Trib. ue 13.09.2023, T-167/22, Transformers Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd c. EUIPO – H&F srl, decide la tra i seguenti segni (prodotti quasi uguali):
– segno denominativo TMC TRANSFORMERS , chiesto in registrazione;
–
Il Trib conferma le decisioni amministrative che danno ragione all’opponente: il secondo marchio crea confondibilità.
Centrale è l’espressione TMc in entrambi, la quale a sua volta è sufficientemente distintiva.
C’è somiglianza fonetica e visiva, non concettuale
Il Parlamento UE approva la <<Risoluzione legislativa del Parlamento europeo del 12 settembre 2023 sulla proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche per i prodotti artigianali e industriali, che modifica i regolamenti (UE) 2017/1001 e (UE) 2019/1753 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e la decisione (UE) 2019/1754 del Consiglio (COM(2022)0174 – C9-0148/2022 – 2022/0115(COD))>> (link diretto qui).
Ora tocca al Consiglio ma non si vedono ostacoli all’orizzonte per l’approvaizone.
La novità è decisamente importante: la tutela (è una privativa sui nomi) prevista per l’agroalimentare ora si estende ai prodotti artigianali e industriali.
Riporto solo questi ultimi due cocnetti come definiti dal reg.:
art. 4.1) << “prodotti artigianali e industriali”: prodotti
a) realizzati interamente a mano, oppure con l’ausilio di strumenti manuali o digitali, o mediante mezzi meccanici, con il contributo manuale ▌ che costituisce una componente importante del prodotto finito; oppure
b) realizzati in modo standardizzato, compresa la produzione in serie e mediante l’uso di macchine;>>
Complicata (doppia, locale e europea) procedura di reguistrazione.
Cenno alla possibilità di intese sulla sostenibilità (art. 40.2.c): che costituisce deroga al divieto di intese restrittive della concorrenza.
La tutela sta nel titolo III, art. 40 ss. Vedi spt art. 40 di cui riporto il § 1:
Articolo 40
Protezione delle indicazioni geografiche
1. Le indicazioni geografiche iscritte nel registro dell’Unione ▌sono protette da:
a) qualsiasi uso commerciale diretto o indiretto dell’indicazione geografica per prodotti che non sono oggetto di registrazione, qualora questi ultimi siano paragonabili ai prodotti oggetto di registrazione o qualora l’uso di tale nome sfrutti, indebolisca, svigorisca o danneggi la reputazione dell’indicazione geografica protetta;
b) qualsiasi usurpazione, imitazione o evocazione del nome protetto come indicazione geografica, anche se la vera origine dei prodotti o servizi è indicata o se l’indicazione geografica protetta è una traduzione o è accompagnata da espressioni quali “genere”, “tipo”, “metodo”, “alla maniera”, “imitazione”, “gusto”, “fragranza”, “come” o un’espressione simile;
c) qualsiasi altra indicazione falsa o ingannevole relativa alla provenienza, all’origine, alla natura o alle caratteristiche essenziali del prodotto usata sulla confezione o sull’imballaggio, sui materiali pubblicitari, nei documenti o nelle informazioni fornite su interfacce online relative al prodotto, così come l’utilizzo, per il confezionamento del prodotto, di recipienti che possano indurre in errore quanto alla sua origine;
d) qualsiasi altra pratica che possa indurre in errore il consumatore quanto alla vera origine del prodotto.
il 3 circuito d’appello usa 7 settembre n. 22-2821, Pim brands v. Haribo, giudice Arleo, conferma il primo grado (notizia e link da IPwatchdog)
La forma e i colori indicano il flavour del dolciume: quindi nessuna distintività.
<<The question is whether the candy’s colors alone signal its flavor or whether the colors and shape combined further that function. Though PIM disagrees, we think the two work together. (…)
As PIM notes, the shape and colors do not match exactly: The bottom could be more curved and have a thinner band of darker green. The wedge could be wider. The point could be sharper and a deeper red. There could be black seeds. But as PIM itself put it, because this candy is an impulse buy, it “do[es]n’t need to be the Mona Lisa.” Oral Arg. 13:15–19. To identify its flavor, the candy’s trade dress need not exactly copy watermelon, but just evoke it.
And the shape contributes to the overall effect. Some shapes for watermelon candies, such as sharks, ropes, and rib-bons, detract from (or at least add no information beyond) the colors. But the wedge shape contributes to the function. The colors alone could leave some ambiguity: Is it watermelon or strawberry? With the wedge shape, all ambiguity is gone—this candy is a wedge of watermelon.
