Categoria: la tutela del marchio

Keyword advertising e avvedutezza del consumatore medio online nel diritto dei marchi

L’appello del 9 circuito n. 23-16060 del 22.10.2024, Lerner&Rowe v. Brown Engstrand&Shely decide una lite per violazione di marchio tra due studi legali avvenuta tramite keyword advertising (k.a.).

Il Panel non affronta le legittimità di quest’ultimo strumento secondo la legge marchi, limitandosi a dire che non ricorre confondibilità tra gli esiti della ricerca Google e il nome/i segno dello studio attore.

Rigetta quindi la domanda.

E’ infatti assai  fiducioso sull’avvedutezza dell’utente medio di internet:

<<Google’s search engine is so ubiquitous that we can be confident that the reasonably prudent online shopper is familiar with its layout and function, knows that it orders results based on relevance to the search term, and understands that it produces sponsored links along with organic search results. Moreover, in this case, the relevant consumers specifically typed in “Lerner & Rowe” as a search term, suggesting that they would be even more discerning of the results they received. Therefore, because this case involves shopping on Google by using the precise trademark at issue, this factor weighs in favor of ALG.>>

E poi:

<The district court was correct to conclude that this is one of the rare trademark infringement cases susceptible to summary judgment. The generally sophisticated nature of online shoppers, the evidence demonstrating that there is not an appreciable number of consumers who would find ALG’s use of the mark confusing, and the clarity of Google’s search results pages, convince us that ALG’s use of the “Lerner & Rowe” mark is not likely to cause consumer confusion.>>.

Del che c’è da dubitare, come avverte Eric Goldman (dal cui blog prendo notizia della e link alla sentenza)

L’opinione concorrente di  J. Desai invece esamina se il k.a. costituisca “uso del marchio”. Ricorda un importante precedente del 2011 del 9 ciruito, che rispose in senso affermativo: ma ora intende rovesciarlo,  perchè non esatto.

<<Whether an action, like bidding
on keywords, that involves no display or presentation of a
mark whatsoever satisfies the “use in commerce” definition.
In other words, does a buyer of advertising keywords who
bids on certain terms and phrases “use” its competitor’s
mark when bidding on it?
In Network Automation, we answered, yes. 638 F.3d at
1144–45. But we provided no analysis to support this
holding, id. at 1145, and we relied on cases with
meaningfully different facts. >>

Chiede quindi un riesame della questione.

Nel keyword search advertisement il mero acquisto del nome altrui non è violazione di marchio

App. del 2 circuito 08.10.2024, 1-800 contacts inc. d. Jand inc. afferma quanto nel titolo.

<<As outlined above, three components to a search advertising campaign are
relevant for our analysis of whether 1-800 has sufficiently alleged trademark
infringement by Warby Parker: first, the defendant’s purchase of a competitor’s
marks as keywords; second, the ads placed on the search results page for the
competitor’s marks; and third, the defendant’s landing webpage to which its ads
are linked. Thus, the central question in this case is whether 1-800 has sufficiently alleged a likelihood of confusion arising from Warby Parker’s use of 1-800’s Marks (i.e., 1800 Contacts,” “1 800 Contacts,” “1800contacts.com,” and “1800contacts”) in the keyword bidding process, the search ads, and/or the linked landing webpage. (….)
Further, in the search advertising context, an alleged infringer’s
purchase of a keyword comprising a competitor’s trademark constitutes a “use in
commerce” of such trademark under the Lanham Act. See Rescuecom Corp., 562
F.3d at 127 (holding that complaint regarding Google’s AdWord’s
recommendation of plaintiff’s trademark to plaintiff’s competitors “adequately
plead[ed] a use in commerce” under the Lanham Act)
(…)
1-800 alleges that Warby Parker made an infringing use of 1-800’s Marks in
the first component of its search advertising campaign: the keyword purchase.
However, as described above, the mere act of purchasing a competitor’s
trademarks as keywords in the search advertising context does not constitute
trademark infringement or unfair competition. See id. at 130. Warby Parker’s
purchase of 1-800’s Marks, standing alone, does not infringe 1-800’s Marks because “a defendant must do more than use another’s mark in commerce to violate the Lanham Act.” Id. The statute requires a showing that the defendant’s use caused consumer confusion. (….)

we conclude that 1-800 has failed to sufficiently plead that Warby Parker’s advertising plan was likely to confuse consumers at any point in the sales process because 1-800 does not claim that Warby Parker actually used the former’s Marks other than by buying them as keywords in the search engine auctions, and such use alone does not create a likelihood of consumer confusion>>

analoga soluzione probabilmente anche in base al nostro art. 20.2 cpi.-

La sentenza poi passa ad esaminare la confondibilità delle “landing pages”, negandola.

(notizia e link da Eric Goldman blog)

Componente denominativa e figurativa nel giudizio di confondibilità tra marchi

Si considerino i seg. marchi a paragone:

Il Board of appeal EUIPO 5 agosto 2024 , case R 1839/2023-5, L’Oreal c. Guangzhou Ya Ti Ao Jia Cosmetics Co., Ltd, conferma che non c’è confondiiblità.

