Aperta la consultaizone pubblica sul report inerente alla prassi applicativa della regola sulla mala fede in materia di marchi: CP 13 – Common Practice ‘Trade mark applications made in bad faith’, marzo 2023.
Qui la pagina dell’ufficio e qui invece il link diretto al file word .-
Sintesi molto interessante su un tema che potrebbe ritenersi di rara applicazione, mentre invece non è così.
Vedremo quanto vi si avvicinerà il testo definitivo.
Utili indicazioni sul problema in oggetto da parte di Trib. UE 22.03.2023, T-617/21, B§Bartoni c. EUIPO – Hypertherm . Si trattava di elettrodo di torcia da saldatura.
Il fatto, che il compoente sia consumabile con l’uso, impedisce la sua tutela ex art. 4 (spt. § 2 ) reg. 6 del 2002, §§ 33-42.
Il Trib. poi dà altri chiarimenti:
– sull’assenza di smontaggio e di nuovo montaggio al momento della sostituzione dell’elettrodo , § 40 ss.
– sul fatto che la torcia sia considerata completa senza l’elettrodo, § 50′ ss
– sull’intercambiabilità dell’elettrodo, § 63 ss
In sintesi non è data tutela da modello sotto alcun profilo all’elettrodo di tale torcia.
(notizia e link offerti da Marcel Pemsel Wednesday, April 12, 2023 in IPKat)
Interessante decisione del 5° Board of Appeal dell’EUIPO, 7 marzo 2023, caso R 1490/2022-5, Chiever RB . v. la pagina web della pratica nel sito del’ufficio nonchè direttamente il file word on la traduzione automatica inglese (orig. olandese).
Questo il link diretto al video.
Domanda rigettata in primo grado amminstrativo per assenza di distintività ma accolta nel reclamo.
I marchi multimediali sono contemplati dal reg. di esecuzione del reg. UE 2017/1001: reg. 2018/626 art. 3.3.i), circa la modalità di rappresentazione (file audiovisivo)
Qui l’interessnte è dove si possa apporre il marchio audiovisivo.
Lo spiega l’istante:
<< – The Office shall explicitly draw the comparison with a TV spot. In most cases, a multimedia brand is not TV advertising at all and should therefore not be compared with it. It is a new type of brand, a combination of sound, images and movement. This could be a TV spot, but in most cases it is precisely not. They are videos on the internet, lead on websites, on Instagram. All moving images and sounds, to which modern consumers are fully accustomed to using their mobile phone.
– The sign in question will be used in practice, including via Facebook. Once the end has passed, a bottle of wine with a clear label appears in a new shot. Of course, the trade mark proprietor does not choose to include that bottle of wine in his trade mark, just as, in the case of a slogan, you do not, in principle, take the trade mark (the sender) with it>>.
Poi il Board osserva:
<< (5) Final remark: evolution of technology and digital marketing
72 With the evolution of technology, it cannot be excluded that multimedia brands are also effectively placed on goods. Moreover, digital packaging is already a reality.
73 For wines, it is perfectly possible, for example, that not only a QR code on the bottle, but also the wine label itself is scanned by the consumer via his smartphone and it will then see the video requested. A label can be ‘activated’ by way of words.
74 The Chamber gives an example below:
https://winerytale.com/media-release/wine-label-storytelling/” >>
Riporto poi la Conclusion:
<<75 Consumers may not have previously been accustomed to assigning a function of origin to a combination of images and sounds. This has changed with the digital evolution. As also indicated in the Common Communication on new types of marks, there is an increase in the number of signs combining images and sound used as part of market strategies, which will lead consumers to perceive them more as indications of commercial origin. The applicant also rightly points out that the multimedia mark consists of moving images and sounds to which modern consumers are entirely accustomed to their mobile phone.
