Disegni e modelli: prova della anteriore divulgazione tramite screenshot di pagina internet

Anna Maria Stein in IPKat segnala interessante decisione sull’oggetto: 3rd Board of Appeal 11.09.2024 , case R 5/2024-3, Ekomill OÜ v. Ecosauna Project OÜ.

<<20 The invalidity applicant invoked as prior design D1, an oval-shaped wooden sauna as manufactured and sold by a Lithuanian company. It provided as evidence of disclosure two screenshots of two posts allegedly from Facebook, dated 22 August 2013 and July 2014 (Annex 3), and indicated two hyperlinks in its observations. It did not file any additional evidence at the appeal stage.
21 The Invalidity Division considered that this evidence constitutes sufficient proof of disclosure. The Board does not concur.
22 Although the appearance of a picture of a design on the internet constitutes a publication within the meaning of Article 7(1) CDR (20/10/2021, T‑823/19, Bobby pins, EU:T:2021:718, § 32), the invalidity applicant must provide solid evidence of this event of disclosure.
23 To establish disclosure, a printout or a screenshot should show the full URL address of a website, demonstrating the source of design disclosure on the internet (20/10/2021, T‑823/19, Bobby pins, EU:T:2021:718, § 33-34).
24 As correctly pointed out by the design holder, the indication of a hyperlink in the invalidity applicant’s observations cannot suffice in this respect. Hyperlinks or URL addresses per se cannot be considered sufficient evidence for proving the disclosure of a prior design. Even if these are active, they should be supplemented with additional evidence, such as a printout or a screenshot of the relevant information contained therein (07/02/2007, T 317/05, Guitar, EU:T:2007:39, § 43) including the full URL address. This is because information accessible through a hyperlink or URL address may later be altered, removed or difficult to identify. Even assuming that the URL link would display the screenshot, as shown in Annex 3, it is impossible for the Board to ascertain whether the content to be found under the hyperlink has been changed or removed over time.
25 In this regard, the Board notes that this assessment aligns with the ‘CP 10 Common Practice – Criteria for assessing disclosure of designs on the internet’ (Section 2.4.4, p. 29) established by the IP offices of the European Union in the framework of the European Union Trade Mark and Design Network, with the purpose of offering guidance on the sources, reliability, presentation, and assessment of online evidence. Accordingly, when the screenshot does not contain all relevant information, namely source, date, and depiction of the invoked prior design, additional evidence should be submitted. Although these texts are not binding for the Board, it may take it into account in its decision-making process.
26 Considering that the screenshots provided do not show the source of disclosure, and that the event of disclosure cannot be proved by means of probabilities or suppositions but must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence (09/03/2012, T-450/08, Phials, EU:T:2012:117, § 24-25), the Board finds that the invalidity applicant failed to submit sufficient proof of disclosure of the prior design D1 within the meaning of Article 7(1) CDR>>.

La decisione va condivisa; solo che un difensore, minimamente prudente e pratico della rete, lo sa e lo fa d’istinto

Sul “carattere individuale” dei disegni e modelli

Ripasso sul carattere individuale dei modelli (art. 6 reg. EU 6 del 2002) offerto da Trib. UE T-654/22 del 10.04.2024, da segnalzione di Marcel Pemsel in IpKat, M&T 1997, a.s. c.  EUIPO.

Design sub iudice:

 

Anteriorità asseritamente provante l’assenza di car. individ.:

Dopo due rigetti amministrativi, l’istante ottiene vittoria giudiziale: chi la dura la vince (stavolta).

<< 25 It should be noted that Regulation No 6/2002 does not define the concept of the ‘informed user’. According to the case-law, the concept of ‘informed user’ must be understood as lying somewhere between that of the ‘average consumer’, applicable in trade mark matters, who need not have any specific knowledge and who, as a rule, makes no direct comparison between the trade marks at issue, and the ‘sectoral expert’, who is an expert with detailed technical expertise. Thus, the concept of the informed user may be understood as referring, not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly observant one, either because of his or her personal experience or his or her extensive knowledge of the sector in question (judgment of 20 October 2011, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 53).

