Categoria: PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST

Cautelare veneziano sulla tutela della DOC Prosecco contro impresa non concorrente

L’ampiezza di tutela delle DOC divini offerta dall’art. 103 reg. UE 1308/2013 è dimostrata dall’ordinanza cautelare 2 ottobre 2023, RG 8170/2023, giudice dr Doro.

Le imprese convenute non erano minimamente in concorrenza col Consorzio di tutela Prosecco (vendevano caramelle e per di più con forma sessualmente esplicita).

Riporto il passaggio più significativo sul concetto di “evocazione”:

<<L’utilizzazione della D.O.C. “Prosecco” nel prodotto oggetto di causa e nella sua pubblicità presente sul sito internet di Cold costituisce una violazione delle predette disposizioni sotto molteplici profili, giacché:
– vi è un uso della D.O.C. sia diretto sia indiretto, giacché il termine “Prosecco” è riportato più volte nella confezione e nella descrizione del prodotto presente nel sito internet di Cold;
– vi è uno sfruttamento indebito della D.O.C., giacché il produttore e il distributore
utilizzano la notorietà del termine “Prosecco” e si “agganciano” alla medesima al fine di garantire un successo commerciale al prodotto, che però non ha alcun legame con il prodotto tipico tutelato dalla D.O.C. e con il relativo disciplinare;
– vi è, altresì, un indebolimento della D.O.C., che normalmente viene riferita a vini di pregio e invece nel prodotto di cui è causa viene accostata a caramelle dalla forma fallica e all’organo sessuale maschile (“PERFECT FOR LOVER OF WILLIES AND PROSECCO”), ledendo gravemente l’immagine della D.O.C.;
– è irrilevante che il prodotto non sia identico o simile a quello protetto dalla D.O.C., alla luce dei principi richiamati dalla giurisprudenza sopra richiamata;
– è chiaramente idonea ad indurre in errore il pubblico dei consumatori relativamente all’origine e alle caratteristiche intrinseche del prodotto, facendo pensare che lo stesso abbia un qualche legame con il vino D.O.C. “Prosecco” o lo contenga tra gli ingredienti, quando così non è, come si evince dalla lista degli ingredienti riportata nel retro della confezione.
La condotta appare altresì integrare illecito concorrenziale per appropriazione dei pregi e per scorrettezza professionale ex art. 2598, nn. 2 e 3, c.c. e, con specifico riferimento all’ultimo punto, pubblicità ingannevole ai sensi dell’art. 2, lett. b), del D. Lgs. n. 145/2007 e pratica commerciale scorretta in quanto ingannevole ex artt. 20 e 21 del D. Lgs. n. 206/2005>>.

Qui la scorrettezza era eclatante dato che il Prosecco nemmeno figurava tra gli ingredienti.

La sconfitta di Tesla sul marchio per birre GIGABIER presso l’EUIPO

Marcel Pemsel su IPKaT dà notizia della sconfitta amministrativa (per ora) di Testla sul marchio GIGABIER per birre.

E’ la decisione della divisione di opposizione OPPOSITION Nо B 3 162 062, Tesla c. Juicyphant GmbH, 20.09.2023.

La norma azionata dall’opponente Tesla è l’art. 8.4 reg. Ue 1001 del 2017, per cui:

<<4.   In seguito all’opposizione del titolare di un marchio non registrato o di un altro segno utilizzato nella normale prassi commerciale e di portata non puramente locale, il marchio richiesto è escluso dalla registrazione se e in quanto, conformemente a una normativa dell’Unione o alla legislazione dello Stato membro che disciplina detto segno:

a)

sono stati acquisiti diritti a detto contrassegno prima della data di presentazione della domanda di marchio UE, o della data di decorrenza del diritto di priorità invocato per presentare la domanda di marchio UE;

b)

questo contrassegno dà al suo titolare il diritto di vietare l’uso di un marchio successivo.>>

così interpretato dall’ufficio:

<<Therefore, the grounds of refusal of Article 8(4) EUTMR are subject to the following requirements:

• the earlier sign must have been used in the course of trade of more than local significance prior to the filing of the contested trade mark;

• pursuant to the law governing it, prior to the filing of the contested trade mark, the opponent acquired rights to the sign on which the opposition is based, including the right to prohibit the use of a subsequent trade mark;

• the conditions under which the use of a subsequent trade mark may be prohibited are fulfilled in respect of the contested trade mark.

These conditions are cumulative. Therefore, where a sign does not satisfy one of those conditions, the opposition based on a non-registered trade mark or other signs used in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 8(4) EUTMR cannot succeed>>.

Tesla non riesce a dare questa prova.

Il ragionameno in diritto non è particolarmente interessante.

Lo è quello in fatto, anche se troppo detagliato per essere riporatto in toto.