In that vein, the wedge might or might not identify the fla-vor on its own or with other color schemes. That trade dress is not before us; the watermelon-colored wedge is. The registered trademark at issue defines the mark by both colors and shape. So does PIM’s complaint. Plus, when we look at the pictured candies, our eyes are drawn immediately to both their colors and their shape. We think of a slice of watermelon based on both its color scheme and its shape. And in this color scheme, the candy looks like a watermelon wedge. So we hold that the trade dress presented as a whole, colors and shape together, makes the watermelon candy more identifiable as a slice of wa-termelon. That is function enough>>.
DA noi la conclusione sarebbe verosimilmente uguale ex art. 9.c – 13.1.b) c.p.i.
Il secondo non è vero che sia dissimilar dal primo: è similar, anche se solo in parte.
Si noti l’evidente tentatico del secondo di porre una netta differenza nel nome, la cui rilevanza è duplicemente notevole all’interno di ciascun marchio: sia perchè il nome prevale sul disegno nella percezione cnsumeristica (lo stesso BoA lo ricorda) sia perchè è scritto assai ingrande nel caso specifico.
Quindi il rigetto dell’opposizione era ingiustificato e la procedura torna alla Opposition Division per vedere se ciò basta per un giudizio di confondibilità (essenzialmente data la rinomanza dell’anteriorità: <<It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR>>, § 25)
Così il 1 Board of appeal dell’ EUipo 20 giuigno 2023In Case R 1952/2022-1Mast-Jägermeister SE c. Tin Kakuszi (ungheria) (v pag. web euipo e accouint del fascicolo nel database ove trovi trad. automat. dall’ioriginale tedesco)
<<18. The earlier figurative mark likewise consists of a rectangular shape which resembles a-bottle label. On a dark-green background there is a white rectangle bordered by a green line followed by a white line. There is a horizontal banderolein orange in the middle of the Zei chens, which contains the text ‘Jägermeister’ in black stylised letters. Underneath it is the word element ‘SELECTED 56 BOTANICALS’ in considerably smaller lettering together with further details, which are barely legible on account of their even smaller font. Above the orange stripred is a white and golden green circle which is decorated with golden-coloured leaves on its underside. The stylised head of a stag with antlers in a jet-circle is depicted in the green circle. Above and framed by the anchor is a circle in a lighter green with a white Latin cross. For the above reasons, the most distinctive element of the earlier sign is the word element ‘Jägermeister’. Nevertheless, the brown targeted will not-neglect the graphic design as a whole and in particular the representation of a stag’s head on a green circle with a cross and the green and orange colour schema in the overall impression of the earlier trade mark.
19. Despite the differences that exist, in particular the differences in the most distinctive word components ‘ST. Joseph’ and ‘Jägermeister’ and in terms of the figurative elements (head of a man in contrast to the head of a deer), the opposing signs have a low degree of visual similarity, as theirgraphic arrangement is very similar overall. The signs are identical in terms of their colour schema (green, white, gold and orange/red), their basic rectangular shape, their construction and their essential graphic elements and their arrangement to one another (circular green element with a portraitsimilar strip above an orange-coloured/red banderole).
20. Both the earlier sign and the central left-hand part of the sign applied for consist of an inner (dark) white rectangle which is firstly bordered by a green, then a dark-green white line and then a dark green line. Both signs contain a red or orange band positioned in the centre with a black lettering above which a dark-and-white and golden green circle with a gold floral decoration is attached. In the dark green circle, there is in each case a stylised front view of a head (by a man in the contested sign and a stag in the earlier sign), which is surrounded by a jet circle in each case.
21. The signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of visual similarity.
22. The signs are aurally dissimilar, as the most distinctive word elements ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign and ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign un are pronounced differently-depending onthe different relevant languages.
23. The signs are conceptually dissimilar. Some of the consumers will understand the word element ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign as a reference to the naked Josef. The word-element ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign as a whole has no meaning. Nevertheless, the German-speaking consumer in any case immediately recognises therein thefact that the terms ‘Jäger’ and ‘Meister’ are combined, and therefore a meaning that differs from ‘ST. Joseph’. Furthermore, for all the consumers targeted, the signs differ in the meaning of the respective figurative elements, namely the depiction of a head of a man in the application, in contrast to the depiction of a head of a deer in the earlier trade mark.