26 As regards the informed user’s level of attention, it should be noted that, although the informed user is not the well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect average consumer who normally perceives a design as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, he or she is also not an expert or sectoral expert capable of observing in detail the minimal differences that may exist between the designs at issue. Thus, the qualifier ‘informed’ suggests that, without being a designer or a technical expert, the user knows the various designs which exist in the sector concerned, possesses a certain degree of knowledge with regard to the features which those designs normally include, and, as a result of his or her interest in the products concerned, shows a relatively high degree of attention when he or she uses them (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2011, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

27 In the present case, as regards the applicant’s argument that it is not only the end user himself or herself who may be regarded as an informed user, but also the handle salesperson, it should be noted that, according to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, the concept of ‘informed user’ does not refer to a professional quality linked to the product concerned. Furthermore, the informed user is neither an expert nor a specialist, such as a sectoral expert. The applicant’s argument therefore cannot succeed. (…)

34 According to the case-law, the degree of freedom of the designer of a design is determined by, inter alia, the constraints of the features imposed by the technical function of the product or an element thereof, or by statutory requirements applicable to the product to which the design is applied. Those constraints result in a standardisation of certain features, which will thus be common to the designs applied to the product concerned (see judgment of 29 October 2015, Roca Sanitario v OHIM – Villeroy & Boch (Single control handle faucet), T‑334/14, not published, EU:T:2015:817, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

35 In the present case, the Board of Appeal’s assessment, set out in paragraph 31 above, is consistent with the case-law of the Court according to which the degree of freedom of the designer of a door handle with a grip is high, on account of the fact that that handle can be made in a significant variety of shapes, colours and materials (judgment of 5 July 2017, Gamet v EUIPO – ‘Metal-Bud II’ Robert Gubała (Door handle), T‑306/16, not published, EU:T:2017:466, paragraphs 45 to 47).

36 Contrary to what the applicant claims, the length of the pivoting lever of a door handle with a grip does not appreciably limit the designer’s freedom either in relation to the particular shape of that lever or in relation to the other elements of the appearance of such a handle, as shown by the examples of door handles illustrated in paragraph 25 of the contested decision. (…)

55 Furthermore, as regards the elements which are, for their part, relevant to the comparison of the overall impressions produced by the designs at issue, it should be noted that, when the informed user uses a door handle with a grip in accordance with its normal use, he or she clasps its gripping area with the hand, which corresponds, in the present case, to the grip, in order to exert downward pressure so that the latch of the door slides and allows the door to be opened, which can then be pushed or pulled. Where the informed user approaches the door handle in order to use it normally, that user sees it from above. Accordingly, the most visible elements of the handle are those corresponding to the outward-facing parts of the handle, namely the front, side and top parts of the handle. As the Board of Appeal acknowledged in paragraphs 33 and 35 of the contested decision, the differences at the back, namely the curvature of the edges and the shape of the neck, will also be visible to the informed user and will not be overlooked by him or her. Moreover, as the applicant points out, the rounded curvature of the edges of the contested design is accompanied by a thinner and smoother appearance which the informed user will easily notice.

56 Furthermore, the rounded and thinner shapes of the edges of the contested design constitute differences from the earlier design which will be perceived by the informed user as influencing the manipulation of the handle and are, therefore, important elements in relation to the overall impression produced by the contested design, in accordance with the considerations set out in paragraphs 49 and 50 above. Those aspects have an impact on the ease of use of the handle, since they correspond to the parts of it which come into direct contact with the hand of the informed user.

57 Consequently, in accordance with the considerations set out in paragraph 49 above, the attention of the informed user is focused on all the elements set out in paragraphs 55 and 56 above.