Nemmeno è riconosciuta la tutela allargata, § 86 ss., per assenza sia di reputation che di connessione/link tra i due segni.

Segnalazione e link da parte di Marcel Pemsel in IPKat

Tra i fattori da considerare nel giudizio di confondibilità c’è pure la rinomanza del marchio successivo

Anteriorità opposta:

Marchio denominativo cbiesto in registrazione: << CHIQUITA QUEEN >>.

Stessi prodotti : frutta fresca.

Ebbene, Trib. UE 29.05.2024, T-79/23, Chiquita Brands v. EUIPO-Jara 2000, annullando l’appello ammnistrativo, esclude il rischio di confondibilità.

Qui interessa il passaggio dove include la rinomanza del secondo marcbio (di parte di esso: di CHIQUITA) tra i fattori da conteggiare per il giudizio di confondibilità.

<<46  In that regard, EUIPO’s argument that the reputation of the mark applied for, or of its distinct elements, is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the relative ground for refusal, referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected.

47 It is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the factor based on the distinctive character of the earlier mark, which is linked to the protection granted to such a mark and which is to be taken into consideration in the context of the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion and, on the other, the distinctive character which an element of a composite mark may have, which is linked to its ability to dominate the overall impression produced by that mark and which must be examined from the stage of assessing the similarity of the signs (see, to that effect, order of 27 April 2006, L’Oréal v OHIM, C‑235/05 P, not published, EU:C:2006:271, paragraph 43, and judgment of 25 March 2010, Nestlé v OHIM – Master Beverage Industries (Golden Eagle and Golden Eagle Deluxe), T‑5/08 to T‑7/08, EU:T:2010:123, paragraph 65).

48 Thus, in the present case, since it is not disputed that the mark CHIQUITA enjoys a reputation in the European Union for some fresh fruits, it is possible to take into account, at the stage of the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue, that reputation as a relevant factor for assessing the distinctive character of the element ‘chiquita’ appearing in the sign CHIQUITA QUEEN.

49 Furthermore, since the examination of the distinctive character of the elements of a sign cannot be confused with the examination of the distinctive character of the earlier mark carried out as part of the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 of the contested decision, as well as that relied on in EUIPO’s response, which refers to the reputation of the earlier mark under the protection granted to the latter in the context of the assessment of the overall risk confusion, is irrelevant.

50 It follows that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in concluding that the term ‘chiquita’, appearing in the sign of the mark applied for, had weak distinctive character>>.

Deicisione probabilmente esatta ma che richiederebbe un esame approfondito, data la non banale questione teorica sottostante.

Marcel Pemsel  in IPKat, che dà notizia della sentenza, sostanzialmente concorda, pur evidenziando contrasti con giurisprudenza precedente.

L’importanza del poter azionare un marchio di rinomanza, invece che ordinario

Marcel Pemsel su IPKat segnala Cancellation Division EUIPO n. C 57137 del 25 aprile 2024, Luis Vuitton c. Yang, come esempio dell’utilità pratica dell’optare per l’azione basata sulla rinomanza nei casi in cui è dubbio ricorrano i requisiti per quella sulla tutela ordinaria.

Non si può che convenirne. Ma quanto ha speso LV nei decenni per il suo marketing?

Marcbio depositato da Yang:

Abnteriuorità azionata da LV:

Ebbene, la domanda di annullamento è accolta sulla base della rinomanza.,

<<Therefore, taking into account and weighing up all the relevant factors of the present case, it must be concluded that, when encountering the contested mark, the relevant consumers will be likely to associate it with the earlier sign, that is to say, establish a mental ‘link’ between the signs. However, although a ‘link’ between the signs is a necessary condition for further assessing whether detriment or unfair advantage are likely, the existence of such a link is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that there may be one of the forms of damage referred to in Article 8(5) EUTMR (26/09/2012, T‑301/09, CITIGATE / CITICORP et al., EU:T:2012:473, § 96)>>.

Poi sull’unfair advantgege: The Cancellation Division agrees with the applicant’s arguments. The contested sign will, through its similarity with the earlier reputed trade mark, attract more consumers to the EUTM proprietor’s goods and will therefore benefit from the reputation of the earlier trade mark. A substantial number of consumers may decide to turn to the EUTM proprietor’s goods due to the mental association with the applicant’s reputed mark, thus misappropriating its powers of attraction and advertising value. This may stimulate the sales of the EUTM proprietor’s goods to an extent that they may be disproportionately high in comparison with the size of the EUTM proprietor’s own promotional investment. It may lead to the unacceptable situation where the EUTM proprietor is allowed to take a ‘free-ride’ on the investment of the applicant in promoting and building up goodwill for the EUTM proprietor’s sign. This would give the EUTM proprietor a competitive advantage since its goods would benefit from the extra attractiveness they would gain from the association with the applicant’s earlier mark. The applicant’s leather goods are known for their traditional manufacturing methods, handcrafted from the highest quality raw materials. The earlier mark is identified with the image of luxury, glamour, exclusivity and quality of the products, and those characteristics can easily be transferred to the contested goods.

