PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST – Pagina 16

Decisione amministartiva sulla confondibilità dei marchi Abercrombie v. Adenauer e Jaguar v. Puma (sulla confondibilità di segni avversari simili/uguali ma rovesciati)

– I –

La divisione di opposizione dell’EUIPO decide l’opposizione N° B 3 172 678 in data 8 agosto 2023 (qui la pagina del fascicolo e qui link diretto al testo) relativa al confronto tra marchi figurativi.

(segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat)

L’opposizione è parzialmnente (sotto il profilo merceologico) accolta.

<< e) Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion
Likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking into account all the factors relevant to the circumstances of the case; this appreciation depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the degree of recognition of the mark on the market, the association that the public might make between the two marks and the degree of similarity between the signs and the goods/services (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 22).
A likelihood of confusion (including a likelihood of association) exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods/services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings.
The Opposition Division has assumed in section d) of this decision that the earlier marks have been extensively used and enjoy an enhanced scope of protection. The examination of likelihood of confusion will, therefore, proceed on the premise that the earlier marks have an enhanced degree of distinctiveness. Indeed, the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and, therefore, marks with a highly distinctive character because of the recognition they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18).
The goods and services are assumed to be identical or similar to a high degree and they target the general and professional publics. The degree of attention varies from average to high.
The similarities between the signs arise from the depiction of a bird in all the signs, which leads to a low degree of visual similarity and at least an average degree of conceptual similarity (if not identity), while the signs are aurally not comparable, as concluded above. However, the signs differ considerably in the particular ways the common elements are depicted, such as their orientations and different shapes of wings, different circular and/or semi-circular shapes and, in particular, the additional verbal elements of the contested sign, which have no counterparts in the earlier marks. The aforesaid differences are particularly relevant when assessing the likelihood of confusion and all these differences will lead to a rather distinct overall impression created by the signs. Even though both parties have used the same concept of a silhouette of a bird in their signs, this itself is not sufficient to give rise to a likelihood of confusion or association, since the differentiating elements are clearly perceivable and sufficiently outweigh the similarities of a depiction of a figurative bird.
The opponent cannot rely on the protection of the depiction of a type of animal, or its part, per se. In the case of two purely figurative signs (or, by analogy a purely figurative sign versus a figurative sign containing a figurative component, as in the present case), which depict a certain type of animal, or a part of it, the owner of an earlier mark can only preclude registration of a contested sign if the figurative depiction itself shows significant similarities to the latter sign (18/04/2018, R 1547/2017-2, DEVICE OF A BLACK BIRD (fig.) / RABE et al., § 35; 28/05/2009, R 1841/2007-1, Form eines Mammuts / ELEPHANT WORLD-TOURS et al., (fig.), § 56). However, the similarities of the figurative elements in the present case are not considered significant, while important differences between the signs are introduced by the verbal elements of the contested sign, as mentioned above, which have the strongest impact in that sign.
Consequently, in the Opposition Division’s point of view, even if there is a conceptual link between the signs, on account of the coinciding concept conveyed by the figurative element of a silhouette of a bird, the considerable visual differences between the signs, as described above, are sufficient to prevent any likelihood of confusion, especially bearing in mind that the relevant public displays an average to high level of attention. Consequently, the fact that the signs contain a depiction of a silhouette of a bird is not sufficient in itself to lead to a finding of likelihood of confusion. The Opposition Division considers that the consumers will be able to safely distinguish between the signs.
Considering all the above, there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Therefore, the opposition must be rejected insofar as it is based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR.
The opponent has also based its opposition on the following earlier trade mark:
international trade mark registration designating the European Union No 1 457 089 (figurative mark).
This earlier mark invoked by the opponent is less similar to the contested mark. This is because it contains additional figurative components, namely a circle and some figurative lines, which overall give an impression of a simplified depiction of the Sun. These additional elements further differentiate between the signs visually and they also introduce an additional differing concept, which is not present in the earlier trade marks compared above. Therefore, the outcome cannot be different with respect to the goods for which the opposition has already been rejected; no likelihood of confusion exists with respect to those goods>>.

C’è pure un interessante esame dell’opposizione basata sulla rinomanza, p. 10 ss , anche essa accolta parzialmente.

Si sta diffondendo la prassi di cercare di sfruttare la notorietà altrui rovesciando la direzione di un’immagine rinomata (e qui pure aggiungendovi un nome): tentativo per ora rischioso .

– II –

In pari data 8 agosto la stessa Divisione di Opposizione nella OPPOSITION Nо B 3 123 557 Jaguar Land Rover Limited v.Puma Energy International SA ha dato esito quasi opposto (o semplicemente diverso) al conflitto tra questi due segni per prodotti uguali:

Le differenze però sono qui maggiori: spt. direi nel primo il felino sta saltando, mentre nel secondo sta correndo e poi i colori sono invertiti.

<<In making the visual comparison of two marks depicting an animal, the Opposition Division must take care not to apportion excessive weight to a coincidence in features that are merely generic to this part of the animal body (e.g. legs, tails), since these traits, which are common to felines, differ significantly in the details of the marks under comparison (13/07/2017, R 110/2017 2, DEVICE OF A FLYING BIRD (fig.) / DEVICE OF A FLYING BIRD (fig.) et al., § 61; 29/07/2020, R 2901/2019 5, DEVICE OF A SHEEP (fig.) / DEVICE OF A RAM (fig.), § 30). Indeed, these two depictions of a feline show some significant differences. This is caused predominantly by the fact that the depiction of a feline in the contested sign is very simplified and the morphologic features of felines are not clearly, immediately and effortlessly visible. Instead, that sign consists merely of a feline’s contour and requires some mental effort in order to recognise and identify a feline. This contrasts sharply with the depiction of a feline in the earlier mark, which is less streamlined and more detailed/elaborate, and contains more clearly identifiable morphologic features of a feline than the contested sign, such as details of its head, ears, eyes, etc.