76 Although the filing of films as trade marks is quite new and exceptional, that does not mean that the registration of such marks would be precluded if they could be immediately perceived as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods or services in question, so that the relevant public could, without any possibility of confusion, distinguish the goods or services of the proprietor of the mark from those with a different commercial origin (05/12/2002, T 130/01, Real People, Real Solutions, EU:T:2002:301, § 19).
77 Admittedly, although special or original characteristics are not criteria for the distinctive character of a trade mark, the mark in question must enable the public to distinguish the goods and services in question from those of other undertakings or persons (04/07/2017, T-81/16, a pair of curved strips on the side of a Tire, EU:T:2017:463, § 49).
78 The mark applied for does not only have original features (although they are not necessary), but the video also enables the public to distinguish the goods and services in question from those with a different commercial origin.
79 Therefore, in the view of the Chamber, the multimedia mark at issue is capable of fulfilling the essential function of a trade mark, which distinguishes the goods and services applied for from a different origin, and is therefore not contrary to the absolute ground for refusal laid down in Article 7 (1) (b)EUTMR.
80 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal is therefore considered to be well founded and the contested decision is annulled.
(notizia e link offerti da Anna Maria Stein Thursday, April 13, 2023 in IPKat)
Cass. sez. 1 del 14.03.2023 n. 7378, rel. Fidanzia, circa il legittimo motivo che osta all’esarimento del marchio (art. 5 cod. propr. ind.) costituito da distribuzione selettiva di prodotti di lusso.
<<La Corte d’Appello si è limitata a dare atto che Chantecler aveva ben “indicato”, già nel procedimento di primo grado, quali caratteristiche dovevano possedere i rivenditori della sua rete, ritenendo, tuttavia, all’esito dell’esame del materiale probatorio – difformemente rispetto alle conclusioni cui era pervenuto il giudice di primo grado – che non vi era prova che i criteri elencati dalla Chantecler (ubicazione in capoluoghi di provincia o importanti comuni di provincia o zone di rilevante interesse turistico commerciale, posizione centrale dell’esercizio commerciale; tradizione consolidata nel tempo dell’esercizio; alta professionalità dell’esercente ed elevata qualità del servizio offerto ai clienti; stigliature ed arredi presenti nell’esercizio eleganti e di alta qualità; commercializzazione autorizzata di importanti marchi di gioielleria quali a titolo esemplificativo: Bulgari, Pomellato, Buccellati, Cartier, Chopard, etc) fossero stati dalla stessa effettivamente applicati nell’individuazione dei distributori.
In particolare, ha precisato la Corte di merito che, nei contratti di distribuzione (valorizzati dal Tribunale in senso favorevole alla ricorrente), non era, in realtà, indicato alcun criterio in forza del quale il singolo distributore era stato selezionato, né che, nel corso del rapporto, il distributore dovesse continuare a mantenere il possesso dei requisiti richiesti. Neanche i contratti di agenzia prodotti in causa (valorizzati difformemente dal Tribunale) erano idonei a fornire la prova dell’esistenza di un sistema di distribuzione selettiva e comunque risultavano conclusi dopo quelli con i distributori, non consentendo quindi di affermare che i distributori fossero stati in precedenza selezionati sulla base dei criteri previsti dai contratti di agenzia….
Infine, la Corte d’Appello, nell’esaminare i diversi criteri indicati da Chantecler per la selezione dei distributori, ha comunque accertato che ben venticinque esercizi su novantanove presenti nell’elenco non erano ubicati né in capoluoghi di provincia, né in zone di interesse turistico.
Alla luce delle soprariportate osservazioni, la Corte territoriale ha concluso che difettava la prova che i distributori autorizzati fossero stati selezionati sulla base del possesso di determinati requisiti prestabiliti.
Come già anticipato, trattasi di valutazione di fatto che non è sindacabile in sede di legittimità, essendo stata articolatamente congruamente con una motivazione immune da vizi logici>>.
