Categoria: PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST

Il termine GRUYERE è generico e non registrabile comer marchio: così l’appello del 4 circuito USA

Sarah Burstein in Mastodon dà notizia di e link a questa interessante sentenza 03.03.3023, No. 22-1041, dell’appello del 4 circuito, INTERPROFESSION DU GRUYERE; SYNDICAT INTERPROFESSIONNEL DU GRUYERE v. U. S. DAIRY EXPORT COUNCIL; ATALANTA CORPORATION; INTERCIBUS, INC..

Il comando è quello secondo cui il marchio denominativo GRUYERE non è registrabile (come marchio di certificazion: che è quelo concesso “to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.“, 15 US Code § 1127 ) perchè divenuto denominazione generica.

Sentenza dettagliata anche nel fatto, come raccomandabilmente si usa in common law.

<<All told, the record reflects sales in 2020 of at least pounds of gruyerelabeled cheese that was produced outside of the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France.

In In Re Cooperativa Produttori Latte E Fontina Valle D’acosta, the TTAB concluded that the term fontina “merely describes or is the generic name for a type of cheese,” in part because “the record reveal[ed] that there is a domestic fontina cheese.” 230 U.S.P.Q. 131 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 1986). Here too, the evidence demonstrates the existence of a domestic gruyere cheese. And even more persuasively, the record establishes that, at least in 2020, non-Swiss and non-French cheese made up a substantial portion of the cheese sold as gruyere in the United States market. “This evidence is probative of generic use because the more members of the public see a term used by competitors in the field, the less likely they will be to identify the term with one particular producer” (or, in this case, one geographic region). Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). And significantly, Wegmans—which sells both domestic and Swiss-produced gruyere cheese—sold more domestic gruyere-labeled cheese than Swiss gruyere-labeled cheese each year between 2016 and 2021 (except 2020). This evidence strongly indicates that “to the American purchaser, [GRUYERE] primarily signifies a type of cheese (much like brie, swiss, parmesan or mozzarella) regardless of regional origin, rather than a mark of certification.” Id.>>

Per cui:

<< Having addressed the Consortiums’ challenges to the district court’s opinion, we conclude that, while the district court made certain improper inferences in its analysis, the record nevertheless contains evidence that is “so one-sided” that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Opposers must prevail as a matter of law. Retail Servs., Inc., 364 F.3d at 542. The FDA standard of identity, the pervasive sales of non-Swiss and nonFrench cheese labeled as gruyere in the United States, and the common usage of gruyere “establish[] that when purchasers walk into retail stores and ask for [gruyere], they regularly mean” a type of cheese, and not a cheese that was produced in the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France. Glover, 74 F.3d at 59>>.

Il marchio denominativo METAVERSE FOOD per cibi non è registrabile perchè non distintivo

Negato il carattere distintivo al marchio in oggetto dal reclamo amministrativo dell’EUIPO 2nd Board of Appeal 28.02.2023, Case R 2357/2022-2 ,Oshee Polska Sp. z o.o.

Passi pertinenti:

<< 20 The applicant submits that ‘The expert examining the trade mark application neverthelessbased its decision on a misunderstanding of the concept of Metaverse. ‘Metaverse’ is avirtual world in which people, as avatars, interact with each other in a three-dimensionalspace that mimics reality. (…) [there is] a separation between the virtual world ofMetaverse and the real world. Metaverse is defined strictly as a category defined in thevirtual world and should not be confused with all other online activities. For example,making purchases in an online shop of physical products that will be delivered to us inreal form, or organising an online meeting, e.g. videoconferencing or lecture or checkingmail, is not an entrance to the Metaverse world.”
21. However, the House considers that the virtual world (Metaverse) is not a well-definedand distinct category in the virtual world. Nor is the borderline between the real worldand the virtual world clear.
22. The virtual world (Metaverse) is not just avatar, alternative reality and virtual products.The distinction between Metaverse and other forms of online activity is blurred. A goodexample is the change of Facebook’s very strong name to Meta in 2021, the latter seen asa reference to Metaverse and the beginning of an increased Facebook/Meta activity inMetaverse( https://www.welbloom.com/nft/, 27/02/2023).
23. More and more frequent examples also indicate that Metaverse is another e-commerceviewer, i.e. online commerce. Companies use Metaverse to promote their goods andbrands, which later translate into increased sales of their goods in the real world (see e.g.https://nypost.com/2022/04/05/coca-cola-launches-virtual-drink-inside-the-metaverse/;24/02/2023).
24. There are also growing voices that soon known online shops will turn into Metaverse(virtual) online shops where the goods offered will be presented in virtual form, but thepurchase will de facto concern real products that will then be sent home (such as a‘normal’ online order).
25. Some shops already offer some virtual services, e.g. virtual shoe measurement. It canvirtually measure the foot and virtually select customised shoes without leaving the home(e.g. https://ccc.eu/pl/esizeme; https://www.esize.me/; 24/02/2023).
26. The above examples show that virtual spaces are constantly evolving and absorbing thenew forms and opportunities offered by advances in IT and technology.
27. In the light of the foregoing, the Chamber sees no error in the definition of the word‘Metaverse’ as a virtual space.
28. According to settled case-law, the distinctive character of a trade mark must be assessedby reference, first, to the goods or services referred to in the application for registrationand, second, to the perception of the relevant public, which consists of the average,reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumers of thosegoods or services (29/04/2004, C-473/01 P & C-474/01 P, Tabs, EU:C:2004:260,Paragraph 33; 08/05/2008, C-304/06 P, Eurohypo, EU:C:2008:261, § 67; 21/01/2010, C-398/08 P, Vorsprung durch Technik, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 34).
29. The goods covered by the declaration are, inter alia, vouchers, jellies, salads and differenttypes of food in Classes 29 and 30. These products are now widely available online. Asvirtual spaces evolve, these products can increasingly be promoted and offered throughMetaverse. Some companies have already set up Metaverse stores where they can buytheir real products with home delivery (e.g.: ‘Lindt USA launches Its First-Ever 3DVirtual Store with ByondXR and Makes Shopping for Premium Chocolate a TrulyInnovative Experience’, https://www.accesswire.com/726619/Lindt-USA-Launches-ItsFirst-Ever-3D-Virtual-Store-with-ByondXR-and-Makes-Shopping-for-PremiumChocolate-a-Truly-Innovative-Experience, 27/03/2023;https://www.mashed.com/1112615/lindt-created-its-own-3d-virtual-store/; 27/03/2023).
30. In the light of the foregoing, the relevant public will perceive the mark simply as anindication devoid of any distinctive character, indicating that food, food in the form ofgoods in Classes 29 and 30, are offered or can be purchased in a virtual space.
31. The goods covered by the declaration are also pharmaceuticals, vitamin preparations orfood supplements in Class 5.
32. The applicant submits that products such as pharmaceuticals, vitamin preparations orfood supplements are subject to different marketing conditions than those in Classes 29and 30, have different uses and are sold through different distribution channels.
33. The Chamber notes that pharmaceuticals (both prescription and over-the-counter),vitamin preparations or food supplements are also widely available online (forprescription medicines, after submission of a prescription). Some food supplements arealready offered via Metaverse (https://www.welbloom.com/nft/ 27/03/2023). Theprovision of medical assistance and health consultations (including prescriptions andrecommendations for pharmaceuticals) through Metaverse is also mentioned (see anumber of articles on this subject: https://ictandhealth.com/what-will-metaverse-offerphysicians-and-patients-in-the-future/news/; https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/5-wayspharma-can-benefit-from-metaverse-timoth%C3%A9-cynober-pharm-d-?trk=pulsearticle; https://sixdegreesmed.com/pharma-metaverse/; 27/03/2023).
34. Pharmaceutical preparations and supplements are also in the form of food and food.
35. In the light of the foregoing, the relevant public will perceive the mark simply as anindication devoid of any distinctive character, indicating that the relevant goods in Class5, namely pharmaceutical preparations and food and food supplements, are offered or canbe purchased in a virtual space.
36. Therefore, the relevant public will not perceive any indication of commercial origin inthe sign at issue, but only information of the general nature of the relevant goods inClasses 29, 30 and 5>>.

Tutto bene, solo che si sono altre passate registrazioni concesse dall’Ufficio col termine Metaverso. Per queste non vale il medesimo ragionamento? Il BoA replica (§ 37 segg.) che non può farci nulla: eventuali errori passati non possono indurre a ripeterli ora!

