Sulla (assente) distintività di marchio costituito dai numeri da 1 a 23 disposti su tre file

Il board of appeal dell’EUIPO , decisione del 2 maggio 2023, case R 1967/2022-1, appl: Margiela, conferma la mancanza di distintività di marchio numerico cioè costiotuito dai numeri da 1 a 23 in progresisone e disposti su tre file, per candele, illuminazione ed altri.

Norma di riferimentoi: art. 7.1.b dell’EUTMR

Primo grado amminisrativo: <<In the contested decision, the examiner found that the relevant public would perceive the sign at issue as, for example, a listing of the product/article number, a bar code, or a pre-printed label. By doing so the examiner determined the way in which the sign applied for will, if registered, probably be shown to the public (see, to this extent, 12/09/2019, C-541/18, Sign comprising a hashtag, EU:C:2019:725, § 24, 25). The Board concurs that the sign at issue will likely be perceived by the relevant public as a pre-printed tag/label to be affixed, for example, on the goods in Classes 4, 11 and 21 or on their packaging or, with particular regard to retail services, in Class 35, on an invoice, on a letter head or on a catalogue>>.

L’ufficio in appello:

<<The fact that the sequence does not highlight any specific number does not make it distinctive for the goods and services covered by the application for registration. In particular, the Board notes that a pre-printed tag/label of long sequences of numbers in three lines, could not provide information to consumers capable of designating the commercial origin of the goods or services. For example, the sequence of numbers in three lines, when put on a tag/label for the goods at issue, could indicate the reference number of three variants of an article in stock (e.g. three variants of the same product in three colours) one on top of the other, or as a way which could enable the shop to circle one number in pen for internal accounting purposes (e.g. to indicate the number of items remaining in stock, which may vary and thus can be indicated by hand). When used for the services at issue, the long sequences of numbers in three lines, could be perceived as providing administrative information for the undertaking (e.g. company number/commercial registration number) and/or its services (e.g. publication authorisation number of the retailer’s/wholesaler’s catalogue, etc.) as explained above.
27 As regards both the goods and services applied for, the Board recalls that there must be certain aspects of the signs at issue which may be easily and instantly memorised by the relevant public and which would make it possible for those signs to be perceived immediately as indications of the commercial origin (see, to that effect and by analogy, 29/09/2009, T‑139/08, Device of smile from SMILEY (fig.), EU:T:2009:364, § 31).
28 In the present case, the sequence of numbers from 0 to 23, in three lines when applied to the goods and services for which protection is sought, would not easily and instantly be recalled by the relevant public as a distinctive sign, but will likely be perceived by the relevant public as one (or three) non-distinctive sequence(s) of numbers.
29 The Board observes that the length of the sequence(s) does not allow the individual details of the mark to be committed to memory, or the sign taken as a whole, to be apprehended. The sign for which protection is sought would be perceived by the relevant public as one (or three) long sequence(s) of numbers positioned on three separate lines, but the relevant public is unlikely to remember what numbers are listed in the sign or positioned at the beginning or at the end of each line. Therefore, the sign, taken as a whole, will be perceived as one (or three) unmemorable sequence(s) of numbers, and therefore the relevant public will not tend to perceive it as a particular indication of commercial origin>>.

Decisione esatta.

Caso comunque interessante: non è distintivo perchè non memorizzabile oppure perchè il pubblico, vedendolo, pensa a comunicaizoni ammnistrative interne all’azienda circa il prodotto?

(segnalazione di Nedim Malovic in IPKat)

Andy Wharol e la sua elaborazione della fotografia di Prince scattata da Lynn Goldsmith: per la decisione della Corte Suprema non c’è fair use

Supreme Court US n. 21-869 del 18 maggio 2023, ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL ARTS, INC. v. GOLDSMITH ET AL.  decide l’oggetto.

Decide uno dei temi più importanti del diritto di autore, che assai spesso riguarda opere elaboranti opere precedenti.

Qui riporto il sillabo e per esteso: in sostanza l’esame della SC si appunta solo sul primo elemento dei quattro da conteggiare per decidere sul fair use (In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include : (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; ), 17 US code § 107.

