la tutela del marchio – Pagina 4

La confondibilità dei marchi nel caso Jagermeister

Il secondo non è vero che sia dissimilar dal primo: è similar, anche se solo in parte.

Si noti l’evidente tentatico del secondo di porre una netta differenza nel nome, la cui rilevanza è duplicemente notevole all’interno di ciascun marchio: sia perchè il nome prevale sul disegno nella percezione cnsumeristica (lo stesso BoA lo ricorda) sia perchè è scritto assai ingrande nel caso specifico.

Quindi il rigetto dell’opposizione era ingiustificato e la procedura torna alla Opposition Division per vedere se ciò basta per un giudizio di confondibilità (essenzialmente data la rinomanza dell’anteriorità: <<It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR>>, § 25)

Così il 1 Board of appeal dell’ EUipo 20 giuigno 2023In Case R 1952/2022-1Mast-Jägermeister SE c. Tin Kakuszi (ungheria) (v pag. web euipo e accouint del fascicolo nel database ove trovi trad. automat. dall’ioriginale tedesco)

<<18. The earlier figurative mark likewise consists of a rectangular shape which resembles a-bottle label. On a dark-green background there is a white rectangle bordered by a green line followed by a white line. There is a horizontal banderolein orange in the middle of the Zei chens, which contains the text ‘Jägermeister’ in black stylised letters. Underneath it is the word element ‘SELECTED 56 BOTANICALS’ in considerably smaller lettering together with further details, which are barely legible on account of their even smaller font. Above the orange stripred is a white and golden green circle which is decorated with golden-coloured leaves on its underside. The stylised head of a stag with antlers in a jet-circle is depicted in the green circle. Above and framed by the anchor is a circle in a lighter green with a white Latin cross. For the above reasons, the most distinctive element of the earlier sign is the word element ‘Jägermeister’. Nevertheless, the brown targeted will not-neglect the graphic design as a whole and in particular the representation of a stag’s head on a green circle with a cross and the green and orange colour schema in the overall impression of the earlier trade mark.
19. Despite the differences that exist, in particular the differences in the most distinctive word components ‘ST. Joseph’ and ‘Jägermeister’ and in terms of the figurative elements (head of a man in contrast to the head of a deer), the opposing signs have a low degree of visual similarity, as theirgraphic arrangement is very similar overall. The signs are identical in terms of their colour schema (green, white, gold and orange/red), their basic rectangular shape, their construction and their essential graphic elements and their arrangement to one another (circular green element with a portraitsimilar strip above an orange-coloured/red banderole).
20. Both the earlier sign and the central left-hand part of the sign applied for consist of an inner (dark) white rectangle which is firstly bordered by a green, then a dark-green white line and then a dark green line. Both signs contain a red or orange band positioned in the centre with a black lettering above which a dark-and-white and golden green circle with a gold floral decoration is attached. In the dark green circle, there is in each case a stylised front view of a head (by a man in the contested sign and a stag in the earlier sign), which is surrounded by a jet circle in each case.
21. The signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of visual similarity.
22. The signs are aurally dissimilar, as the most distinctive word elements ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign and ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign un are pronounced differently-depending onthe different relevant languages.
23. The signs are conceptually dissimilar. Some of the consumers will understand the word element ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign as a reference to the naked Josef. The word-element ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign as a whole has no meaning. Nevertheless, the German-speaking consumer in any case immediately recognises therein thefact that the terms ‘Jäger’ and ‘Meister’ are combined, and therefore a meaning that differs from ‘ST. Joseph’. Furthermore, for all the consumers targeted, the signs differ in the meaning of the respective figurative elements, namely the depiction of a head of a man in the application, in contrast to the depiction of a head of a deer in the earlier trade mark.
24. Overall, the signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of similarity.
25. The Opposition Division considered the signs to be dissimilar and therefore, from their point of view, did not examine the further requirements ofthe asserted opposition. However, since, as stated above, the signs have a low degree of visual similarity, this must be remedied. It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR (-16/01/2018, 398/16, COFFEE ROCKS (fig.)/STARBUCKS COFFEE (fig.) et al., EU:T:2018:4, § 78)>>.

La componente denominativa prevale su quella grafica del marchio: conferma del trend

Trib. UE 6 settembre 2023 , T-576/22, Bora creation slk c. EUIPO-Truie Skincare:

Marchio posterioore: denouinativo TRUE SKIN

Marchio anteriore:

Classe 3: make up e simili

Rifl soggettivO: consumatore spagnolo.

