Anna Maria Stein dà notizia del rigetto di Alicante della domanda di marchio avanzata da Loro Piana , consistente <<nella combinazione di fascetta più nodino e nastrini più pendenti metallici, uno a forma di lucchetto, l’altro a forma di ghiera che, nel suo insieme, è applicata alla mascherina della tomaia che copre la parte superiore del piede, in tutto o in parte, e sempre posizionata più vicino alla linguetta, rispetto alla punta della scarpa>>
<<In tale contesto, soltanto il marchio che diverga significativamente dalla norma o dagli usi del settore e sia pertanto in grado di soddisfare la sua funzione essenziale originaria non è privo di carattere distintivo ai sensi dell’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, lettera b), RMUE (25/10/2007, C-238/06 P, Plastikflaschenform, EU:C:2007:635, § 81; 04/05/2017, C-417/16 P, DEVICE OF A SQUARESHAPED PACKAGING (fig.), EU:C:2017:340, § 35-36).
Nel caso di specie, il segno in questione è solo un’ulteriore variante dei molti esistenti sul mercato che adottano elementi decorativi più o meno semplici, da sole o in combinazione tra di loro. Infatti, la posizione del segno nonché la sua rappresentazione, non si discostano significativamente dalla norma né dalle consuetudini del settore di riferimento. In particolare, il segno consiste meramente di una fascetta con nodino e nastrini con pendenti metallici apposti sulla mascherina della tomaia>>.
Quanto al potere istruttorio dell’Ufficio:
<<La giurisprudenza europea ha più volte stabilito che l’Ufficio, laddove accerti
l’assenza di carattere distintivo intrinseco del marchio richiesto, può fondare il proprio esame su fatti risultanti dall’esperienza pratica generalmente acquisita nella commercializzazione di prodotti di largo consumo, fatti conoscibili da qualsiasi persona e, soprattutto, dai consumatori di tali prodotti, non essendo obbligato a dedurre esempi tratti da tale esperienza pratica (15/03/2006, T-129/04,
Plastikflaschenform, EU:T:2006:84, § 15; 29/06/2015, T-618/14, Snacks con forma
de taco, EU:T:2015:440, § 29-30, 32 e giurisprudenza ivi citata)>>.
Vedremo l’esito del reclamo (che riterrei probabile).
<<The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion
77 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered by those marks. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
78 Furthermore, the degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark, which determines the scope of the protection conferred by that mark, is one of the relevant factors to be taken into account in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, with the result that marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of their recognition on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with less distinctive character (judgments of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24, and of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; see also judgment of 29 March 2023, Machková v EUIPO – Aceites Almenara (ALMARA SOAP), T‑436/22, not published, EU:T:2023:167, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited). However, in the light of the interdependence between the factors to be taken into account, the existence of a likelihood of confusion cannot automatically be ruled out where the distinctive character of the earlier mark is weak (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2020, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO, C‑766/18 P, EU:C:2020:170, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
79 In practice, where the earlier mark and the mark applied for coincide in an element that is weakly distinctive with regard to the goods or services at issue, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion does not often lead to a finding that such a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, exists (judgments of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 55; of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO, C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 53; and of 18 January 2023, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO – Vidyanand (YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL), T‑443/21, not published, EU:T:2023:7, paragraph 121). Where the elements of similarity between two signs at issue arise from the fact that they have a component with a low degree of inherent distinctiveness in common, the impact of such elements of similarity on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is itself low (see judgments of 20 September 2018, Kwizda Holding v EUIPO – Dermapharm (UROAKUT), T‑266/17, EU:T:2018:569, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited, and of 20 January 2021, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO – M. J. Dairies (BBQLOUMI), T‑328/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:16, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
80 In paragraphs 45 to 50 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, in the light of the identity or various degrees of similarity, from low to high, of the goods at issue, the average degree of visual similarity and conceptual identity between the marks at issue and the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the relevant public, the level of attention of which varied from average to high, was likely to believe that the goods covered by those marks came from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. It added, in paragraph 52 of that decision, that its assessment would not have been different if it had found that the figurative element representing a lion’s head in the earlier mark, or even that mark taken as a whole, had only a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, in the light of the dominant nature of that element in that mark and the interdependence between the various factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. It took the view that those assessments were not contrary, in the circumstances of the case, to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court.
