PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST – Pagina 9

Perplessa decisione di assenza di confondibilità tra due marchi figurativi UE rappresentanti un leone

I marchi a paragone:

Qui sopra il marchio chiesto in registrazione e sub iudice

Qui sopra invece l’anteriorità oppostagli

Merceologicamente sovrapponibili quasi del tutto.

L’appello amminstrativo ravvisava confondibilità e accoglieva l’opposizione basata sull’anteriorità.

Il Tribunale 20.12.2023, T-564/22,. Pierre Balmain c. EUIPO-Story Time, invece, la esclude per la debolezza del marchio anteriore, annullando la decisione del Board of appeal.

Ecco la sintesi finale:

<<The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion

77 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered by those marks. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

78 Furthermore, the degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark, which determines the scope of the protection conferred by that mark, is one of the relevant factors to be taken into account in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, with the result that marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of their recognition on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with less distinctive character (judgments of 11 November 1997, SABEL, C‑251/95, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24, and of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; see also judgment of 29 March 2023, Machková v EUIPO – Aceites Almenara (ALMARA SOAP), T‑436/22, not published, EU:T:2023:167, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited). However, in the light of the interdependence between the factors to be taken into account, the existence of a likelihood of confusion cannot automatically be ruled out where the distinctive character of the earlier mark is weak (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2020, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO, C‑766/18 P, EU:C:2020:170, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

79 In practice, where the earlier mark and the mark applied for coincide in an element that is weakly distinctive with regard to the goods or services at issue, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion does not often lead to a finding that such a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, exists (judgments of 12 June 2019, Hansson, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 55; of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO, C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 53; and of 18 January 2023, YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v EUIPO – Vidyanand (YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL), T‑443/21, not published, EU:T:2023:7, paragraph 121). Where the elements of similarity between two signs at issue arise from the fact that they have a component with a low degree of inherent distinctiveness in common, the impact of such elements of similarity on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is itself low (see judgments of 20 September 2018, Kwizda Holding v EUIPO – Dermapharm (UROAKUT), T‑266/17, EU:T:2018:569, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited, and of 20 January 2021, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO – M. J. Dairies (BBQLOUMI), T‑328/17 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:16, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

80 In paragraphs 45 to 50 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, in the light of the identity or various degrees of similarity, from low to high, of the goods at issue, the average degree of visual similarity and conceptual identity between the marks at issue and the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the relevant public, the level of attention of which varied from average to high, was likely to believe that the goods covered by those marks came from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. It added, in paragraph 52 of that decision, that its assessment would not have been different if it had found that the figurative element representing a lion’s head in the earlier mark, or even that mark taken as a whole, had only a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, in the light of the dominant nature of that element in that mark and the interdependence between the various factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. It took the view that those assessments were not contrary, in the circumstances of the case, to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court.

81 By its fourth complaint, the applicant disputes, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s assessment that there is a likelihood of confusion in the present case. It submits that the marks at issue, although they both consist of the representation of the same concept, namely a lion’s head, create a different overall impression in the mind of the relevant public. In that regard, it relies on the fact that the representation of such a concept is banal and commonplace in the fashion sector and that the earlier mark has only a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, which, in combination with the other factors in the present case, should have led the Board of Appeal to rule out the existence of a likelihood of confusion.

82 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments. However, in the alternative, should the Court take the view that the earlier mark has a low degree of inherent distinctiveness, it states, in essence, that it endorses the applicant’s claim for annulment on the basis of the single plea in law relied on by the applicant, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court which ensures that marks with a low degree of inherent distinctiveness are not overprotected (see paragraph 79 above).

83 In that regard, it must, first, be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in finding that the earlier mark had an average degree of inherent distinctiveness, whereas that degree of inherent distinctiveness could only be categorised as low (see paragraph 75 above).