Mi limito alla conclòusione:

<<The Opposition Division considers that the evidence does not provide a convincing picture of use of the opponent’s sign prior to the time of the filing of the contested trade mark, nor does it indicate that any such use could be considered as meeting the minimum threshold of ‘use in the course of trade of more than mere local significance’ in the relevant territories, as set out in Article 8(4) EUTMR. Moreover, the documents submitted do not provide any concrete indications as to the potential degree of recognition of the opponent’s sign by the public in the relevant territories at the relevant point in time.

Whether or not a trade sign is of more than mere local significance may be established by demonstrating the existence of a network of economically active branches throughout the relevant territory, but also more simply, for example, by producing invoices issued outside the region in which the proprietor has its principal place of business or press cuttings showing the degree of recognition on the part of the public of the sign relied on (24/03/2009, T-318/06 – T-321/06, General Optica, EU:T:2009:77, § 43). (……)

The opponent’s CEO merely stating that, at some point in the future, they intend to produce/offer a beer under the sign ‘GIGABIER’ does not constitute ‘prior use in the course of trade of more than mere local significance’, contrary to the opponent’s assertions.>>

E infine:

<<Considered in the context of a half hour long speech, the opponent’s CEO only briefly referred to the relevant goods while an image of two empty bottles branded ‘Gigabier’ briefly appeared on the screens behind him. When considered with the other indicia in the evidence referred to above (as well as the weaknesses thereof, including the brevity of the interlude between the opponent’s announcement and the relevant date), it is clear that these Annexes only support the conclusion that the single use of the earlier sign prior to the relevant date is the opponent’s brief announcement at an event in Germany, attended by a maximum of 9,000 people, that a beer may possibly be launched in the future under that brand. The evidence also shows that this announcement attracted some comments on social media. However, the evidence does not show that this single announcement by the opponent during a brief event at the new factory plant in Brandenburg, one day prior to the filing of the contested application, was followed by or attracted the attention of a substantial part of the relevant public in Ireland and/or Denmark. Therefore, the opponent has clearly failed to prove that its use of the sign in the course of trade in Ireland and/or Denmark prior to the relevant date was of more than mere local significance in those territories.

This conclusion is not altered by the content, date or language of publication of the articles submitted as Annex 1, which make no mention of the relevant sign or goods, and instead only refer to the opponent’s plans for/construction of a car manufacturing plant.

The opponent has failed to prove that – at the relevant date – the public in the relevant territories were exposed to or were aware of any of the articles or social media posts submitted as evidence, or indeed of the opponent’s announcement itself. No evidence was submitted (such as invoices, price lists, turnover or sales figures, press clippings or actual advertising) demonstrating the opponent’s prior use of ‘GIGABIER’ for the relevant goods (much less attesting to any significance, duration or intensity thereof) as required under Article 8(4) EUTMR. In the same vein, none of the evidence submitted provides any true or reliable indications as to the relevant public’s degree of awareness of the opponent’s sign (if any) prior to the filing of the contested sign.

Any use, however minimal, which could potentially be established in relation to the claimed sign (for example, the social media posts showing two order confirmations of ‘GIGABIER’/Annex 13, which would in any case amount to only €89 and DKK 700 in terms of sales according to the prices of the products indicated in the 2023 blog excerpts/Annex 14) would only have occurred in 2023 (see Annexes 12-16), which is clearly well after the contested EUTM application’s filing date of 10/10/2021. Furthermore, there are no other indications in the evidence submitted that the opponent even referred to publicly (much less indeed made any actual relevant use of) the sign relied upon between their CEO’s mention of ‘GIGABIER’ in their speech on 09/10/2021 and their Twitter posts in 2023/Annexes 12-16. Indeed, the Danish blog excerpts and articles submitted as Annex 14, dating to 2023, refer to the ‘launch’ of ‘GIGABIER’ having occurred in 2023>>.

Sul luogo del danno da illecito ai fini della giurisdizione ex reg. UE 1215 del 2012, art. 7 n° 2

Trib. Milano 5 luglio 2023 n° 5553/2023 sez. 14 Trib. IMpr., rel. Fazzini Elisa, rigetta una domanda di misure di diritto di autore avanzata da soggetto italiano contro pretesi contraffattori inglesi per carenza di giurisdizione.

Ciò perchè il criterio di colelgasmento del luogo del dannn (“in materia di illeciti civili dolosi o colposi, davanti all’autorità giurisdizionale del luogo in cui l’evento dannoso è avvenuto o può avvenire;” art. 7 n. 2 del reg. cit.) non va inteso come danno conseguenza ma solo come danno evento.