<< The “purpose and character” of AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph in commercially licensing Orange Prince to Condé Nast does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Pp. 12–38.
(a)
AWF contends that the Prince Series works are “transformative,”and that the first fair use factor thus weighs in AWF’s favor, because the works convey a different meaning or message than the photograph. But the first fair use factor instead focuses on whether an allegedlyinfringing use has a further purpose or different character, which is amatter of degree, and the degree of difference must be weighed againstother considerations, like commercialism. Although new expression, meaning, or message may be relevant to whether a copying use has asufficiently distinct purpose or character, it is not, without more, dis-positive of the first factor. Here, the specific use of Goldsmith’s photograph alleged to infringe her copyright is AWF’s licensing of OrangePrince to Condé Nast. As portraits of Prince used to depict Prince inmagazine stories about Prince, the original photograph and AWF’s copying use of it share substantially the same purpose. Moreover, AWF’s use is of a commercial nature. Even though Orange Prince adds new expression to Goldsmith’s photograph, in the context of the challenged use, the first fair use factor still favors Goldsmith. Pp. 12–27.
(1)
The Copyright Act encourages creativity by granting to the creator of an original work a bundle of rights that includes the rights toreproduce the copyrighted work and to prepare derivative works. 17
U.
S. C. §106. Copyright, however, balances the benefits of incentives to create against the costs of restrictions on copying. This balancingact is reflected in the common-law doctrine of fair use, codified in §107,which provides: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” To determine whether a particular use is “fair,” the statute enumerates four factors to be considered. The factors “set forth general principles, the application of which requires judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances.” Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U. S. ___, ___.
The first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes,” §107(1), considers the reasons for, and nature of, the copier’s use of an original work. The central question it asks is whether the use “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . (supplanting the original), or instead adds something new, with afurther purpose or different character.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 579 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As most copying has some further purpose and many secondary works add something new, the first factor asks “whether and to what extent” the use at issue has a purpose or character different from the original. Ibid. (emphasis added). The larger the difference, the morelikely the first factor weighs in favor of fair use. A use that has a further purpose or different character is said to be “transformative,” but that too is a matter of degree. Ibid. To preserve the copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative works, defined in §101 of the Copyright Act to include “any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,or adapted,” the degree of transformation required to make “transformative” use of an original work must go beyond that required to qualify as a derivative.
The Court’s decision in Campbell is instructive. In holding that parody may be fair use, the Court explained that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value” because “it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.” 510 U. S., at 579. The use at issue was 2 Live Crew’s copying of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” to create a rap derivative, “Pretty Woman.” 2 Live Crew transformed Orbison’s song by adding new lyrics and musical elements, such that “Pretty Woman” had adifferent message and aesthetic than “Oh, Pretty Woman.” But that did not end the Court’s analysis of the first fair use factor. The Court found it necessary to determine whether 2 Live Crew’s transformationrose to the level of parody, a distinct purpose of commenting on theoriginal or criticizing it. Further distinguishing between parody and satire, the Court explained that “[p]arody needs to mimic an originalto make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” Id., at 580–581. More generally, when “commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, . . . the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.” Id., at 580.
Campbell illustrates two important points. First, the fact that a use is commercial as opposed to nonprofit is an additional element of the first fair use factor. The commercial nature of a use is relevant, but not dispositive. It is to be weighed against the degree to which the use has a further purpose or different character. Second, the first factor relates to the justification for the use. In a broad sense, a use that has a distinct purpose is justified because it furthers the goal of copyright,namely, to promote the progress of science and the arts, without diminishing the incentive to create. In a narrower sense, a use may be justified because copying is reasonably necessary to achieve the user’s new purpose. Parody, for example, “needs to mimic an original to make its point.” Id., at 580–581. Similarly, other commentary or criticism that targets an original work may have compelling reason to “conjure up” the original by borrowing from it. Id., at 588. An independent justification like this is particularly relevant to assessing fairuse where an original work and copying use share the same or highly similar purposes, or where wide dissemination of a secondary work would otherwise run the risk of substitution for the original or licensedderivatives of it. See, e.g., Google, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).
In sum, if an original work and secondary use share the same orhighly similar purposes, and the secondary use is commercial, the first fair use factor is likely to weigh against fair use, absent some other justification for copying. Pp. 13–20.
(2)
The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fairwhen used for one purpose but not another. See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 585. Here, Goldsmith’s copyrighted photograph has been used in multiple ways. The Court limits its analysis to the specific use allegedto be infringing in this case—AWF’s commercial licensing of Orange Prince to Condé Nast—and expresses no opinion as to the creation, display, or sale of the original Prince Series works. In the context of Condé Nast’s special edition magazine commemorating Prince, the purpose of the Orange Prince image is substantially the same as thatof Goldsmith’s original photograph. Both are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince. The use also is of a commercial nature. Taken together, these two elements counsel against fair use here. Although a use’s transformativeness may outweigh its commercial character, in this case both point in the same direction. That does not mean that all of Warhol’s derivative works, nor all uses of them, give rise to the same fair use analysis. Pp. 20–27.
(b)
AWF contends that the purpose and character of its use of Goldsmith’s photograph weighs in favor of fair use because Warhol’s silkscreen image of the photograph has a different meaning or message. By adding new expression to the photograph, AWF says, Warhol madetransformative use of it. Campbell did describe a transformative use as one that “alter[s] the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.” 510 U. S., at 579. But Campbell cannot be read to mean that §107(1) weighs in favor of any use that adds new expression, meaning, or message. Otherwise, “transformative use” would swallow the copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works, asmany derivative works that “recast, transfor[m] or adap[t]” the original, §101, add new expression of some kind. The meaning of a secondary work, as reasonably can be perceived, should be considered to the extent necessary to determine whether the purpose of the use is distinct from the original. For example, the Court in Campbell considered the messages of 2 Live Crew’s song to determine whether the song hada parodic purpose. But fair use is an objective inquiry into what a user does with an original work, not an inquiry into the subjective intent of the user, or into the meaning or impression that an art critic or judge draws from a work.
Even granting the District Court’s conclusion that Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic, that difference must be evaluatedin the context of the specific use at issue. The purpose of AWF’s recent commercial licensing of Orange Prince was to illustrate a magazine about Prince with a portrait of Prince. Although the purpose could bemore specifically described as illustrating a magazine about Prince with a portrait of Prince, one that portrays Prince somewhat differently from Goldsmith’s photograph (yet has no critical bearing on her photograph), that degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF, given the specific context and commercial nature of the use. To hold otherwise might authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs to be used for purposes that are substantially the sameas those of the originals.
AWF asserts another related purpose of Orange Prince, which is tocomment on the “dehumanizing nature” and “effects” of celebrity. No doubt, many of Warhol’s works, and particularly his uses of repeated images, can be perceived as depicting celebrities as commodities. But even if such commentary is perceptible on the cover of Condé Nast’s tribute to “Prince Rogers Nelson, 1958–2016,” on the occasion of the man’s death, the asserted commentary is at Campbell’s lowest ebb: It “has no critical bearing on” Goldsmith’s photograph, thus the commentary’s “claim to fairness in borrowing from” her work “diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish).” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 580. The commercial nature of the use, on the other hand, “loom[s] larger.” Ibid. Like satire that does not target an original work, AWF’s asserted commentary “can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification forthe very act of borrowing.” Id., at 581. Moreover, because AWF’s copying of Goldsmith’s photograph was for a commercial use so similar to the photograph’s typical use, a particularly compelling justification is needed. Copying the photograph because doing so was merely helpfulto convey a new meaning or message is not justification enough. Pp.28–37.
(c) Goldsmith’s original works, like those of other photographers, areentitled to copyright protection, even against famous artists. Such protection includes the right to prepare derivative works that transform the original. The use of a copyrighted work may nevertheless be fair if, among other things, the use has a purpose and character that is sufficiently distinct from the original. In this case, however, Goldsmith’s photograph of Prince, and AWF’s copying use of the photograph in an image licensed to a special edition magazine devoted to Prince, share substantially the same commercial purpose. AWF has offered no other persuasive justification for its unauthorized use of thephotograph. While the Court has cautioned that the four statutory fairuse factors may not “be treated in isolation, one from another,” but instead all must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright,” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 578, here AWF challenges only the Court of Appeals’ determinations on the first fair use factor, and theCourt agrees the first factor favors Goldsmith. P. 38 >>