(Notizia e link da Marcel Pensel di IPKat in data odierna, che dà notizia di analoaga genella decisione per “METAVERSE DRINK”, ma in lingua polacca.)

Elaborazione creativa di opera fotografica: il caso del ritratto del giudice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, fermatosi però ai preliminari …

Il NOrth. Dist. of Georgia , Atlanta Division, del 13 marzo 2023, giudice Boulee, Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Julie Torres Art, LLC et al, civil action n° 1:22-CV-00655-JPB, esamina una interessante fattispecie concreta di creazione elaborativa di una fotografia della giurista Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Solo che attore non è il fotografo ma un’associazione di categoria, in base a contratto di mandato/licenza.

Notizia riportata da molte fonti giuridiche sul web : ad es. da The art newspaper da C. Porterfiled. 17.03.2023.

Questi i due lavori a paragone :

Sarebbe stato interessante leggere la decisione. Solo che il giudice non ravvisa legittimazione nell’attore (l’associazione di categoria) e rigetta per il momento la domanda (gli concede 14 gg per modificarla).

In particolare non ravvisa l’esistenza di una licenza esclusiva, unica possibilità per chi non è owner. Si tratta, da noi, di carenza di legittimazione attiva (condizione dell’azione), da sempre riconosciuta al licenziatario esclusivo e solitamente negata a quello non esclusivo.

Clausola del contratto tra il fotografo e l’associazione

<<You retain [Plaintiff] as your exclusive agent to sell, syndicate,
license, market or otherwise distribute any and all
celebrity/portrait photographs and related video portraits,
submitted to us by you and accepted by us for exploitation for
sale or syndication during the term of this Agreement (the
“Accepted Images”). You must be the sole owner of the
copyright for all such photographs and may not offer any
celebrity/portrait photographs for sale or syndication to or
through any other agent, representative, agency, person or
entity during the Term of this Agreement.>>

Errore non piccolo da parte di chi preparò il contratto, probabilmente.

Faranno bene gli operatori a prendere nota e a verificare i loro conntratti alla luce del diritto nazionale.-

Linee guida dello US Copyright Office sulla registrabilità di opere prodotte con intelligenza artificiale

Sono state diffuse le “Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence” , 10-16 marzo 2023.

Fonte: web page dell’Ufficio .

Il passo interessante è sub III:

<<It begins by asking ‘‘whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely beingan assisting instrument, or whether thetraditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musicalexpression or elements of selection,arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.’’ In the case of works containing AI-generated material, theOffice will consider whether the AI contributions are the result of‘‘mechanical reproduction’’ or instead of an author’s ‘‘own original mentalconception, to which [the author] gave visible form.’’ The answer will depend on the circumstances,particularly how the AI tool operatesand how it was used to create the final work. This is necessarily a case-by case inquiry. If a work’s traditional elements of authorship were produced by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the Office will not register it.
For example, when an AI technology receives solely a prompt from a human and produces complex written, visual, or musical works in response, the ‘‘traditional elements of authorship’’ are determined and executed by the technology—not the human user.
Based on the Office’s understanding of the generative AI technologies currently available, users do not exercise ultimate creative control over how such systems interpret prompts and generate material.
Instead,these prompts function more like instructions to a commissioned artist—they identify what the prompter wishes to have depicted, but the machine determines how those instructions are implemented in its output.
Forexample, if a user instructs a text generating technology to ‘‘write a poem about copyright law in the style ofWilliam Shakespeare,’’ she can expect the system to generate text that is recognizable as a poem, mentions copyright, and resembles Shakespeare’s style. But the technology will decide the rhyming pattern, the words in each line, and the structure of the text.
When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship. As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.
In other cases, however, a work containing AI-generated material will also contain sufficient human authorship to support a copyright claim. For example, a human may select or arrange AI-generated material in a sufficiently creative way that ‘‘the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.’’ Or anartist may modify material originally generated by AI technology to such a degree that the modifications meet the standard for copyright protection. In these cases, copyright will only protect the human-authored aspects of the work, which are ‘‘independent of’’ and do ‘‘not affect’’ the copyright status of the AI-generated material itself>>
Mi pare affermazione di buon senso.

Il marchio denominativo FUCKING AWESOME per abbigliamento sportivo è confermato privo di distintività (anche se non contrario a buon costume)

Così Trib. UE 15.03.2023 , T-178/22, FA World Entertainment Inc. c. EUIPO .