58 In the light of the information provided in paragraphs 55 and 56 above and the high level of attention of the informed user in the present case (see paragraph 22 above), it must be held that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, the differences in the angles of the grip and the neck are neither marginal nor minor variations of one and the same design. A more rounded shape generally results in a softening of the lines of the neck and grip, which has a significant effect both on the overall appearance and on the ease of use of the door handle. It is therefore an element which attracts the informed user’s attention.

59 It follows from the foregoing that, although the designer’s freedom is high (see paragraph 35 above), those differences are sufficiently significant to produce a different overall impression of the designs at issue, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s analysis.

60 In the light of those considerations, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the designs at issue produced the same overall impression on the informed user and that the contested design therefore lacked individual character within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002>>.

Sulla priorità dei disegni/modelliu UE costituita previo modello utilità

Teoricamente itnressante questione decisa da Corte di giustizia 27.02.2024, C-382/21 P, EUIPO v. Kaikai , segnalata da Marcel Pemsel su IPKat.

La lite è centrata sulla decorrenza del dies a quo per una valida priorità di una domanda di disegno/modello ex reg. 6/2006, il cui art. 41 dice: <<1. Chiunque abbia regolarmente depositato una domanda di registrazione di un disegno o modello o di un modello d’utilità in uno o per uno degli Stati che aderiscono alla convenzione di Parigi o all’accordo che istituisce l’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio, ovvero il suo avente causa, fruisce, per un periodo di sei mesi dalla data di deposito della prima domanda, di un diritto di priorità per effettuare il deposito di una domanda di registrazione di disegno o modello comunitario per il medesimo disegno o modello o per il medesimo modello di utilità.

2. È riconosciuto come fatto costitutivo del diritto di priorità qualsiasi deposito avente valore di deposito nazionale regolare a norma della legislazione dello Stato nel quale è stato effettuato o in forza di accordi bilaterali o multilaterali>>.

Il dubbio giuridico nasce dal fatto che : i) Kai kai aveva rivendicato priorità per un  previo deposito come modello di utilità (almeno così pare: arg. da § 28) e nel termine di 12 mesi, non di 6 mesi; ii) il cit. art. 41 parla di termine semestrale e solo per modelli di utilità, non per invenzioni. iii) la Conv. Unione di Parigi pone invece un termine dui 12 mesi per invenzioni e modelli di utilità,

Ebbene, la CG riformando il Trib., afferma l’applicabilità del solo art. 41 reg. UE 6/2002:  per cui la priorità richiesta era stata giustamente negata dall’EUIPO

Del resto, prosegue la CG,  la norma di Conv. Unione (art. 4) non si applica direttamente nell’ordinamento europeo, che non ne è parte: ciò nemmeno considerando che di fatto l’ha recepita con i TRIPs, i quali non hanno efficacia diretta, § 63.

Per la precisione:

<<68   Ne consegue che le norme enunciate all’articolo 4 della Convenzione di Parigi sono prive di effetto diretto e, pertanto, non sono idonee a creare in capo ai singoli diritti che questi possano far valere direttamente in forza del diritto dell’Unione (v., in tal senso, sentenza del 25 ottobre 2007, Develey/UAMI, C‑238/06 P, EU:C:2007:635, punti 39 e 43).

69 Pertanto, il diritto di priorità ai fini del deposito di una domanda di disegno o modello comunitario è disciplinato dall’articolo 41 del regolamento n. 6/2002 e gli operatori economici non possono avvalersi direttamente dell’articolo 4 della Convenzione di Parigi.