Per quanto elevata la creatività di Wharol, non si può negare che egli si sia appoggiato a quella della fotografa.

Da noi lo sfruttamento dell’opera elaborata, pe quanto creativa questa sia,  sempre richiede il consenso del titolare dell’opera base (a meno che il legame tra le due sia evanescente …).

Decisione a maggioranza, con opinione dissenziente di Kagan cui si è unito Roberts. Dissenso assai articolato, basato soprattutto sul ravvisare uso tranformative e sul ridurre l’importanza dello sfruttamento economico da parte di Wharol. Riporto solo questo :

<<Now recall all the ways Warhol, in making a Prince portrait from the Goldsmith photo, “add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different character”—all the wayshe “alter[ed] the [original work’s] expression, meaning, [and] message.” Ibid. The differences in form and appearance, relating to “composition, presentation, color palette, and media.” 1 App. 227; see supra, at 7–10. The differences in meaning that arose from replacing a realistic—and indeed humanistic—depiction of the performer with an unnatural, disembodied, masklike one. See ibid. The conveyance of new messages about celebrity culture and itspersonal and societal impacts. See ibid. The presence of, in a word, “transformation”—the kind of creative building that copyright exists to encourage. Warhol’s use, to be sure, had a commercial aspect. Like most artists, Warhol did not want to hide his works in a garret; he wanted to sell them.But as Campbell and Google both demonstrate (and as further discussed below), that fact is nothing near the showstopper the majority claims. Remember, the more trans-formative the work, the less commercialism matters. See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579; supra, at 14; ante, at 18 (acknowledging the point, even while refusing to give it any meaning). The dazzling creativity evident in the Prince portrait might not get Warhol all the way home in the fair-use inquiry; there remain other factors to be considered and possibly weighed against the first one. See supra, at 2, 10,
14. But the “purpose and character of [Warhol’s] use” of the copyrighted work—what he did to the Goldsmith photo, in service of what objects—counts powerfully in his favor. He started with an old photo, but he created a new new thing>>.

L’embedding non costituisce comunicazione al pubblico però non permette la difesa del safe harbour ex § 512DMCA

Il giudice Barlow della Utah District Court, 2 maggio 2023, caso 2:21-cv-00567-DBB-JCB, decide un’interessante lite sull’embedding.

Attore è il gestore dei diritti su alcune foto eseguite da Annie Leibovitz. Convenuti sono i gestori di un sito che le aveva “riprodotte” con la tecnica dell’embedding (cioè non con riproduzine stabile sul proprio server).