24. Overall, the signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of similarity.
25. The Opposition Division considered the signs to be dissimilar and therefore, from their point of view, did not examine the further requirements ofthe asserted opposition. However, since, as stated above, the signs have a low degree of visual similarity, this must be remedied. It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR (-16/01/2018, 398/16, COFFEE ROCKS (fig.)/STARBUCKS COFFEE (fig.) et al., EU:T:2018:4, § 78)>>.
Trib. UE 6 settembre 2023 , T-576/22, Bora creation slk c. EUIPO-Truie Skincare:
Marchio posterioore: denouinativo TRUE SKIN
Marchio anteriore:
Classe 3: make up e simili
Rifl soggettivO: consumatore spagnolo.
Il trib. conerma che non c’è rischio di confuisione
<<69 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
70 In the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that, in the light of the identity of the goods at issue, the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the below-average degree of visual similarity and the average degree of phonetic similarity of the signs at issue as well as the finding that the conceptual comparison remained neutral or that there were no relevant conceptual differences that could help to distinguish between the signs at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the Spanish-speaking public which did not understand English, the level of attention of which was average.
71 In that regard, first, the applicant submits that the earlier mark is not essentially perceived as the word mark ‘true’, but that it is the figurative representation of that mark which makes it distinctive because, if that were not the case, that mark could not have been registered on account of the descriptiveness of the term ‘true’ for the English-speaking public. However, it must be pointed out that that argument is similar to that set out in paragraph 46 above and must therefore, for the reasons already stated in that paragraph, be rejected.
72 Secondly, as regards the conceptual comparison, which the Board of Appeal incorrectly found to be neutral, whereas the signs at issue are conceptually different, it must be held that that error of assessment does not have any consequences in the context of the analysis of the likelihood of confusion. As the Board of Appeal pointed out and as the Court has held in paragraph 67 above, the concept is conveyed by one of the two word elements in the mark applied for, namely the element ‘skin’, which is understood as referring to the skin and which is, at best, weakly distinctive with regard to the goods at issue, with the result that the conceptual dissimilarity cannot counteract the overall similarity between the signs at issue.
73 Consequently, in spite of the error of assessment which was made as regards the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue and although there are certain differences between those signs, it must be held that, following a global assessment, the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the part of the relevant public>>.
App. Milano n. 2597/2023 del 5 settembre 2023, Rg 3103/2021, rel. Orsenigo, conferma il rigetto delle domande di Sony pur correggendo (giustamente) la motivaizone.
Sony , produttore fonografico ex art. 72 l. aut., lamentava l’illegititmo rifuto di autorizzare ( o direttamente o tramito mandato a Siae) la distribuzione on line e la sincronizzazione.
Ma o queste erano prevista nei contratti alla base della realizzazione dei dischi oppure no. Nel secondo caso non c’è modo per riconoscere a Sony diritti che non ha ; nè può lametnarsi di revoca del mandato a SIae, che è liberissimo in capo al’autore o ai suoi eredi o aventi casua. Nel primo caso allora Sony avrebbe potuto procedere e poi resistere ad eventuali domande degli eredi Battisti.
Il vero punto allora è se i contratti iniziali (quando le facoltà desiderate da Sony tecnocologicamente non esistevano) potevano essere interpretati evolutivamente: nel senso di far rientarre nelle facolà acquisite da Sony pure quelle che tecnologcamente avrebbeero potuto venir eventualmente scoperte in futuro.
La risposta positiva è difficile, parrebbe: ma sarebbe stato bene riproatare in setnenza uil testo eatto dei poatti pertinenti.
Giustamente rigettata la (incomprensibile) domanda di danno basata su contatto sociale tra Battisti e le case editrici musicali (il contratto per la produzione del dischi era stato sottoscritto da Battisti personalmente): non c’era alcun affidamento di Sony da tutelare in essi.
Palese infondatezza pure nella domanda verso gli amministratori delle due società ex art. 2476 c. 6 (ora c. 7) c.c. come danno diretto al terzi
Da ringraziare Franklin Graves che su Linkedin dà notizia del provv. USCO-Review Board 5 settembre 2023, nel caso “Théâtre D’opéra Spatial” di Jason M. Allen (qui link al documento , da lui offerto).
Si tratta di una prima immagine creata con l’AI di Midjourney , poi ritoccata con Adobe Photoshop e Ggiapixel AI.
Ne aveva chiesto protezione senza menzionare la modalità creativa.
Anche l’organo amministrativamente gerarchico rigetta perchè l’opera creata da AI non contiene creatività umana nè l’istante, pur invitato, ha distinto ciò che è creato da AI e ciò che è da lui creato.