Segue importante precisazione processuale su come vada fatta valere l’eccezione:
<<In ogni caso, se era pur vero che la Chantecler aveva richiesto di provare, anche per testimoni, la circostanza che i distributori erano stati selezionati in base ai criteri sopra indicati, tuttavia, dopo che il Tribunale aveva ritenuto superflua la prova, la Chantecler s.p.a. non aveva proposto l’istanza, in sede di precisazione delle conclusioni di primo grado, con la conseguenza che la stessa doveva ritenersi rinunciata, e non poteva essere presa in considerazione nel giudizio d’appello, pur se in quella sede era stata riproposta>>.
Anna Maria Stein su IPKat ci informa che l’Ufficio USA ha emesso guidelines sull’oggetto: Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence.
Si legge nelle stesse:
<<As the agency overseeing the copyright registration system, the Office has extensive
experience in evaluating works submitted for registration that contain human
authorship combined with uncopyrightable material, including material generated by
or with the assistance of technology. It begins by asking “whether the ‘work’ is basically
one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely being an assisting
instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work (literary,
artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, etc.) were actually
conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” 23 In the case of works containing
AI-generated material, the Office will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of “mechanical reproduction” or instead of an author’s “own original mental conception,
to which [the author] gave visible form.” 24 The answer will depend on the circumstances,
particularly how the AI tool operates and how it was used to create the final work. This is necessarily a case-by-case inquiry.
If a work’s traditional elements of authorship were produced by a machine, the work lacks
human authorship and the Office will not register it . For example, when an AI technology
receives solely a prompt from a human and produces complex written, visual, or musical
works in response, the “traditional elements of authorship” are determined and executed
by the technology—not the human user. Based on the Office’s understanding of the
generative AI technologies currently available, users do not exercise ultimate creative
control over how such systems interpret prompts and generate material. Instead, these
prompts function more like instructions to a commissioned artist—they identify what the
prompter wishes to have depicted, but the machine determines how those instructions are
implemented in its output. For example, if a user instructs a text-generating technology
to “write a poem about copyright law in the style of William Shakespeare,” she can expect
the system to generate text that is recognizable as a poem, mentions copyright, and
resembles Shakespeare’s style. 29 But the technology will decide the rhyming pattern, the
words in each line, and the structure of the text. 30 When an AI technology determines
the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of
human authorship.31 As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be
disclaimed in a registration application.
In other cases, however, a work containing AI-generated material will also contain
sufficient human authorship to support a copyright claim. For example, a human may
select or arrange AI-generated material in a sufficiently creative way that “the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 33 Or an artist may modify
material originally generated by AI technology to such a degree that the modifications
meet the standard for copyright protection. 34 In these cases, copyright will only protect
the human-authored aspects of the work, which are “independent of ” and do “not affect”
the copyright status of the AI-generated material itself>>.
Interessante sentenza del Bundesgerighthof 15.12.2022, n° I ZR 173/21 (citata da post linkedin di Richard Dissmann ove anche link al testo originale e in traduzione inglese)
Riporto i passaggi rilevanti:
“13 b) Pursuant to Section 2 subs. 1 No. 4 UrhG, works of visual art, including works of architecture and applied art, as well as designs of such works, are among the works protected by copyright, provided they are personal intellectual creations pursuant to Section 2 subs. 2 UrhG. A personal intellectual creation is a creation of individual character whose aesthetic content has reached such a degree that, in the opinion of circles receptive to art and reasonably familiar with art appreciation, one can speak of an “artistic” achievement. In this context, the aesthetic effect of the design can only justify copyright protection to the extent that it is based on and expresses an artistic achievement (BGH, judgment of 7 April 2022 – I ZR 222/20, GRUR 2022, 899 [juris, marginal no. 28] = WRP 2022, 729 – Porsche 911, mwN).