70 Tuttavia, poiché l’accordo ADPIC vincola l’Unione e dunque prevale sugli atti di diritto derivato dell’Unione, questi ultimi devono essere interpretati, per quanto possibile, in conformità alle disposizioni di tale accordo (v., per analogia, sentenze del 10 settembre 1996, Commissione/Germania, C‑61/94, EU:C:1996:313, punto 52, e del 1º agosto 2022, Sea Watch, C‑14/21 e C‑15/21, EU:C:2022:604, punti 92 e 94 nonché giurisprudenza ivi citata). Il regolamento n. 6/2002 deve quindi essere interpretato, per quanto possibile, conformemente all’accordo ADPIC e, di conseguenza, alle norme enunciate dagli articoli della Convenzione di Parigi, segnatamente l’articolo 4, incorporate in tale accordo (v., per analogia, sentenze del 15 novembre 2012, Bericap Záródástechnikai, C‑180/11, EU:C:2012:717, punti 70 e 82, nonché dell’11 novembre 2020, EUIPO/John Mills, C‑809/18 P, EU:C:2020:902, punti 64 e 65).

71 Nell’interpretare l’articolo 41 del regolamento n. 6/2002 conformemente all’articolo 4 della Convenzione di Parigi, occorre altresì tener conto delle disposizioni del TCB, a norma del quale è stata depositata la domanda anteriore su cui si basa la KaiKai per rivendicare un diritto di priorità. Infatti, dal momento che tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione sono parti del TCB, si può tener conto delle disposizioni di tale trattato ai fini dell’interpretazione di disposizioni di diritto derivato dell’Unione che rientrano nel suo ambito di applicazione (v., in tal senso, sentenza del 1º agosto 2022, Sea Watch, C‑14/21 e C‑15/21, EU:C:2022:604, punto 90 e giurisprudenza ivi citata). In tale contesto, occorre altresì rilevare che, conformemente al suo articolo 1, paragrafo 2, il TCB non pregiudica i diritti previsti dalla Convenzione di Parigi>>.

e poi:

<<Pertanto, dal chiaro tenore letterale di tale articolo 41, paragrafo 1, risulta inequivocabilmente che, ai sensi di tale disposizione, solo due categorie di domande anteriori – vale a dire, una domanda di registrazione di un disegno o modello e una domanda di registrazione di un modello di utilità – possono fondare un diritto di priorità a beneficio di una domanda di registrazione di un disegno o modello comunitario posteriore, e ciò unicamente entro un termine di sei mesi a decorrere dalla data di deposito della domanda anteriore considerata.

77 Ne risulta altresì che detto articolo 41, paragrafo 1, ha carattere esaustivo e che la circostanza che tale disposizione non fissi il termine entro il quale può essere rivendicato il diritto di priorità fondato su una domanda di registrazione di un brevetto non costituisce una lacuna di detta disposizione, bensì la conseguenza del fatto che quest’ultima non consente di fondare tale diritto su questa categoria di domande anteriori.

78 Pertanto, da un lato, una domanda internazionale depositata a norma del TCB può fondare un diritto di priorità, in applicazione dell’articolo 41, paragrafo 1, del regolamento n. 6/2002, solo nella misura in cui la domanda internazionale in questione abbia ad oggetto un modello di utilità e, dall’altro, il termine per rivendicare tale diritto sulla base di una siffatta domanda è quello di sei mesi, espressamente fissato a detto articolo 41, paragrafo 1.>>

Decisione esatta,

Divulgazione al pubblico del modello, distruttiva del carattere individuale, costituita da fotografie apparse su Instagram

Il Tribunale UE 6 marzo 2024, T-647/22 Puma c. EUIPO+Handelsmaatschappij J. Van Hilst BV rigetta l’impugnaizone e conferma che la condotta de qua costituisce divulgazione ex art. 7 reg. 6/2004.

Condotta relativa ad un modello di scarpe da tempo libero, registrato ma anticipato da uso del titolare oltre i 12 mesi anteriori al deposito (art. 7.2.b) del reg.

La condotta divulgativa consistette nell’uso delle scarpe Puma da parte di Rihanna, documentato da fotografie apparse su Instagram.

Ebbene, si tratta di divulgazione, dice il Trib.

IL quale respinge pure il giudizio in senso opposto proposto da Puma sulla base di una asserita non nitidezza e e di insufficiente visionabilità delle fotegrafie.