<<A tale riguardo, il Collegio rileva che la Corte di Giustizia identifica, in generale, detto luogo sia in quello in cui ha avuto luogo la condotta lesiva, sia in quello in cui il danno si è concretizzato, sicché il convenuto può essere citato, a scelta dell’attore, dinanzi al giudice dell’uno o dell’altro (Corte UE 28 gennaio 2015, causa C-375/13; Corte UE 16 giugno 2016, causa C-12/15; Corte UE 5 luglio 2018, causa C27/17; Corte UE 29 luglio 2019, causa C-451/18). Alla luce degli insegnamenti della Suprema Corte, il tribunale ritiene che occorra tenere presente che “per luogo in cui il danno si è concretizzato” si deve aver riguardo al «danno iniziale», l’unico ad essere destinato ad assumere rilievo ai fini della giurisdizione, senza che assumono rilevanza i diversi luoghi ove si asserisce patito il pregiudizio patrimoniale (cfr. Cass. S.U. 13504/2023; Cass. S.U. 8571/2015; Cass. S.U. 23593/2010), in quanto il criterio del locus commissi delicti non può dilatarsi fino a ricomprendere qualsiasi luogo in cui possano
essere risentite le conseguenze negative a valle di un danno verificatosi altrove (cfr. Corte UE 10 giugno 2004, causa C-168/02), né tantomeno detto luogo può coincidere con il domicilio del danneggiato, laddove la condotta dannosa si sia verificata altrove (cfr. Corte UE 16 giugno 2016, causa C-12/15). In considerazione dei principi espressi dai giudici di legittimità e da quelli europei, è, dunque, evidente che la disposizione di cui all’art. 7.2 del Regolamento deve essere interpretata nel senso che per ‘luogo in cui l’evento dannoso è avvenuto o può avvenire’ debba intendersi il luogo in cui “si è prodotta la lesione del diritto della vittima, senza avere riguardo al luogo dove si sono verificati o potranno verificarsi le conseguenze future della stessa” (cfr. Cass., S.U. 24245/2015), in quanto tale espressione non può riguardare il luogo del domicilio del ricorrente, in cui è localizzato il centro principale del suo patrimonio, per il solo motivo che egli avrebbe ivi subìto un danno finanziario derivante dalla perdita di elementi del suo patrimonio avvenuta e subìta in un altro Stato membro (cfr. Corte UE 10 giugno 2004, causa C-168/02).
Alla luce di tali principi, il tribunale ritiene che il “danno iniziale”, nel caso di specie, debba collocarsi nel Regno Unito a seguito della pubblicazione del libro “The Good Mothers”, essendosi verificate in Italia esclusivamente le eventuali conseguenze patrimoniali, che rappresentano il c.d. danno conseguenza o danno risarcibile, non contemplate dall’art. 7 n. 2 del Regolamento. Nessuna rilevanza,
assume, ai fini della sussistenza di una giurisdizione in capo al giudice italiano, la circostanza che il libro, attraverso la piattaforma e-commerce Amazon, sia acquistabile anche in Italia (cfr. nota 4, pag. 6 dell’atto di citazione), atteso che è circostanza pacifica che esso sia stampato esclusivamente in lingua inglese, non destinato, pertanto, a un pubblico italiano>>

Solo che la legge parla di evento dannoso: quindi fino a che una conseguenza negativa nel patrimoniio della vittima non ci sia, non c’è evento di danno. Quindi deve trattarsi del luogo del danno conseguenza, non della condotta.   La legge avrebbe dobuto dire “l’autorità giurisdizionale del luogo in cui la condotta poi risoltasi in danno è stata tenuta …> .

Il che dovrebbe valere per l’azione sia su danno patrimoniale che non patrimoniale.

Da notare che il giudice riesce ad applicare il reg. citato UE contro un soggetto di un paese che dal 2016 non è più in UE

L’autorità della concorrenza tedesca sulla abusività della clausole imposte da Google

nel caso B7-70721 l’autogirà garante tedesca fa partire un’indagine verso Google per la vioalzione dell’art. 19a.2.4  e art. 32.b.1 della legge concorrenziale tedesca.

Si tratta della decisione 5 ottobre 2023 : vedila in inglese nel sito dell’autorità.

Ex art. 19a.2.4, l’autorità può impedire di

<<4. creating or appreciably raising barriers to market entry or otherwise impeding other undertakings by processing data relevant for competition that have been collected by the undertaking, or demanding terms and conditions that permit such processing, in particular

a) making the use of services conditional on the user agreeing to the processing of data from other services of the undertaking or a third-party provider without giving the user sufficient choice as to whether, how and for what purpose such data are processed;

b) processing data relevant for competition received from other undertakings for purposes other than those necessary for the provision of its own services to these undertakings without giving these undertakings sufficient choice as to whether, how and for what purpose such data are processed;>>

Andiamo ora alle violazioni ravvisarte, sostanzialmente consistenti nella insufficiente scelta data all’utente:

<<(51) .First of all, there is a lack of sufficient granularity in the setting options both when a  Google account is created and when Google’s services are used by non-authenticated  users. Users do not have the option to opt out of cross-service data processing and to limit the processing of data to the Google end user service in which the data were generated. Users only have the choice to accept personalisation across all services –  including data Google collects on third-party websites and apps as well as data Google obtains from third parties – or to opt out of personalisation altogether, also including personalisation based on the data collected in the specific service used. Due to this lack of fine-tuning users cannot make a free choice.19 As a result, they may be tempted to consent to more extensive data processing than they actually wish to accept. The Decision Division has thus reached the preliminary view that insufficient granularity of the choices offered can also result from the fact that no differentiation is possible with regard to different processing purposes.
(52) Furthermore, users are not given sufficient choice within the meaning of Section 19a(2) sentence 1 no. 4a GWB with regard to Google’s data processing terms as in some cases Google offers users no choice at all as to the data processing options, thus not giving any choice with regard to cross-service data processing. When users use a service either by signing in to an account or without an account, Google provides for the possibility of (cross-service) data processing for certain areas without giving users the option of rejecting this.20 Users who wish to use one of Google’s services thus have no choice but to accept cross-service data processing (“take it or leave it”).
(53) Furthermore, the setting options offered by Google – both for signed-in users and for non-authenticated users – lack sufficient transparency. There is a lack of sufficiently concise and comprehensible indications which could provide users with sufficient information as to whether, how and for what purpose Google processes data across services.
The information provided by Google is not sufficient to make users understand
the far-reaching possibilities Google provides for cross-service data processing. In particular, Google does not explain to users which of their data are processed, how they are processed and what is included in the processing purposes. The use of imprecise or unclear terminology and the exclusive reference to examples instead of conclusive definitions contribute to this. In addition, data processing enabled by the users’ consent is presented from a one-sided positive perspective whereas the significant extent of cross-service data processing is not disclosed to users. Users can thus not easily comprehend the scope of the choice options.
(54) Finally, when creating a Google account there is no equivalence of consent and rejection. This is because in the context of the so-called “Express personalisation” users can only accept the data processing option provided for, but have no possibility of rejecting this. Rejection is only possible in the context of the so-called “Manual personalisation”, which requires considerably more clicks. For users it is therefore easier to consent than to reject. In this way, Google exerts an unreasonable influence on the users’ decision so that they have no free choice and no sufficient choice within the meaning of Section 19a(2) sentence 1 no. 4a GWB>>.

Marchio e ricambisti indipendenti : il caso della mascherina del radiatore riproducente il marchio Audi nel supporto per fissarci il marchio originale

Molto intessante (pure se assai altrettanto particolare…) caso C-334/22 Audi AG v. GQ, nel quale l’avvocato generale Medina ha presentato il 21.09.2023 le sue conclusioni.

Ne dà notizia Marcel Pemsel in IPKat ove anche una riproduzione della mascherina (assente nel documento con le Conclusioni):

Per l’ AG,  non si impinge nella privativa.

La risposta è condivisibile.

Successivamente l’AG si occupa del caso in cui la Corte non lo segua. Dice che allora non si può applicare la limitazione posta dall’art. 14.1.c) del reg. 2017/1001, per  cui <<Il diritto conferito dal marchio UE non consente al titolare di impedire ai terzi l’uso in commercio: (…) c) del marchio UE per identificare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi come prodotti o servizi del titolare di tale marchio, specie se l’uso di tale marchio è necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto o servizio, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio>>.

Letteralmente non è applicabile, è vero. La questione è intricata : una risposta affermativa non mi parrebbe a prima vista impossibile, anche se meriterebbe analisi approfondita

Marchio non distintivo per beni e giochi virtuali

La fotografia di un mitragliatore per giochi on line basati su armi da fuoco non è distintivo e quindi nemmeno registrabile.

Così l’appello amministrativo EUIPO-4 sez.- 13 settembre 2023, case R 275/2023-4 Colt CZGroup .

Ne dà notizia Alessandro Cerri su IPKat.

Questo il marchio:

La decisione è esatta ma anche facile. Il marchio possiede distintività  vicina allo zero (nemmeno un minimo tentativo di personalizzare -“originalizzare” o meglio “distintivizzare”, verrebbe da dire- l’immmagine dell’arma), nè rileva il fatto che si applichi a vendite di servizi on line invece che beni fisici.

Quasi invisibile la componente denominativa.

L’unico passaggio interessante  è il rapporto con la privativa da disegno/modello. Per l’ufficio,  esso è nullo: quantunque questa presupponga “carattere individuale”, il giudizio di distintività sul marchio è da essa autonomo.