In this regard, consumers are capable of perceiving differences between the stylisation of signs. The key point is how the signs at issue are normally perceived overall and not how the stylistic differences between them may be perceived in the event that a particularly meticulous consumer is in a position to examine the graphic stylisation and draw comparisons between them (20/07/2017, T 521/15, D (fig.) / D (fig.) et al., EU:T:2017:536, § 49)>>

La risposta è di dubbia esattezza: il consumatore ricorda ad un livello di astrattezza maggiore , almeno per i beni di largo consumo

(anche qui segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat che correttamente solleva il problema del grado di astratezza con cui ricorda il consumatore)

Il Tribunale di Washington conferma la negazione amministrativa di tutela autorale al dr. Stepah Thaler per opera creata tramite IA

Varie fonti notiziano circa la sentenza 18 agosto 2023 , caso n° 22-1564 (BAH) del tribunale di WEashington DC, Thaler v. SHIRA PERLMUTTER, che nega la tutela autorale a opera creata tramite intelligenza artificiale.

Si tratta della fase giudiziale successiva all’analogo rigetto amministrativo, su cui v. mio post 18.02.2022.

Ad es. v. questo link alla sentenza , offerto dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman

<<Copyright has never stretched so far, however, as to protect works generated by new forms of technology operating absent any guiding human hand, as plaintiff urges here. Human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright.
That principle follows from the plain text of the Copyright Act. The current incarnation of the copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, provides copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The “fixing” of the work in the tangible medium must be done “by or under the authority of the author.” Id. § 101. In order to be eligible for copyright, then, a work must have an “author.”
To be sure, as plaintiff points out, the critical word “author” is not defined in the Copyright Act. See Pl.’s Mem. at 24. “Author,” in its relevant sense, means “one that is the source of some form of intellectual or creative work,” “[t]he creator of an artistic work; a painter, photographer, filmmaker, etc.” Author, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/author (last visited Aug. 18, 2023); Author, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/author_n (last visited Aug. 10, 2023). By its plain text, the 1976 Act thus requires a copyrightable work to have an originator with the capacity for intellectual, creative, or artistic labor. Must that originator be a human being to claim copyright protection? The answer is yes.2
The 1976 Act’s “authorship” requirement as presumptively being human rests on centuries of settled understanding. The Constitution enables the enactment of copyright and patent law by granting Congress the authority to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
2 The issue of whether non-human sentient beings may be covered by “person” in the Copyright Act is only “fun conjecture for academics,” Justin Hughes, Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement, 44 COLUMBIA J. L. & ARTS 383, 408–09 (2021), though useful in illuminating the purposes and limits of copyright protection as AI is increasingly employed. Nonetheless, delving into this debate is an unnecessary detour since “[t]he day sentient refugees from some intergalactic war arrive on Earth and are granted asylum in Iceland, copyright law will be the least of our problems.” Id. at 408.
writings and discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. 1, cl. 8. As James Madison explained, “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned,” for “[t]he public good fully coincides in both cases [of copyright and patent] with the claims of individuals.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). At the founding, both copyright and patent were conceived of as forms of property that the government was established to protect, and it was understood that recognizing exclusive rights in that property would further the public good by incentivizing individuals to create and invent. The act of human creation—and how to best encourage human individuals to engage in that creation, and thereby promote science and the useful arts—was thus central to American copyright from its very inception. Non-human actors need no incentivization with the promise of exclusive rights under United States law, and copyright was therefore not designed to reach them.
The understanding that “authorship” is synonymous with human creation has persisted even as the copyright law has otherwise evolved. The immediate precursor to the modern copyright law—the Copyright Act of 1909—explicitly provided that only a “person” could “secure copyright for his work” under the Act. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9, 10, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077. Copyright under the 1909 Act was thus unambiguously limited to the works of human creators. There is absolutely no indication that Congress intended to effect any change to this longstanding requirement with the modern incarnation of the copyright law. To the contrary, the relevant congressional report indicates that in enacting the 1976 Act, Congress intended to incorporate the “original work of authorship” standard “without change” from the previous 1909 Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).

The human authorship requirement has also been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court when called upon to interpret the copyright law. As already noted, in Sarony, the Court’s recognition of the copyrightability of a photograph rested on the fact that the human creator, not the camera, conceived of and designed the image and then used the camera to capture the image. See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60. The photograph was “the product of [the photographer’s] intellectual invention,” and given “the nature of authorship,” was deemed “an original work of art . . . of which [the photographer] is the author.” Id. at 60–61. Similarly, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court delineated a prerequisite for copyrightability to be that a work “must be original, that is, the author’s tangible expression of his ideas.” 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954). Goldstein v. California, too, defines “author” as “an ‘originator,’ ‘he to whom anything owes its origin,’” 412 U.S. at 561 (quoting Sarony, 111 U.S. at 58). In all these cases, authorship centers on acts of human creativity.
Accordingly, courts have uniformly declined to recognize copyright in works created absent any human involvement, even when, for example, the claimed author was divine. The Ninth Circuit, when confronted with a book “claimed to embody the words of celestial beings rather than human beings,” concluded that “some element of human creativity must have occurred in order for the Book to be copyrightable,” for “it is not creations of divine beings that the copyright laws were intended to protect.” Urantia Found. v. Kristen Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958–59 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that because the “members of the Contact Commission chose and formulated the specific questions asked” of the celestial beings, and then “select[ed] and arrange[d]” the resultant “revelations,” the Urantia Book was “at least partially the product of human creativity” and thus protected by copyright); see also Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, 96-cv-4126 (RWS), 2000 WL 1028634, at *2, 10–11 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000) (finding a valid copyright where a woman had “filled nearly thirty stenographic notebooks with words she believed were dictated to her” by a “‘Voice’ which would speak to her whenever she was prepared to listen,” and who had worked with two human co-collaborators to revise and edit those notes into a book, a process which involved enough creativity to support human authorship); Oliver v. St. Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 297, 299 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (finding no copyright infringement where plaintiff claimed to have transcribed “letters” dictated to him by a spirit named Phylos the Thibetan, and defendant copied the same “spiritual world messages for recordation and use by the living” but was not charged with infringing plaintiff’s “style or arrangement” of those messages). Similarly, in Kelley v. Chicago Park District, the Seventh Circuit refused to “recognize[] copyright” in a cultivated garden, as doing so would “press[] too hard on the[] basic principle[]” that “[a]uthors of copyrightable works must be human.” 635 F.3d 290, 304–06 (7th Cir. 2011). The garden “ow[ed] [its] form to the forces of nature,” even if a human had originated the plan for the “initial arrangement of the plants,” and as such lay outside the bounds of copyright. Id. at 304. Finally, in Naruto v. Slater, the Ninth Circuit held that a crested macaque could not sue under the Copyright Act for the alleged infringement of photographs this monkey had taken of himself, for “all animals, since they are not human” lacked statutory standing under the Act. 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018). While resolving the case on standing grounds, rather than the copyrightability of the monkey’s work, the Naruto Court nonetheless had to consider whom the Copyright Act was designed to protect and, as with those courts confronted with the nature of authorship, concluded that only humans had standing, explaining that the terms used to describe who has rights under the Act, like “‘children,’ ‘grandchildren,’ ‘legitimate,’ ‘widow,’ and ‘widower[,]’ all imply humanity and necessarily exclude animals.” Id. at 426. Plaintiff can point to no case in which a court has recognized copyright in a work originating with a non-human>>.