14 b) In substance, these standards correspond to the EU law concept of a work protected by copyright within the meaning of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (BGH, GRUR 2022, 899 [juris para. 29] – Porsche 911, mwN). This is an autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted and applied uniformly throughout the EU (CJEU, Judgment of 13 November 2018 – C-310/17, GRUR 2019, 73 [juris para. 33] = WRP 2019, 55 – Levola Hengelo; Judgment of 12 September 2019 – C-683/17, GRUR 2019, 1185 [juris para. 29] = WRP 2019, 1449 -Cofemel). For an object to be classified as a work, two cumulative conditions must be fulfilled. First, the object in question must be original in the sense that it
constitutes its author’s own intellectual creation (CJEU, GRUR 2019, 73 [juris para. 36] – Levola Hengelo; GRUR 2019, 1185 [juris para. 29] – Cofemel; ECJ, Judgment of 11 June 2020 – C-833/18, GRUR 2020, 736 [juris para. 22] = WRP 2020, 1006 – Brompton Bicycle). An object is an original if it reflects the personality of its author by expressing his free creative choices. This cannot be assumed if the creation of an object was determined by technical considerations, by rules or by other constraints which left no room for the exercise of artistic freedom (CJEU, GRUR 2019, 1185 [juris para. 30 f.] – Cofemel; GRUR 2020, 736 [juris para. 23 f.] – Brompton Bicycle). On the other hand, classification as a work is reserved for elements expressing such creation (CJEU, GRUR 2019, 73 [juris para. 36 f.] – Levola Hengelo; GRUR 2019, 1185 [juris para. 29] – Cofemel; GRUR 2020, 736 [juris para. 22] – Brompton Bicycle).
15 This is in line with the assumption that works of applied art do not have higher requirements as to their level of originality than works of art without a specific purpose (BGH, judgment of 13 November 2013 I ZR 143/12, BGHZ 199, 52 [juris, marginal no. 26] – Geburtstagszug). In the case of objects of everyday use which have design features determined by the purpose of use, the scope for artistic design is only often limited. For this reason, the question arises in particular whether they are artistically designed beyond the form dictated by their function and whether this design reaches a level of originality that justifies copyright protection.
A design level that justifies copyright protection but is nevertheless low leads to a correspondingly narrow scope of protection of the work in question (BGHZ 199, 52 [juris, marginal no. 41] – Geburtstagszug, mwN)”
DA noi però il design industriale deve presentare anche “valore artistico” (art. 2 sub 10, legge aut.)
l’appello federale usa 04.04.2023 Case: 21-2301, Bertini c. Apple, riforma la decisione dell USPTO sul marchio APPLE MUSIC (segnalazione di post Mastodon del prof. Lemley)
In lite era l’individuazione della data di priorità del marchio di Apple , dato che Bertini opponeva un proprio uso per concerti jazz dal 1985 del marchio APPLE JAZZ.
Caso molto interessante perchè Apple tentò di unire alla data del prorio inizio d’uso (2015) l’uso fattone da colui che nel 2007 le aveva venduto -nella cessione della casa discografica dei Beatles- pure i marchi della stessa, tra cui “Apple” per “[g]ramophone records featuring music” and “audio compact discs featuring music” . Di questo allegava un primo uso dal 1968!
Il primo grado dell’ufficio rigetta l’opposizione del Bertini ma l’accoglie invece l’appello de quo.
In diritto USA si chiama “taking” la possibilità di unire l’uso di marchi diversi al fine dello stabilire la priorità,, p. 4 ss. Tale concetto giuridico sta al centro della motivazione dela sentenza.
Naturalmente uno dei problemi principali è quiello di determnare l’ampiezza merceologica coperta dal marchio dei Beatles.
conclusione: <<To establish tacking, Apple must therefore show live
musical performances are substantially identical to
gramophone records. There is no need to vacate and remand
for the Board to make a finding on this issue in the
first instance. No reasonable person could conclude, based
on the record before us, that gramophone records and live
musical performances are substantially identical. Nothing
in the record supports a finding that consumers would
think Apple’s live musical performances are within the normal
product evolution of Apple Corps’ gramophone records.