Manca del resto la due cause (difesa ai limiti della responsabilità aggravata, civilprocessualmente):

The EUTM proprietor claimed to have due cause for using the contested mark because (1) a search of trade mark registers with effect in the EU did not reveal any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign; and (2) the name of the famous Italian Piazza Vittorio is the inspiration for the name ‘VITTORIO’. The applicant wanted to dedicate her brand to Italianism, to Rome and to the place where she lives with her family.

These EUTM proprietor arguments do not amount to ‘due cause’ within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR. Due cause under Article 8(5) EUTMR means that, notwithstanding the detriment caused to, or unfair advantage taken of, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier trade mark, registration and use by the EUTM proprietor of the mark for the contested goods may be justified if the EUTM proprietor cannot be reasonably required to abstain from using the contested mark, or if the EUTM proprietor has a specific right to use the mark for such goods that takes precedence over the earlier trade mark. In particular, the condition of due cause is not fulfilled merely by the fact that a search of trade mark registers having effect in the EU has not revealed any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign. Nor can the fact that ‘VITTORIO’ coincides with the name of a square in Turin justify its use as part of the sign, which would take unfair advantage of the reputation built up through the efforts of the proprietor of the earlier mark.

Ci sono anche ragine considerazione in fatto suilla provba dell’uso di cu iè onerata LV ed art. 64 c.23 -3 EUTMR

Istruzioni sulla prova della rinomanza dei marchi dal Tribunale UE (che viene normalmente acquisita e persa con gradualità)

Trib. UE 24.04.2024, T-157/23, Kneipp GmbH c. EUIPO-Patou:

<<Whether the earlier mark has a reputation and the burden of proof in relation to that reputation

…

19 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in order to satisfy the requirement of reputation, a mark must be known to a significant part of the public concerned by the goods or services covered by that trade mark. In examining that condition, it is necessary to take into consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the earlier mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it. There is, however, no requirement for that mark to be known by a given percentage of the relevant public or for its reputation to cover all the territory concerned, so long as that reputation exists in a substantial part of that territory (see judgment of 12 February 2015, Compagnie des montres Longines, Francillon v OHIM – Staccata (QUARTODIMIGLIO QM), T‑76/13, not published, EU:T:2015:94, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

20 However, the above list being merely illustrative, it cannot be required that proof of the reputation of a mark pertains to all those elements (see judgment of 26 June 2019, Balani Balani and Others v EUIPO – Play Hawkers (HAWKERS), T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

21 Furthermore, an overall assessment of the evidence adduced by the proprietor of the earlier mark must be carried out in order to establish whether that mark has a reputation (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2012, Rubinstein and L’Oréal v OHIM, C‑100/11 P, EU:C:2012:285, paragraph 72). An accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, may be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts (see judgment of 26 June 2019, HAWKERS, T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

22 Next, it should be noted that the reputation of an earlier mark must be established as at the filing date of the application for registration of the mark applied for (judgment of 5 October 2020, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – SBS Bilimsel Bio Çözümler (apiheal), T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112). Documents bearing a date after that date cannot be denied evidential value if they enable conclusions to be drawn with regard to the situation as it was on that date. It cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after that date may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date (see judgment of 16 October 2018, VF International v EUIPO – Virmani (ANOKHI), T‑548/17, not published, EU:T:2018:686, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited; see also, by analogy, order of 27 January 2004, La Mer Technology, C‑259/02, EU:C:2004:50, paragraph 31).

23 In the present case, the reputation of the earlier mark had to be established as at 29 November 2019, the date on which the application for registration of the mark applied for was filed. The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, that, as a whole, the evidence submitted by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO demonstrated convincingly that the earlier mark enjoyed a strong reputation, at least in France, which constitutes a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in respect of perfumery and fragrances in Class 3 for which, inter alia, the earlier mark was registered.

24 In particular, it should be noted that, in order to find that the reputation of the earlier mark had been established, the Board of Appeal relied on the evidence referred to in paragraph 6 of the contested decision, namely, a statement signed by a representative of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, various copies of licence agreements or agreements conferring rights in respect of a trade mark JOY between that party and third parties, images of products, several extracts from websites of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO and third parties, a large number of articles and press cuttings, extracts from books, advertisements, numerous invoices and extracts from ‘tweets’.

25 In the first place, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that the documents produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, the existence of which is not disputed, do not provide evidence of the reputation of the earlier mark in a significant part of the relevant territory in the absence, in particular, of information concerning the market share of the earlier mark.

26 In that regard, as a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments suggesting that the evidence intended to prove the reputation of the earlier mark in Member States other than the French Republic is irrelevant. While it is true that the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark had a reputation ‘at least in France’ and that that State constituted a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, that does not mean that the evidence relating to other Member States is irrelevant. On the contrary, the latter evidence further supports the Board of Appeal’s finding, by demonstrating in particular the geographical scope of the earlier mark’s reputation, and must therefore be taken into consideration.

