la tutela del marchio – Pagina 3

Esclusa la confondibilità dei marchi BIOTRON e BIOTRON

Il 2° Board of Appeal EUIPO 28.11.2023, case R 1656/2023-2,BIOTROP PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A c. CIFO srl, la esclude nella seguente fattispecie

Conclude così’:

<<A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between
the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks
and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between
those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks,
and vice versa.
40 Nonetheless, the principle of interdependence is not intended to apply mechanically.
Therefore, while it is true that, by virtue of the principle of interdependence, a lesser degree
of similarity between the goods or services covered may be offset by a greater degree of
similarity between the marks, conversely there is nothing to prevent a finding that, in view
of the circumstances of a particular case, there is no likelihood of confusion, even where
identical goods are involved and there is a weak degree of similarity between the marks at
issue (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs. EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 96).
41 The goods and services are similar to an average and low degree. The signs are visually,
phonetically and conceptually similar to a low degree. The relevant public will show a
high level of attention at the time of purchase.
42 The differences between the signs, arising from their respective endings and the figurative
representation of the contested sign, are not negligible in the overall impression created by
the marks, especially for a public with a higher level of attention. Accordingly, they are
able to compensate for the visual, phonetic and even conceptual similarities that result from
the presence, at the beginning, of the term ‘BIO’, and the string of letters ‘t-r-o’ common
to all the signs (05/10/2020, T-602/19, NATURANOVE, EU:T:2020:463, § 74).
43 It should be stressed that the similarity between the marks at issue created by their prefix
‘bio’ carries very limited weight, if any, in the context of the global assessment of the
likelihood of confusion. Owing to the lack of distinctive character of that prefix, it cannot
be perceived as an indication of commercial origin. The relevant public’s attention will, as
a result, naturally focus more on the elements which differentiate the signs at issue and, in
particular, on the suffixes ‘tron’ in the earlier marks and ‘trop’ in the contested mark and
on the figurative elements in that mark (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs.
EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 101).
44 In this respect, it would be against the rationale of the EUTMR to give too much
importance in the assessment of a likelihood of confusion to non-distinctive elements. It
would be inappropriate if a proprietor of a trade mark composed of figurative and/or verbal
elements, where each of them taken alone or in combination are non-distinctive, were in
the position to successfully claim a likelihood of confusion based on the presence of one of these elements in the other sign. This would result in unduly broad protection for
descriptive and non-distinctive elements, which would prohibit other competitors from
using the same descriptive and non-distinctive elements as components of their trade
marks, especially if the use of such a term is in accordance with honest practice in
commercial matters (18/09/2013, R 1462/2012-G, ULTIMATE GREENS / ULTIMATE
NUTRITION, § 62).
45 It follows that excessive protection of marks consisting of elements which, as in the present
case, have weak distinctive character, if any, in relation to the goods or services at issue,
could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law, if, in the
context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the mere presence of such
elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking
into account the remainder of the specific factors in the present case (18/01/2023,
T-443/21, YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL (fig.)/ yoga ALLIANCE (fig.),
EU:T:2023:7, § 117-118)>>.

Lasciua ad es perplessi uil § 29 : <<Furthermore, the mere fact that the marks at issue are composed of the same number of letters, some of which coincide, is not decisive. Since the alphabet is made up of a limited number of letters, which, moreover, are not all used with the same frequency, it is inevitable that many words will have the same number of letters and even share some of them, but they cannot, for that reason alone, be regarded as visually similar. In addition, the public is not, in general, aware of the exact number of letters in a word mark and, consequently, will not notice, in the majority of cases, that two conflicting marks have the same number of letters (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs. EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 63)>>.

TAle limitatezza va superata cambiando radicalmente i. segno: non c’è era obbligo di legge di adottare quello de quo.

Infine, per il Board c’è affinità tra la produzione di certi beni e il servizio di retail dei medesimi (così almeno interpretererei il primo punto, non chiarissimo): <<23.Indeed, generally, retail services concerning the sale of particular goods are similar to these particular goods [cioè alla loro produzione? o vendita all’ingrosso?]. Although the nature, purpose and method of use of these goods and services are not the same, they present some similarities, as they are complementary and the services are generally offered through the same trade channels (where the goods are offered for sale) and they target the same public (24/09/2008, T-116/06, ‘O Store’, EU:T:2008:399, § 60)>>.