Il lavoro fatto dall’istante era questo:
<<Because the Work here contains AI-generated material, the Board starts with an analysis
of the circumstances of the Work’s creation, including Mr. Allen’s use of an AI tool. According
to Mr. Allen, the Work was created by 1) initially generating an image using Midjourney (the
“Midjourney Image”), 2) using Adobe Photoshop to “beautify and adjust various cosmetic
details/flaws/artifacts, etc.” in the Midjourney Image, and 3) upscaling the image using Gigapixel AI>>.
Decisum conseguente:
<<In his Second Request, Mr. Allen asserts a number of arguments in support of his claim.
He argues that his use of Midjourney allows him to claim authorship of the image generated by
the service because he provided “creative input” when he “entered a series of prompts, adjusted
the scene, selected portions to focus on, and dictated the tone of the image.” Id. at 4. As
explained in his correspondence, Mr. Allen created a text prompt that began with a “big picture
description” that “focuse[d] on the overall subject of the piece.” Allen Sept. Creation
Explanation. He then added a second “big picture description” to the prompt text “as a way of
instructing the software that Mr. Allen is combining two ideas.” Id. Next, he added “the overall
image’s genre and category,” “certain professional artistic terms which direct the tone of the
piece,” “how lifelike [Mr. Allen] wanted the piece to appear,” a description of “how colors
[should be] used,” a description “to further define the composition,” “terms about what style/era
the artwork should depict,” and “a writing technique that Mr. Allen has established from
extensive testing” that would make the image “pop.” Id. He then “append[ed the prompt] with
various parameters which further instruct[ed] the software how to develop the image,”7 resulting
in a final text prompt that was “executed . . . into Midjourney to complete the process” and
resulted in the creation of the Midjourney Image above. Id.8
In the Board’s view, Mr. Allen’s actions as described do not make him the author of the
Midjourney Image because his sole contribution to the Midjourney Image was inputting the text
prompt that produced it. Although Mr. Allen describes “input[ing] numerous revisions and text
prompts at least 624 times” before producing the Midjourney Image, Allen Sept. Creation
Explanation, the steps in that process were ultimately dependent on how the Midjourney system
processed Mr. Allen’s prompts. According to Midjourney’s documentation, prompts “influence”
what the system generates and are “interpret[ed]” by Midjourney and “compared to its training
data.”9 As the Office has explained, “Midjourney does not interpret prompts as specific
instructions to create a particular expressive result,” because “Midjourney does not understand grammar, sentence structure, or words like humans.”10 It is the Office’s understanding that,
because Midjourney does not treat text prompts as direct instructions, users may need to attempt
hundreds of iterations before landing upon an image they find satisfactory. This appears to be
the case for Mr. Allen, who experimented with over 600 prompts before he “select[ed] and
crop[ped] out one ‘acceptable’ panel out of four potential images … (after hundreds were
previously generated).” Allen Sept. Creation Explanation. As the Office described in its March
guidance, “when an AI technology receives solely a prompt from a human and produces
complex written, visual, or musical works in response, the ‘traditional elements of authorship’
are determined and executed by the technology—not the human user.” AI Registration
Guidance, 88 Fed. Reg. at 16,192. And because the authorship in the Midjourney Image is more
than de minimis, Mr. Allen must exclude it from his claim. See id. at 16,193. Because Mr. Allen
has refused to limit his claim to exclude its non-human authorship elements, the Office cannot
register the Work as submitted.>>
Alina Trapova su Linkedin segnala Cass. sez. 1 del 16 gennaio 2023 n. 1.107, rel. Scotti.
La quale ad es. dice che <<la protezione del diritto d’autore postula il requisito dell’originalità e della creatività, consistente non già nell’idea che è alla base della sua realizzazione, ma nella forma della sua espressione, ovvero dalla sua soggettività, presupponendo che l’opera rifletta la personalità del suo autore, manifestando le sue scelte libere e creative; la consistenza in concreto di tale autonomo apporto forma oggetto di una valutazione destinata a risolversi in un giudizio di fatto, come tale sindacabile in sede di legittimità soltanto per eventuali vizi di motivazione (Sez. 1, n. 10300 del 29.5.2020; Sez. 1, n. 13524 del 13.6.2014; Sez. 1, n. 20925 del 27.10.2005)>>.
Però i due cocnetti sono in realtà uno solo: la creatività (art. 6 l. aut).
Si può semmai discutere della <<novità>>, però non menzionata però dallla legge.
Il punto intressante sarebbe stato quello dell’immagine non tutelabile perchè creata col software (in che misura e modo?). Però la SC rigetta perchè non esaminato nella fase di merito.