84 As regards the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal gave undue importance, in the contested decision, to the conceptual identity between the marks at issue in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the purchase of goods in Classes 14 and 25 is based, in principle, particularly on their visual aspect. Clothing and clothing accessories, the purpose of which is to embellish the appearance of the human body, are generally marketed in ‘bricks and mortor’ shops or online shops, as the case may be with the help of sales assistants or advisers and, in the light of those particular marketing conditions, the consumer’s choice is mainly made by looking at them. Consequently, the marks covering those goods will normally be perceived visually prior to or at the time of purchase, with the result that the visual aspect is of greater importance in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2011, IIC v OHIM – McKenzie (McKENZIE), T‑502/07, not published, EU:T:2011:223, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

85 In the present case, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal, by finding that there was a higher than average degree of overall similarity between the marks at issue, attached more importance, in paragraph 49 of the contested decision, to the conceptual comparison of those marks than to the visual comparison, in particular in so far as it found that the differences in the stylisation of the marks were of limited importance in the overall impression created by those marks and therefore did not have sufficient impact to assist consumers in decisively distinguishing between the marks.

86 In so doing, it attached too much importance to the conceptual identity between the marks at issue, since, first, and as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 84 above, the choice of the goods at issue is based mainly on their visual aspect and, secondly, the concept represented in the marks at issue, namely a lion’s head, is used in a banal and commonplace way in the commercial presentation or the decoration of goods in the fashion sector.

87 Consequently, the second part of the second complaint must be upheld and the examination of the present action must be continued by taking into account the error of assessment thus noted.

88 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 78 and 79 above and the finding, made in paragraphs 50 and 51 above, that the representation of a lion’s head is a banal and commonplace decorative motif in the fashion sector, in which consumers are regularly faced with such a motif in the commercial presentation or the decoration of the goods, with the result that that motif has lost its capacity to identify the commercial origin of those goods, it must be held that, even though the marks at issue are conceptually identical, that can be of only limited importance in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, since the concept in common to which those marks refer is only weakly distinctive in relation to the goods at issue and can therefore contribute only to a very limited extent towards the function of a mark, which is to identify the origin of those goods and to distinguish them from those with a different origin (see paragraphs 47 and 52 above).

89 In view of the weak distinctive character of the concept which is common to the marks at issue and the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark, considered as a whole, the fact that the marks at issue are visually similar to an average degree was not sufficient to enable the Board of Appeal to find, in the contested decision, that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, even if the goods at issue were identical.

90 Consequently, the applicant’s fourth complaint must be upheld, inasmuch as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

91 In view of all of the foregoing considerations, the single plea put forward by the applicant must be upheld, in so far as it is based on the third complaint (see paragraph 76 above), on the second part of the second complaint (see paragraph 87 above) and on the fourth complaint (see paragraph 90 above) and the contested decision must therefore be annulled in so far as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001>>.

Sono perplesso sia sulla banalità del segno anteriore, che sulla scarsa somiglianza tra i due segni: quindi complessivcamente pure sul giudizio del Tribunale.

(segnalazione di Anna Maria Stein in IPKat)

Il New York Times, e un gruppo di scrittori, citano OpenAI e Microsoft per violazione di copyright, consistente nella riproduzione di articoli (o di loro libri) per allenare la loro Intelligenza Artificiale e nel loro inserimento nell’output

– I –

Il NYT il 27 dicembre dà notizia di aver fatto causa per il saccheggio dei suoi articoli e materiali per allenare ChatGP e altri sistemi di AI e l’uso nell’output dai prompts degli utenti.

Offre pure il link all’atto di citazione. depositato presso il South. Dist. di NY il 27 dicembre 2023 , Case 1:23-cv-11195 .

Qui interessante è la decrizione del funzionamento della generative AI e del suo training, oltre alla storia di OpenAI che -contrariamente agli inizi (solo strategicamente open, allora vien da dire)- open adesso non lo è più , §§ 55 ss.: v. § 75 ss

Le condotte in violazione (con molti esempi reali -screenshot- delle prove eseguite dall’attore, spesso a colori: anzi, viene detto in altro articolo che l’Exhibit J contiene 100 esempi ; lo stesso sito in altro articolo offre il link diretto a questo allegato J) sono:

– Unauthorized Reproduction of Times Works During GPT Model Training,§ 83 ss

– Embodiment of Unauthorized Reproductions and Derivatives of Times Works in
GPT Models, § 98 ss

– Unauthorized Public Display of Times Works in GPT Product Outputs, § 102 ss;

-Unauthorized Retrieval and Dissemination of Current News, § 108 ss.