27 First, it should be noted that the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced (i) numerous online articles (exhibit 7) showing that the perfume Joy was voted, in 2000, ‘Scent of the Century’ by the UK FiFi Awards, which is described as ‘perfume’s ultimate accolade’, and (ii) a screenshot of the Fragrance Foundation’s website (exhibit 6), referring to the listing of the perfume Joy on the ‘Hall of Fame’ of that foundation in 1990. As noted by the Board of Appeal, those awards are prestigious awards, which involve both longstanding use of the earlier mark and recognition of that mark by the relevant public.

28 Second, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced various extracts from books, articles and press cuttings (exhibits 4, 5, 12 and Annex 2) showing, inter alia, the use of the earlier mark for perfumes and fragrances and attesting that a significant part of the relevant public, in particular in France, knew the perfume Joy. The numerous extracts from articles, the date and place of publication of which can for the most part be identified, relate in particular to the years 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017 and were published in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Portugal and, mainly, France, in fashion and beauty magazines of national or international importance, such as Elle, Grazia, Gala or Vogue. Several articles, dated from 2015 to 2017, describe the perfume Joy as the ‘second best-selling perfume of all time’, ‘one of the most popular and successful fragrances in the world’, ‘a strong rival to the number one best-selling fragrance of all time’. Lastly, several books on perfumery deal with the perfume Joy, listing it as one of ‘the five greatest perfumes in the world’, or as one of the ‘111 perfumes you must smell before you die’ or describing it as ‘one of the greatest floral perfumes ever created’. Finally, a selection of ‘tweets’ dated from the period between 2013 and 2015 (exhibit 14) demonstrates the social media presence of the earlier mark.

29 Third, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced 27 invoices (exhibit 11) corresponding to advertising campaigns, which it carried out in 2013, 2014 and 2018, not only in the press, but also on television at a significant cost, in order to promote the earlier mark.

30 Fourth, the abovementioned factors are supported by a large number of invoices (exhibit 16) relating to sales involving several thousand products covered by the earlier mark, in an amount of tens of thousands of euro, to various distributors in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal and Romania, for the years 2013 to 2018.

31 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, it follows from the foregoing that, assessed as a whole, that evidence establishes that the earlier mark has a reputation in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in particular in France, as regards perfumery and fragrances in Class 3.

32 The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO made significant efforts and investments in order to promote the earlier mark among the general public and in particular among the French general public. Those efforts took the form of significant advertising campaigns, a media presence in newspapers and magazines aimed at the general public and widely distributed within the European Union. Furthermore, the sales invoices submitted which related mainly to sales of perfumes and ‘eaux de parfums’ support the abovementioned factors demonstrating, inter alia, the wide geographical coverage of the earlier mark on that territory and a constant effort on the part of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share, at least until 2018.

33 Those documents, as well as the prestigious awards won by the perfume Joy, make it possible to establish that the earlier mark is widely known by the general public, in relation to the goods which it designates, in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, even though those awards date back several years and sales figures fell between 2013 and 2018. In the latter regard, it should be noted that, in any event, the earlier mark enjoyed a high degree of reputation in the past, which, even if it were to be assumed that it may have diminished over the years, still survived at the date of filing the application for registration of the mark applied for in 2019; accordingly, a certain ‘surviving’ reputation remained at that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca Europe v OHIM – PSA Peugeot Citroën (Simca), T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

34 Thus, the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public are teenagers who were not born when the perfume Joy won those awards and that adults aged 18 to 29 were not aware of the historical events, such as the awards and mentions in books at the relevant time, is unfounded. As EUIPO correctly submits, those parts of the relevant public may become aware of the long-lasting reputation of the earlier mark, without necessarily being the witnesses of all the awards and public praise achieved by the earlier mark in the past, and may come into contact with that mark, by way of example, through digital advertising, billboards or the printed press. Moreover, the EU judicature has already held that it cannot be ruled out that a ‘historical’ mark may retain a certain ‘surviving’ reputation, including where that mark is no longer used (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca, T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

35 Furthermore, such reasoning also applies to the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public does not frequent luxury retail outlets, with the result that it cannot know the perfume Joy which is sold only by selected and prominent luxury retailers. First, the public concerned acquires and retains knowledge of a mark in several ways, in particular by visiting in person retail outlets where the corresponding products are sold, but also by other means such as those described in paragraph 34 above. Second, even consumers in the general public who cannot afford to purchase luxury branded goods are often exposed to them and are familiar with them (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 October 2022, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO – Wisniewski (Representation of a chequerboard pattern II), T‑275/21, not published, EU:T:2022:654, paragraph 47).