81 By its fourth complaint, the applicant disputes, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s assessment that there is a likelihood of confusion in the present case. It submits that the marks at issue, although they both consist of the representation of the same concept, namely a lion’s head, create a different overall impression in the mind of the relevant public. In that regard, it relies on the fact that the representation of such a concept is banal and commonplace in the fashion sector and that the earlier mark has only a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, which, in combination with the other factors in the present case, should have led the Board of Appeal to rule out the existence of a likelihood of confusion.
82 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. However, in the alternative, should the Court take the view that the earlier mark has a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, it states, in essence, that it endorses the applicant’s claim for annulment on the basis of the single plea in law relied on by the applicant, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court which ensures that marks with a low degree of inherent distinctiveness are not overprotected (see paragraph 79 above).
83 In that regard, it must, first, be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the earlier mark had an average degree of inherent distinctiveness, whereas that degree of inherent distinctiveness could only be categorised as low (see paragraph 75 above).
84 As regards the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal gave undue importance, in the contested decision, to the conceptual identity between the marks at issue in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the purchase of goods in Classes 14 and 25 is based, in principle, particularly on their visual aspect. Clothing and clothing accessories, the purpose of which is to embellish the appearance of the human body, are generally marketed in ‘bricks and mortor’ shops or online shops, as the case may be with the help of sales assistants or advisers and, in the light of those particular marketing conditions, the consumer’s choice is mainly made by looking at them. Consequently, the marks covering those goods will normally be perceived visually prior to or at the time of purchase, with the result that the visual aspect is of greater importance in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2011, IIC v OHIM – McKenzie (McKENZIE), T‑502/07, not published, EU:T:2011:223, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
85 In the present case, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal, by finding that there was a higher than average degree of overall similarity between the marks at issue, attached more importance, in paragraph 49 of the contested decision, to the conceptual comparison of those marks than to the visual comparison, in particular in so far as it found that the differences in the stylisation of the marks were of limited importance in the overall impression created by those marks and therefore did not have sufficient impact to assist consumers in decisively distinguishing between the marks.
86 In so doing, it attached too much importance to the conceptual identity between the marks at issue, since, first, and as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 84 above, the choice of the goods at issue is based mainly on their visual aspect and, secondly, the concept represented in the marks at issue, namely a lion’s head, is used in a banal and commonplace way in the commercial presentation or the decoration of goods in the fashion sector.
87 Consequently, the second part of the second complaint must be upheld and the examination of the present action must be continued by taking into account the error of assessment thus noted.
88 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 78 and 79 above and the finding, made in paragraphs 50 and 51 above, that the representation of a lion’s head is a banal and commonplace decorative motif in the fashion sector, in which consumers are regularly faced with such a motif in the commercial presentation or the decoration of the goods, with the result that that motif has lost its capacity to identify the commercial origin of those goods, it must be held that, even though the marks at issue are conceptually identical, that can be of only limited importance in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, since the concept in common to which those marks refer is only weakly distinctive in relation to the goods at issue and can therefore contribute only to a very limited extent towards the function of a mark, which is to identify the origin of those goods and to distinguish them from those with a different origin (see paragraphs 47 and 52 above).
89 In view of the weak distinctive character of the concept which is common to the marks at issue and the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark, considered as a whole, the fact that the marks at issue are visually similar to an average degree was not sufficient to enable the Board of Appeal to find, in the contested decision, that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, even if the goods at issue were identical.
90 Consequently, the applicant’s fourth complaint must be upheld, inasmuch as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
91 In view of all of the foregoing considerations, the single plea put forward by the applicant must be upheld, in so far as it is based on the third complaint (see paragraph 76 above), on the second part of the second complaint (see paragraph 87 above) and on the fourth complaint (see paragraph 90 above) and the contested decision must therefore be annulled in so far as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001>>.
Sono perplesso sia sulla banalità del segno anteriore, che sulla scarsa somiglianza tra i due segni: quindi complessivcamente pure sul giudizio del Tribunale.