Il trib. conerma che non c’è rischio di confuisione

<<69 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

70 In the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that, in the light of the identity of the goods at issue, the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the below-average degree of visual similarity and the average degree of phonetic similarity of the signs at issue as well as the finding that the conceptual comparison remained neutral or that there were no relevant conceptual differences that could help to distinguish between the signs at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the Spanish-speaking public which did not understand English, the level of attention of which was average.

71 In that regard, first, the applicant submits that the earlier mark is not essentially perceived as the word mark ‘true’, but that it is the figurative representation of that mark which makes it distinctive because, if that were not the case, that mark could not have been registered on account of the descriptiveness of the term ‘true’ for the English-speaking public. However, it must be pointed out that that argument is similar to that set out in paragraph 46 above and must therefore, for the reasons already stated in that paragraph, be rejected.

72 Secondly, as regards the conceptual comparison, which the Board of Appeal incorrectly found to be neutral, whereas the signs at issue are conceptually different, it must be held that that error of assessment does not have any consequences in the context of the analysis of the likelihood of confusion. As the Board of Appeal pointed out and as the Court has held in paragraph 67 above, the concept is conveyed by one of the two word elements in the mark applied for, namely the element ‘skin’, which is understood as referring to the skin and which is, at best, weakly distinctive with regard to the goods at issue, with the result that the conceptual dissimilarity cannot counteract the overall similarity between the signs at issue.

73 Consequently, in spite of the error of assessment which was made as regards the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue and although there are certain differences between those signs, it must be held that, following a global assessment, the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the part of the relevant public>>.

Domanda di contraffazione di marchio rigettata nonostante l’uguaglianza del marchio usato nel keyword advertising

la us distr. court East. dist. of Kentucky-Lexingtom del 24 agosto 2023, Case: 5:23-cv-00232-DCR, Nursing CE Central c. Colibri , rigetta (al momento) la domanda della prima nonostante la seconda avesse usato il marchio denominativo “Nursing CE Central” della prima nel Google advertising e nonostante un rapporto di piena concorrenza (servizi di formazione e consulenza per infermiere).

Ma i consueti sei fattori per la confondibiità portano la corte a rigettare la domanda, nonsotante l’ulteriore elemento del public interest giocasse a favore dell’attore.

(segnalazione e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Decisione amministartiva sulla confondibilità dei marchi Abercrombie v. Adenauer e Jaguar v. Puma (sulla confondibilità di segni avversari simili/uguali ma rovesciati)

– I –

La divisione di opposizione dell’EUIPO decide l’opposizione N° B 3 172 678 in data 8 agosto 2023 (qui la pagina del fascicolo e qui link diretto al testo) relativa al confronto tra marchi figurativi.

(segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat)

L’opposizione è parzialmnente (sotto il profilo merceologico) accolta.