Conclusioni dell’ufficio:

<<55 In the present case, the mark applied for constitutes a banal representation of the object which is the essence of the goods and services claimed and, therefore, merely informs the relevant public in the territory of the European Union of the nature of the goods and services at issue in Classes 9, 35 and 41, namely that they are virtual goods in the form of firearms or online entertainment, sporting or cultural services aimed at virtual firearms. The application in that figurative version does not provide the consumer public in the territory of the European Union with any additional original information.
56 The relevant consumer public will therefore not be in a position to determine the commercial source of those goods and services when it sees the mark applied for in relation to the goods and services in question in Classes 9, 35 and 41. In addition, the application contains completely non-distinctive (‘MADE IN CZECH REPUBLIC’) and small-sized, miniature (‘CZ BREN 2’) word elements which cannot in any way influence its absence of distinctive character and avert the perception of the relevant public from a completely common representation of a firearm which has no distinctive character in relation to all the goods and services defined above, or which could create a lasting impression of the mark.
57 The applicant stated that the application deviates significantly from the norm or customs in the sectors concerned and this is apparent, for example, from evidence No 1-8 submitted by the applicant at first instance (see observations of 23 May 2022). In that regard, the Board of Appeal finds, first of all, that the evidence supporting the secondary declaration of acquired distinctive character of the application cannot be taken into account in the present appeal proceedings, since the Board of Appeal deals exclusively with the question of inherent distinctiveness, which always precedes the possible application of Article 7(3) EUTMR. However, the Board of Appeal analysed the referenced Annex 1-8 in the form of an extract from Wikipedia, articles from various periodicals and photographs of firearms and indicated that they did not in any way reveal, either individually or in relation to each other, that the application was sufficiently distinctive or that it departed significantly from norms or customs in the sector concerned – those documents do not in any way support the applicant’s assertion that the figurative element of the firearm reproduced in the application was complex. That evidence does not in any way follow from that evidence.
58 As regards the applicant’s argument that the exceptional shape and general appearance of the application is supported by the fact that CZ BREN 2 is also registered as a Community design and therefore has individual character, the requirement of individual character being similar to that of a trade mark, the Board of Appeal rejects it as wholly unfounded. The existing Community design No 4409852-0001 cannot have any direct effect on the distinctive character of the trade mark application in relation to the goods and services in Classes 9, 35 and 41. The trade mark must have the capacity to distinguish unequivocally the goods and services of a given undertaking from those of another undertaking, irrespective of whether or not a related design is registered.
59 A design and a trade mark are two distinct types of industrial property rights governed by different laws and having different criteria or conditions for registration. The use of the argument that a design is registered and has individual character cannot have a direct effect on the distinctive character of the mark. That criterion applies exclusively and individually to the trade mark application referred to above, notwithstanding its similar representation with that design>>.

La citazione in giudizio dell’associazione scrittori usa contro Open AI

E’ reperibile in rete (ad es qui) la citazione in giuidizio avanti il South. Dist. di New Yoerk contro Open AI per vioalzione di copyright proposta dalla importante Autorhs Guild e altri (tra cui scrittori notissimi) .

L’allenamento della sua AI infatti pare determini riproduzione e quindi (in assenza di eccezione/controdiritto) violazione.

Nel diritto UE l’art. 4 della dir 790/2019 presuppone il diritto  di accesso all’opera per  invocare l’eccezione commerciale di text and data mining:

<< 1. Gli Stati membri dispongono un’eccezione o una limitazione ai diritti di cui all’articolo 5, lettera a), e all’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, della direttiva 96/9/CE, all’articolo 2 della direttiva 2001/29/CE, all’articolo 4, paragrafo 1, lettere a) e b), della direttiva 2009/24/CE e all’articolo 15, paragrafo 1, della presente direttiva per le riproduzioni e le estrazioni effettuate da opere o altri materiali cui si abbia legalmente accesso ai fini dell’estrazione di testo e di dati.

2. Le riproduzioni e le estrazioni effettuate a norma del paragrafo 1 possono essere conservate per il tempo necessario ai fini dell’estrazione di testo e di dati.

3. L’eccezione o la limitazione di cui al paragrafo 1 si applica a condizione che l’utilizzo delle opere e di altri materiali di cui a tale paragrafo non sia stato espressamente riservato dai titolari dei diritti in modo appropriato, ad esempio attraverso strumenti che consentano lettura automatizzata in caso di contenuti resi pubblicamente disponibili online.