(segnalazione e link di Marcel Pemsel inIPJKat , critico sulla decisione)

Diritto di marchio vs. diritto alla parodia del marchio stesso : la lite sul marchio VANS

Lisa Ramsey su Twitter (X) segnala un articolo da Bloomberg law che offre il link all‘Appello del 2 circuito 5 dicembre 2023, docket No. 22-1006, Vans v. MSCHF.

Il caso è intreressante , affrontando un tema di attualità: il rapporto tra diritto di marchio e quello di parodia, da inserire nel diritto alla libetà di parola.

Il problema nasce quando il secondo è esercitato da imprenditori (anche gli artisti allora possono esserlo ed anzi lo sono nel diritto della concorrenza): c’è infatti il sospetto che vogliano lucrare sulla notorietà altrui.

La corte fa qui prevalere il diritto di marchio, appellandosi alla sentenza Supreme Court del 2023 Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC e a un precedente imprtante in del 2 circuito Rogers v. Grimaldi dek 1989 per cui la parodia va bene solo se e fino a che non generi confondibilità:

<<The Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s forecloses MSCHF’s argument
that Wavy Baby’s parodic message merits higher First Amendment scrutiny under Rogers. As the Court held, even if a defendant uses a mark to parody the
trademark holder’s product, Rogers does not apply if the mark is used “‘at least in
part’ for ‘source identification.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc.,
v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
Here, MSCHF used Vans’ marks in much the same way that VIP Products
used Jack Daniel’s marks—as source identifiers. As discussed above and
illustrated below, VIP Products used the Jack Daniel’s bottle size, distinctive
squared-off shape, and black and white stylized text to invoke an image of Jack
Daniel’s famous whiskey bottle.
Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. 148–49.
Likewise, MSCHF’s design evoked myriad elements of the Old Skool
trademarks and trade dress. Among other things, MSCHF incorporates, with
distortions, the Old Skool black and white color scheme, the side stripe, the
perforated sole, the logo on the heel, the logo on the footbed, and the packaging.
See Part I, above. MSCHF included its own branding on the label and heel of the
Wavy Baby sneaker, just as VIP Products placed its logo on the toy’s hangtag. But
even the design of the MSCHF logo evokes the Old Skool logo. And unlike VIP
Products, MSCHF did not include a disclaimer disassociating it from Vans or Old
Skool shoes. See Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 150 (noting the dog toy included a
disclaimer that read: “This product is not affiliated with Jack Daniel Distillery”).
A trademark is used as a “source identifier” when it is used “to identify or
brand a defendant’s goods or services” or to indicate the “‘source or origin’ of a
product.” Id. at 156 (alterations adopted). MSCHF used Vans’ trademarks—
particularly its red and white logo—to brand its own products, which constitutes
“quintessential ‘trademark use’” subject to the Lanham Act. Id. at 155 (citation
omitted); see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812–13
(mechanic’s use of Harley-Davidson’s bar and shield motif in his logo, despite
the “humorous[]” message, was traditional trademark use subject to the
likelihood of confusion analysis).
Moreover, although MSCHF did not purport to sell the Wavy Baby under
the Vans brand, it admitted to “start[ing]” with Vans’ marks because “[n]o other
shoe embodies the dichotomies—niche and mass taste, functional and trendy,
utilitarian and frivolous—as perfectly as the Old Skool.” Jt. App’x at 353. In
other words, MSCHF sought to benefit from the “good will” that Vans—as the
source of the Old Skool and its distinctive marks—had generated over a decades-
long period. See Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 156. Notwithstanding the Wavy Baby’s
expressive content, MSCHF used Vans’ trademarks in a source-identifying
manner. Accordingly, the district court was correct when it applied the
traditional likelihood-of-confusion test instead of applying the Rogers test>>.

La composizione del conflitto di interssi è ragionevole: ok alla parodia e alla libertà di espressine, ma in termini chiari e non equivoci (cioè senza alcun rischio di confondibilità).

La parodia come interesse antagonista della privativa di marchio è tema ancora non affrontato sistematicamente.

