Categoria: PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST

Un caso di progetto di lavoro di ingegneria/architettura ex art. 99 l. aut.

Trib. Napoli n. 1300/2023 del 6 febbraio 2023, RG 24090/2017, rel. Graziano, decide su una  domdanda di violazione di copyright per illecitamente protratta riproduzione di lavori di architettura/oingegneristici per il festival di Ravello e per loro illecita esecuzione .
Il Trib. rigetta però la qualificazione come opera DELL’INFGEGNO ex art. 2.5 l. aut.  anche se concede quella di progtto di ingegneria ex art. 99 l. aut. e l’equo compenso ivi previsto per euro 17.000,00-

Nega l’applicaizone dell’art. 11.2 l. aut. , non trattandosi di opera dell’ingegno.

Spunti: <<L’atto creativo si atteggia, dunque, come un atto giuridico in senso stretto che determina una modificazione della realtà e produce effetti giuridici, a prescindere dalla direzione della volontà. Sul punto, si osserva che il deposito e la registrazione rilevano ad altri fini, il primo ha generica funzione di controllo; la seconda fa fede fino a prova contraria dell’avvenuta pubblicazione dell’opera e della paternità dell’autore>>.

poi:

<<Pertanto, lo strumento di tutela individuato dall’ordinamento nell’ipotesi in cui un’opera sia qualificata come un progetto di lavoro di ingegneria o di lavoro analogo, secondo la giurisprudenza di legittimità, è costituito dal riconoscimento di un equo compenso, in quanto “L’art. 99 della legge 22 aprile 1941 n. 633 sul diritto dell’autore di progetti di lavori di ingegneria (od analoghi) protegge tanto l’espressione formale dell’idea con il diritto esclusivo di riproduzione dei piani e disegni, quanto il suo contenuto con riguardo alla sua concreta realizzazione, ma la pretesa all’equo compenso per l’utilizzazione dell’idea è riconosciuta al detto autore di progetti di lavori d’ingegneria solo quando il progetto presenta soluzioni originali di problemi tecnici e il terzo, nell’esecuzione della sua opera, sia ricorso a tali soluzioni o manifestamente o utilizzando soluzioni solo apparentemente diverse (cosiddette sostituzioni mediante equivalenze), che non incidono sui punti realmente originali e qualificanti del progetto” (ex multis Cass., Sez. V n. 3933/84, Cass., Sez. V n. 2168/82; Cass., Sez. V n. 773/80)>>

Infine:

<<Sulla base delle osservazioni suindicate, a cui il Collegio aderisce, si ritiene che i progetti in questione vadano ricondotti nella fattispecie dei “progetti di lavori” di cui all’art. 2578 c.c., non a quella dei “disegni e opere dell’architettura” ex art. 2, n. 5 della L. 22 aprile 1941, n. 633, in quanto gli elaborati, oggetto di contestazione, rappresentano soluzioni originali a problemi tecnici, la cui originalità viene pedissequamente traslata dalla peculiare originalità a monte della struttura del palco sospeso di Villa Rufolo da altri progettata, su cui gli progetti incidono>>.

(da www.ilcaso.it)

Il termine GRUYERE è generico e non registrabile comer marchio: così l’appello del 4 circuito USA

Sarah Burstein in Mastodon dà notizia di e link a questa interessante sentenza 03.03.3023, No. 22-1041, dell’appello del 4 circuito, INTERPROFESSION DU GRUYERE; SYNDICAT INTERPROFESSIONNEL DU GRUYERE v. U. S. DAIRY EXPORT COUNCIL; ATALANTA CORPORATION; INTERCIBUS, INC..

Il comando è quello secondo cui il marchio denominativo GRUYERE non è registrabile (come marchio di certificazion: che è quelo concesso “to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.“, 15 US Code § 1127 ) perchè divenuto denominazione generica.

Sentenza dettagliata anche nel fatto, come raccomandabilmente si usa in common law.