<< e) Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion
Likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking into account all the factors relevant to the circumstances of the case; this appreciation depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the degree of recognition of the mark on the market, the association that the public might make between the two marks and the degree of similarity between the signs and the goods/services (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 22).
A likelihood of confusion (including a likelihood of association) exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods/services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings.
The Opposition Division has assumed in section d) of this decision that the earlier marks have been extensively used and enjoy an enhanced scope of protection. The examination of likelihood of confusion will, therefore, proceed on the premise that the earlier marks have an enhanced degree of distinctiveness. Indeed, the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and, therefore, marks with a highly distinctive character because of the recognition they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18).
The goods and services are assumed to be identical or similar to a high degree and they target the general and professional publics. The degree of attention varies from average to high.
The similarities between the signs arise from the depiction of a bird in all the signs, which leads to a low degree of visual similarity and at least an average degree of conceptual similarity (if not identity), while the signs are aurally not comparable, as concluded above. However, the signs differ considerably in the particular ways the common elements are depicted, such as their orientations and different shapes of wings, different circular and/or semi-circular shapes and, in particular, the additional verbal elements of the contested sign, which have no counterparts in the earlier marks. The aforesaid differences are particularly relevant when assessing the likelihood of confusion and all these differences will lead to a rather distinct overall impression created by the signs. Even though both parties have used the same concept of a silhouette of a bird in their signs, this itself is not sufficient to give rise to a likelihood of confusion or association, since the differentiating elements are clearly perceivable and sufficiently outweigh the similarities of a depiction of a figurative bird.
The opponent cannot rely on the protection of the depiction of a type of animal, or its part, per se. In the case of two purely figurative signs (or, by analogy a purely figurative sign versus a figurative sign containing a figurative component, as in the present case), which depict a certain type of animal, or a part of it, the owner of an earlier mark can only preclude registration of a contested sign if the figurative depiction itself shows significant similarities to the latter sign (18/04/2018, R 1547/2017-2, DEVICE OF A BLACK BIRD (fig.) / RABE et al., § 35; 28/05/2009, R 1841/2007-1, Form eines Mammuts / ELEPHANT WORLD-TOURS et al., (fig.), § 56). However, the similarities of the figurative elements in the present case are not considered significant, while important differences between the signs are introduced by the verbal elements of the contested sign, as mentioned above, which have the strongest impact in that sign.
Consequently, in the Opposition Division’s point of view, even if there is a conceptual link between the signs, on account of the coinciding concept conveyed by the figurative element of a silhouette of a bird, the considerable visual differences between the signs, as described above, are sufficient to prevent any likelihood of confusion, especially bearing in mind that the relevant public displays an average to high level of attention. Consequently, the fact that the signs contain a depiction of a silhouette of a bird is not sufficient in itself to lead to a finding of likelihood of confusion. The Opposition Division considers that the consumers will be able to safely distinguish between the signs.
Considering all the above, there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Therefore, the opposition must be rejected insofar as it is based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR.
The opponent has also based its opposition on the following earlier trade mark:
international trade mark registration designating the European Union No 1 457 089 (figurative mark).
This earlier mark invoked by the opponent is less similar to the contested mark. This is because it contains additional figurative components, namely a circle and some figurative lines, which overall give an impression of a simplified depiction of the Sun. These additional elements further differentiate between the signs visually and they also introduce an additional differing concept, which is not present in the earlier trade marks compared above. Therefore, the outcome cannot be different with respect to the goods for which the opposition has already been rejected; no likelihood of confusion exists with respect to those goods>>.

C’è pure un interessante esame dell’opposizione basata sulla rinomanza, p. 10 ss , anche essa accolta parzialmente.

Si sta diffondendo la prassi di cercare di sfruttare la notorietà altrui rovesciando la direzione di un’immagine rinomata (e qui pure aggiungendovi un nome): tentativo per ora rischioso .

– II –

In pari data 8 agosto la stessa Divisione di Opposizione nella OPPOSITION Nо B 3 123 557 Jaguar Land Rover Limited v.Puma Energy International SA ha dato esito quasi opposto (o semplicemente diverso) al conflitto tra questi due segni per prodotti uguali:

Le differenze però sono qui maggiori: spt. direi nel primo il felino sta saltando, mentre nel secondo sta correndo e poi i colori sono invertiti.

<<In making the visual comparison of two marks depicting an animal, the Opposition Division must take care not to apportion excessive weight to a coincidence in features that are merely generic to this part of the animal body (e.g. legs, tails), since these traits, which are common to felines, differ significantly in the details of the marks under comparison (13/07/2017, R 110/2017 2, DEVICE OF A FLYING BIRD (fig.) / DEVICE OF A FLYING BIRD (fig.) et al., § 61; 29/07/2020, R 2901/2019 5, DEVICE OF A SHEEP (fig.) / DEVICE OF A RAM (fig.), § 30). Indeed, these two depictions of a feline show some significant differences. This is caused predominantly by the fact that the depiction of a feline in the contested sign is very simplified and the morphologic features of felines are not clearly, immediately and effortlessly visible. Instead, that sign consists merely of a feline’s contour and requires some mental effort in order to recognise and identify a feline. This contrasts sharply with the depiction of a feline in the earlier mark, which is less streamlined and more detailed/elaborate, and contains more clearly identifiable morphologic features of a feline than the contested sign, such as details of its head, ears, eyes, etc.

In this regard, consumers are capable of perceiving differences between the stylisation of signs. The key point is how the signs at issue are normally perceived overall and not how the stylistic differences between them may be perceived in the event that a particularly meticulous consumer is in a position to examine the graphic stylisation and draw comparisons between them (20/07/2017, T 521/15, D (fig.) / D (fig.) et al., EU:T:2017:536, § 49)>>

La risposta è di dubbia esattezza: il consumatore ricorda ad un livello di astrattezza maggiore , almeno per i beni di largo consumo

(anche qui segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat che correttamente solleva il problema del grado di astratezza con cui ricorda il consumatore)

Modifiche al codice di proprietà industriale

la legge 102 del 24.07.2023 (GU 184 del 8 agosto 2023) apporta alcune modifiche al c.p.i.