Il giudice applica il c.d server test del noto caso Perfect 10 Inc. v. Google  del 2006 così sintetizzato: <<Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Google’s unauthorized display of thumbnail and full-sized images violated the copyright holder’s rights. The court first defined an image as a work “that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression . . . when embodied (i.e., stored) in a computer’s server (or hard disk, or other storage device).” The court defined “display” as an individual’s action “to show a copy . . ., either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process ….”>>.

Quindi rigetta la domanda nel caso dell’embedding sottopostogli :

<<The court finds Trunk Archive’s policy arguments insufficient to put aside the “server” test. Contrary to Trunk Archive’s claims, “practically every court outside the Ninth Circuit” has not “expressed doubt that the use of embedding is a defense to infringement.” Perfect 10 supplies a broad test. The court did not limit its holding to search engines or the specific way that Google utilized inline links. Indeed, Trunk Archive does not elucidate an appreciable difference between embedding technology and inline linking. “While appearances can slightly vary, the technology is still an HTML code directing content outside of a webpage to appear seamlessly on the webpage itself.” The court in Perfect 10 did not find infringement even though Google had integrated full-size images on its search results. Here, CBM Defendants also integrated (embedded) the images onto their website.(…) Besides, embedding redirects a user to the source of the content-in this case, an image hosted by a third-party server. The copyright holder could still seek relief from that server. In no way has the holder “surrender[ed] control over how, when, and by whom their work is subsequently shown.” To guard against infringement, the holder could take down the image or employ restrictions such as paywalls. Similarly, the holder could utilize “metadata tagging or visible digital watermarks to provide better protection.” (…)( In sum, Trunk Archive has not persuaded the court to ignore the “server” test. Without more, the court cannot find that CBM Defendants are barred from asserting the “embedding” defense. The court denies in part Trunk Archive’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.>>

Inoltre, viene negato il safe harbour in oggetto, perchè non ricorre il caso del mero storage su server proprio di materiali altrui, previsto ex lege. Infatti l’embedding era stato creato dai convenuti , prendendo i materiali da server altrui: quindi non ricorreva la passività ma l’attività , detto in breve

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman)

Il motore di ricerca è corresponsabile per associazioni indesiderate ma errate in caso di omonimia?

La risposta è negativa nel diritto USA, dato che Microsoft è coperta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA:

Così , confermando il 1° grado, la 1st District court of appeal della Florida, Nos. 1D21-3629 + 1D22-1321 (Consolidated for disposition) del 10 maggio 2023, White c. DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS, ed altri.

fatto:

Mr. White sued various nonresident defendants for damages in tort resulting from an episode of a reality/crime television show entitled “Evil Lives Here.” Mr. White alleged that beginning with the first broadcast of the episode “I Invited Him In” in August 2018, he was injured by the broadcasting of the episode about a serial killer in New York also named Nathaniel White. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, the defamatory episode used Mr. White’s photograph from a decades-old incarceration by the Florida Department of Corrections. Mr. White alleged that this misuse of his photo during the program gave viewers the impression that he and the New York serial killer with the same name were the same person thereby damaging Mr. White.

Diritto :

The persons who posted the information on the eight URLs provided by Mr. White were the “information content providers” and Microsoft was the “interactive service provider” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) and (3). See Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that a search engine falls within the definition of interactive computer service); see also In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W. 3d 80, 90 (Tex. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (“The ‘national consensus’ . . . is that ‘all claims’ against internet companies ‘stemming from their publication of information created by third parties’ effectively treat the defendants as publishers and are barred.”). “By presenting Internet search results to users in a relevant manner, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft facilitate the operations of every website on the internet. The CDA was enacted precisely to prevent these types of interactions from creating civil liability for the Providers.” Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 276, 283 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., 925 F.3d at 1265.
In Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014), the state law defamation claim was “properly dismissed” as “preempted under § 230(c)(1)” since Google, like Microsoft here, merely hosted the content created by other providers through search services. Here, as to Microsoft’s search engine service, the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment finding Microsoft immune from Mr. White’s defamation claim by operation of Section 230 since Microsoft did not publish any defamatory statement.
Mr. White argues that even if Microsoft is immune for any defamation occurring by way of its internet search engine, Microsoft is still liable as a service that streamed the subject episode. Mr. White points to the two letters from Microsoft in support of his argument. For two reasons, we do not reach whether an internet streaming service is an “interactive service provider” immunized from suit for defamation by Section 230.
First, the trial court could not consider the letters in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The letters were not referenced in Mr. White’s written response to Microsoft’s motion. They were only in the record in response to a different defendant’s motion for a protective order. So the trial court could disregard the letters in ruling on Microsoft’s motion. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(5); Lloyd S. Meisels, P.A. v. Dobrofsky, 341 So. 3d 1131, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Without the two letters, Mr. White has no argument that Microsoft was a publisher of the episode.
Second, even considering the two letters referenced by Mr. White, they do not show that Microsoft acted as anything but an interactive computer service. That the subject episode was possibly accessible for streaming via a Microsoft search platform does not mean that Microsoft participated in streaming or publishing the episode

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Fair use nel software: la sentenza di appello in Apple v. Corellium

L’appello dell’11 circuito 8 maggio 2023, Apple v. Corellium, Case: 21-12835, decide un interessante caso di fair use nel software.