Pur se non espressamente previsto (art. 14 dir. 2015/2436; a differenza dal diritto di autore: dir. 29-2001 art. 5.3.k), è però in generale da ammettere. Resta il compito di individuarne i confini e cioè di conciliarlo con il diritto di marchio.

Il ruolo di Facebook nella presenza (conosciuta) di marchi contraffatti sul suo marketplace

Direct liability no, ma contributory si, dice il tribunale del Distr. Nord di New York 7.11.2023, caso 5:22-CV-1305 (MAD/ML), Car-Freshner v. Meta.

Si tratta del marchio del noto alberello deodorante di largo uso negli autoveicoli.

responsabilità diretta, no: <<In Tiffany, the Second Circuit concluded that eBay did not directly infringe on Tiffany’s
trademark where it resold genuine Tiffany goods. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103. Tiffany argued that
some of the goods being sold on eBay were counterfeit, which the Second Circuit explained “is
not a basis for a claim of direct trademark infringement against eBay, especially inasmuch as it is
undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as counterfeit and
took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany goods.” Id. The Second Circuit
continued, “[t]o impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all of the
purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of
genuine Tiffany goods.” Id.
Although Plaintiffs allege that Meta did not promptly remove the infringing products from
its websites, there are no allegations that Meta “placed” the infringing marks on any goods. 15
U.S.C. § 1127(1)(A); see also Lops v. YouTube, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-843, 2023 WL 2349597, *3
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2023) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he exhibits indicate that the videos were created
or posted by third parties rather than by YouTube. But YouTube cannot be subject to direct
liability for trademark infringement based on videos uploaded by third parties”);
Nike, Inc. v. B&H Customs Servs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 3d 498, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[T]he
infringer must have some intention to sell, advertise, or distribute the infringing product or service
in order for strict liability to attach. Mere unwitting transportation of another’s goods is not enough . . . “). As such, the Court grants Meta’s motion and dismisses the direct liability claims>>.

ma contributory liability, si, visto che Meta sapeva delle dopcumentate contestazioni dell’attore:

<<Plaintiffs’ allegations are different from those in Business Casual Holdings because Plaintiffs allege that Meta did not remove the infringing post or products from Facebook or Instagram until Plaintiffs filed their original complaint with this Court. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶¶ 114-
15, 117, 119, 121. Plaintiffs allege that even after they notified Facebook and Instagram of the alleged infringement, both websites advertised and offered the infringing products. See id. at ¶¶ 110. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, they have sufficiently stated a contribution claim as they allege that Meta had knowledge of the alleged infringement and instead of removing the posts or products from its websites, it continued to advertise the products. Thus, the Court denies Meta’s motion to dismiss>>.

La sentenza riproduce pure i marchi a confronto (p. 48-49), ravvisandone la sufficiente confondibilità per rigettare l’istanza di dismiss di Meta e per proseguire il processo

La lite sui marchi HAMILTON v. LEWIS HAMILTON

il segno LEWIS HAMILTON (del pilota di F1) è confondibile con HAMILTON (nota marca di orologi svizzeri) per prodotti sostanzialmente eguali?

Risponde positivamente il 1° board dell’appello amministrativo dell’EUIPO 17.10.2023, Case R 336/2022-1, 44IP ltd v. Hamilton International AG .

Si dimostra sempre difficile provare la propria notorietà a livello europeo: qui però, si badi, allo scopo di escludere confondibilità con il previo segno della casa orologiaia svizzera. Si v. la parte VI “Public perception and knowledge of Lewis Hamilton”.