Altra questione è se serva la divulgazione dell’intero modello oppure basti anche solo quella di una sua parte (significativa). Risposta nel primo senso, direi. Ed allora si deve vedere se sia ricorsa o meno nel caso. Discute bene la cosa Marcel Pemsel in IPKat.

Lite sul design di bottiglie di gin: Mark & Spencer batte Aldi in appello UK

Ecco le bottiglie in lite:

altro originale registrato da M&S
originale registrato da M&S
prodotto concorrente di ALDI, stimato in contraffazione

Il giudice inglese di appello conferma la contraffazione con decisione 27.02.2024, Case No: CA-2023-000521, della Court of Appeal, Judge Hacon (di cui ci notizia e a cui ci offre il link Alessandro Cerri in IPKat) su normativa ante-Brexit ma dalla stessa non influenzata (lo dice espresameente la corte)  e quindi di interesse per la UE.

Conclusioni del giudice di primo greado (come da sentenza di appello)

<<The judge’s assessment may be summarised as follows.
30. The relevant sector. The relevant sector was, as Aldi contended, spirits and liqueurs in the UK.
31. The informed user. It is common ground that the informed user is a consumer. It followed from the judge’s identification of the relevant sector that the informed user was a UK purchaser and consumer of spirits and liqueurs. As an informed user, the user would exercise a relatively high degree of attention compared to the average consumer who is the touchstone in trade mark law.
32. The designer’s degree of freedom. If a snow effect was to be used, it had to be created by the use of gold flakes. The aperture of the bottle had to accommodate the injection of the liqueur with gold flakes in it, but there was no reason to suppose that this was much of a limitation. If a design was to be printed on the side of the bottle, it would be simpler to print on a straight side. The more colours the design had, the more expensive production would be. Otherwise, the designer had considerable freedom, particularly with regard to the shape of the bottle and the design to be printed on it.
33. As to the design on the side of the bottle, if gold snow was to be used in the liquid and if a design was to be printed on the side of the bottle, it made sense to have a winter design. But there was almost complete freedom as to how to make a design look wintry.
34. There was no design constraint requiring the liqueur to be illuminated. There would be no other practical place to put a light other than in the base of the bottle, but that required the choice of a light in the first place.
35. Features solely dictated by technical function. Although Aldi argued that four features of the designs were solely dictated by technical function, all four features were aspects or consequences of aesthetic choices made by the designer.
36. The relevance of branding. The Aldi bottles bear the words “The INFUSIONIST
Small Batch”. This was relied on by Aldi as a difference from the Registered Designs in which no words appear. The judge’s assessment was that the word
“INFUSIONIST” was clear enough to make an impression, whereas the words “The” and “Small Batch” were less conspicuous and played no significant additional part in the overall impression of the designs.
37. Effect of the priority date and grace period. The judge found that a number of designs relied on by Aldi did not form part of the design corpus due to the effect of the priority date (15 December 2020) and the grace period (which started on 15
December 2019).
38. The  design corpus. The judge reproduced images of 33 bottles in [70] and [71] which represented a small proportion of the totality of the design corpus. Excluding M&S’s products, four bottles with an integrated light were marketed before December 2020, but none with a shape like that of the Registered Designs. Five members of the corpus had a snow effect of some sort, none with a bottle shape similar to that of the Registered Designs. Two had both a snow effect and an integrated light. Saverglass, the manufacturer of the bottles supplied to M&S, had a UK registered design for the shape of those bottles (referred to as the “botanics” shape) which formed part of the corpus. Of the totality of the design corpus, excluding M&S designs made available in the grace period, only the M&S 2019 Snow Globe shown in [33] had the botanics shape and a snow effect (but no integrated light).
39. Comparison of the overall impressions. The judge expressed his assessment of the comparison as follows:
80. The features that the informed user would note as being in
common between the RDs in suit and the Aldi bottle are these:
(1) The identical shapes of the two bottles. The informed
user would pay little attention to the fact that both have
in part straight sides. That is true of the vast majority
of the spirit bottles shown in the evidence. The
informed user would take into account that for
economic reasons the range of bottle shapes for spirits
and liqueurs does not extend to every functional and
aesthetic possibility. However, this would not detract
from the apparent identicality in shape when measured
against the design corpus as a whole.
(2) What appear to be the identical shapes of the two
stoppers.
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. M&S v Aldi
(3) A winter scene over the entirety of the straight portion
of the side, consisting in one case entirely, and in the
other case mostly, of tree silhouettes.
(4) In the case of UK 80 and 84, a snow effect.
(5) In the case of UK 82 and 84, an integrated light.
81. In my judgment and with the design corpus in mind, each of
those similarities would appear significant to the informed user
and cumulatively they would be striking.
82. There are differences. Aldi relied on these:
(1) The winter scene of the RDs in suit is in white only and
features a stag and a doe. On the Aldi bottles the scene
is in white and a colour with trees only.
(2) The Aldi bottle has the “Infusionist” branding. The
RDs in suit have none.
(3) The foregoing two features of the Aldi bottle give it a
front. There is no front to the RDs in suit.
(4) The Aldi winter scene is brighter and busier than that on
the RDs in suit.
(5) The Aldi stoppers have a watch strap label with the Aldi
logo on the top, the RDs in suit do not.
(6) The Aldi stoppers are darker in shade than those of the
RDs in suit.
83. Going back to the statutory test, it is whether the RDs in suit
and the Aldi bottles produce a different overall impression. In
my judgment they do not because of the features they have in
common, set out above. The differences to which Aldi points
are there, but they are differences of relatively minor detail
which do not affect the lack of difference in the overall
impressions produced by the Aldi bottles on the one hand and
each of the RDs in suit on the other.” >>