4. Il presente articolo non pregiudica l’applicazione dell’articolo 3 della presente direttiva>>.

Il passaggio centrale (sul se ricorra vioalzione nel diritto usa) nella predetta citazione sta nei §§ 51-64:

<<51. The terms “artificial intelligence” or “AI” refer generally to computer systems designed to imitate human cognitive functions.
52. The terms “generative artificial intelligence” or “generative AI” refer specifically to systems that are capable of generating “new” content in response to user inputs called “prompts.”
53. For example, the user of a generative AI system capable of generating images
from text prompts might input the prompt, “A lawyer working at her desk.” The system would then attempt to construct the prompted image. Similarly, the user of a generative AI system capable of generating text from text prompts might input the prompt, “Tell me a story about a lawyer working at her desk.” The system would then attempt to generate the prompted text.
54. Recent generative AI systems designed to recognize input text and generate
output text are built on “large language models” or “LLMs.”
55. LLMs use predictive algorithms that are designed to detect statistical patterns in the text datasets on which they are “trained” and, on the basis of these patterns, generate responses to user prompts. “Training” an LLM refers to the process by which the parameters that define an LLM’s behavior are adjusted through the LLM’s ingestion and analysis of large
“training” datasets.
56. Once “trained,” the LLM analyzes the relationships among words in an input
prompt and generates a response that is an approximation of similar relationships among words in the LLM’s “training” data. In this way, LLMs can be capable of generating sentences, p aragraphs, and even complete texts, from cover letters to novels.
57. “Training” an LLM requires supplying the LLM with large amounts of text for
the LLM to ingest—the more text, the better. That is, in part, the large in large language model.
58. As the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has observed, LLM “training” “almost
by definition involve[s] the reproduction of entire works or substantial portions thereof.”4
59. “Training” in this context is therefore a technical-sounding euphemism for
“copying and ingesting.”
60. The quality of the LLM (that is, its capacity to generate human-seeming responses
to prompts) is dependent on the quality of the datasets used to “train” the LLM.
61. Professionally authored, edited, and published books—such as those authored by Plaintiffs here—are an especially important source of LLM “training” data.
62. As one group of AI researchers (not affiliated with Defendants) has observed,
“[b]ooks are a rich source of both fine-grained information, how a character, an object or a scene looks like, as well as high-level semantics, what someone is thinking, feeling and how these states evolve through a story.”5
63. In other words, books are the high-quality materials Defendants want, need, and have therefore outright pilfered to develop generative AI products that produce high-quality results: text that appears to have been written by a human writer.
64. This use is highly commercial>>

L’uso come marchio di certificazione non costituisce uso come segno distintivo della provenienza (e cioè come marchio individuale)

Marcel Pemsel su IPKat segnala l’interessante Trib. UE 6 settembr 2023, T-774/21, DPG Deutsche Pfandsystem GmbH c. EUIPO-Užstato sistemos administratorius VšĮ

L’ultima chiede la registrazione del segno seguente:

La DPG fa valere l’anteriorità seguente:

.

Però di fronte alla richiesta di prova del genuine use (da noi art. 178.4 cpi; in UE art. 47.2 reg. 1001 del 2017) , la DPG non vi riesce.

Essa sovraintende al sistema tedesco di riciclo di bottiglie e packaging : per cui l’ampia prova della presenza del segno sui prodotti degli associati non vale prova del suo uso, dato che l’aveva chiesto e ottenuto come marchio individuale e non di certificazione.

<<41  That being said, it is appropriate to examine whether, beyond that function of certifying such goods, the earlier sign also fulfilled, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicant, the function of identifying the commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

42 In that connection, the applicant maintains that when business consumers saw the earlier sign on the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system, on the invoices and on its website, they perceived it as an individual mark indicating the commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

43 As a preliminary point, it must be stated that the applicant’s line of argument relates only to the nature of use of the earlier sign in relation to the services covered by that sign, that is, the services referred to in paragraph 7 above.

44 Regarding, first, the nature of use of the earlier sign on the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system, it is true that all the pages of that document are marked with the sign.

45 However, the graphic elements of that sign such as the bottle, the can and the curving arrow pointing to the left are symbols used throughout the European Union to denote the recycling process or recycling services and are placed on items to be recycled (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Užstato sistemos administratorius v EUIPO – DPG Deutsche Pfandsystem (Representation of a bottle and an arrow), T‑477/18, not published, EU:T:2019:240, paragraphs 32 to 34).

46 Accordingly, when such a sign is affixed to a legal document such as the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system, it will in all likelihood be understood as referring, on the part of business consumers, to the recycling process in itself and to the fact that certain goods are subject to a specific recycling system, that is, the DPG system, and not as indicating the commercial origin of the services covered by the earlier sign.

47 That perception is borne out by the wording of those terms and conditions of participation because, as noted by the Board of Appeal, those terms and conditions present the earlier sign systematically as a marking element of disposable drinks packaging for the purposes of certifying that those goods are covered by the DPG system.

48 Accordingly, inter alia, Article 1.2 of Part I of the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system, which is part of the section entitled ‘Fundamental Principles of the DPG System and functions of the System Participants’, specifies that the earlier sign serves as a ‘symbol’ for the mandatory deposit. Similarly, Article 1.1 of Section 1 of Part II of those terms and conditions provides that the packaging concerned must be marked in such a way as not to impair the meaning of the earlier sign, that is, that that packaging is ‘subject to the mandatory deposit’.