In breve dice ora l’ufficio che il pubblico non lo percepusce come segni di provenenzia aziendale
<<In the case at hand the sign is not distinguishable from the appearance of the
goods it designates, namely “metallic gold outer soles sold as an integral
component of men’s and women’s shoes”; it would only be distinctive for the
purposes of Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR if the consumer was able to recognize the
sign applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to
distinguish the shoes of the applicant from those of other undertakings
(21/04/2010, T-7/09, ‘Spannfutter’, EU:T:2010:153, § 26) and, also, if it
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector. The benchmark
also applies to signs which are only applicable to a component or an element
of the appearance of the product, in the case at hand “Metallic gold outer
soles” (10/10/2008, T-387/06 to T-390/06, ‘Pallet’, EU:T:2008:427, § 36;
13/04/2011, T-202/09, ‘Footwear’, EU:T:2011:168, § 40; 19/09/2012, T-50/11,
‘Stoffmuster’, EU:T:2012:436, § 43).
· The sign consists of a metallic gold sole on footwear. It is clear from these
objective characteristics that the sign applied for aims to protect a coloured
surface in a particular position of the shoe. The sign merges in the eyes of the
relevant public with the claimed goods itself, i.e. shoes, since in the words of
the applicant the metallic gold outer soles are sold as an integral component
of men’s and women’s shoes.
· As to the gold colour of the sole, the public will not instantly perceive a single
colour, or a coloured element which forms part of the external appearance of
the goods as a reference to the commercial origin of the goods (21/10/2004,
C-447/02, ‘Orange’, EU:C:2004:649, § 78). Thus, while colours are capable of
conveying certain associations of ideas, and of arousing feelings, they
possess little inherent capacity for communicating specific information,
especially since they are commonly and widely used, because of their appeal,
in order to advertise and market goods or services, without any specific
message (06/05/2003, C-104/01, ‘Libertel’, EU:C:2003:244, § 40; 24/06/2004,
C-49/02, ‘Blau/Gelb’, EU:C:2004:384, § 38; 12/11/2008, T-400/07, ‘Farben in
Quadraten’, EU:T:2008:492, § 35).
· Furthermore, the use of the gold colour to highlight the quality of a given
product is a common place associated with high quality and excellence and,
therefore, does not confer distinctive character on the product>.
L’avvocato Tassi segnala l’opposto esito dato dall’ufficio alla suola rossa di Louboutin (dopo il via libera della corte giustizia 12.06.2018, C-163/16)
Tre notazioni su Trib. Milano n. 6542/2021 del 27 luglio 2021, RG 32332/2016, rel. Fazzini E.:
1°) <<. Il Collegio ritiene, comunque, che tale eccezione
sia anche infondata, atteso che essa si basa esclusivamente sul fatto che esso sarebbe formato da
semplici lettere dell’alfabeto, “senza alcuna caratteristica di fantasia”, dovendosi ritenere al riguardo
che i marchi numerici (o alfabetici) sono privi di tutela solo quando sono usati per esigenze di
comunicazione imprenditoriale, come per indicare la serie o il tipo di prodotto o la loro quantità, ma
non quando sono utilizzati, come nel caso di specie, in funzione distintiva, tenuto conto che l’art. 7
c.p.i. prevede espressamente che possono costituire oggetto di registrazione come marchio d’impresa
tutti i segni, in particolare, fra gli altri, le parole, compresi i nomi di persone, i disegni e le lettere. Si
ritiene, in particolare, che il marchio, rappresentato da lettere dell’alfabeto, non possa automaticamente
essere considerato nullo, o comunque debole, essendo, comunque, necessaria la prova contraria da
parte di chi ne contesti la validità come marchio, la quale, nel caso di specie, non è stata in alcun modo
fornita>>
2°) <<Alla luce di tale motivazione, il Collegio ritiene, pertanto, tenuto conto della pluralità dei casi indicati
da parte attrice e non oggetto di specifica contestazione e del comportamento assunto dal Riva Faccio e
dalla società convenuta anche nelle more del giudizio, continuando a porre in essere atti in violazione
dell’accordo, che sia provata la reiterata violazione degli obblighi negoziali per la palese e insistita
inosservanza sia di quanto sancito specificatamente nel contratto, concluso tra le parti nel novembre
2012, sia del canone della buona fede nella sua esecuzione. Si ritiene, in particolare, alla luce del consolidato indirizzo interpretativo della Suprema Corte, che la buona fede nella esecuzione del
contratto si sostanzia in un generale obbligo di solidarietà che impone a ciascuna delle parti di agire in
modo tale da preservare gli interessi dell’altra, a prescindere tanto da specifici obblighi contrattuali,