Sul motivo di appello 7 relativo al comparison:
<<61 Since the judge’s conclusion that the designs of the Aldi products produced the same overall impression on the informed user as the Registered Designs involved a multifactorial evaluation, this Court can only intervene if he erred in law or in principle: see Magmatic at [24] and compare Actavis Group PTC EHF v ICOS Corp [2019] UKSC 15, [2019] Bus LR 1318 at [78]-[81] (Lord Hodge) and Re Sprintroom Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 932, [2019] BCC 1031 at [72]-[78] (McCombe, Leggatt and Rose LJJ).
62. Aldi contends that, even if it fails on grounds 1-6, the judge did fall into error. Junior counsel for Aldi concentrated his oral submissions on two points. First, he argued that the judge had not properly considered the impact of the absence of the snow effect and the integrated light on the comparison with respect to the Registered Designs which did not include those features. Secondly, he argued that the judge had given undue weight to the shapes of the bottles and stoppers, particularly given that the shape of the bottle was protected by a third party registered design and that the design corpus included bottles with similar stoppers.
63. I do not accept either of these arguments. Given that I have concluded that UK 78 and UK 80 do both include a light, that point falls away. As for the point about the snow  effect, at best this would mean that Aldi infringed UK 80 (and UK 84) but not UK 78 (or UK 82). The correct approach, however, must be to compare UK 78 and UK 80 Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. M&S v Aldi (and UK 82 and UK 84) respectively with the Aldi products in the same states. I think that is effectively what the judge did, although he did not say so explicitly. The weight to be given to the shape of the bottles and the stopper was a matter for the judge as part of his overall assessment. The fact that the shape of the bottle was protected by a third party registered design is irrelevant apart from the fact that the design therefore formed part of the design corpus which the judge took into account.
He also took the stoppers in the design corpus into account. He made no error of
principle in comparing the overall impressions of the Aldi products with those of the Registered Designs, and his conclusion was one that he was fully entitled to reach”.
Conclusion

La tutela dei modelli per sistemi modulari è data anche se una caratteristica è funzionale, purchè le altre non lo siano: nuova conferma di validità per la privativa sui mattoncini Lego

Sul complesso rapporto tra i §§ 1, 2 e 3 dell’art. 8 reg. UE 6 del 2002 su disegni e modelli comunitari, interviene il Trib. UE 24.01.2024, T-537/22, Delta Sport c. EUOPO-Lego.

