 (with whom Upjohn LJ agreed). Diplock LJ also spoke of the clear need for a causal connection between the two works (at p.624).
6. Whether there has been subconscious copying is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of all the evidence (and does not rest on the shifting of an evidential burden: see Mitchell v BBC (above) at [39]). There will rarely, if ever, be direct evidence of subconscious copying, so it is necessary – as with any issue where direct evidence is lacking – to reach a conclusion based on inferences from other evidence. The following direction which the trial judge, Wilberforce J, had given himself was approved by the Court of Appeal in Francis Day (at pp.614-615):

“The final question to be resolved is whether the plaintiffs’ work has been copied or reproduced, and it seems to me that the answer can only be reached by a judgment of fact upon a number of composite elements: The degree of familiarity (if proved at all, or properly inferred) with the plaintiffs’ work, the character of the work, particularly its qualities of impressing the mind and memory, the objective similarity of the defendants’ work, the inherent probability that such similarity as is found could be due to coincidence, the existence of other influences upon the defendant composer, and not least the quality of the defendant composer’s own evidence on the presence or otherwise in his mind of the plaintiffs’ work.”

Conclusioni, prima parte, § 200 ss:

Mr Sutcliffe urged me to stand back from the detail and focus on the bigger picture. The case, he said, boiled down to four unassailable points: the similarities between the songs, not by a laser-like focus on individual elements (because to do so risked losing the song), but by listening to the sounds as a whole; the “one-in-a-million” chance of two unique sounds correlating with one another within the space of months; the three “fingerprints” in Mr Sheeran’s work; and the lack of credible explanation from the claimants for the creation of the OI Phrase.
Of necessity, in view of the nature of the allegations in this case, I have analysed in some detail the musical elements that went into the creation of Shape, but I agree with Mr Sutcliffe that it is important to stand back from the detail. When I do so, however, I come to the opposite conclusion to him. It is in reality the defendants who have focused on the three points of particular similarity between Oh Why and Shape, while ignoring points of difference, the fact that each element is a common building block in music of this and many other genres, and the use of the same or similar elements in other parts of Shape and in other Ed Sheeran songs.
Having reviewed all the circumstances, their use together in the OI Phrase by the writers of Shape is explained in my judgment by reasons other than copying. The “one-in-a-million” chance of them being used together (and the fact that the precise notes, vocalised and harmonised in the same way has not been found before) is no more than a starting point when considering whether one is copied from the other. While Mr Chokri’s initial reaction to the similarities, posted on Facebook in January 2017, is understandable, coincidences (which, by definition, would not be remarked upon in the absence of marked similarities) are not uncommon.
Listening to the sounds as a whole, as urged by Mr Sutcliffe, the two phrases play very different roles in their respective songs. The OW Hook is the central part of the song, and reflects the song’s slow, brooding and questioning mood. Without diminishing its importance, the OI Phrase plays a very different role: something catchy to fill the bar before each repeated phrase “I’m in love with your body”. The use of the first four notes of the rising minor pentatonic scale for the melody is so short, simple, commonplace and obvious in the context of the rest of the song that it is not credible that Mr Sheeran sought out inspiration from other songs to come up with it. As to the combination of elements upon which the defendants rely, even if Mr Sheeran had gone looking for inspiration, then Oh Why is far from an obvious source, given the stark contrast between the dark mood created by the OW Hook in Oh Why and the upbeat, dance feel that Mr Sheeran was looking to create with Shape

Dispositivo:

205. Accordingly, for the reasons I have set out above, I conclude as follows:

(1) While there are similarities between the OW Hook and the OI Phrase, there are also significant differences;

(2) As to the elements that are similar, my analysis of the musical elements of Shape more broadly, of the writing process and the evolution of the OI Phrase is that these provide compelling evidence that the OI Phrase originated from sources other than Oh Why;

(3) The totality of the evidence relating to access by Mr Sheeran to Oh Why (whether by it being shared with him by others or by him finding it himself) provides no more than a speculative foundation for Mr Sheeran having heard Oh Why;

(4) Taking into account the above matters, I conclude that Mr Sheeran had not heard Oh Why and in any event that he did not deliberately copy the OI Phrase from the OW Hook;

(5) While I do not need to resort to determining where the burden of proof lies, for completeness:

(a) the evidence of similarities and access is insufficient to shift the evidential burden so far as deliberate copying is concerned to the claimants;

(b) the defendants have failed to satisfy the burden of establishing that Mr Sheeran copied the OI Phrase from the OW Hook; and

(c) even if the evidential burden had shifted to the claimants, they have established that Mr Sheeran did not deliberately copy the OI Phrase from the OW Hook.

(6) Finally, again taking into account all the matters I have considered above, I am satisfied that Mr Sheeran did not subconsciously copy Oh Why in creating Shape.