Non è infatti discussa la questione del se ricorrsse uan notirrietà vicile del corridore nel 2015, anno di deposiuto del marchio della casa orologiaia. Ma una norma come nil n. art. 8.3 cpi nella UE non esiste. pur se la giurisprudenza di fatto ha posto una regola analoga ma non uguale (diritto di continuare ad usare mna no ndi impedire la registaszione altrui): <<§ 61 In accordance with case-law, famous persons enjoy special protection when applying for trade marks. Insofar as their name is recognized, this recognition neutralizes any similarity with other signs which, under normal circumstances, would lead to a likelihood of confusion (24/06/2010, C-51/09 P, Barbara Becker, EU:C:2010:368; 02/12/2008, T-212/07, Barbara Becker, EU:T:2008:544; 17/09/2020, C-449/18 P & C-474/18 P, MESSI (fig.) / MASSI et al., EU:C:2020:722; 26/04/2018, T-554/14, MESSI (fig.) / MASSI et al., EU:T:2018:230; 16/06/2021, T-368/20, Miley Cyrus / Cyrus et al., EU:T:2021:372)>>

Conclusione:

<< 135 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion. It follows from the very wording of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR that the concept of a likelihood of association is not an alternative to that of a likelihood of confusion, but serves to define its scope (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 29; 22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 17).
136 A likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be assessed globally. That global assessment implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and in particular similarity between the trade marks and between the goods or services covered.
Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the signs, and vice versa (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17; 22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 19). The more distinctive the earlier trade mark, the greater the risk of confusion, and trade marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the reputation they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than trade marks with a less distinctive character (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18).
137 Where a common element, retains an independent distinctive role in the composite sign, the overall impression produced by that sign may lead the public to believe that the goods or services at issue come, at the very least, from companies which are linked economically, in which case a likelihood of confusion must be held to be established (22/10/2015, C‑20/14, BGW / BGW, EU:C:2015:714, § 40).
138 In numerous members states, family names are given more weight than first names, even if they are at the beginning (03/06/2015, T-559/13, Giovanni Galli, EU:T:2015:353, § 47). In the absence of any arguments or evidence submitted with this respect, the Board considers that the family name has no less importance than the first name in neither Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia nor Lithuania.
139 In light of the at least average degree of similarity between the goods and services, the average degree of similarity of the signs and the normal inherent distinctive character of the earlier trade mark, a likelihood of confusion exists in at least Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania. Despite the fact that the average consumer will display a high level of attention, even these consumers may believe that the EUTM applied for is a sub-brand of the earlier trade mark and that both belong to the same or economically-linked undertakings.
140 For the sake of completeness, the Board would like to add the following:
141 Even if Lewis Hamilton were a famous person in the entire European Union, it needs to be taken into consideration that the evidence in file suggests that he is often referred to by his family name. This is evident from the evidence submitted by the opponent in its response to the statement of grounds (page 27ss, page 6 351 of the file and Annex AN44.1), which proves that newspapers refer to him only as ‘Hamilton’. This does not mean anything else than that the relevant public will immediately associate ‘Hamilton’ with ‘Lewis Hamilton’. Even if ‘Lewis Hamilton’ enjoyed the status of a famous person, the term ‘Hamilton’ alone would also be associated with him, which would lead to the fact that the public could believe that the earlier trade mark is also
endorsed by the applicant, and leading therefore also to a likelihood of confusion since the public might believe, that both trade marks are coming from the same undertaking or belong to undertakings economically-connected.
142 The relevant facts in these proceedings are different from those in the proceedings which led to the judgments on which the applicant relies. Nothing in the file allowed the conclusion that the public would refer to Barbara Becker as Becker alone. The same holds true with respect to Miley Cyrus, who is only known as Miley Cyrus and not as Cyrus. Last, in the Messi case, the opposing trade mark was not Messi. Consequently, in these cases, the fame and repute of Barbara Becker, Miley Cyrus and Leo Messi could exceptionally rule out any likelihood of confusion>>

(segnalazine odierna di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat)

Il giudizio di confondibilità quando il marchio anteriore è di certificazione: il caso Grillhoumi c. Halloumi, con soccombenza del governo cipriota

Altra vicenda nella lite sui segni richiamanti il formaggio cipriota Halloumi.

Si tratta della sentenza Trib. UE 11.10.2023 N, T-415/22 .

Sul punto in oggetto si legge:

<< The General Court held, in particular, that, where the earlier marks relied on in the opposition were national certification marks, which had been registered under national legislation transposing Directive 89/104, the likelihood of confusion had to be understood – by analogy with the rules governing collective marks – as being the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services covered by those earlier trade marks and those covered by the trade mark applied for all originated from persons authorised by the proprietor of those earlier marks to use them or, where appropriate, from undertakings economically linked to those persons or to that proprietor. It added that, furthermore, although, in the event of opposition by the proprietor of a certification mark, the essential function of that type of mark had to be taken into account in order to understand what was meant by likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, the fact remained that the case-law establishing the criteria with regard to which the existence of such a likelihood of confusion had to be assessed in practice was applicable to cases concerning an earlier certification mark>>.