Il succo è che, per affossare la privativa per fiunzionalità dell’aspetto, bisogna che tutte le caratteristiche di questo siano appunto dettate da esigenze funzionali. Nel caso specifico, solo una delle sette lo era (ex § 2), per cui l’esenzione di cui al § 3 può operare per le altre sei: e per questo la privativa non può essere invalidata.

In altre parole, per quest’ultimo scopo, bisogna che tutti gli aspetti del prodotto siano dettati solo da esigenze funzionali.

Nel caso specifico le sette caratteristiche erano tutte funzionali ex § 1 e sei di queste anche ex art. § 2: da qui il “pericolo” per Lego , dato che l’esenzione ex § 3 è riferita solo al § 2, non al § 1.

E’ confermata allora la validità della privativa sui mattoncini, già sancita nella precedent sentenza del Tribuinale UE del 2021 (su cui v. mio post).

<<31 In paragraph 80 of the annulment judgment, the General Court also explained that, in order to preserve the effectiveness of Article 8(3) of Regulation No 6/2002, where EUIPO, when examining an application for a declaration of invalidity based on Article 25(1)(b) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 8(1) of that regulation, finds that the characteristics of the appearance of the product concerned by the contested design fall within both Article 8(1) and Article 8(2) of that regulation, and where the proprietor of the contested design relies on the benefit of Article 8(3) of that regulation, it must examine whether those features are capable of falling within the protection of modular systems for the purposes of that latter provision, including when the applicant for a declaration of invalidity did not rely on Article 8(2) of that regulation.

32 In the contested decision, after finding that all the characteristics of the contested design fell within Article 8(1) of Regulation No 6/2002, the Board of Appeal applied Article 8(2) of that regulation. Since that article applied, according to the Board of Appeal, to all the characteristics of that design, the Board of Appeal examined whether it met the requirements of the exception provided for by Article 8(3) of that regulation. The Board of Appeal concluded that that design fell within that exception protecting modular systems, with the result that the application for a declaration of invalidity had to be rejected.

33 It follows from the foregoing that the objective of the application of Article 8(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, in the contested decision, was to determine, in accordance with the annulment judgment, whether the exception provided for in Article 8(3) of that regulation could possibly be applied in the present case and whether the contested design could thus remain valid, although all its characteristics were solely dictated by its technical function within the meaning of Article 8(1) of that regulation.

34 In the second place, it is necessary to analyse whether, in this context, the applicant’s arguments concerning the impossibility of applying Article 8(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, in relation to the characteristic of the smooth surface, are likely to result in the unlawfulness of the Board of Appeal’s finding, according to which there was no reason to declare the contested design invalid.

35 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as the General Court found in paragraph 96 of the annulment judgment, if at least one of the features of appearance of the product concerned by a contested design is not solely dictated by the technical function of that product, the design at issue cannot be declared invalid under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 6/2002.

36 The same interpretation applies, by analogy, to Article 8(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, with the result that a design can only be declared invalid, pursuant to that article, in the case where all its characteristics fall under that article, which implies that, first, they meet the requirements provided for by that article and, secondly, none of them fall within the exception, provided for by Article 8(3) of that regulation.

37 It follows that a design is declared invalid, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Regulation No 6/2002, only in the case where all of its characteristics are excluded from protection. If at least one of its characteristics is protected, in particular due to the application of the exception provided for in Article 8(3) of that regulation, the design remains valid.