Considerazioni che nella sostanza valgono anche per il nostro art. 6 l. aut.

Modifiche al codice di proprietà industriale

la legge 102 del 24.07.2023 (GU 184 del 8 agosto 2023) apporta alcune modifiche al c.p.i.

Le più importati sono nei primi tre articoli: art. 1 Divieto di registrazione di marchi evocativi di indicazioni geografiche e denominazioni di origine protetta; art. 2 Protezione temporanea dei disegni e dei modelli nelle fiere; art. 3 Titolarita’ delle invenzioni realizzate nell’ambito di universita’ ed enti di ricerca.

In particolare andrà approfondito il caso sub 1, dovendolo distinguere sia da quello delle segg. lettere c) e c-bis) sia dalla tutela delle denominazioni ex reg. 1151/2012, spt. art. 13 (del cui § 3 potrebbe essere ritenuta attuazione)

Cuiriso è la nuolva disciplina del calcolo dei termini di durata, art. 20: pare non coincuidere con quella civilprocessuale , ad es. , se si tiene conto della’rt. 155 cpc.

Disegno elementare ma sufficientemente distintivo ai sensi della disciplina dei marchi

Questo disegno di un teddy bear come marchio bidimensionale (così pare, anche se il rif. all’art. 7.1.e) del reg. 40-1994 fa pensare ad una forma cioè ad un segno 3D) per gioielli è stato ritenuto sufficientemente distintivo, per cui è stata rigettata la domanda di amnnullamenot per carenza di distintività.

Così -confermando la fase amminsitrativa- il Trib. UE 26.07.2023, T-591/21, Apart c. EUIPO-Tous SL.

<< 70 First, it is true that, according to the case-law, a sign which is excessively simple and composed of a basic geometrical figure, such as a circle, a line, a rectangle or a conventional pentagon, is not, in itself, capable of conveying a message which consumers will be able to remember, with the result that they will not regard it as a trade mark unless it has acquired distinctive character through use (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2007, Cain Cellars v OHIM (Device of a pentagon), T‑304/05, not published, EU:T:2007:271, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

71 In that regard, it must be observed that the contested sign and geometrical shapes cannot be regarded as being comparably simple. Irrespective of whether it will be recognised as a teddy bear or as a fantasy figure, the outline contains sufficient elements – such as rounded shapes – as a result of which it cannot be compared to a simple geometrical shape.

72 Secondly, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that, in its review of legality, the Court is not bound by the decision-making practice of EUIPO (judgment of 7 September 2022, Völkl v EUIPO – Marker Dalbello Völkl (International) (Völkl), T‑155/21, not published, EU:T:2022:518, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

73 Thirdly, the heart symbol is commonly used in trade in general, and not only in the jewellery sector. It is also used in a wide variety of fields and is immediately recognised as symbolising love or affection. The extent of the use of the heart symbol cannot be compared to the use of the representation of a teddy bear. Although the teddy bear is capable of conveying positive feelings, it is not used for the same purposes and is not associated, immediately and unequivocally, with feelings of love or affection, but rather, as the applicant also maintains, with childhood or childhood memories.

74 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the relevant public would not be attracted by the shape of the bear in itself, but rather by the symbols conveyed by it, namely love or tenderness, or by the argument relating to the meaning of the teddy bear as a symbol of love. The consumer will perceive and remember the mark as such and it cannot be established that, in the present case, such a consumer will be attracted by that mark solely because of the appeal of the symbols that it represents>>.

Rigettata pure il motivo della caratteristica (rectius: della forma) che dà valore essenziale al prodotto (art. 7.1.e.iii) reg. 1001 / 2017.

<< 84 The immediate aim of the prohibition on registering purely functional shapes and the prohibition on registering shapes which give substantial value to the goods is to prevent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend the life of other rights which the EU legislature has sought to make subject to ‘limited periods’ (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 September 2014, Hauck, C‑205/13, EU:C:2014:2233, paragraph 31, and of 6 October 2011, Bang & Olufsen v OHIM (Representation of a loudspeaker), T‑508/08, EU:T:2011:575, paragraph 65).

85 Like the ground for refusal to register that applies to the shapes of goods which are necessary to obtain a technical result, the ground that concerns refusal to register signs consisting exclusively of shapes which give substantial value to the goods is to prevent the granting of a monopoly on those shapes (judgment of 6 October 2011, Representation of a loudspeaker, T‑508/08, EU:T:2011:575, paragraph 66).

86 The concept of a ‘shape which gives substantial value to the goods’ cannot be limited purely to the shape of products having only artistic or ornamental value, as there is otherwise a risk that products which have essential functional characteristics as well as a significant aesthetic element will not be covered. In that case, the right conferred by the trade mark on its proprietor would grant that proprietor a monopoly on the essential characteristics of such products, which would not allow the objective of that ground for refusal to be fully realised (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 September 2014, Hauck, C‑205/13, EU:C:2014:2233, paragraph 32).

87 It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above, in invalidity proceedings, as the registered EU trade mark is presumed to be valid, it is for the person who has filed the application for a declaration of invalidity to invoke before EUIPO the specific facts which call the validity of that trade mark into question.

88 In the applicant’s view, it is well known that the teddy bear is recognised as a symbol of love – similar to the symbol of the heart – which evokes positive emotions and strengthens the purchasing impulse. The applicant submits that the aesthetic value of the contested mark – an aspect which, in its view, is highlighted by the intervener – determines its attractiveness for consumers and significantly increases the value of the goods.