Confondibilità rigettata in appello EUIPO

marchio posteriore for classes 5, 35 and 44, namely “pharmaceuticals”, “medical preparations”, “food supplements” and “dietetic substances for babies (colori rivendicati)

marchio anteriore designating, inter alia, classes 5, 30 and 32, “ia” designating goods in class 10 and “ia” designating services in class 35.

Il 1st board of appeal EUIPO 31.10.2023, case R 1529/2023-1, INTERAPOTHEK, S.A.U. v. Q4MEDIA rigetta per assebnza di confondibilità ex art. 8.1.b EUTMR.

Conclusione:

<<Overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
36 The enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark was not claimed. Its inherent
distinctiveness results from the distinctive element ‘iaʼ in the central and initial position
but is weakened by the fact that its second word ‘BABYʼ is descriptive. The last word
‘interapothekʼ cannot be seen as a meaningful expression: as explained before, even if its
part ‘apothekʼ can be related to ‘Apothekeʼ (German word for ‘pharmacyʼ) the
combination with the prefix ‘interʼ lacks any tangible sense and is not descriptive. The
element may be seen as allusive but still distinctive. Overall, the inherent distinctiveness
of the earlier mark is under average.
37 The level of attention of both, the professional and the general public is high. The mark
has been found aurally similar to an average degree but conceptually and visually only to
a low degree. For the relevant goods and services the visual aspect is not less important
than the aural one, because the goods are bought on sight and the services are often
contracted on basis of written descriptions (offers, catalogues, Internet searches).
Therefore, taking into consideration the high level of attention of the relevant public and
the weakened distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the likelihood of confusion cannot be
confirmed even for identical goods. Even less so can this likelihood exist for goods that
are only similar.
38 The other earlier marks invoked in the opposition are even less similar to the EUTM
application as they overlap with the latter in only two letters, but differ in a multitude of
factors (beginning, length, font of the letter ‘aʼ, colours, initial letter/sound, number of
syllables). The likelihood of confusion does not exist on the basis of these marks either.>>

Famiglia di marchi (a fini del giudizio di confondibilità)

App. Milano 3057 / 2’023 del 30.10.2023, rg 2355/2021.rel. Cortelloni, Sergio Ricci spa c. Sergio Rossi spa:

<<La Corte rileva che una “famiglia di marchi”, per essere tale, presuppone un “marchio capostipite” e altri marchi che riproducono lo stesso nucleo fondamentale, identificativo ed evocativo di determinati prodotti, con eventuali mere varianti grafiche, che, peraltro, devono apparire accessorie e marginali rispetto al nucleo fondamentale considerato.
Nel caso in esame, i segni di Stefano Ricci spa oggetto di disamina, come detto, sono i seguenti: …

Orbene, con riferimento a tali segni, sembra a questa Corte che la possibilità di ravvisare in essi un “nucleo fondamentale comune” incontri un forte ostacolo nel fatto che l’utilizzo delle lettere “SR” avviene – in ciascuno dei marchi considerati – con modalità del tutto particolari e differenti: talvolta, mediante l’impiego di forme “classicheggianti” (1); altre, con l’ulteriore inserimento di una cornice geometrica e decorata, a forma ottagonale, dentro la quale le lettere sono inserite su sfondo bianco (2); ancora, mediante l’utilizzo di decori intrecciati tali da rendere meno riconoscibili ed evidenti le lettere e da evidenziare maggiormente l’aspetto decorativo (3); in un altro caso, mediante l’utilizzo delle lettere con modalità non intrecciate e distanti fra loro, in “stampatello” maiuscolo e aventi fondo bianco /sfumato (4); infine, utilizzando forme moderne e quasi geometriche ove, ancora una volta, il richiamo alle lettere “SR” appare molto meno evidente e riconoscibile (5).
Pertanto, in assenza di un “nucleo fondamentale comune” – che non si ripete in modo costante ed evidente – non sembra possibile ravvisarsi, in concreto, l’esistenza di una “famiglia di marchi”, nel senso auspicato da parte appellante>>

Marchio “Emoji” usato solo a fini descrittivi della propria attività

Eric Goldman dà notizia di NORTHERN DISTRICT Court OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION 29 settembre 2023, No. 22-cv-2378, Emoji company v. vari soggetti .