Le più importati sono nei primi tre articoli: art. 1 Divieto di registrazione di marchi evocativi di indicazioni geografiche e denominazioni di origine protetta; art. 2 Protezione temporanea dei disegni e dei modelli nelle fiere; art. 3 Titolarita’ delle invenzioni realizzate nell’ambito di universita’ ed enti di ricerca.

In particolare andrà approfondito il caso sub 1, dovendolo distinguere sia da quello delle segg. lettere c) e c-bis) sia dalla tutela delle denominazioni ex reg. 1151/2012, spt. art. 13 (del cui § 3 potrebbe essere ritenuta attuazione)

Cuiriso è la nuolva disciplina del calcolo dei termini di durata, art. 20: pare non coincuidere con quella civilprocessuale , ad es. , se si tiene conto della’rt. 155 cpc.

Momento e modo cui valutare il marchio violato nel giudizio di contraffazione

Cass. sez. I n° 21.738 del 20.07.2023, rel. Falabella (con passaggi non limpidissimi…):

1) il giudizio sulla esistenza o meno della rinomanza va dato alla data del deposito (o di uso, se marchio di fatto) del secondo marchio. Così parrebbe leggendo : <<l’odierna ricorrente ha agito in giudizio per sentir dichiarare la nullità dei marchi di (Omissis) e l’accertamento della contraffazione posta in essere, ai propri danni, attraverso di essi. Sotto il primo profilo i Giudici del merito dovevano evidentemente verificare se alla registrazione dei marchi si frapponesse l’impedimento di cui all’art. 12, lett. e): a tal fine l’indagine circa la rinomanza dei segni in questione andava condotta avendo riguardo all’epoca del deposito del primo dei marchi “(Omissis)” (anno 1999, come è pacifico), non ad epoca successiva. Simile (ma non esattamente coincidente) conclusione si impone in relazione alla sola domanda relativa all’accertamento dell’illecito contraffattivo. Come insegna la Corte di giustizia, il diritto del titolare alla tutela del suo marchio contro le lesioni di quest’ultimo non sarebbe né effettivo né efficace se non permettesse di prendere in considerazione la percezione del pubblico interessato nel momento in cui si è iniziato l’uso del segno che lede il suddetto marchio: quindi, per determinare la portata della tutela di un marchio regolarmente acquisito in funzione della sua capacità distintiva, il giudice deve prendere in considerazione la percezione del pubblico interessato nel momento in cui il segno, il cui uso lede il suddetto marchio, ha iniziato ad essere oggetto di utilizzazione (Corte giust. CE 27 aprile 2006, C-145/05, Levi Strauss & Co., 17 e 20, pure citata da parte ricorrente)>>.

Affermazione scontata.

2) la contraffazione va accertata rispetto al marchio violato così come depositato, non così come concretamente usato. Così parrebbe da <<è senz’altro vero che il giudizio quanto al rischio confusorio determinato dalla somiglianza dei marchi, siccome impiegati per prodotti o servizi identici o affini, può riguardare segni che presentino una differente caratterizzazione (per essere l’uno denominativo e l’altro al contempo denominativo e figurativo: per una ipotesi siffatta cfr. ad es. Cass. 18 giugno 2018, n. 15927). E’ altrettanto vero, però, che, ove si tratti di accertare la nullità della registrazione ex art. 12, comma 1, lett. b), o l’uso illecito del segno che sia simile ad altro marchio precedentemente registrato, a norma dell’art. 20 comma 1, lett. b), occorre guardare a tale titolo di privativa, e cioè al segno oggetto di deposito e registrazione, non al modo con cui esso venga utilizzato dall’avente diritto (sull’irrilevanza delle modalità concrete di applicazione dei marchi denominativi ai prodotti, dovendo la valutazione quanto all’impedimento alla registrazione del marchio effettuarsi sulla base dei segni quali registrati o richiesti: Trib. UE 29 febbraio 2012, T-525/10, Azienda Agricola Colsaliz, 37; Trib. UE 9 giugno 2010, T-138/09, Muñoz Arraiza, 50)>>.