89 The Board of Appeal stated that the fact that the shape of the contested mark may be pleasing or attractive is not sufficient to exclude it from registration. In that regard, the Board of Appeal stated that the intervener’s statements relating to the meaning of the teddy bear symbol were not sufficient to show that the contested mark came under Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 40/94 and also observed that the applicant had merely recalled the relevant case-law without explaining in what respect the contested sign would determine to a large extent the behaviour of consumers. Lastly, it noted that the applicant relied on several occasions on the alleged simplicity of the bear shape in order to prove that it was devoid of distinctive character, which was in direct contradiction with the criteria required for the application of Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of that regulation.

90 In the present case, it must be stated that the contested mark does not represent a sign which consists exclusively of the shape or another characteristic of the goods. As is apparent from the reasoning set out in paragraphs 37 to 47 above, the goods covered by the contested mark represent items of jewellery which generally take the form of rings, necklaces or earrings and which are likely to bear the sign of which that mark consists, but not to take the shape thereof.

91 Consequently, the contested mark consists of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the goods it covers and not of a sign which consists exclusively of the shape of those goods.

92 Therefore, that assessment of the contested mark precludes that mark from being capable of falling under the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 40/94>>.

(segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel di IPKat)

La violazione di norme fiscali comporta nullità civilistica (di trasferimento/licenza di marchio)? No, dice Trib. Milano (con un’applicazione della rivendica ex art. 118 c.1 cod. propr. ind.)

Trib. Milano dep. 16.06.2023 n° 5025/2023, RG 38556/2020, rel. Marangoni:

<<5.1 La questione relativa alla rilevanza di un intento elusivo di norme fiscali sulla validità dei contratti civilistici connessi è stabilmente pervenuta ad un principio di tendenziale non interferenza.
La giurisprudenza formatasi su tale questione – come ricostruita da Cass. SU 23601/17 – aveva rilevato come, in assenza di disposizioni che sancissero testualmente la nullità del negozio giuridico elusivo di una norma tributaria, non fosse nemmeno configurabile una nullità virtuale del contratto per frode alla
legge (art. 1344 c.c.) o per violazione di una norma imperativa (art. 1418, comma 1, c.c.). Ciò in quanto la norma fiscale non avrebbe carattere imperativo, tenuto conto della distinzione tra norme imperative e norme inderogabili, nonché del peculiare carattere settoriale dell’interesse sotteso. Le norme tributarie,
essendo poste a tutela di interessi pubblici di carattere settoriale e non ponendo, in linea di massima, divieti, pur essendo inderogabili, non possono qualificarsi imperative, presupponendo tale qualificazione che la norma abbia carattere proibitivo e sia posta a tutela di interessi generali che si collochino al vertice della gerarchia dei valori protetti dall’ordinamento giuridico.
Tale orientamento – ha rilevato ancora Cass. SU 23601/17 – è stato poi recepito dallo stesso legislatore tributario nell’art. 10, comma 3, I. 27 luglio 2000, n. 212 (cd. Statuto dei diritti del contribuente), a mente del quale “le violazioni di disposizioni di rilievo esclusivamente tributario non possono essere causa di nullità del contratto” mentre il successivo art. 10 bis della stessa I. n. 212 del 2000 (articolo aggiunto legge dall’art. 1 del d.lgs. n. 128 del 5 agosto 2015, che ha abrogato e sostituito l’art. 37 bis del d.P.R. 29 settembre 1973 n. 600), stabilisce la mera inopponibilità all’amministrazione finanziaria dei fatti, degli atti e dei contratti che siano sprovvisti di “sostanza economica” e finalizzati, “pur nel
rispetto formale delle norme fiscali” a realizzare “essenzialmente vantaggi fiscali indebiti”.
In assenza di specifica disposizione di legge – nella fattispecie non sussistente – deve dunque confermarsi che le pattuizioni contenute in un contratto che siano dirette ad eludere, in tutto o in parte, la normativa fiscale, non implicano di per sé la nullità del contratto stesso, trovando nel sistema tributario le relative sanzioni (v. Cass. SU 23601/17 cit., Cass. 4785/07, Cass. 17475/20)>>

Suul’art. 118/1 cpi:

<<7. Ritiene il Collegio che le valutazioni innanzi espresse quanto all’inesistenza di diritti sorti in capo a GIADA s.p.a. rispetto alla presunta utilizzazione autonoma dei marchi JACOB COHËN debbano essere estese anche ai segni di fatto rappresentati dal cd “Baffo” e dalle cifre “688”, “613” e “622”, segni che sono stati oggetto di domande di registrazione comunitaria e nazionale da parte della stessa GIADA s.p.a.
Quanto al segno “Baffo”, deve rilevarsi che parte attrice ha depositato documenti dai quali si evince che l’utilizzazione di tale segno era precedente all’inizio della licenza con GIADA s.p.a. (v. docc. da 23 a 26 attr.), mentre per i segni costituiti dalle menzionate cifre risultano depositate fatture So.Ge.Tex s.r.l. – prima licenziataria dei marchi JACOB COHËN – risalenti agli anni 2003/04 che presentavano codici identificativi dei prodotti aventi come cifra iniziale il numero “6” (doc. 88 attr., documenti allegati alla dichiarazione Paolo Soncin).
Ritiene il Collegio che la funzione di marchi accessori e secondari rispetto ai marchi registrati JACOB COHËN che detti segni di fatto per concorde indicazione delle parti hanno rivestito nel corso del lungo rapporto di licenza intercorso tra le parti consenta di ritenere che anche su di essi sia individuabile un uso continuativo e rilevante riconducibile alla titolare dei marchi principali registrati. In effetti GIADA s.p.a. non ha motivato la sua decisione di procedere al deposito formale delle domande di registrazioni di tali marchi se non come conseguenza della sua tesi relativa alla presunta interruzione della catena delle cessioni dei marchi registrati cui sarebbe conseguita la decadenza per non uso degli stessi, situazione che avrebbe consentito ad essa di acquisire in autonomia tutti i diritti su di essi (e quindi anche sui marchi accessori e secondari).
La fondatezza di tale tesi è stata negata e dunque a tale proposito non si può che ritenere che l’uso dei segni di fatto rappresentati dal cd “Baffo” e dalle cifre “688”, “613” e “622” abbiano seguito la stessa sorte dei marchi registrati, in quanto pacificamente utilizzati sui prodotti oggetto di licenza, realizzati
ed approvati dalla licenziataria e rispetto ai quali tutti i diritti devono ritenersi ad essa spettanti (v. contratto 20.6.2006, in doc. 18 attr.: art. 3.3, in cui il Concessionario si era impegnato a non registrare qualsiasi altro marchio del Concedente o con esso confondibile; contratto di licenza 1.8.2013, in doc. 1
attr.: art. 6.3 che impedisce alla licenziataria la commercializzazione di prodotti che non siano stati approvati dalla licenziante, art. 9.2 che impedisce alla licenziataria di apporre sui prodotti marchi d iversi da quelli licenziati) in quanto utilizzati con il suo consenso.
7.1 Deve dunque riconoscersi la fondatezza del richiamo al primo comma dell’art. 118 c.p.i. svolta da parte attrice per ciò che concerne le domande nazionali di registrazione del segno “Baffo”, rispetto alle quali va affermato che l’uso precedente e continuo di tale segno di fatto – realizzato mediante l’attività
della licenziataria – è riconducibile alla JACOB COHEN COMPANY s.p.a. e che ciò consente di ritenere l’insorgenza in favore della stessa del diritto di procedere alla sua registrazione, diritto che appare violato dai depositi del medesimo segno eseguiti dalla ex-licenziataria>>.