Accordingly, Apple is not entitled to tack its use of
APPLE MUSIC for live musical performances onto Apple
Corps’ 1968 use of APPLE for gramophone records. Because
Apple began using the mark APPLE MUSIC in 2015,
Bertini has priority of use for APPLE JAZZ as to live musical
performances. We therefore reverse the Board’s dismissal
of Bertini’s opposition to Apple’s application to
register APPLE MUSIC>>
I casi in oggetto non sono frequenti ma ora ce ne è uno deciso dal board of appeal del’EUIPO: marchio grafico a forma di coniglietto per sex toys che riproduce quasi pedissequamente prevcedetne marchio rinomato usato per prodotti per l’infanzia.
Si tratta del 4° board of appeal 10.01.2023, case R 442/2022-4, Mercis BR c. Bunnyjuice, Inc (qui la pag. dell’ufficio ed invece qui il link diretto al file word)
Intgeressa soprattutto:
i) a fini pratici, le prove documentali (corpose) prodotte dall’opponente a fondamento della allegazione di reputazione/rinomanza, trattata ai §§ 41 ss (tra cui pure un sondaggio di mercato, § 53)
ii) il passaggio sul detriment:
<< (iv) Use which would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark
As the evidence submitted by the opponent shows, the earlier mark appeals to children, instilling a sense of safety. The earlier mark stands for innocence, no aggression, no controversy and respect for the world of children encouraging them to develop and value their own identity and to express themselves in their own way allowing scope for their own imagination. The goods covered by the contested mark obviously possess characteristics which are incompatible with this image and is liable to have a negative impact on it>>.
(notizia e link da Kevin Bercimuelle-Chamot in IPKat in data odierna)
Questo il drawing chiesto in privativa di marchio, appena rilasciato dall’USPTO.
Indicazioni dell’ufficio: << Mark Drawing Type: 2 – AN ILLUSTRATION DRAWING WITHOUT ANY WORDS(S)/ LETTER(S); Description of the Mark: The mark consists of the distinctive shape of the box in which the goods are sold”.
Si tratta di marchio tridimensionale.
Parrebbe da noi poco distintivo, non essendo raro trovarlo nel mercato dei dolci.
Nè da notizia un tweeet di Trademarks are magic ove link alla pagina web dell’Ufficio.
Si v. il post Twitter di Trademarks Are Magic sui due seguenti marchi appena cocnesso dall’USPTO (e i link alle pagine relative dell’ufficio medesimo):
e
La descrizione del primo: <<The mark consists of a three-dimensional configuration of the interior of a retail store. The ceiling in the middle of the store shows a red color circle with a white center as part of an incomplete exclamation point, located directly above the check-out stand and with recessed lighting inside. The top part of the incomplete rounded exclamation point is red with a white center, in a “V” shape, with recessed lighting inside, and extends from the front of the store to the middle of the store. The stylized wording “ME SALVE!” appears on the front of the check-out stand, with the letters in red and the exclamation point having a red color outline and white interior. The broken lines depicting the check-out stand, cash register, lighting fixtures, walls, clothing racks and shelves only show the position of the trade dress in the retail store and are not claimed as individual features of the mark>>.
Descrizione del secondo: <<The mark consists of three-dimensional trade dress configuration of a red and white color ceiling fascia in the shape of an incomplete exclamation mark, in the interior of a retail store. The exclamation mark design is composed of two separate fascia, one is a V shape with a red color outline, a white color center and a rounded corner; and the second is a circle with a red color outline and a white color center. The circle fascia is located in front of the corner of the V shape fascia. The V shape fascia runs from the entrance of the store and the circle fascia is above the checkout stand of the store. The fascia have recessed lightings on their surface. The broken lines depicting the check-out stand, lighting fixtures, walls, windows, clothing racks and shelves only show the position of the trade dress in the retail store and are not claimed as individual features of the mark>>.
I colori rosso e bianco fanno parte della domanda di marchio.