Si tratta del sftw CORSEC per simulare il sistema operativo iOS di Apple anche su macchine android.

La corte di appello conferma il fair use, dati i benefici per la collettività di tale sftw.

<< Like Google Books, CORSEC adds new features to copyrighted works. CORSEC allows re-searchers to visualize in real time iOS’s processes, freeze those pro-cesses and study them for as long as they need to, step backward and forward in time at will to closely monitor system activity, and run multiple experiments from the same starting point. CORSEC also adds file and app browsers. There’s no dispute that these fea-tures assist researchers and enable them to do their work in new ways. Corellium has thus “augment[ed] public knowledge by mak-ing available information about [iOS].” Id. at 207; see also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that copying student assignments into a database to detect plagiarism was “transformative” because the database’s “use of [the students’] works had an entirely different function and pur-pose than the original works”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Google image search’s “use of thumbnails [was] highly transformative” because the “use of the images served a different function” than the original pictures by “improving access to information on the internet ver-sus artistic expression” (cleaned up)); Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a PlayStation emulator was “modestly transformative” because the emulator “create[d] a new platform, the personal computer, on which consumers can play games designed for the Sony PlayStation”) >>.

Apple solleva tre obieizoni, rigettate dalla Corte.

<<Against all this, Apple advances three arguments—all unpersuasive.

First, Apple argues that “making verbatim copies of a cop-yrighted work and converting [those works] into a different format is not transformative.” Apple is right. In Patton, for example, we found no transformative use where “verbatim copies of portions of . . . original books . . . ha[d] merely been converted into a digital format.” 769 F.3d at 1262. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not transformative to convert copyrighted songs from CDs to MP3 files for download because the “original work[s] [were] merely retransmitted in a different medium.” See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
But this isn’t a case in which the original is simply repack-aged in a different format. Corellium adds several features that are not normally available on iOS. These include (1) the ability to see and halt running processes; (2) the ability to modify the kernel; (3) CoreTrace, a tool to view system calls; (4) an app browser; (5) a file browser; and (6) the ability to take live snapshots. They also include, for example, the ability to modify the trust cache so that researchers can install new programs on the device that allow the user to perform fuzzing (a way to find bugs in a product’s code) or other types of security research. The record, in other words, shows that there wasn’t verbatim copying here. And even if there were, Patton itself recognized that “verbatim copying may be transform-ative so long as the copy serves a different function than the origi-nal work.” 769 F.3d at 1262. Here, Corellium used iOS to serve a research function, and not as a consumer electronic device.
Second, Apple contends that “[s]ecurity research is not a transformative purpose because it is one of the purposes already served by Apple’s works.” Apple says that “security researchers have long used Apple-licensed versions of iOS to do their work.” Corellium (in our view) rightly points out the flaw in this argu-ment: it’s “like saying Google Books was not transformative be-cause scholars could manually search books for keywords by going to the library.” In other words, there’s no dispute that CORSEC “adds features that are not available on retail iOS that are useful for security research.” These features make security research far more efficient. See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting “the transformative purpose of en-hancing efficiency”). They also make possible deeper insights into the software. The fact that iOS itself allowed for some security re-search before, then, can’t negate Corellium’s innovation (just like sifting through books at the library didn’t negate Google Books’s transformativeness).
Third, Apple asserts that “the district court was wrong to find—on summary judgment—that the purpose of [CORSEC] is security research.” For this, Apple mostly points to evidence show-ing that customers can use CORSEC for multiple purposes. For example, Corellium’s expert testified that security research wasn’t CORSEC’s “exclusive use.” But transformativeness does not re-quire unanimity of purpose—or that the new work be entirely dis-tinct—because works rarely have one purpose. In assessing whether a work is transformative, the question has always been “whether a [transformative use] may reasonably be perceived.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added) (finding that a parody was transformative even though both a song and its parody serve the same function of entertainment). We don’t ask whether the new product’s only purpose is transformative.
The Supreme Court made this point in Google. In that case, Google used Java’s code “for the same reason that [Oracle] created those portions, namely, to enable programmers [to use shortcuts] that would accomplish particular tasks.” Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1203. But, at a higher level, the purpose was to create a “new product [that] offer[ed] programmers a highly creative and innovative tool for a smartphone environment.” Id. This higher-order purpose was what made Google’s product transformative. Id. As in Google, the mere fact that some purposes overlap does not pre-clude a finding of transformative use >>

Conflitto tra nomi di dominio e applicazione della disciplina dei segni distintivi: una pronuncia veneziana

giurisprudenzadelleimprese.it pubblica Tribunale di Venezia-sez. specializz. imprese RG 4569/2020, 16.03.2022, rel. L. tosi.