la forma della pagnotta (con cuore disegnato in superficie) non può costiturne marchio tridimensionale

Il board of appeal EUIPO (6 luglio 2023, 5 camera, R 870/2022-5, n° di deposito 002262327, di cu dà notizia Anna Maria Stein su IPKat; trad. inglese automat., orig. tedesco; questa la pag. del fascicolo nel database dell’ufficio) comnferma la difficoltà di registrare come marchio la forma del prodotto: solo se assi distaccantesi dalle prassi di ettore ci si può riuscire.

marchio 3D chiesto in registrazione

Così il BoA:

<<33 However, for the purpose of applying those criteria, account must be taken of the fact that the average consumer’s perception is not necessarily the same in relation to a three-dimensional mark consisting of the appearance of the product itself as it is in relation to a word or figurative mark consisting of a sign which is independent from the appearance of the goods it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element; it could therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctive character in relation to such a three-dimensional mark than in relation to a word or figurative mark (29/04/2004, 456/01 P Metal C 457/01 P, Tabs (3D), EU:C:2004:258, § 38; 20/10/2011, 344/10 P pads C 345/10 P, Botella esmerilada II, EU:C:2011:680, § 46; 15/12/2016, 678/15, DEVICE OF A CRESCENT (fig.) + DEVICE OF A CURVED LINE WIDENING INTO AN ARC IN SHADES OF GREEN (fig.), EU:T:2016:749, § 22; 26/10/2017, 857/16 , SHAPE OF A TALL GLASS (3D), EU:T:2017:754, § 22).
34 In such circumstances, only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin is not devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR (20/10/2011, 344/10 P 345/10 P P, Botella esmerilada II, EU:C:2011:680, § 47 with further references). The more closely the registered shape resembles the shape most likely to be taken by the product in question, the greater the likelihood of the shape being devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of that provision (16/12/2020, 118/20, Form einer Verpackung, EU:T:2020:604, § 28)>>.

E poi:

<< 48 Finally, a heart character is also a simple geometric shape which is generally also devoid of distinctive character (12/09/2007, 304/05 , Pentagon, EU:T:2007:271, § 22, 33; 13/07/2011, 499/09, Purpur, EU:T:2011:367, § 34; 13/04/2011, 159/10, Parallélogramme, EU:T:2011:176, § 28, 30; 06/11/2014, 53/13 , Line which slants and curves, EU:T:2014:932, § 70; 28/06/2017, T-470/16, Darstellung EINES DREIECKS (fig.), EU:T:2017:442, § 23;), although it is not the classification as a geometric shape that is decisive, but that the geometric figure illustrated is not capable of conveying a message that consumers will be able to remember (13/07/2011, 499/09, Purpur, EU:T:2011:367, § 36; 29/09/2008, 139/08 , Smiley, EU:T:2009:364, § 31, 37).
49 It is an obvious fact that heart symbols were perceived by the relevant public (see paragraph 39 above) in exactly the same way as nowadays, namely as an expression of sympathie, affection or connection, at the time of the application in 2001. The fact that the use of a heart shape is not, or was not unusual, on the bakery goods market that is the subject of these proceedings is evident from the Google image search submitted as Annex 2 by the applicant for cancellation on 25 August 2020, and is confirmed in the printouts from websites which show heart-shaped bread rolls submitted by the EUTM proprietor as Annex HE 2 with the grounds of appeal.

50 The decoration of the upper side of bread and bread rolls with the aid of stamps or handles or pushers is not novelty, but rather a longitudinal tradition, as can be seen from the ancient Browup mpel, as can be seen in Annex BG 1 of 3 November 2022 (see, in particular, the article over a 1500-year-old, religious breadth stamp in fts magazine).
51 Overall, it can be seen from the present documents and taking into account obvious facts that the goods that are the subject of these proceedings often had a round shape and were light colour in June 2001. Furthermore, the decoration of the bread surface is a longer-year-end tradition. With regard to simple heart designs, these were not distinctive in principle in 2001 as symbols for affection or enthusiasm. Finally, the use of this symbol for bakery goods, which were purchased and consumed at celebrations of all kinds, for example, was also customary on the market. The fact that the design of cardiac foodstuffs in the form of a heart was at least in 2002 in Germany (see paragraph 39 above) is also confirmed by the decision of the German Federal Patent Court (32 W (pat) 281/03) mentioned by the applicant for cancellation in its written submission of 3 November 2022. In that decision, confectionery in the form of a heart was refused on the grounds that it was devoid of distinctive character.
52 Overall, the contested sign merely consists of a connection between elements that are customary in the sector and devoid of distinctive character, which was already obvious in 2001. Overall, the contested trade mark 2001 was not so striking that it would have been remembered by the consumer (14/02/2019, 123/18 , REPRESENTATION OF A HERZENS (fig.), EU:T:2019:95, § 30)>>