<<All told, the record reflects sales in 2020 of at least pounds of gruyerelabeled cheese that was produced outside of the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France.

In In Re Cooperativa Produttori Latte E Fontina Valle D’acosta, the TTAB concluded that the term fontina “merely describes or is the generic name for a type of cheese,” in part because “the record reveal[ed] that there is a domestic fontina cheese.” 230 U.S.P.Q. 131 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 1986). Here too, the evidence demonstrates the existence of a domestic gruyere cheese. And even more persuasively, the record establishes that, at least in 2020, non-Swiss and non-French cheese made up a substantial portion of the cheese sold as gruyere in the United States market. “This evidence is probative of generic use because the more members of the public see a term used by competitors in the field, the less likely they will be to identify the term with one particular producer” (or, in this case, one geographic region). Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). And significantly, Wegmans—which sells both domestic and Swiss-produced gruyere cheese—sold more domestic gruyere-labeled cheese than Swiss gruyere-labeled cheese each year between 2016 and 2021 (except 2020). This evidence strongly indicates that “to the American purchaser, [GRUYERE] primarily signifies a type of cheese (much like brie, swiss, parmesan or mozzarella) regardless of regional origin, rather than a mark of certification.” Id.>>

Per cui:

<< Having addressed the Consortiums’ challenges to the district court’s opinion, we conclude that, while the district court made certain improper inferences in its analysis, the record nevertheless contains evidence that is “so one-sided” that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Opposers must prevail as a matter of law. Retail Servs., Inc., 364 F.3d at 542. The FDA standard of identity, the pervasive sales of non-Swiss and nonFrench cheese labeled as gruyere in the United States, and the common usage of gruyere “establish[] that when purchasers walk into retail stores and ask for [gruyere], they regularly mean” a type of cheese, and not a cheese that was produced in the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France. Glover, 74 F.3d at 59>>.

Il marchio denominativo METAVERSE FOOD per cibi non è registrabile perchè non distintivo

Negato il carattere distintivo al marchio in oggetto dal reclamo amministrativo dell’EUIPO 2nd Board of Appeal 28.02.2023, Case R 2357/2022-2 ,Oshee Polska Sp. z o.o.

Passi pertinenti:

<< 20 The applicant submits that ‘The expert examining the trade mark application neverthelessbased its decision on a misunderstanding of the concept of Metaverse. ‘Metaverse’ is avirtual world in which people, as avatars, interact with each other in a three-dimensionalspace that mimics reality. (…) [there is] a separation between the virtual world ofMetaverse and the real world. Metaverse is defined strictly as a category defined in thevirtual world and should not be confused with all other online activities. For example,making purchases in an online shop of physical products that will be delivered to us inreal form, or organising an online meeting, e.g. videoconferencing or lecture or checkingmail, is not an entrance to the Metaverse world.”
21. However, the House considers that the virtual world (Metaverse) is not a well-definedand distinct category in the virtual world. Nor is the borderline between the real worldand the virtual world clear.
22. The virtual world (Metaverse) is not just avatar, alternative reality and virtual products.The distinction between Metaverse and other forms of online activity is blurred. A goodexample is the change of Facebook’s very strong name to Meta in 2021, the latter seen asa reference to Metaverse and the beginning of an increased Facebook/Meta activity inMetaverse( https://www.welbloom.com/nft/, 27/02/2023).
23. More and more frequent examples also indicate that Metaverse is another e-commerceviewer, i.e. online commerce. Companies use Metaverse to promote their goods andbrands, which later translate into increased sales of their goods in the real world (see e.g.https://nypost.com/2022/04/05/coca-cola-launches-virtual-drink-inside-the-metaverse/;24/02/2023).
24. There are also growing voices that soon known online shops will turn into Metaverse(virtual) online shops where the goods offered will be presented in virtual form, but thepurchase will de facto concern real products that will then be sent home (such as a‘normal’ online order).
25. Some shops already offer some virtual services, e.g. virtual shoe measurement. It canvirtually measure the foot and virtually select customised shoes without leaving the home(e.g. https://ccc.eu/pl/esizeme; https://www.esize.me/; 24/02/2023).
26. The above examples show that virtual spaces are constantly evolving and absorbing thenew forms and opportunities offered by advances in IT and technology.
27. In the light of the foregoing, the Chamber sees no error in the definition of the word‘Metaverse’ as a virtual space.
28. According to settled case-law, the distinctive character of a trade mark must be assessedby reference, first, to the goods or services referred to in the application for registrationand, second, to the perception of the relevant public, which consists of the average,reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumers of thosegoods or services (29/04/2004, C-473/01 P & C-474/01 P, Tabs, EU:C:2004:260,Paragraph 33; 08/05/2008, C-304/06 P, Eurohypo, EU:C:2008:261, § 67; 21/01/2010, C-398/08 P, Vorsprung durch Technik, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 34).
29. The goods covered by the declaration are, inter alia, vouchers, jellies, salads and differenttypes of food in Classes 29 and 30. These products are now widely available online. Asvirtual spaces evolve, these products can increasingly be promoted and offered throughMetaverse. Some companies have already set up Metaverse stores where they can buytheir real products with home delivery (e.g.: ‘Lindt USA launches Its First-Ever 3DVirtual Store with ByondXR and Makes Shopping for Premium Chocolate a TrulyInnovative Experience’, https://www.accesswire.com/726619/Lindt-USA-Launches-ItsFirst-Ever-3D-Virtual-Store-with-ByondXR-and-Makes-Shopping-for-PremiumChocolate-a-Truly-Innovative-Experience, 27/03/2023;https://www.mashed.com/1112615/lindt-created-its-own-3d-virtual-store/; 27/03/2023).
30. In the light of the foregoing, the relevant public will perceive the mark simply as anindication devoid of any distinctive character, indicating that food, food in the form ofgoods in Classes 29 and 30, are offered or can be purchased in a virtual space.
31. The goods covered by the declaration are also pharmaceuticals, vitamin preparations orfood supplements in Class 5.
32. The applicant submits that products such as pharmaceuticals, vitamin preparations orfood supplements are subject to different marketing conditions than those in Classes 29and 30, have different uses and are sold through different distribution channels.
33. The Chamber notes that pharmaceuticals (both prescription and over-the-counter),vitamin preparations or food supplements are also widely available online (forprescription medicines, after submission of a prescription). Some food supplements arealready offered via Metaverse (https://www.welbloom.com/nft/ 27/03/2023). Theprovision of medical assistance and health consultations (including prescriptions andrecommendations for pharmaceuticals) through Metaverse is also mentioned (see anumber of articles on this subject: https://ictandhealth.com/what-will-metaverse-offerphysicians-and-patients-in-the-future/news/; https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/5-wayspharma-can-benefit-from-metaverse-timoth%C3%A9-cynober-pharm-d-?trk=pulsearticle; https://sixdegreesmed.com/pharma-metaverse/; 27/03/2023).
34. Pharmaceutical preparations and supplements are also in the form of food and food.
35. In the light of the foregoing, the relevant public will perceive the mark simply as anindication devoid of any distinctive character, indicating that the relevant goods in Class5, namely pharmaceutical preparations and food and food supplements, are offered or canbe purchased in a virtual space.
36. Therefore, the relevant public will not perceive any indication of commercial origin inthe sign at issue, but only information of the general nature of the relevant goods inClasses 29, 30 and 5>>.

Tutto bene, solo che si sono altre passate registrazioni concesse dall’Ufficio col termine Metaverso. Per queste non vale il medesimo ragionamento? Il BoA replica (§ 37 segg.) che non può farci nulla: eventuali errori passati non possono indurre a ripeterli ora!