36 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the market share held by the earlier mark has not been established by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO does not necessarily mean that the reputation of the earlier mark has not been established. First, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, the list of factors to be taken into account in order to assess the reputation of an earlier mark is indicative and not mandatory, as all the relevant evidence in the case must be taken into account and, second, the detailed and verifiable evidence produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO is sufficient in itself to establish conclusively the reputation of the earlier mark for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see judgment of 14 September 2022, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO – Save the Duck (ITINERANT), T‑417/21, not published, EU:T:2022:561, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

37 In the second place, the applicant also relies on the fact that the Board of Appeal assumed that the earlier mark had a reputation and wrongly stated that it was for the applicant to prove a drastic loss of reputation of the earlier mark between 2018 and 29 November 2019, the filing date of the mark applied for.

38 As recalled in the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, it cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after the filing date of the application for registration of the mark at issue may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The same reasoning applies to the loss of such a reputation, which is also, in general, lost gradually. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date.

39 Thus, evidence which predates the filing date of the application for registration of the contested mark cannot be deprived of probative value on the sole ground that it bears a date which predates that filing date by five years (judgment of 5 October 2020, apiheal, T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112).

40 It is also apparent from the case-law that, as regards the burden of proof in relation to reputation, it is borne by the proprietor of the earlier mark (see judgment of 5 October 2022, Puma v EUIPO – CMS (CMS Italy), T‑711/20, not published, EU:T:2022:604, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

41 In the present case, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, after recalling that the application for registration had been filed on 29 November 2019, emphasised that most of the evidence submitted related to the period between 2013 and 2017 and that some of that evidence dated back to 1990, 2000 or 2006; however, it noted that the evidence in fact contained indications concerning the continuous efforts of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share in 2018, before adding that ‘the loss of reputation rarely happens as a single occurrence but is rather a continuing process over a long period of time, as the reputation is usually built up over a period of years and cannot simply be switched on and off’ and that ‘in addition, such drastic loss of reputation for a short period of time would be up to the applicant to prove’.

42 Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, that assessment does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof and is consistent with the case-law cited in paragraphs 38 to 40 above. In the absence of concrete evidence showing that the reputation progressively acquired by the earlier mark over many years suddenly disappeared during the last year under examination, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the earlier mark still had a reputation on 29 November 2019, the relevant date (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 79).

43 Therefore, the first complaint of the single plea in law must be rejected>>.

Non c’è confondibilità (somiglianza tra segni) se il marchio denominativo altrui è assai tenuamente evocato, anzi lasciato solo intuire

Si considerino i segni a paragone:

SEcondo il board of appeal EUIPO 19.02.2024, case R 1147/2023-1, Hyundai v. Global Trade services, non c’è somiglianza tra segni e quindi il primo è registrabile.

<<Contrary to the opponent’s claims, the Board agrees with the contested decision that consumers will not be able to read any letters in the contested sign but will perceive only vertical bars of different heights, two of which have dots. The contested sign is missing the horizontal lines, which is an essential component of the normal graphic representation of the verbal element ‘hyundai’, without which the relevant public will have difficulty in recognising that verbal element. Consequently, the contested sign will not be immediately and without any mental effort recognised as the verbal element ‘hyundai’. It is much more probable that the contested sign will be recognised only as the combination of some basic figurative elements. Only after an in-depth analysis, which consumers do not tend to perform (26/03/2021, R 551/2018-G, Device (fig.) / Device (fig.), § 52), might very stylised representations of the verbal element ‘hyundai’ be perceive>>

Marcel Pemsel in IPkat dà notizia della e link alla decisione.

Curiosamente una sua ricerca nella AI Gemini di Google gli dà questo esito: <<The image you sent me appears to be a trademark image filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). It depicts a blue logo on a white background, but without any additional context, it is impossible to say for certain what the logo represents or what company or organization it belongs to. […] >>

A me invece, con uguale prompt,  Gemini dà esito opposto, riferendosi proprio alla parola Hyundai:

Ma l’AI non è il consumatore medio, essendo la sua logica operativa assai diversa da quella umana (parrebbe).

Servizi di “print on demand” violano il diritto di marchio? Probabilmente si

Eric Goldman dà notizia di e link a US DIST. COURT-WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION 1 marzo 2024 ,Case No. 1:23-cv-611 , Canvafishj c. Pixels.com, che non stoppa la domanda per violazione di marchio di un’artista contro il servizio  di print on demand offerto da Pixels.com.

La riproduzione, fatta a richeista del cliente, costituisce uso del marchio altrui: <<Even with those gaps, viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to Canvasfish, and considering the greater degree of control Pixels exercises over its manufacturing and shipping process than Redbubble, Canvasfish has made a plausible case that Pixels is a “user” of the trademarks on the products it displays on its websites, and Canvasfish has therefore stated a plausible trademark infringement claim>>.