Pure affermazione scontata: la diversità rileva solo al fine di eventuale decadenza per non uso

il Trib. UE sulla confondibilità tra marchi denominativi (messaggio concettuale dei nomi di persona e neutralizzazione -mancata, nel caso sub iudice- prodotta dagli elementi differenzianti)

Precisazioni sempre utili in argomento da Trib. UE 21.06.2023, Cases T‑197/22 and T‑198/22, Ioulia and Irene Tseti Pharmaceutical Laboratories SA v. EUIPO (+ Arbora & Ausonia, SL).

Il Trib. per lo più accoglie l’opposizione (cioè non in toto).

Sentenza istruttiva che ripercorre tutti i soliti passaggi nelle liti di questo tipo.

(notizia da M. Pemsel in IPKat)

Sfruttamento della rinomanza del marchio altrui o lecita parodia? La Corte Suprema parteggia per il titolare del marchio in JACK DANIEL’S PROPERTIES, INC. v. VIP PRODUCTS LLC

Ecco la decisione della Corte Suprema 8 giugno 2023, No. 22–148, in JACK DANIEL’S PROPERTIES, INC. v. VIP PRODUCTS LLC.

Il tema dei confini della lecita parodia/satira rispetto allo sfruttamento della notorietà altrui è sempre difficile da trattare. O meglio, quello del se e in che limiti possa darsi diritto di espressione ad imprese commerciali: agendo per lucro, infatti, è plausibile che le loro condotte mirino al lucro , invece che contribuire al democratico dibattito nella società (marketplace of ideas). Ma allora il problema potrebbe allargarsi dato che qualunque artista professionista agisce anche per lucro: viene meno la creatività? No di certo.

Comunque la Corte taglia corto: non si può nemmeno discutere di diritto di parola e di parodia (espresamente prevista, si badi, dal 15 US code § 1125.(c)(3)(A)(ii)) quando avviene nell’ambito di attività commerciale e integrando direttamente la fattispecie tipica di violazione di marchio altriu.

Il noto Rogers test che si applica appunto nella questione violazione di privativa vs. diritto di parola (per gli expressive works) non si applica, cassando la decisione di appello del 9 circuito.

Dal Syllabo:

<<(b) In this case, VIP conceded that it used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers. And VIP has said and done more in the same direction with respect to Bad Spaniels and other similar products. The only question remaining is whether the Bad Spaniels trademarks are likely to cause confusion. Although VIP’s effort to parody Jack Daniel’s does not justify use of the Rogers test, it may make a difference in the standard trademark analysis. This Court remands that issue to the courts below. Pp. 17–19.
2. The Lanham Act’s exclusion from dilution liability for “[a]ny noncommerical use of a mark,” §1125(c)(3)(C), does not shield parody, criticism, or commentary when an alleged diluter uses a mark as a designation of source for its own goods. The Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary puts the noncommercial exclusion in conflict with the statute’s fair-use exclusion. The latter exclusion specifically covers uses “parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon” a famous mark owner, §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii), but does not apply when the use is “as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services,” §1125(c)(3)(A). Given that carve-out, parody is exempt from liability only if not used to designate source. The Ninth Circuit’s expansive view of the noncommercial use exclusion—that parody is always exempt, regardless whether it designates source—effectively nullifies Congress’s express limit on the fair-use exclusion for parody. Pp. 19–20.>>

e poi da p. 2 della sentenza:

<<Today, we reject both conclusions. The infringement issue is the more substantial. In addressing it, we do not decide whether the threshold inquiry applied in the Court of Appeals is ever warranted. We hold only that it is not appropriate when the accused infringer has used a trademark to designate the source of its own goods—in other words, has used a trademark as a trademark. That kind of use falls within the heartland of trademark law, and does not receive special First Amendment protection. The dilution issue is more simply addressed. The use of a mark does not count as non commercial just because it parodies, or otherwise comments on, another’s products>>.

Da noi l’art. 21 c.p.i. non prevede l’uso lecito come parodia nè diritto di espressione.

V. ora il post 21 giugno u.s. di Lisa Ramsey, Resolving Conflicts Between Trademark and Free Speech Rights After Jack Daniel’s v. VIP Products (Guest Blog Post). e tra i saggi più impegnati Jack Daniel’s vs. Bad Spaniels—Does a Dog Toy Get Heightened First Amendment Protection? di Jelena Laketić nel Berkeley Technology Law Journal.