La convenuta aveva usato il marchio denominativo (la parola) “Emoji” nel descrivere i propri prdotti, dato che vendeva stickers che ricordavano la forma di emojis.

Si tratta di fair use secondo il diritto dei marchi usa (da noi art. 21 c.1 c.p.i., xa vedere se lettere b) o c)), dice la corte.

Là è l’argt. 15 US Core § 1115.b. (4): << That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin;>> (la Corte non menziona la fattispecie sub (4), ma altre paiono non adatte)

Interessante è anche la questione della volgarizzazione del segno.

La corte dice che, impregiudicato se lo sia per digital icons, non lo è per altri prodottio come gli stickers fisici sub iudice: <<But those facts do not strip Emoji Company of trademark protection for the term “emoji”
on classes of products other than digital icons, such as, as relevant here, stickers. That’s because
“emoji” is not a generic term for stickers or emoji-themed stickers. See McCarthy, supra at 12:1
(stating that when a name is generic, “the name of the product answers the question ‘What are
you?’”); see also H.D. Michigan, Inc., 496 F.3d at 760 (“A company’s name may be generic as to
one of its products, but not generic as to its other products, even those related to the first
product. Two Second Circuit decisions illustrate this principle. In one, the court . . . held that the
word ‘safari’ is generic as applied to a type of khaki hat and jacket, but not generic as applied to
boots, shoes, shirts, ice chests, and tobacco. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1976). In another, the court held that the word ‘self-realization’ is a
generic name for a yoga organization (people performing yoga attempt to attain self-realization),
but descriptive as applied to yoga books and classes. See Self–Realization Fellowship Church v.
Ananda Church of Self–Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1995).”). Thus, Winlyn has not
shown that Emoji Company has a less-than-likely shot at success on the merits on the basis that its
mark is generic and therefore unprotectable>>.

Questa la pubblicità della covnenuta (su Amazon; immagine rpesa dal blog di Eric Goldman):

Marchio e ricambisti indipendenti : il caso della mascherina del radiatore riproducente il marchio Audi nel supporto per fissarci il marchio originale

Molto intessante (pure se assai altrettanto particolare…) caso C-334/22 Audi AG v. GQ, nel quale l’avvocato generale Medina ha presentato il 21.09.2023 le sue conclusioni.

Ne dà notizia Marcel Pemsel in IPKat ove anche una riproduzione della mascherina (assente nel documento con le Conclusioni):

Per l’ AG, non si impinge nella privativa.

La risposta è condivisibile.

Successivamente l’AG si occupa del caso in cui la Corte non lo segua. Dice che allora non si può applicare la limitazione posta dall’art. 14.1.c) del reg. 2017/1001, per cui <<Il diritto conferito dal marchio UE non consente al titolare di impedire ai terzi l’uso in commercio: (…) c) del marchio UE per identificare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi come prodotti o servizi del titolare di tale marchio, specie se l’uso di tale marchio è necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto o servizio, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio>>.

Letteralmente non è applicabile, è vero. La questione è intricata : una risposta affermativa non mi parrebbe a prima vista impossibile, anche se meriterebbe analisi approfondita

Marchio denominativo anticipato da marchio complesso

Trib. ue 13.09.2023, T-167/22, Transformers Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd c. EUIPO – H&F srl, decide la tra i seguenti segni (prodotti quasi uguali):

– segno denominativo TMC TRANSFORMERS , chiesto in registrazione;

–

marchio anteriore azionato dall’opponente

Il Trib conferma le decisioni amministrative che danno ragione all’opponente: il secondo marchio crea confondibilità.

Centrale è l’espressione TMc in entrambi, la quale a sua volta è sufficientemente distintiva.

C’è somiglianza fonetica e visiva, non concettuale