Quindi

<<54 The more closely a sign resembles the shape most likely to be taken by the product in question (or its packaging or packaging), the greater the original distinctive character. Only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector is able to fulfil a function of indicating origin (29/04/2004 , 456/01 P resins C 457/01 P, Tabs (3D), EU:C:2004:258, § 39; 07/05/2015, C-445/13 P, Bottle, EU:C:2015:303, § 91; 26/10/2017, 857/16 , SHAPE OF A TALL GLASS (3D), EU:T:2017:754, § 23). Novelty and originality are not relevant criteria for the assessment of distinctive character (17/12/2010, 336/08, Hase, EU:T:2010:546, § 24; 26/11/2015, 390/14 , JK KANGOO JUMPS XR, EU:T:2015:897, § 25; 26/10/2017, 857/16 , SHAPE OF A TALL GLASS (3D), EU:T:2017:754, § 23).
55 As already stated, light, round bread and bread rolls were common in 2001. At the time of application, the heart on the bread roll was also perceived as a purely decorative, customary and therefore non-distinctive symbol.
56 Whether it was the EUTM proprietor, which introduced the bread rolls decorated with a heart stamp for the first time on the market is likewise irrelevant and is unable to alter the already established non-distinctive character of the sign (cf. for descriptive expressions: 06/02/2013, 412/11 , Transcendental meditation, EU:T:2013:62, § 92).
57 The fact that the exclamation in the shape of a heart was supposedly a highly innovative design element at the relevant point in time cannot be understood against the background of the longitudinal breadth mist, which was much more elaborate in comparison therewith (see, for example, Annex BG 1 of 3 November 2022).
58 The EUTM proprietor’s reference to Section 50 (2) MarkenG in conjunction with Section 8 (1) (1) MarkenG also comes to nothing. This is because a corresponding provision according to which an application for a declaration of invalidity based on lack of inherent distinctive character can only be made within a period of ten years after the date of registration of the contested trade mark is lacking precisely in the European Union Trade Mark Regulation.
59 The Cancellation Division correctly found that the contested European Union trade mark was devoid of the necessary minimum degree of distinctive character pursuant to Article 59(1)(a) EUTMR in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR. The appeal must therefore be dismissed as unfounded>>.

“Parmigiano reggiano” vs formaggio “Vacche rosse”: sentenza bolognese in tema di D.O.P. e marchio collettivo

Trib. Bologna n. 1633/2023 del 4 agosto 2023, RG 21527/2019, rel. Romagnoli, CONSORZIO DEL FORMAGGIO PARMIGIANO REGGIANO c. SAPORI DELLE VACCHE ROSSE S.R.L., affronta un ineressante caso di allegata violazione di DOP e di marchio collettivo circa il segno “parmigiano reggiano”.

Accoglie per lo più la domanda del Consorzio.

Come sempre nei casi di DOP, il problema è capire quando ricorra le evocatività, dato il tenore del reg. UE 1151/2012 art. 13.

La sitnesi dell’accertamento è qui:

<<In definitiva, risultano accertate nelle condotte descritte più evocazioni illecite della DOP PARMIGIANO REGGIANO, vuoi direttamente afferenti la denominazione protetta (l’uso dell’aggettivo “reggiana”) vuoi afferenti indirettamente la denominazione stessa, per associazione concettuale di determinate caratteristiche esteriori del prodotto a caratterizzazioni tipiche e individualizzanti della DOP (la marchiatura con lo stesso posizionamento e aspetto grafico della DOP sullo scalzo della forma); emerge inoltre una importante condotta illecita di agganciamento alla notorietà e importanza della DOP PARMIGIANO REGGIANO, mediante palese imitazione del Parmigiano Reggiano Vacche Rosse che parte convenuta produceva e commercializzava già prima della produzione e messa in commercio del formaggio contestato, con potenziale danno derivante dallo sfruttamento indebito della reputazione della DOP, della cui protezione gode pure il Parmigiano Reggiano di tale tipologia>>.

Pregevolmente la sentenza contiene dettagliate riproduzioni grafiche e fotografiche che rendono comprensibile l’iter logico motivatorio. Un plauso al giudice: così dovrebbero fare tutti i suoi colleghi nelle decisioni di proprieà itnellettuale (e forse non solo in esse).

Sul diritto connesso del produttore fonografico, un’interessante e approfondita sentenza romana

Trib. Roma n. 12.101/2023 del 4 agosto 2023, RG 80798/2018, rel. Basile , nella lite tra il maestro Vessicchio e la RAI, di cui ha dato ampiamentoe conto la stampa oggi.

La sentenza farà testo, dato l’approfondimento del tema e la numerosità delle questioni affrontate. E’ non definitiva rimetendo sul ruolo ex art. 279 n. 4 cpc per al quantificaizone del credito del maestro Vessicchio in base alle perizie espletate sulle dimensjoni dell’avvenuto utilizzo.

Il dubbio di base era se il maestro consegnando un master a RAI, in esecuzione di contratto, ne fosse anche il produttore ex art. 73 e 73 bis legge aut.

Principali insegnamenti presenti in sentenza:

1) non serve essere imprendutiore del settore, basta organizzare la produzione fonografica ancbe solo in quella ‘occcasione:

<<Partendo da quest’ultima norma, il Collegio rileva in primo luogo l’infondatezza della contestazione di parte convenuta relativa alla non ravvisabilità della qualifica di produttore fonografico in capo al Maestro VESSICCHIO e/o alla società CIAOSETTE, sul presupposto che essi, in spregio a quanto previsto dall’art. 78 L.d.A., non avrebbero agito in qualità di imprenditore, né avrebbero sostenuto gli investimenti necessari per la registrazione.
Difatti, benché nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi il produttore fonografico svolge tale attività in maniera continuativa e professionale con scopo di lucro e, dunque, acquisisce la qualifica di imprenditore commerciale ai sensi dell’art. 2195 c.c., la norma invocata da RAI e RAI COM non impone affatto la qualifica di imprenditore commerciale in capo al produttore fonografico, ma considera come “produttore di fonogrammi” qualunque persona fisica o giuridica che assume l’iniziativa e la responsabilità della prima fissazione dei suoni.
Deve pertanto ritenersi che la qualifica di produttore fonografico e il conseguente diritto alla corresponsione dell’equo compenso previsto dagli artt. 73 e 73-bis L.d.A. spetti a chiunque abbia assunto l’iniziativa e la responsabilità della prima fissazione dei suoni su un supporto fonografico (c.d. master), indipendentemente dal fatto che esso rivesta anche la qualifica di imprenditore commerciale e – come si vedrà meglio appresso – a prescindere dal fatto che la fissazione sia avvenuta nell’ambito di un’attività commerciale finalizzata alla messa in commercio delle copie.
Anche con riguardo all’iniziativa e alla responsabilità della prima fissazione dei suoni, non colgono nel segno le contestazioni di parte convenuta secondo le quali gli attori non avrebbero fornito la prova di aver effettivamente compiuto le attività necessarie alla produzione, duplicazione e commercializzazione dei relativi supporti fonografici, adempiendo alle formalità e agli obblighi facenti carico al produttore fonografico, né avrebbero agito di loro iniziativa, ma su specifico incarico conferito al Maestro VESSICCHIO dalla stessa RAI COM, che lo avrebbe incaricato di produrre le musiche di accompagnamento originali del programma “La prova del cuoco”.
Rimandando la trattazione del profilo della commercializzazione dei supporti fonografici al tema della utilizzazione secondaria dei fonogrammi in contestazione, rileva il Collegio come la documentazione versata in atti dagli attori documenti sufficientemente la circostanza che la prima fissazione su supporto fonografico delle opere musicali utilizzate dalla RAI nel programma La prova del cuoco avvenne nell’anno 2000 su iniziativa del Maestro VESSICHIO, in proprio e quale legale rappresentante di CIAOSETTE, negli Studi di registrazione Plastic Studios (cfr. dichiarazione di Silvio Capitta, legale rappresentante della Plastic Studios, All. 3).
Gli attori provvidero, altresì, a remunerare gli artisti interpreti che avevano preso parte alle registrazioni (cfr. dichiarazioni dei sigg.ri Pino Perris, Maurizio Dei Lazzareti e Renato Pistocchi, All. 4).
Gli altri brani di sottofondo furono invece registrati, sempre su iniziativa del Maestro VESSICCHIO, in proprio e quale legale rappresentante di CIAOSETTE, nell’anno 2006 presso gli studi Meggaride Sound, sostenendone i relativi costi (cfr. dichiarazione del sig. Claudio Ribulet depositata sub All. 5 e dichiarazioni dei sigg.ri Pino Perris e Maurizio Dei Lazzareti, All. 4) (…).

Riguardo al secondo profilo, giova ripetere che né il dato letterale, né l’interpretazione dell’invocato art. 78 L.d.A. pongono condizioni o limiti minimi all’importo dell’investimento economico per l’acquisto della qualifica di produttore fonografico in capo a chi assume l’iniziativa e la responsabilità della prima fissazione dei suoni.
Dunque, anche investimenti di modesta entità possono essere idonei a realizzare la prima fissazione dei suoni su un supporto fonografico in grado di essere utilizzato da terzi per scopo di lucro o senza scopo di lucro.
L’analisi della fattispecie costitutiva dei diritti sul fonogramma e la definizione di produttore fonografico contenuta nell’art. 78 L.d.A. indicano chiaramente che il titolo d’acquisto originario dei diritti di produttore fonografico di cui agli artt. 72 e ss. L.d.A. è costituito dall’assunzione dell’iniziativa e del rischio economico della realizzazione di una fissazione sonora nuova e originale (la c.d. prima fissazione).
La norma in esame – come si vedrà anche in seguito – neppure condiziona l’acquisto a titolo originario dei diritti sul fonogramma alla “primaria” attività di produzione, duplicazione e commercializzazione dei supporti fonografici.
Sicché, anche nel caso in cui la prima fissazione delle opere musicali destinate al programma RAI “La prova del cuoco” fosse avvenuta al solo fine di consegnare il master all’utilizzatore finale (RAI ), gli odierni attori avrebbero comunque acquistato ab origine la qualifica di produttori fonografici e, di conseguenza, i diritti ad essi spettanti ai sensi degli artt. 72 e 73-bis L.d.A. per ogni utilizzazione del supporto fonografico, indipendentemente dalla sua riproduzione in ulteriori supporti fonografici, distribuzione e commercializzazione.>>.

2) irrilevante la mancata richiesta e apposizione di contrasssegno SIAE:

<<Anche la deduzione relativa alla mancata richiesta dei contrassegni SIAE, con il pagamento dei relativi diritti d’autore, non coglie nel segno.
E’ evidente, infatti, che l’apposizione del contrassegno SIAE su ogni supporto fonografico contenente suoni, voci o immagini in movimento che reca la fissazione di opere dell’ingegno di cui all’art. 1 L.d.A., oltre ad essere finalizzata alla protezione del diritto d’autore degli autori delle opere ivi fissate (questione che, come detto, non viene in alcun rilievo in questa sede), riguarda i supporti fonografici “destinati ad essere posti comunque in commercio o ceduti in uso a qualunque titolo a fine di lucro”.
Ne discende, al contrario, che qualora, come nel caso in esame, il supporto fonografico non sia destinato alla vendita e/o al noleggio al pubblico a fine di lucro, non sussiste alcun obbligo di apporre il contrassegno SIAE sul master realizzato e destinato ad essere utilizzato direttamente da un’emittente televisiva, né sussiste l’esigenza di tutelare attraverso tale accorgimento il diritto d’autore>>

3) distinzione concettuale netta tra incarico di creazione dell’opera e produzione del fonogramma, p. 24-25

4) la cessione dei diritto sull’opera non comporta la cessione di quello di produttore, anche ex art. 109/1 l. aut.

5) la proprietà della res è un diritto diverso da quello al compenso come produttore fonografico, p. 28-29

6) non è richiesta una previa utilizzione primaria perchè maturi l’equo compensui ex 73-73 bis l. aut. su quelle secodnarie : quindi il compenso spetta anche su un master di opera mai prima commercializzata , p. 31/4

7) prescrizione 1: si tratta non di fatto illecito ma di violazione di obbligazione ex lege. Quindi opera il termine generale decennale, anzichè la diversa regola per ciò che va pagato ad anno o in termine minore ex art. 2948.4 cc.

8) prescrizione 2: il termine allora decorre dalle singole utilizzazioni.

L’embedding sul proprio sito di fotografia altrui, legittimamente presente su altro sito, non è comunicazione al pubblico

l’appello del 9° Circuito afferma quanto sopra (No. 22-15293 del 17 luglio 2023, Hunley e Brauer c. Instagram ; notizia e link da Tyler Ochoa in Eric Goldman blog).

Due fotografi avevano postato loro foto su Instagram e se le vedono poi riprrodotte tramite incorporazione (embedding) da Time e da Buzzfeed.