V. ora l’interessante saggio dei proff. Tushnet e Lemley, 11.01.2024, “First Amendment Neglect in Supreme Court Intellectual Property Cases” .

Tutela extramerceologica di marchio rinomato concessa solo in parte

Trib. UE 24 maggio 2023, T-509/22, Bimbo SA v. Euipo-Bottari euripe srl, decide in modo corretto domanda di tutela della rinomanza (art. 8.5 reg. UE 2017/1001)

marchio chiesto in registratozione ma contestato dall’opponente

L’anteriorità era data da BIMBO (marchio denominativo assai rinomato in Spagna per pane e prodotti relativi) rispetto al marchio de quo , riferito per lo più a prodotti relativi alle biciclette.

Giustamente il Trib. conferma la decisione amministrativa di rigetto della domanda di tutela della rinomanza: non c’è approfittamento indebito da parte dell’uno nè dilution a carico dell’altro.

E’ però assai dubbio che ci sia per quelle poche classi di prodotti per cui l’Ufficio ha concesso la tutela (§ 7: soprattutto per le cl. 3 e 28)

class 3: ‘Detergents; Soap; Grease-removing preparations’;
Class 21: ‘Drinking bottles; Drinking bottles for sports’;
Class 28: ‘Scooters [toys]; Tricycles for infants [toys]; scooters for kids; Gloves for games’.

Marcel Pemsel su Ipkat offre un utile suggerimento operativo per favorire il riconoscimenot della tutela allargata: <<In order to show that the reputation of a trade mark goes beyond the public targeted by the goods or services for which the trade mark is famous, evidence on collaboration with companies from different sectors can be useful. Also, other efforts to extend the brand beyond the sector for which it enjoys a reputation can show that consumers in other sectors are familiar with it, such as merchandising producs or sponsorships>>.

Giusto: bravo Marcel!

Lite in tema di marchi per keyword advertising tra studi legali dell’Arizona

Distr. Court of Arizona 8 maggio 2023, Case 2:21-cv-01540-DG, Lerner & Rowe PC,
v. Brown Engstrand & Shely LLC, et al.:

<<The three relevant screenshots produced by Plaintiff show clear labeling of Defendants’ entry, using Defendants’ name and prominently labelled as an “Ad,” and with no use of Plaintiff’s trademark or confusingly similar language or content.

Reasonably savvy Internet users with a strong incentive to select the right lawyer would not be confused by these clearly labeled ads into believing that Defendants were Plaintiff.

Plaintiff produces no survey evidence showing a likelihood of confusion, and its evidence that, at most, 0.215% of all consumers exposed to Defendants’ ads were in fact confused by them is simply not enough to show a likelihood. Two-tenths of one percent is not an appreciable or significant portion of consumers exposed to Defendants’ keyword-generated ads. Plaintiff does have a strong mark, but no reasonable jury viewing Plaintiff’s thin evidence could find that potential clients viewing Defendants’ clearly labeled ads are likely to be confused into thinking Defendants were in fact Plaintiff.
The 25 irrelevant screenshots produced by Plaintiff – screenshots taken during a time when Defendants’ were not buying Plaintiff’s name as a keyword – reinforce the Court’s conclusion. Each of the irrelevant screenshots was produced by searching for “lerner & rowe,” “lerner rowe,” or a variation of these words. Doc. 68-3.

And even though Defendants had not purchased Plaintiff’s name as a keyword, Defendants’ ads appeared in the search results along with ads for other personal injury law firms.

Google’s algorithm apparently called up similar law firms when a specific law firm was searched for. See, e.g., Doc. 57-6 at 15 (including an ad for azinjuredworker.com), 17 (getlawyersnow.com and palumbowolfe.com), 18 (arjashahlaw.com), 20 (getlawyersnow.com), 22 (hutzler law.com), 28 (larryhparkerphoenix.com). These screenshots show what Internet users find when searching on Google for Lerner & Rowe – ads for a variety of law firms.

As with all searches on Google, the consumer then must scroll through the returns to decide which entries are worth clicking on.

Because Defendants’ entries use their name and are clearly labeled “Ad,” the consumers would know they are seeing an ad for another law firm, as would be true with the other firms seen in the screenshots. The Internet user would then, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “skip from site to site, ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.” Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1179. This is not confusion; this is typical Internet searching. And because “the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely confusion, not mere diversion,” Plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149>>, P. 19-20.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)