(Notizia e link da Marcel Pensel di IPKat in data odierna, che dà notizia di analoaga genella decisione per “METAVERSE DRINK”, ma in lingua polacca.)

Elaborazione creativa di opera fotografica: il caso del ritratto del giudice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, fermatosi però ai preliminari …

Il NOrth. Dist. of Georgia , Atlanta Division, del 13 marzo 2023, giudice Boulee, Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Julie Torres Art, LLC et al, civil action n° 1:22-CV-00655-JPB, esamina una interessante fattispecie concreta di creazione elaborativa di una fotografia della giurista Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Solo che attore non è il fotografo ma un’associazione di categoria, in base a contratto di mandato/licenza.

Notizia riportata da molte fonti giuridiche sul web : ad es. da The art newspaper da C. Porterfiled. 17.03.2023.

Questi i due lavori a paragone :

Sarebbe stato interessante leggere la decisione. Solo che il giudice non ravvisa legittimazione nell’attore (l’associazione di categoria) e rigetta per il momento la domanda (gli concede 14 gg per modificarla).

In particolare non ravvisa l’esistenza di una licenza esclusiva, unica possibilità per chi non è owner. Si tratta, da noi, di carenza di legittimazione attiva (condizione dell’azione), da sempre riconosciuta al licenziatario esclusivo e solitamente negata a quello non esclusivo.

Clausola del contratto tra il fotografo e l’associazione

<<You retain [Plaintiff] as your exclusive agent to sell, syndicate,
license, market or otherwise distribute any and all
celebrity/portrait photographs and related video portraits,
submitted to us by you and accepted by us for exploitation for
sale or syndication during the term of this Agreement (the
“Accepted Images”). You must be the sole owner of the
copyright for all such photographs and may not offer any
celebrity/portrait photographs for sale or syndication to or
through any other agent, representative, agency, person or
entity during the Term of this Agreement.>>

Errore non piccolo da parte di chi preparò il contratto, probabilmente.

Faranno bene gli operatori a prendere nota e a verificare i loro conntratti alla luce del diritto nazionale.-

Linee guida dello US Copyright Office sulla registrabilità di opere prodotte con intelligenza artificiale

Sono state diffuse le “Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence” , 10-16 marzo 2023.

Fonte: web page dell’Ufficio .

Il passo interessante è sub III:

<<It begins by asking ‘‘whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely beingan assisting instrument, or whether thetraditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musicalexpression or elements of selection,arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.’’ In the case of works containing AI-generated material, theOffice will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of‘‘mechanical reproduction’’ or instead of an author’s ‘‘own original mentalconception, to which [the author] gave visible form.’’ The answer will depend on the circumstances,particularly how the AI tool operatesand how it was used to create the final work. This is necessarily a case-by case inquiry. If a work’s traditional elements of authorship were produced by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the Office will not register it.
For example, when an AI technology receives solely a prompt from a human and produces complex written, visual, or musical works in response, the ‘‘traditional elements of authorship’’ are determined and executed by the technology—not the human user.
Based on the Office’s understanding of the generative AI technologies currently available, users do not exercise ultimate creative control over how such systems interpret prompts and generate material.
Instead,these prompts function more like instructions to a commissioned artist—they identify what the prompter wishes to have depicted, but the machine determines how those instructions are implemented in its output.
Forexample, if a user instructs a text generating technology to ‘‘write a poem about copyright law in the style ofWilliam Shakespeare,’’ she can expect the system to generate text that is recognizable as a poem, mentions copyright, and resembles Shakespeare’s style. But the technology will decide the rhyming pattern, the words in each line, and the structure of the text.
When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship. As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.
In other cases, however, a work containing AI-generated material will also contain sufficient human authorship to support a copyright claim. For example, a human may select or arrange AI-generated material in a sufficiently creative way that ‘‘the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.’’ Or anartist may modify material originally generated by AI technology to such a degree that the modifications meet the standard for copyright protection. In these cases, copyright will only protect the human-authored aspects of the work, which are ‘‘independent of’’ and do ‘‘not affect’’ the copyright status of the AI-generated material itself>>
Mi pare affermazione di buon senso.