quanto dal dovere extracontrattuale del neminem laedere, trovando tale impegno solidaristico il suo
limite precipuo unicamente nell’interesse proprio del soggetto, tenuto, pertanto, al compimento di tutti
gli atti giuridici e/o materiali che si rendano necessari alla salvaguardia dell’interesse della controparte, nella misura in cui essi non comportino un apprezzabile sacrificio a suo carico (cfr. per tutte Cass. 4
maggio 2009, n. 10182). Si ritiene, pertanto, come già affermato anche da questo tribunale, che un
compromesso negoziale fondato anche su particolari piccoli impone alle parti di uniformare i propri comportamenti a un livello molto elevato di correttezza, tale da evitare che anche in via indiretta si possano generare o anche solo avallare fraintendimenti ed equivoci (cfr. tribunale di Milano, sentenza
6454/2016, pubblicata il 26.05.2016). La violazione continuata e duratura delle disposizioni
contrattuali, nonché del canone di lealtà costituisce inadempimento contrattuale di indubbia rilevanza e
oggettiva gravità, tale, quindi, da giustificare l’accoglimento della domanda di risoluzione. Trattandosi
di contratto a esecuzione continuata, in conformità della previsione di cui all’art. 1458 c.c., l’efficacia
della pronuncia retroagisce al momento della litispendenza, con conseguente cessazione degli effetti
dei contratti alla data della notificazione dell’atto di citazione introduttivo del presente giudizio,
effettuata in data 20.05.2016 (cfr. Cass. 20894/2014)>>.
3°) danno da royalties ipotetiche: 15% del fatturato (ammontare assai diffuso)
Annullata invece dall’appello amministrativo (e non portata in sede giurisdizionale) la inziale decisione di contrarietà a ordine pubblico e/o buon costume
E’ stata daecisa dal reclamo ammisnitativo dlel’Uifficio euroep la lite sul marhcio dneominativo e figurativo ICELAND, chiesto per diverse classi merceologiche (per lo più attinenti als ettore alimentare).
Il figurativo è questo :
Ne dà notizia Giorgio Luceri su IPKat e gisutamente ricjhiama l’imoprtanza della decisione che si portrà come precednte improtante sulloggetto (oltre al noto caso Chniemsee del …, ampiamente richiamato)
La norma di riferimenot è la’rt. 7.1.c) dell’EUTMR.
Si v. della lunga decisione ad es. i §§ 125 ss sulle caratteristiche del paese Islanda.
E poi i §§ 148-149 : <<What is more, consumers in the EU are in fact used to seeing an indication of the
country of origin, production or processing on a variety of products. Such
indications are not only linked to a legal obligation in the European Union to
indicate the country of origin of foodstuffs but are also common in relation to other
goods (stationary, electronic appliances, etc.). For these latter goods, consumers
are used to seeing the indication ‘Made in [country name]’ and their purchase
decision may be dependent or at least influenced by the country indicated
(‘Chiemsee’, cited supra, para. 9, indent 4, § 98). In particular, in view of the
growing environmental and ecological conscience of the target public, consumers
may for example choose fruit, vegetable and meat products that were grown in
countries which have strict and reliable regulations regarding the use of pesticides,
antibiotics and growth hormones. Regarding electric and electronic apparatus,
consumers may turn to products which are linked to a country enjoying a reputation for good eco-quality, robust and environmentally sustainable goods and services and which offer the possibility of easy-to-avail post-sales assistance with all the guarantees of Single Market consumer protection to be found in the EU or the EEA.
149 Given that Iceland will have a propensity to describe sustainable and eco-friendly goods, such an image can easily influence purchasing decisions of the relevant public. Since the beginning of the millennium, environmental concerns have had an important place on the international agenda and national governments in developed countries have taken extensive measures in response to consumer concerns in this respect. As a result, there has been a growing demand for more eco-friendly, sustainable products. For this reason, eco-friendliness embedded in the identity of countries at the forefront of the eco movement (such as the Nordic region and Germany) will positively influence the acquisition decision of
consumers. >>
Conclusion: << 198 … the Grand Board concludes that the mark at issue would be perceived by the relevant public as an indication that the goods and services so designated originate from Iceland. Consequently, the Grand Board confirms the findings of the Cancellation Division that the mark has been registered contrary to the provisions of Article 7(c) EUTMR. >>
Seguono interessanti riferimenti alle opinioni degli esperti ed esame di atlre disposizioni del reg. UE