38 In the present case, it should be observed that the parties do not dispute the Board of Appeal’s findings according to which six of the seven characteristics of the appearance of the product concerned by the contested design, which are referred to in paragraph 9 above, fall within both Article 8(1) of Regulation No 6/2002 and Article 8(2) of that regulation. In support of its plea relating to the infringement of Article 8(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, the applicant claims that that article does not apply to the smooth surface, which constitutes only one of the seven characteristics identified by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision.

39 Thus, even in the event that, as the applicant maintains, one of the seven characteristics of the contested design, namely the smooth surface, would not be covered by Article 8(2) of Regulation No 6/2002, the application of the exception provided for in Article 8(3) of that regulation would possibly be affected in relation to that characteristic alone, with the result that that exception would in any event cover the other six.

40 To the extent that a design is declared invalid only in the case where all its characteristics are excluded from protection, the applicant’s arguments which, even if they were assumed to be well founded, would have the result of affecting the protection of only one of the seven characteristics of the contested design, are therefore not likely to call into question the validity of that design as a whole>>.

Doppia successione nei diritti di registrante ai fini del calcolo del periodo di grazia da divulgazione di disegno o modello (art. 7.2 reg. 6-2002)

Caso non frequente di doppia successione nei diritti di richiedente protezione a disegno (anzi modello) circa il calcolo dei 12 mesi di periodo di grazia ex art. 7.2 reg. UE 6 del 2002: Trib. UE del 26 aprile 2023 , T-757/21, Activa – Grillküche GmbH c. EUIPO-Targa GmbH  .

Successione accettata dal Trib. UE

La tutelabilità come modello del componente di prodotto complesso nel caso di sua consumabilità

Utili indicazioni sul problema in oggetto da parte di Trib. UE 22.03.2023, T-617/21, B§Bartoni c. EUIPO – Hypertherm .   Si trattava di elettrodo di torcia da saldatura.

Il fatto, che il compoente sia consumabile con l’uso, impedisce la sua tutela ex art. 4 (spt. § 2 ) reg. 6 del 2002, §§ 33-42.

Il Trib. poi dà altri chiarimenti:

– sull’assenza di smontaggio e di nuovo montaggio al momento della sostituzione dell’elettrodo , § 40 ss.

– sul fatto che la torcia sia considerata completa senza l’elettrodo, § 50′ ss

– sull’intercambiabilità dell’elettrodo, § 63 ss

In sintesi non è data tutela da modello sotto alcun profilo all’elettrodo di tale torcia.

(notizia e link offerti da Marcel Pemsel Wednesday, April 12, 2023  in IPKat)

Altro caso di violazione del modello per sandali Crocs: ora presso l’EUIPO

l’appello amministrativo dell’ufficio afferma la nullità del modello di sandalo simile a quello di  Crocs.

Si tratta della decisione del 3° Board of Appeal 9 gennaio 2023, caso R 68/2022-3, Crocs c. Li-Fuzhou Tanglong Electronic Commerce.

La nullità sta nella mancanza di carattere individuale ex art. 6 (e art. 25.1.b) del reg. UE  No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001.

Il primo grado amminisartivo però aeva deciso in senso opposto.

Ma anche ad occhio la somigliazna è tale per c ui è difficile assai evitare di pesnare che  differisca <<in modo significativo dall’impressione generale suscitata in tale utilizzatore da qualsiasi disegno o modello che sia stato divulgato al pubblico>>

Questa la pag. nel database giurisprudenziale dell’Ufficio.

Il giudizio di “ragione unicamente tecnica” di certe caratteristiche dell’aspetto di disegni e modelli

In tale giudizio: i)  contano -ma poco- altri modelli analoghi del titolare ;

ii) non contano per nulla gli aspetti coloristici non presenti nella registrazione.

Così sull’art. 8.1 reg. UE 6 del 2002 la Corte di giustizia 02.03.2023, C-684/21,Papierfabriek Doetinchem BV c. Sprick GmbH Bielefelder Papier- und Wellpappenwerk & Co.

La massima sub ii) però non è sicurissima: la corte infatti al § 31 è poco chiara.