Annullata invece dall’appello amministrativo (e non portata in sede giurisdizionale) la inziale decisione di contrarietà a ordine pubblico e/o buon costume

Altro caso di violazione del modello per sandali Crocs: ora presso l’EUIPO

l’appello amministrativo dell’ufficio afferma la nullità del modello di sandalo simile a quello di  Crocs.

Si tratta della decisione del 3° Board of Appeal 9 gennaio 2023, caso R 68/2022-3, Crocs c. Li-Fuzhou Tanglong Electronic Commerce.

La nullità sta nella mancanza di carattere individuale ex art. 6 (e art. 25.1.b) del reg. UE  No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001.

Il primo grado amminisartivo però aeva deciso in senso opposto.

Ma anche ad occhio la somigliazna è tale per c ui è difficile assai evitare di pesnare che  differisca <<in modo significativo dall’impressione generale suscitata in tale utilizzatore da qualsiasi disegno o modello che sia stato divulgato al pubblico>>

Questa la pag. nel database giurisprudenziale dell’Ufficio.

Il giudizio di “ragione unicamente tecnica” di certe caratteristiche dell’aspetto di disegni e modelli

In tale giudizio: i)  contano -ma poco- altri modelli analoghi del titolare ;

ii) non contano per nulla gli aspetti coloristici non presenti nella registrazione.

Così sull’art. 8.1 reg. UE 6 del 2002 la Corte di giustizia 02.03.2023, C-684/21,Papierfabriek Doetinchem BV c. Sprick GmbH Bielefelder Papier- und Wellpappenwerk & Co.

La massima sub ii) però non è sicurissima: la corte infatti al § 31 è poco chiara.

Un caso da manuale di tutela della rinomanza: il marchio denominativo GOOGLE CAR

Trib. UE 01.02.2023, T-569/21, Zoubier Harbaoui c. EUIPO-Google LLC decide la lite.

Naturalmente applica la tutela della rinomanza (art. 8.5 reg. 2017/1001) : se non lo fa con Google , uno dei brand più famosi al mondo, non si sa quando mai possa applicarla!

Si noti che è stato (giustamente) ritenuto irrilevante il fatto che Google :

i) non lo avesse registrato per autoveicoli ma per prodotti-servizi  diverse; e che

ii) commercializzasse le proprie auto con altro marchio  (WAYMO : v. https://waymo.com/).

Riporto solo il passo sull’indebito vantaggio/unfair advantage: << The risk of unfair advantage covers the situation in which the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier by that association with the earlier mark with the reputation (see judgment of 26 September 2018, PUMA, T‑62/16, EU:T:2018:604, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). In order to determine whether the use of the later mark takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned. As regards the strength of the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark, it follows from the case-law that the stronger that mark’s distinctive character and reputation are, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it (judgment of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others, C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 44; see also judgment of 28 May 2020, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO – Intercontinental Great Brands (gullón TWINS COOKIE SANDWICH), T‑677/18, not published, EU:T:2020:229, paragraph 121). The more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the later mark is taking unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark (judgment of 27 November 2008, Intel Corporation, C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraph 67)>>.

Interessante è il passaggio processuale relativo al fatto che il giudizio dell’Ufficio non debba analiticamente cpnsiderere tutti i prodotti indicati nelle classi scelte ma possa raggrupparli, §§ 29-30

Cponfondibilityà tyras marchio nenominativo e complesso: il caso Tjhermorad

marchio posteriore

Anteriorità: word mark THERMRAD

Merceologicamente prodotti abbastanza affini.

Ecco il giudizio di Trib. UE 8 maro 2023 , T-172/22, Salim Selahaddin Gönenç  c. EUIPO-Solar A/S.

Visual similarity:

1) in the present case, the earlier word mark, consisting of the element ‘thermrad’, and the dominant word element of the mark applied for, ‘termorad’, are of the same length, both being formed of eight letters. They thus overlap in so far as they contain the sequence of the letter ‘t’ followed by the string of letters ‘erm’ and ‘rad’. However, those signs are differentiated by the letters ‘h’ and ‘o’ and, in the mark applied for, by the geometric shape contained in the letter ‘t’ and the expression ‘aluminium panel radiator’, as well as by the stylisation of the typeface used.