E’ interessante perchè non sono molte le vertenze (note) tra nomi di dominio .

Provvedimento corretto tranne in un puinto:

Segnalo solo un passaggio che parrebbe un errore concettuale:

<<Secondo le linee guida EUIPO relative ai marchi – valido supporto anche per la valutazione nel diritto interno, data la diretta ispirazione o derivazione di questo dalle fonti sovranazionali, e comunitarie in particolare – il carattere distintivo può essere valutato solo in relazione, in via primaria, ai prodotti o servizi per i quali è stata chiesta la sua registrazione, e, secondariamente, alla percezione del segno da parte del pubblico di riferimento.>>

L’errore starebbe nel far proprio il giudizio dell’ Ufficio Europeo,  che in effetti nelle sue Guidelines (ediz. 2023, p. 368) scrive (“Such distinctiveness can be assessed only by reference first to the goods or services for which registration is sought and, second, to the relevant public’s perception of that sign (12/07/2012, C‑311/11 P, Wir machen das Besondere einfach, EU:C:2012:460, § 24 and case-law cited therein”).

Che lo pensi l’EUIPO e la sentenze ivi citt., non fa venir meno l’errore.

Infatti, come la confondibilità va stimata in base al consumatore (al giudizio del pubblici), così la distintività: non può essere diverso il parametro soggettivo di giudizio nei due casi.

Ma potrebbe essere solo un difetto comunicativo e non cognitivo: potrebbe riferirsi solo ai due aspetti logici da considerare (prodotti + soggetti), fermo restando che il giudizio è solo in relazione ai secondi (non ha senso indagare il punto di vista “delle merci”).

Irrilevante è qui la regola della c.d. unitarietà, dato che gli usi in conflitto erano entrambi come domain names

Ruolo della descrizione e dei disegni nell’interpretazione della domanda brevettuale

Cass. sez. I del 01.02.2023 n. 3013, rel. Catallozzi:

<<- ciò posto, si osserva che, come osservato anche nello stesso precedente giurisprudenziale di questa Corte richiamato dalle ricorrenti, la descrizione ed i disegni allegati alla domanda di concessione di un brevetto industriale, pur non potendo in alcun modo determinarne l’ambito della tutela concessa dal brevetto laddove questo sia del tutto generico con riferimento all’indicazione dei limiti della protezione, possono essere utilizzati al fine di chiarire e interpretare la rivendicazione (cfr. Cass. 9 aprile 2019, n. 22079);

– infatti, l’individuazione dell’ambito di protezione brevettuale e dei relativi limiti è enucleabile anche attraverso la descrizione e i disegni del brevetto stesso, che assolvono a una funzione esplicativa delle rivendicazioni (cfr. Cass. 16 dicembre 2019, n. 33232; Cass. 5 marzo 2019, n. 6373; Cass. 28 luglio 2016, n. 15705);

– pertanto, pur riconoscendo la validità della regola che pone la sufficiente descrizione dell’invenzione quale requisito per il rilascio del brevetto e la centralità del ruolo delle rivendicazioni nell’individuazione dell’ambito della tutela, deve ritenersi che l’interpretazione di queste ultime non si limita al testo letterale delle stesse, pur non potendosi estendere a tutto ciò che può essere dedotto da un esperto del ramo dalla considerazione della descrizione e dei disegni;

– in particolare, non può disconoscersi la valenza interpretativa della descrizione e dei disegni nei casi, quale quello in esame, in cui tali strumenti, nel circostanziare la struttura di una certa caratteristica del trovato, consentono di puntualizzare, in funzione limitativa, l’oggetto della rivendicazione, formulata in termini ampi e caratterizzati da inevitabile genericità, partecipando alla dichiarazione di volontà del titolare circa il perimetro della tutela richiesta;

– in tali casi, l’utilizzo delle descrizioni e dei disegni, lungi dall’estendere l’ambito della protezione oltre quella espressa dalle rivendicazioni, permette che la concessione della privativa sia maggiormente aderente alla volontà del titolare e, coerentemente con quanto disposto dall’art. 52, comma 3, cod. prop. ind., realizza un’equa protezione del titolare e una ragionevole sicurezza giuridica ai terzi, potenzialmente avvantaggiati dalla limitazione dell’ambito di protezione;>>

La sentenza, poi , esamina pure l’art. 64 cpi (invenzione dei dipendenti)

Due Cassazioni sulla contraffazione per equivalenti

Cass. sez. I del 4 gennaio 2022 n. 120 , rel.  Iofrida, sull’interpretazione dell’art. 52 cod. propr. ind. (e soprattutto sul suo co. 3 bis)

Premessa:

<<Come già rilevato da questa Corte (Cass. 2977/2020), nelle disposizioni della CBE e dell’art. 52 c.p.i. viene colto unanimemente “il superamento del risalente approccio cosiddetto della “central definition theory””, incentrato sulla valutazione dell’invenzione nel suo complesso, quale ricostruita sulla base delle caratteristiche essenziali della soluzione inventiva attribuita al trovato, non rilevando elementi accessori e secondari, anche se riprodotti (si pensi all’orientamento improntato, ai fini del giudizio sull’equivalenza, alla individuazione, nell’invenzione e nel prodotto contraffattorio, della medesima “idea inventiva” o “idea di soluzione” o “nucleo inventivo protetto” o “cuore dell’invenzione brevettata”: Cass. 2848/1960; Cass. 257/2004; Cass. 12545/2004; Cass. 22495/2006); modalità di ricostruzione che aveva incontrato critiche perché prescindeva dal ruolo centrale svolto dalle rivendicazioni e frustrava le esigenze di certezze dei terzi in ordine all’ampiezza dell’esclusiva brevettuale, e “l’approdo alla cosiddetta “peripheral definition theory”, fondata sulla chiara e precisa identificazione dei limiti e dei confini della protezione brevettuale, funzionali alla determinazione del perimetro della privativa”, sulla base delle caratteristiche del trovato espressamente rivendicate nel testo brevettuale, secondo il c.d. esame “elemento per elemento”, fatto proprio dal legislatore Europeo e italiano, che aveva già trovato applicazione nel sistema statunitense (c,d. “element by element rule”, a sua volta corollario della “all elements rule”, secondo cui, perché si abbia contraffazione, ogni elemento rivendicato deve ritrovarsi nell’oggetto o letteralmente o per equivalenti).

Si è quindi rafforzato il ruolo centrale e autonomo delle rivendicazioni, sia nella valutazione dei requisiti di brevettabilità dell’invenzione, in quanto solamente le caratteristiche, come effettivamente rivendicate, debbono essere prese in considerazione per stabilire la differenza tra l’oggetto del brevetto e l’arte nota, sia nella fase di accertamento della contraffazione letterale o per equivalenti>>.

Poi sull’equivalenza come di solito inerpretata:

< 2.4. Vi sono due principali metodologie per valutare l’equivalenza: a) il triple test o metodo FWR (function, way, result), di matrice statunitense, secondo cui, in un’analisi di ogni parte dell’invenzione, nella contraffazione per equivalenti rientrano solo quelle soluzioni che realizzano lo stesso risultato dell’invenzione (result), con le stesse modalità (way) e che svolgono sostanzialmente la stessa funzione (function); b) il criterio dell’ovvietà, di derivazione tedesca, secondo cui rientrano nella contraffazione del brevetto per equivalenti tutte le realizzazioni che, in virtù della tecnica nota, costituiscono, per il tecnico del ramo, un’ovvia variante ovvero una risposta banale e ripetitiva rispetto a quanto rivendicato, salvo che il trovato oggetto di contestazione non risolva un problema tecnico diverso, potendo allora rientrare nel campo delle invenzioni dipendenti, di cui all’art. 68, comma 2, c.p.i..

Questa Corte ha aderito prevalentemente alla seconda teoria (Cass. 257/2004; Cass. 9549/2012 Cass. 24658/2016).

Si è poi rilevato che, al fine di escludere la contraffazione per equivalenza, non rileva la variazione, seppure originale, apportata ad un singolo elemento del trovato brevettato, se la variazione non consenta di escludere l’utilizzazione, anche solo parziale, del brevetto anteriore, occorrendo, in tal caso, l’autorizzazione all’utilizzo da parte del titolare del brevetto antecedente (Cass. 30234/2011).

E’ stato nuovamente ribadito (Cass. 22351/2015, caso Omac-Galli, riguardante un brevetto relativo ad una macchina per carico e scarico e accoppiamento di strisce di pelle) che “una riproduzione solo parziale del dispositivo brevettato non è idonea ad escludere, di per sé, la contraffazione laddove la parzialità non impedisca, secondo un accertamento che costituisce una questione di fatto, affidata all’apprezzamento del giudice di merito, insindacabile se sorretto da motivazione adeguata ed esente da vizi logici, di ritenere l’utilizzazione del brevetto, nella sua struttura generale, anteriore”.

Si è invece esclusa la contraffazione per equivalenti quando un prodotto o procedimento in contestazione sia significativamente diverso rispetto a quello brevettato, tanto che, presentando una differenza tecnica strutturale, qualitativamente apprezzabile e che investe il nucleo inventivo protetto, non possa essere considerata un mero equivalente (Cass. 9548/2012).

Nella pronuncia già citata n. 2977/2020, si è chiarito in motivazione che, tuttavia, al fine di dare, oggi, effettiva applicazione alla regola di contemperamento, contemplata dell’art. 52 c.p.i., commi 3 e 3 bis, l’ambito di tutela del brevetto non può sempre essere determinato sulla base del solo contenuto letterale delle rivendicazioni, che esprimono dichiarazioni di volontà dell’inventore, in quanto “vi sono indubbiamente casi in cui la non coincidenza fra il prodotto e il contenuto oggettivo delle rivendicazioni brevettuali non esclude la contraffazione, allorché la modesta variante incida su di un elemento della rivendicazione che non abbia importanza centrale nell’economia dell’idea inventiva (eliminandolo, o sostituendolo in una diversa soluzione espressiva della stessa idea fondamentale); o allorché il prodotto accusato di contraffazione per equivalenti assolve alla stessa funzione del prodotto brevettato, seguendo sostanzialmente la stessa via e pervenendo allo stesso risultato; o, ancora quando la soluzione sostitutiva adottata dal contraffattore rispetto alla soluzione brevettata appaia ovvia e non originale, tenuto conto, quale parametro di valutazione, delle conoscenze medie del tecnico del settore” >>.