49 Likewise, where Annex 1 to the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system in its 2013 version – which does not differ substantially from the 2016 version – describes the characteristics of the earlier sign, it does not do so in relation to the services covered by that sign. That annex, entitled ‘Specifications for First Distributors regarding the Marking of DPG Packaging’, merely sets out the various components of the earlier sign in order to assist first distributors in marking disposable drinks packaging. The way in which the earlier sign is presented within that annex thus refers to its function of certifying that the goods concerned are subject to the DPG system.

50 Further, the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system associate the earlier sign more closely with the activities of the professionals participating in the DPG system than with the services covered by that sign. In particular, according to Article 2 of Section 1 of Part V of those terms and conditions, collectors are encouraged to display the sign in the context of their operations in order to ‘disclose [their] participation in the DPG System’. From that perspective, the earlier sign serves to indicate that certain operators specialising in the collection, treatment and recycling of waste contribute to the implementation of the DPG system as collectors rather than to designate the services concerned.

51 In those circumstances, there is nothing to suggest that business consumers will perceive the marking of the earlier sign on the terms and conditions of participation in the DPG system, irrespective of its certification function, as an indication of the commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

52 Regarding, second, the invoices submitted by the applicant, it must first be stated that they are marked by the earlier sign on the top right and that sign is juxtaposed with the applicant’s business name, that is, ‘DPG Deutsche Pfandsystem GmbH’, which is set out in large underlined letters in bold type on the top left.

53 As is apparent from paragraphs 45 and 46 above, the elements making up the earlier sign are not designed to refer, on the part of business consumers, to the commercial origin of a specific category of services, but rather to the fact that certain goods are subject to a specific recycling system, that is, the DPG system.

54 Moreover, the applicant submits that, according to case-law, the use of the earlier sign together with the business name of its proprietor on invoices does not, in principle, preclude that sign from being able to refer to the commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

55 In that connection, it must be stated that, in paragraphs 74 and 77 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal did not assert that the earlier sign marking the invoices was not perceived as indicating the commercial origin of the services covered by that sign on the ground that it was used together with the applicant’s business name.

56 Regarding the content of the invoices, they display the amount of the participation fees payable by the participants in the DPG system. The invoices thus stated that those fees are calculated according to the approximate amount of items of DPG packaging that the first distributor intends to put into circulation on the German market. Having regard to that wording, the invoicing of the services provided by the applicant and, moreover, covered by the earlier sign have a merely indirect link to that sign, as the sign was associated more closely with the activity of the first distributors and thereby with its use of certifying that the packaging concerned is covered by the DPG system.

57 Having regard to the foregoing, the applicant, which bears the burden of proof, has not shown that, in addition to the earlier sign’s primary function of certification, business consumers perceived the affixing of that sign to the invoices as an indication of commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

58 Third, the use of the earlier sign on the applicant’s website is similarly not sufficient to show that the relevant public perceives the sign as referring to the commercial origin of the services designated by that sign.

59 As considered by the Board of Appeal, on the applicant’s website, the services which it provides and which are, moreover, designated by the earlier sign are associated, inter alia, with the applicant’s business name, that is, ‘DPG Deutsche Pfandsystem GmbH’. By contrast, the earlier sign is present only at the top left of that website, with the result that business consumers are not guided on the applicant’s website by any element that is sufficiently clear to enable them to associate the services concerned with that sign.

60 What is more, that site states in its FAQ that, in essence, in order to comply with regulatory requirements concerning marking of disposable drinks packaging, it is necessary to display the earlier sign on the packaging in question. Thus, the sign is presented as being a marking element used for the purposes of certifying that the packaging concerned was part of the DPG system.

61 In those circumstances, there is nothing to suggest that, in addition to the earlier sign’s primary function of certifying that the packaging concerned is part of the DPG system, business consumers perceived the use of that sign on the applicant’s website as an indication of commercial origin of the services covered by that sign.

62 Having regard to all the foregoing, the Court holds that the applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the earlier sign has been put to genuine use in accordance with the essential function of individual marks within the European Union in respect of the services for which it was registered>>.

MOL incrementale per la determinazione degli utili da contraffazione di modello + tutela cautelare dei segreti ex art. 98 c.p.i.

Sentenza  Trib. Firenze n° 2143/2023 del 13 luglio 2023, rel. Calvani,  RG 16947/2018 che , per la chiarezza e concisione espositiva (come spessa capita ai maestri di lingua di quella città) e per il vasto  numero di questioni affrontate (sostanziali e processuali) ,  è un ottimo caso-scuola.