Però, si badi, il ruolo giocato da Pixels è in effetti significativo: <<Pixels’ services allow third-party creators to upload artwork, photographs, and any other digital images they choose to any of its websites. Pixels does not police the content that is uploaded. (Id. ¶ 23.) Once creators have uploaded images, consumers can browse the entire catalog of content and purchase a number of physical products bearing those images which Pixels will then manufacture and ship anywhere in the country. (Id.) Pixels offers “canvas, wood, and acrylic art prints, greeting cards, phone cases, duvet covers, pillows, shower curtains, and tote bags.” (Id. ¶ 24.) When a consumer has selected an image and a physical product, that image is  sent to a Pixels printing facility where the image is printed onto the product and shipped to the purchaser. (Id. ¶ 27.) Typically, the images are printed on “low-quality products, often overseas.” (Id. ¶ 50.)   In addition to the printing and shipping services Pixels provides, it also offers an augmented reality application through its mobile app that allows potential buyers to see what the selected artwork will look like when it is hung on their wall. (Id. ¶ 25.) “Pixels is actively involved in nearly every aspect of its users’ sales.” (Id. ¶ 28.) It maintains the library of art, acts as the payment processor, and manufactures, prints, warehouses, and ships each product sold through its websites and mobile applications. (Id.)>>

Viene fatta proseguire anche l’azione basata su violazione di copyright

Eric Goldman oggi 6 marzo 2024 dà notizia di altra analoga causa decisa in sostanza nello stesso modo.

L’onere della prova dell’esaurimento el marcjhio

Interessante segnalazione da aprte di Marcel Pemsel in IPKat di Corte di Giustizia C-367/21 del 18.01.2024, Hewlette Packard v. Senetic sulll’oggetto.

L’onere delle prova (poi: odp) spetterà in linea di principio al convenuto, non al titolare del marchio.

Solo che il primo può avere serie difficoltà pratiche nel dare la prova che i prodotti de quibus erano già stato immessi in commercio in altro stato UE (anzi SEE).

La CG dice che allora la regola sull’odp va adattata : in particolare quando cì’è il rischi di compartimentazione dei mercati, cioè quiando cioè la condotta del titolare compromette la libertà di circolazine delle merci sancita dai Trattati UE.

Il che succede quando il titolare tiene condotte particolarmente omertose come nel caso sde quo: i prodotti erano privi di marchio sull’origine o sulla prima immissione e addirittura , interpellato onestamente e apertamente dal terzo convenuto, il titolare si era  rifiutati di dare chiarimenti sull’origine dei prodotti alla base dell’interpello (silenzio informativo pure dal soggetto dal quale il terzo aveVA acquistato) .

Si tratta tecnicamente di un abuso del diritto (ma la Corte non lo menziona se non indirettamente al § 13 , dove riporta l’art. 3.2 della dir. 2004/48) che ne impedisce l’esercizio: diniego di effetti, cioè,  che un ordinamento serio non può non prevedere in tale caso (resta da vedere quale sia la base normativa UE, da noi essendo la buona fede nel caso di contratto e la solidarietà costituzionale ex art. 2 Cost. in caso di pretesa violazione aquiliana).

<<55  Per quanto riguarda la questione di quale sia la parte su cui grava l’onere della prova dell’esaurimento del diritto conferito dal marchio dell’Unione europea, occorre rilevare, da un lato, che tale questione non è disciplinata né dall’articolo 13 del regolamento n. 207/2009, né dall’articolo 15 del regolamento 2017/1001, né da alcuna altra disposizione di questi due regolamenti.

56      D’altro lato, sebbene gli aspetti procedurali del rispetto dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale, compreso il diritto esclusivo previsto dall’articolo 9 del regolamento n. 207/2009, divenuto articolo 9 del regolamento 2017/1001, siano disciplinati, in linea di principio, dal diritto nazionale, quale armonizzato dalla direttiva 2004/48, che, come risulta in particolare dagli articoli da 1 a 3, riguarda le misure, le procedure e i mezzi di ricorso necessari per garantire il rispetto dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale (v., in tal senso, sentenza del 17 novembre 2022, Harman International Industries, C‑175/21, EU:C:2022:895, punto 56), occorre necessariamente constatare che tale direttiva, in particolare i suoi articoli 6 e 7, che rientrano nel capo II, sezione 2, della stessa direttiva, intitolata «Elementi di prova», non disciplina la questione dell’onere della prova dell’esaurimento del diritto conferito dal marchio.

57      Tuttavia, la Corte ha ripetutamente affermato che un operatore che detiene prodotti immessi sul mercato del SEE con un marchio dell’Unione europea dal titolare di tale marchio o con il suo consenso trae diritti dalla libera circolazione delle merci, garantita dagli articoli 34 e 36 TFUE, nonché dall’articolo 15, paragrafo 1, del regolamento 2017/1001, che i giudici nazionali devono salvaguardare (sentenza del 17 novembre 2022, Harman International Industries, C‑175/21, EU:C:2022:895, punto 69 e giurisprudenza ivi citata).

58      A tal riguardo, sebbene la Corte abbia dichiarato, in linea di principio, compatibile con il diritto dell’Unione una norma di diritto nazionale di uno Stato membro in forza della quale l’esaurimento del diritto conferito da un marchio costituisce un mezzo di difesa, di modo che l’onere della prova incomba al convenuto che deduce tale motivo, essa ha altresì precisato che le prescrizioni derivanti dalla tutela della libera circolazione delle merci possono richiedere che tale regola probatoria subisca adattamenti (v., in tal senso, sentenza dell’8 aprile 2003, Van Doren + Q, C‑244/00, EU:C:2003:204, punti da 35 a 37).