Principio di diritto: ““In tema di brevetti per invenzioni industriali e della loro contraffazione per equivalente, ai sensi dell’art. 52, comma 3 bis, del Codice Proprietà Industriale, di cui al D.Lgs. n. 30 del 2005, come modificato ad opera del D.Lgs. 13 agosto 2010, n. 131, il giudice – chiamato a valutare l’esistenza di un illecito contraffattorio deve preliminarmente determinare l’ambito della protezione conferita dal brevetto, poi individuare analiticamente le singole caratteristiche del trovato, così come espressamente rivendicate nel testo brevettuale, interpretate anche sulla base della loro descrizione e dei disegni allegati, e quindi verificare se ogni elemento così rivendicato si ritrovi anche nel prodotto accusato della contraffazione, anche solo per equivalenti, così intendendosi, secondo una delle possibili metodologie utilizzabili, quelle varianti del trovato che possano assolvere alla stessa funzione degli elementi propri del prodotto brevettato, seguendo sostanzialmente la stessa via dell’inventore e pervenendo al conseguimento dello stesso risultato”“.

Passiamo a Cass. sez. I del 20.10.2022 n. 30.943, rel. Falabella:

<< La banalità delle soluzioni tecniche alternative che sono state adottate si traduce, del resto, nella contraffazione per equivalente che la Corte di merito ha positivamente accertato: infatti, al fine di valutare se la realizzazione contestata possa considerarsi equivalente a quella brevettata, così da costituirne una contraffazione, occorre accertare se, nel permettere di raggiungere il medesimo risultato finale, essa presenti carattere di originalità, offrendo una risposta non banale, né ripetitiva della precedente, essendo da qualificarsi tale quella che ecceda le competenze del tecnico medio che si trovi ad affrontare il medesimo problema, potendo ritenersi in questo caso soltanto che la soluzione si collochi al di fuori dell’idea di soluzione protetta (Cass. 2 novembre 2015, n. 22351; Cass. 13 gennaio 2004, n. 257; cfr. pure Cass. 7 febbraio 2020, n. 2977, circa il rilievo che assume, ai fini dell’equivalenza della soluzione inventiva, il fatto che la realizzazione contestata permetta di raggiungere il medesimo risultato finale adottando varianti prive del carattere di originalità, perché ovvie alla luce delle conoscenze in possesso del tecnico medio del settore che si trovi ad affrontare il medesimo problema)>>.

Meta vince in appello contro 47 Stati USA per l’addebito di abuso di posizione dominante (acquisizioni aggressive ed escludenti)

L’Appello del District of Columbia Circuit rigetta l’impugnazione dei 47 Stati , dopo perso il primo grado contro FAcebook, circa l’addebito di abuso di posizone dminante.

Si tratta della sentenza 27.04.2023, caso n° 21-7078, leggibile qui oppure qui , pdf della pagina web della corte.

La sentenza di primo grado caso No. 20-3589 (JEB) del 28.06.2021  è qui oppure qui.

La rigetta soprattutto per “laches” (negligente ritardo, “Verwirkung” forse)

 

La disciplina della contitolarità di un marchio (unanimità o maggioranza per la concessione di licenza) spetta al diritto nazionale, non a quello armonizzato europeo

Così Corte di Giustizia 27.04.2023 , C-686/21, caso Legea.

Vediamo il passo circa il reg. 40/94:

Quanto al regolamento n. 40/94, quest’ultimo, pur riconoscendo la comproprietà di un marchio dell’Unione europea, non contiene alcuna disposizione che disciplini le condizioni di esercizio, da parte dei contitolari di un tale marchio, dei diritti conferiti da quest’ultimo, tra cui quello di decidere di concedere una licenza d’uso o di recedere dal relativo contratto.

37 Orbene, dall’articolo 16, paragrafo 1, del regolamento n. 40/94 si evince che il marchio dell’Unione europea, in quanto oggetto di proprietà, è assimilato a un marchio nazionale registrato nello Stato membro determinato secondo le norme stabilite in detto articolo. Ne consegue che, in assenza di disposizioni di tale regolamento che disciplinino le modalità di adozione, da parte dei contitolari di un marchio dell’Unione europea, della decisione di concedere una licenza d’uso di quest’ultimo o di recedere dal relativo contratto, dette modalità sono disciplinate dal diritto di tale Stato membro.

Motivazione leggerina ma forse esatta nell’esito.

v. mio post sulle conclusioni dell’AG , un pò più consistenti sotto il profilo teorico.