76      In the light of the analysis contained in paragraph 67 above, it is clear that the elements differentiating the signs at issue either occupy a secondary position owing to their purely decorative character, as regards the stylisation of the typeface and the red geometric component, or are negligible, so far as concerns the expression ‘aluminium radiator panel’, due to its reduced size and proportion. Consequently, it must be held that the similarities between the word elements ‘thermrad’ and ‘termorad’ in the signs at issue outweigh their differences, since, in the present case, those differences are not sufficient to attenuate the visual similarities.

77      Consequently, the Board of Appeal justifiably considered that the marks at issue were visually similar to a high degree.

Phonetic similarity:

In the present case, the signs at issue coincide phonetically in that the word elements ‘therm’ and ‘term’ sound identical when pronounced, since, as is apparent from paragraph 66 of the contested decision, the letter ‘h’ is not pronounced in German, Dutch or French. The sound of the syllable ‘rad’ is also the same in the signs at issue. On the other hand, they differ in the sound of the letter ‘o’ and the expression ‘aluminium panel radiator’ in the mark applied for.

83 As regards that expression, it should be found, as the Board of Appeal considered, that it is highly probable that it will be ignored by the relevant public given its descriptive character and the secondary position it occupies owing to its smaller size and position at the bottom of the mark applied for (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2014, El Corte Inglés v OHIM – Baumarkt Praktiker Deutschland (PRO OUTDOOR), T‑127/13, not published, EU:T:2014:767, paragraph 53; of 7 June 2018, MIP Metro v EUIPO – AFNOR (N & NF TRADING), T‑807/16, not published, EU:T:2018:337, paragraph 48; and of 14 June 2018, Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO – Lion Capital (LION’S HEAD global partners), T‑310/17, not published, EU:T:2018:344, paragraph 39).

84 Consequently, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the marks at issue were phonetically similar to a high degree.

Conceptual similarity:

<<the Board of Appeal found that, despite the fact that the word elements ‘thermrad’ and ‘termorad’ did not convey a clear concept in relation to the goods at issue, both signs contained a word element which referred to the concept of ‘heat’ or ‘temperature’, namely ‘therm’ and ‘termo’. Nevertheless, since that similarity was based on an element the distinctiveness of which was weak, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were conceptually similar to at least a low degree.

86 Those findings of the Board of Appeal, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant, are free from error and must therefore be upheld>>.

Distintività del marchio anteriore: normale, § 95

Sintesi:

<< 102  First of all, although the applicant insists, in the present case, that the distinctiveness of the earlier mark is weak, it has nevertheless been found, contrary to his assertion, that the distinctiveness of the earlier mark was normal.

103 Furthermore, it has been established that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical or similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark. Similarly, as is apparent from paragraphs 77, 84 and 86 above, the signs at issue have a high degree of visual and phonetic similarity and a low degree of conceptual similarity.

104 In addition, the public to be taken into account for the purpose of examining the likelihood of confusion consists of both the general public and professionals, both displaying a high level of attention on account of the fact that the goods at issue are purchased infrequently and are expensive. In that regard, in so far as, in paragraph 82 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal included in the assessment of the existence of a likelihood of confusion the part of the relevant public displaying a high level of attention, the Board of Appeal’s error, established in paragraph 34 above, is of no consequence.

105 In the light of all of the factors analysed above, it must be held that the conditions for finding that there is a likelihood of confusion are satisfied in the present case, on account of, in particular, the fact that the goods at issue are identical or similar and the overall similarity of the signs at issue, which are both formed of a fanciful and, therefore, distinctive word element in relation to those goods, and the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark, despite the high level of attention of the relevant public. Thus, in view of the interdependence of the various factors taken into account, it cannot be ruled out that the average consumer of the goods at issue residing in Benelux might believe that those goods come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.

106 Consequently, the complaint relating to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must be rejected>>.

OK. Ci  pare tuttavia assai dubbio che  il marchi odenominativo THERMRAD per <<<Apparatus for lighting, heating, steam generating, cooking, refrigerating, drying, ventilation and water supply; radiators (heating); radiators for central heating’.>> sia valido in quanti mediament distintivit. Ci pare invee assai descrittivo e quindi nullo.