59      Così, le modalità nazionali di assunzione e di valutazione della prova dell’esaurimento del diritto conferito da un marchio devono rispettare le prescrizioni derivanti dal principio della libera circolazione delle merci e, pertanto, devono essere adattate qualora siano tali da consentire al titolare di tale marchio di compartimentare i mercati nazionali, favorendo in tal modo la conservazione delle differenze di prezzo esistenti fra gli Stati membri (v., in tal senso, sentenza del 17 novembre 2022, Harman International Industries, C‑175/21, EU:C:2022:895, punto 50 e giurisprudenza ivi citata).

60      Di conseguenza, quando il convenuto nell’azione di contraffazione riesce a dimostrare che sussiste un rischio reale di compartimentazione dei mercati nazionali qualora egli stesso dovesse sostenere l’onere di provare che i prodotti sono stati immessi in commercio nell’Unione o nel SEE dal titolare del marchio o con il suo consenso, spetta al giudice nazionale adito regolare la ripartizione dell’onere di provare l’esaurimento del diritto conferito dal marchio (v., in tal senso, sentenza dell’8 aprile 2003, Van Doren + Q, C‑244/00, EU:C:2003:204, punto 39).

61      Nel caso di specie, dalla domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale risulta che il titolare dei marchi dell’Unione europea di cui trattasi gestisce un sistema di distribuzione selettiva nell’ambito del quale i prodotti contrassegnati da tali marchi non recano alcuna marcatura che consenta ai terzi di identificare il mercato sul quale sono destinati ad essere commercializzati, che il titolare rifiuta di comunicare tale informazione ai terzi e che i fornitori della parte convenuta non sono inclini a rivelare le proprie fonti di approvvigionamento.

62      A quest’ultimo proposito, occorre rilevare che, in un siffatto sistema di distribuzione, il fornitore si impegna generalmente a vendere i beni o i servizi oggetto del contratto, direttamente o indirettamente, solo a distributori selezionati sulla base di criteri definiti, mentre tali distributori si impegnano a non vendere tali beni o servizi a distributori non autorizzati nel territorio delimitato dal fornitore per l’attuazione di siffatto sistema di distribuzione.

63      In simili circostanze, far gravare sul convenuto nell’azione per contraffazione l’onere della prova del luogo in cui i prodotti contrassegnati dal marchio da esso commercializzati sono stati immessi in commercio per la prima volta dal titolare di tale marchio, o con il suo consenso, potrebbe consentire a detto titolare di contrastare le importazioni parallele dei prodotti contrassegnati da detto marchio, anche se la restrizione della libera circolazione delle merci che ne deriverebbe non sarebbe giustificata dalla tutela del diritto conferito da questo stesso marchio.

64      Infatti, il convenuto nell’azione per contraffazione incontrerebbe notevoli difficoltà a fornire una prova del genere, a causa della comprensibile riluttanza dei suoi fornitori a rivelare la loro fonte di approvvigionamento all’interno della rete di distribuzione del titolare dei marchi dell’Unione europea di cui trattasi.

65      Inoltre, anche qualora il convenuto nell’azione di contraffazione riuscisse a dimostrare che i prodotti recanti i marchi dell’Unione europea di cui trattasi provengono dalla rete di distribuzione selettiva del titolare di tali marchi nell’Unione europea o nel SEE, detto titolare sarebbe in grado di impedire qualsiasi futura possibilità di approvvigionamento da parte del membro della sua rete di distribuzione che ha violato i suoi obblighi contrattuali (v., in tal senso, sentenza dell’8 aprile 2003, Van Doren + Q, C‑244/00, EU:C:2003:204, punto 40).

66      Pertanto, in circostanze come quelle descritte al punto 61 della presente sentenza, spetterà al giudice nazionale adito procedere ad un adeguamento della ripartizione dell’onere della prova dell’esaurimento dei diritti conferiti dai marchi dell’Unione europea di cui trattasi facendo gravare sul titolare di questi ultimi l’onere di dimostrare di aver realizzato o autorizzato la prima messa in circolazione degli esemplari dei prodotti di cui trattasi al di fuori del territorio dell’Unione o di quello del SEE. Qualora sia fornita tale prova, spetterà al convenuto nell’azione per contraffazione dimostrare che i medesimi esemplari sono stati successivamente importati nel SEE dal titolare del marchio o con il suo consenso (v., in tal senso, sentenza dell’8 aprile 2003, Van Doren + Q, C‑244/00, EU:C:2003:204, punto 41 e giurisprudenza ivi citata).>>

Interessante è anche la questione sulla competenza a regolare l’odp: europea, rientrando nel diritto dei marchi armonizzato, o nazionale, rientrando nella ‘area processuale? Propenderei per la seconda.