Qui riporto solo il breve passaggio sul MOL:

<<Passando alla determinazione degli utili, si ritiene che il criterio basato sul
MOL incrementale sia da considerare il più corretto quando si quantificano gli
utili del contraffattore, perché i costi strutturali o comunque svincolati dalla
contraffazione sarebbero stati sostenuti dalla concorrente anche se non avesse
compiuto l’illecito (TI Milano 10/7/2018).

Ma, se si devono determinare quelli del soggetto danneggiato dalla contraffazione, essi devono scontare tutti i costi, anche fissi, che l’imprenditore sostiene proprio per svolgere la sua attività tipica e che avrebbe sostenuto anche se la concorrenza sleale non fosse stata mai posta in essere>>.

* * * *

Lo stesso relatore poi ha emesso un’ordinanza in altra causa che spiega bene i presupposti di tutela dei segreti aziendali ex art. 98 cpi ed in particolare lo stato di secretazione cui vanno soggette le informazioni.

Si tratta di Trib. Firenze ord. 06.02.2023, RG 14188/2022.

Anche qui stante la chiarezza espositiva e l’analitico esame fattuale il provvedimeo costuisce valida guida per casi analoghi futuri circa il concetto di “misure di secretazione” ex art. 98 c.1 lett. c cpi.

Plagio di lettera da parte di un breve saggio: “The Kindest” in Larson v. Dorland Perry

La corte del Massachussets 14.09.2023 n. Case 1:19-cv-10203-IT, larson v. Dorland Perry, (segnalato e linkato dal prof. Edward Lee su X ).

Qui la peculiarità fattuale è che il lavoro plagiario si è evoluto in tre versioni, sempre più lontane dal lavoro originale.

Sulla substantial similarity : <<“Substantial similarity is an elusive concept, not subject to precise definition.” Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988). The inquiry is a “sliding scale”: If there are many ways to express a particular idea, then the burden of proof on  the plaintiff to show substantial similarity is lighter. Id. at 606-07. Here, there are many ways to write a letter, even one dealing specifically with kidney donations. Larson Mem. SJ, Ex. 8 [Doc. No. 189-8] (examples of sample letters from organ donors/family members of organ donors to recipients); Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 7 (Larson Aff.) [Doc. No. 189-1]>>.

Sulle parti non originali:

<<However, “[n]o infringement claim lies if the similarity between two works rests necessarily on non-copyrightable aspects of the original—for example, ‘the underlying ideas, or expressions that are not original with the plaintiff.’” TMTV, Corp. v. Mass. Prods., Inc., 645 F.3d 464, 470 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “[I]t is only when ‘the points of dissimilarity not only exceed the points of similarity, but indicate that the remaining points of similarity are (within the context of plaintiff’s work) of minimal importance either quantitatively or qualitatively, [that] no infringement results.’” Segrets, Inc., 207 F.3d at 66. “‘The test is whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of substance and value.’” Id. at 62. “While summary judgment for a plaintiff on these issues is unusual,” it may be warranted based on the factual record. Id.; accord T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 112 (1st Cir. 2006)>>.

Sui dati fattuali sostenenti il giudizio di accertato plagio nella prima versione:

<<The 2016 Brilliance Audio Letter.8 As Larson concedes, the undisputed evidence mandates a conclusion that the 2016 Letter is substantially similar to the Dorland Letter. The Dorland Letter is approximately 381 words long, Dorland Mem. SJ, Ex. C [Doc. No. 181-3]; of those 381 words, the 2016 Letter copies verbatim approximately 100, and closely paraphrases approximately 50 more, Larson Mem. SJ, Appendix I [Doc. No. 193-1]. Many of these verbatim or near-verbatim lines gave the Dorland Letter its particular character, including: “My gift…trails no strings”; “I [focused/channeled] [a majority of] my [mental] energ[y/ies] into imagining and celebrating you”; “I accept any level of involvement,…even if it is none”; “To me the suffering of strangers is just as real”; and “I [wasn’t given/didn’t have] the opportunity to form secure attachments with my family of origin.” Id. The 2016 Letter also follows an identical structure to the Dorland Letter: a paragraph introducing the donor, including information on race, age, and gender; a paragraph explaining how the donor discovered the need for kidney donation; a paragraph explaining the donor’s traumatic childhood; a paragraph expressing the donor’s focus on the future recipient; a paragraph wishing the recipient health and happiness; and a concluding paragraph expressing a desire to meet. Id. Based on the documents before the court, the 2016 Letter took “material of substance and value” from the Dorland Letter in such a quantity and in such a manner that the points of similarity outweigh the points of dissimilarity. See Segrets, Inc., 207 F.3d at 62, 66.>>

Con analitico esame ravvisa comunque fair use.

Il giudice esclude tortiuous interference nelle continue dichiaraizoni dell’asserito plagiato verso le contriopati contrattiuali dell’asserito plagiante

Esclude anche che ricorra diffamazione.