Interessante segnalazione (di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat) del rigetto EUIPO 23 agosto 2023 , domanda 018843822, di marchio denominativo “Put Putin in” (mettete dentro Putin) per abbigliamento (pag. web del fascicolo e v. link diretto alla decisione).
Ecco il passaggio cruciale:
<<La comunità commerciale percepirebbe il cartello “Putin In” come contrario alla moralità pubblica, in quanto cerca di capitalizzare un evento ampiamente
percepito come tragico, ovvero l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia.
Le implicazioni della guerra in Ucraina per l’UE si estendono all’inflazione, alle
importazioni di gas naturale liquefatto (GNL) (con ripercussioni sull’energia e sui
trasporti), all’aumento della spesa per la difesa, ai flussi di rifugiati dall’Ucraina
verso l’Europa, alla carenza di materie prime e agli impatti negativi sui Paesi
emergenti e in via di sviluppo. Inoltre, è ampiamente riconosciuto che la guerra
ha causato la morte di migliaia di soldati e migliaia di vittime civili.
Il marchio viola i principi morali accettati in quanto sfrutta una tragedia a fini
commerciali, ossia l’intenzione di trarre profitto da un evento tragico, anche se i
consumatori possono percepire il segno come positivo, cioè rinchiudere Putin (in prigione).
Pertanto, il segno non può essere registrato ai sensi dell’articolo 7, paragrafo 1,
lettera f), del regolamento sul marchio UE>>. (orig. svedese, Deepl traduzione)
Il messaggio non è contrario all’ordine pubblico perchè non pare capitalizzare/sfruttare l’ evento tragico dell’aggressione russa, ma piuttosto esprimere un’opinione su tema importante , anche se usando il veicolo della attività economica.
Concordo quindi con le perplessità di Pemsel.
Jerome Tassi su Linkedin segnala la decisione 31 agosto 2023 EUIPO, domanda nà 018731419, istante: Yeshua Investment consulting, che dà esito opposto ai notissimi casi Louboutin
In breve dice ora l’ufficio che il pubblico non lo percepusce come segni di provenenzia aziendale
<<In the case at hand the sign is not distinguishable from the appearance of the
goods it designates, namely “metallic gold outer soles sold as an integral
component of men’s and women’s shoes”; it would only be distinctive for the
purposes of Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR if the consumer was able to recognize the
sign applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to
distinguish the shoes of the applicant from those of other undertakings
(21/04/2010, T-7/09, ‘Spannfutter’, EU:T:2010:153, § 26) and, also, if it
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector. The benchmark
also applies to signs which are only applicable to a component or an element
of the appearance of the product, in the case at hand “Metallic gold outer
soles” (10/10/2008, T-387/06 to T-390/06, ‘Pallet’, EU:T:2008:427, § 36;
13/04/2011, T-202/09, ‘Footwear’, EU:T:2011:168, § 40; 19/09/2012, T-50/11,
‘Stoffmuster’, EU:T:2012:436, § 43).
· The sign consists of a metallic gold sole on footwear. It is clear from these
objective characteristics that the sign applied for aims to protect a coloured
surface in a particular position of the shoe. The sign merges in the eyes of the
relevant public with the claimed goods itself, i.e. shoes, since in the words of
the applicant the metallic gold outer soles are sold as an integral component
of men’s and women’s shoes.
· As to the gold colour of the sole, the public will not instantly perceive a single
colour, or a coloured element which forms part of the external appearance of
the goods as a reference to the commercial origin of the goods (21/10/2004,
C-447/02, ‘Orange’, EU:C:2004:649, § 78). Thus, while colours are capable of
conveying certain associations of ideas, and of arousing feelings, they
possess little inherent capacity for communicating specific information,
especially since they are commonly and widely used, because of their appeal,
in order to advertise and market goods or services, without any specific
message (06/05/2003, C-104/01, ‘Libertel’, EU:C:2003:244, § 40; 24/06/2004,
C-49/02, ‘Blau/Gelb’, EU:C:2004:384, § 38; 12/11/2008, T-400/07, ‘Farben in
Quadraten’, EU:T:2008:492, § 35).
· Furthermore, the use of the gold colour to highlight the quality of a given
product is a common place associated with high quality and excellence and,
therefore, does not confer distinctive character on the product>.
L’avvocato Tassi segnala l’opposto esito dato dall’ufficio alla suola rossa di Louboutin (dopo il via libera della corte giustizia 12.06.2018, C-163/16)