La mascherina del radiatore, sagomata sì da ricordare il marchio Audi per fungere da supporto e fissarci l’emblema originale, è uso del marchio ma non fruisce dell’eccezione dell’uso referenziale lecito

Avevo già dato conto della posizione dell’AG Medina   nella lite.

Ricordo il marchio azionato da Audi:

Ora la Corte di giustizia 25.01.2024, C-334/22, Audi AG c. GQ, decide il rinvio pregiudiziale in senso diverso.  In particolare ritiene che :

1) il supporto per l’emblema  Audi , fissato sulla e facente parte della mascherina del radiatore, costituisce uso del segno;

2) il supporto così sagomato al citato scopo non fruisce dell’eccezione di uso referenziale lecito ex art. 14.1.c) reg. 2017/1001 (“per identificare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi come prodotti o servizi del titolare di tale marchio, specie se l’uso di tale marchio è necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto o servizio, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio.”).

Entrambe questioni non semplici. Sul secondo punto ecco il passaggio della CG:

premessa generale:

<<54  L’obiettivo della limitazione, prevista da tale ipotesi, del diritto esclusivo conferito dal marchio è di consentire ai fornitori di prodotti o di servizi complementari a prodotti o servizi offerti dal titolare di un marchio di utilizzare tale marchio al fine di informare, in modo comprensibile e completo, il pubblico sulla destinazione del prodotto che commercializzano o del servizio che offrono o, in altri termini, sul nesso utilitaristico esistente tra i loro prodotti o i loro servizi e quelli del suddetto titolare del marchio (v., per analogia, sentenze del 17 marzo 2005, Gillette Company e Gillette Group Finland, C‑228/03, EU:C:2005:177, punti 33 e 34, nonché dell’11 gennaio 2024, Inditex, C‑361/22, EU:C:2024:17, punto 51).

55 Pertanto, l’uso di un marchio da parte di un terzo per designare o menzionare prodotti o servizi come quelli del titolare di tale marchio quando tale uso è necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto commercializzato da tale terzo o di un servizio offerto da quest’ultimo rientra, ai sensi dell’articolo 14, paragrafo 1, lettera c), del regolamento 2017/1001, in una delle ipotesi in cui l’uso del marchio non può essere vietato dal suo titolare (v., in tal senso, sentenza dell’11 gennaio 2024, Inditex, C‑361/22, EU:C:2024:17, punto 52). Tale limitazione del diritto esclusivo conferito al titolare del marchio dall’articolo 9 di tale regolamento si applica, tuttavia, solo se detto uso di tale marchio da parte del terzo è conforme alle pratiche di lealtà in campo industriale e commerciale, ai sensi dell’articolo 14, paragrafo 2, di detto regolamento>>

Applicando al caso de quo (con linguaggio non chiarissimo):

<<Nel caso di specie, dalla decisione di rinvio risulta che l’elemento della griglia per radiatori la cui forma è identica o simile al marchio AUDI consente di fissare l’emblema che rispecchia tale marchio su detta griglia. Come risulta altresì dalla decisione di rinvio e dalle osservazioni delle parti, la scelta della forma di tale elemento è guidata dalla volontà di commercializzare una griglia per radiatori che assomigli nel modo più fedele possibile alla griglia per radiatori originale del costruttore degli autoveicoli di cui trattasi.

57 Orbene, occorre distinguere una siffatta situazione, nella quale un’impresa non economicamente collegata al titolare del marchio appone un segno identico o simile a tale marchio sui pezzi di ricambio da essa commercializzati e destinati ad essere integrati nei prodotti di tale titolare, da una situazione in cui una tale impresa, senza tuttavia apporre un segno identico o simile al marchio su tali pezzi di ricambio, faccia un uso di tale marchio per indicare che detti pezzi di ricambio sono destinati ad essere integrati nei prodotti del titolare di detto marchio. Sebbene la seconda di tali situazioni rientri nell’ipotesi di cui al punto 55 della presente sentenza, la prima di dette situazioni non vi rientra. L’apposizione di un segno identico o simile al marchio sul prodotto commercializzato dal terzo eccede, come osservato dall’avvocato generale al paragrafo 57 delle sue conclusioni, l’uso a scopo di riferimento di cui all’articolo 14, paragrafo 1, lettera c), del regolamento 2017/1001 e non rientra quindi in alcuna delle ipotesi coperte da tale disposizione.

58 Ne consegue che, quando un segno, identico o simile a un marchio dell’Unione europea, costituisce un elemento di un pezzo di ricambio per autoveicoli, progettato per il fissaggio dell’emblema del costruttore di tali veicoli su quest’ultimo e non è utilizzato per designare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi come prodotti o servizi del titolare di tale marchio, ma per riprodurre nel modo più fedele possibile un prodotto di tale titolare, un siffatto uso di detto marchio non rientra nell’ambito di applicazione dell’articolo 14, paragrafo 1, lettera c), del regolamento 2017/1001>>.

Mi pare dubbio cher la sagomatura del supporto sul radiatore non sia <<necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto o servizio, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio>>.