Il marchio denominativo FUCKING AWESOME per abbigliamento sportivo è confermato privo di distintività (anche se non contrario a buon costume)

Così Trib. UE 15.03.2023 , T-178/22, FA World Entertainment Inc. c. EUIPO .

Annullata invece dall’appello amministrativo (e non portata in sede giurisdizionale) la inziale decisione di contrarietà a ordine pubblico e/o buon costume

Altro caso di violazione del modello per sandali Crocs: ora presso l’EUIPO

l’appello amministrativo dell’ufficio afferma la nullità del modello di sandalo simile a quello di  Crocs.

Si tratta della decisione del 3° Board of Appeal 9 gennaio 2023, caso R 68/2022-3, Crocs c. Li-Fuzhou Tanglong Electronic Commerce.

La nullità sta nella mancanza di carattere individuale ex art. 6 (e art. 25.1.b) del reg. UE  No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001.

Il primo grado amminisartivo però aeva deciso in senso opposto.

Ma anche ad occhio la somigliazna è tale per c ui è difficile assai evitare di pesnare che  differisca <<in modo significativo dall’impressione generale suscitata in tale utilizzatore da qualsiasi disegno o modello che sia stato divulgato al pubblico>>

Questa la pag. nel database giurisprudenziale dell’Ufficio.

Il giudizio di “ragione unicamente tecnica” di certe caratteristiche dell’aspetto di disegni e modelli

In tale giudizio: i)  contano -ma poco- altri modelli analoghi del titolare ;

ii) non contano per nulla gli aspetti coloristici non presenti nella registrazione.

Così sull’art. 8.1 reg. UE 6 del 2002 la Corte di giustizia 02.03.2023, C-684/21,Papierfabriek Doetinchem BV c. Sprick GmbH Bielefelder Papier- und Wellpappenwerk & Co.

La massima sub ii) però non è sicurissima: la corte infatti al § 31 è poco chiara.

Un caso da manuale di tutela della rinomanza: il marchio denominativo GOOGLE CAR

Trib. UE 01.02.2023, T-569/21, Zoubier Harbaoui c. EUIPO-Google LLC decide la lite.

Naturalmente applica la tutela della rinomanza (art. 8.5 reg. 2017/1001) : se non lo fa con Google , uno dei brand più famosi al mondo, non si sa quando mai possa applicarla!

Si noti che è stato (giustamente) ritenuto irrilevante il fatto che Google :

i) non lo avesse registrato per autoveicoli ma per prodotti-servizi  diverse; e che

ii) commercializzasse le proprie auto con altro marchio  (WAYMO : v. https://waymo.com/).

Riporto solo il passo sull’indebito vantaggio/unfair advantage: << The risk of unfair advantage covers the situation in which the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier by that association with the earlier mark with the reputation (see judgment of 26 September 2018, PUMA, T‑62/16, EU:T:2018:604, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). In order to determine whether the use of the later mark takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned. As regards the strength of the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark, it follows from the case-law that the stronger that mark’s distinctive character and reputation are, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it (judgment of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others, C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 44; see also judgment of 28 May 2020, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO – Intercontinental Great Brands (gullón TWINS COOKIE SANDWICH), T‑677/18, not published, EU:T:2020:229, paragraph 121). The more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the later mark is taking unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark (judgment of 27 November 2008, Intel Corporation, C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraph 67)>>.

Interessante è il passaggio processuale relativo al fatto che il giudizio dell’Ufficio non debba analiticamente cpnsiderere tutti i prodotti indicati nelle classi scelte ma possa raggrupparli, §§ 29-30