Agiscono solo verso Instagram per secondary liability (contributory e/o vicarious), non verso le due testate giornalsitiche.

Risposta in 1 e 2 grado: nessuna responsabilità perchè manca la violazione primaria. Infatti l’embedding non è violazione , la quale richiede una riproduzione nella forma di fissazione sul server (c.d. server test).

Precisazioni tecniche:

<<embedding is different from merely providing a hyperlink. Hyperlinking gives the URL address where external content is located directly to a user. To access that content, the user must click on the URL to open the linked website in its entirety. By contrast, embedding provides instructions to the browser, and the browser automatically retrieves and shows the content from the host website in the format specified by the embedding website. Embedding therefore allows users to see the content itself—not merely the address—on the embedding website without navigating away from the site. Courts have generally held that hyperlinking does not constitute direct infringement. See, e.g., Online Pol’y Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[H]yperlinking per se does not constitute direct infringement because there is no copying, [but] in some instances there may be a tenable claim of contributory infringement or vicarious liability.”); MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., 2012 WL 1107648, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2012) (collecting cases), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 2929392 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012).
From the user’s perspective, embedding is entirely passive: the embedding website directs the user’s own browser to the Instagram account and the Instagram content appears as part of the embedding website’s content. The embedding website appears to the user to have included the copyrighted material in its content. In reality, the embedding website has directed the reader’s browser to retrieve the public Instagram account and juxtapose it on the embedding website. Showing the Instagram content is almost instantaneous>>.

Server test, p. 18:

<<We interpreted the Copyright Act’s fixation requirement and found that an image is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” when it is “embodied (i.e., stored) in a computer’s server, (or hard disk, or other storage device).” Id. at 1160 (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993)). Applying that interpretation, we concluded that a “computer owner shows a copy ‘by means of a . . . device or process’ when the owner uses the computer to fill the computer screen with the photographic image stored on that computer.” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101. And “a person displays a photographic image by using a computer to fill a computer screen with a copy of the photographic image fixed in the computer’s memory.” Id. This requirement that a copy be “fixed in the computer’s memory” has come to be known as the “Server Test.” See id. at 1159 (“The district court referred to this test as the ‘server test.’”) (quoting Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838–39 (C.D. Cal. 2006)); Free Speech Sys., LLC v. Menzel, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2019).>>ù

Sua applicazione al caso, p. 34:

<<Having rejected Hunley’s legal and policy challenges to Perfect 10, we now apply the Server Test to the facts of this case.
By posting photographs to her public Instagram profile, Hunley stored a copy of those images on Instagram’s servers. By displaying Hunley’s images, Instagram did not directly infringe Hunley’s exclusive display right because Instagram had a nonexclusive sublicense to display these photos.
To assert secondary liability claims against Instagram, Hunley must make the threshold showing “that there has been direct infringement by third parties.” Oracle Am., Inc., 971 F.3d at 1050. Time and BuzzFeed wrote the HTML instructions that caused browsers to show Hunley and Brauer’s photographs on Time and BuzzFeed websites. However, under Perfect 10 these instructions did not constitute “display [of] a copy.” See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61. Rather, Instagram displayed a copy of the copyrighted works Hunley posted on its platform, and the web browser formatted and displayed the images alongside additional content from Time and BuzzFeed. Because BuzzFeed and Time embedded—but did not store—the underlying copyrighted photographs, they are not guilty of direct infringement. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61. Without direct infringement, Hunley cannot prevail on any theory of secondary liability. See Giganews, 847 F.3d at 671. As a result, Instagram is not secondarily liable (under any theory) for the resulting display. The district court did not err in dismissing this case on the basis of the Server Test>>.

Nemmeno il profilo della percezione dell’utente fa cambiare opinione ai giudici di appello, pp. 30-31.

IN UE è importante a questo proposito il caso VG Bild-Kunst / Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, causa C-392/19 con sentenza C.G. 9 marzo 2021 e spt. conclusioni AG Szpunar 10.09.2020 (nella cui Introduzione v. spiegazioni tecniche in linguaggio meritoriamente accessibile), giunto a conclusioni opposte.

Resta che il contenuto esterno, pur entrando nel sito web incorporante automaticamente, viene ivi pur sempre “riprodotto”: quindi la violazione di quest’ultimo diritto dovrebbe esserci

Violazioni di copyright e vicarious liability di eBay

Il prof. Eric Goldman nel suo blog dà notizia del Trib. Del Maine Case 2:22-cv-00284-LEW del 28 luglio 2023, Okolita v. Amazon Walmart eBay , su allegata coviolazione da parte di dette piattaforme dei diritti sulle sue fotografie.

La domanda è rigettata tranne che in un punto che sarà approfondito : per la vicarious liability .

Ecco il passaggio:

<<Homing in on eBay’s right and ability to supervise and control infringing activity conducted on its online marketplace, Ms. Okolita alleges in her third claim that eBay is liable to her for failing to stop and/or prevent ongoing incidents of infringement of her copyrights.

To be vicariously liable for infringement, the facts need to demonstrate that eBay profited from the direct infringement of third-party users of its services “while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. This final claim satisfies the plausibility standard. It does so because the law suggests the need for consideration of the qualitative nature of eBay’s response to Ms. Okolita’s takedown requests and eBay’s knowledge and understanding of the infringers’ conduct on its online marketplace. In the context of a motion to dismiss, a plausible claim is viable and an examination of the quality of eBay’s response to Ms. Okolita’s takedown requests is suited for a summary judgment record or trial. Moreover, to the extent eBay premises its motion to dismiss on the copyright safe harbor found in § 512(c), that entails a separate inquiry that arises in the context of an affirmative defense. Although the current record establishes that eBay has a § 512(c) policy (on paper) and that eBay did remove content that infringed Ms. Okolita’s copyright(s), I am not persuaded that a review of Ms.
Okolita’s FAC and its attachments makes it obvious that eBay is sheltered by the safe harbor>>.

Da noi una domanda analoga difficilemente avrebbe successo in base all’art. 6.2 del Digital serices act reg.- Ue 2022/2065 (2. Il paragrafo 1 non si applica se il destinatario del servizio agisce sotto l’autorità o il controllo del prestatore). Almeno in una interpretazione testuale: ma non ne è escluso affatto un esito opposto con interpretazione estensiva