V. ora su Youtube l’interessante analisi riga per riga della citazione svolta da Giovanni Ziccardi.

– II –

Giunge poi notizia di analoga iniziativa giudiziaria (qui però come class action) promossa da scrittori USA. Vedasi la citazione depositata il 19 dicembre 2023 al South. Dist. di NY da Alter, Bird, Branch ed altri contro più o meno gli stessi convenuti. I datasets per il training sono presi da Common Crawl, Webtext, Books1 and 2, Wikipedia etc, § 72 (lo dice lo stesso OPenAI).

L’allegata modalità seguita per la violazione:

<<90. Defendants used works authored and owned by Plaintiffs in the training of their GPT models, and in doing so reproduced these works and commercially exploited them without a license.
91. While OpenAI and Microsoft have kept the contents of their training data secret, it is likely that, in training their GPT models, they reproduced all or nearly all commercially successful nonfiction books. As OpenAI investor Andreesen Horowitz has admitted, “large language models,” like Defendants’ GPT models, “are trained on something approaching the entire corpus of the written word,” a corpus that would of course include Plaintiffs’ works.
92. The size of the Books2 database—the “internet based books corpora” that
Defendants used to train GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and possibly GPT-4 as well—has led commentators to believe that Books2 is comprised of books scraped from entire pirated online libraries such as LibGen, ZLibrary, or Bibliotik. Shawn Presser, an independent software developer, created an open-source set of training data called Books3, which was intended to give developers, in his words, “OpenAI-grade training data.” The Books3 dataset, similar in size to Books2, was built
from a corpus of pirated copies of books available on the site Bibliotik. Works authored and owned by Plaintiffs Alter, Bird, Branch, Cohen, Linden, Okrent, Sancton, Sides, Schiff, Shapiro, Tolentino, and Winchester are available on Books3, an indication that these works were also likely included in the similarly sized Books2>>.

Vedremo l’esito (magari già la comparsa di costitzione, speriamo)

– III –

“Chat GPT Is Eating the World” pubblica una utile lista delle cause pendenti in USA azionanti il copyright contro l’uso in AI (sono 15 , quasi tutte class actions).

Ci trovi anche il fascicolo processuale della sopra cit. NYT Times c. Microsoft-OpenAI (v. DOCKET, link diretto qui e qui nei vari Exhibit l’elenco dell’enorme quantità di articoli copiati)

– IV –

Resta però da vedere se allenare i LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS con materiale protetto ne determini realmente una “riproduzione” sotto il profilo tecnico/informatico: o meglio se tecnicamente si dia un fenomeno che possa giuridicamente qualificarsi “riproduzione”. Kevin Bryan su X dice di no ; Lemley-CAsey pure affermano la legittimità per policy reasons . Ma data la norma in vigore, si deve accertare se vi sia o meno riproduzione: in caso positivo, infatti, l’eventuale elaborazione creativa (tutto da vedere se ricorra e come vada giudicata la creatività) non può prescindere dal consenso dei titolari delle opere riprodotte.

Che queste AI richeidano di accedere a materialiper lo più protetti è com,prensibile: lo dice OpenAI (v. Dan Milmo 8 genn. 2023 nel Guardian). Ma non aiuta a risolvere detto dubbio tecnico-giuridico

Registrazione di licenza di marchio UE chiesta dopo la cessione del marchio stesso, in presenza di dissenso del nuovo tuitolare: un chiaro errore giuridico del Tribunale UE

Palese e dunque strano errore del Trib al Ue in Oy Shaman Spirits Ltd c., EUIPO-Global Drinks Finland Oy, del 22.11.2023, T-679/22 -di cui dà notizia Marcel Pemsel in IPkat.

Il reg. 1001 del 2017 prevede la forma scritta di entrambe le parti solo per la cessione (art. 20.3), non per la licenza (art. 25.3). Per quest’ultima basta la “richiesta” di una delle parti ai limitati fini della registrazione: la forma scritta quindi è solo per detta istanza amministrativa (non per l’atto da registrare) e basta che riguardi il consenso di una sola aprte.

Da noi v. artt. 138-139 cpi (ma non è necessaria forma scritta ad substantiam actus, nemmeno per la cessione).

Irrilevante ciò che dice la normativa secondaria d’esecuzione, che cmq non dice ciò che il T. vorrebbe

Interessante il richiamo dell’art. 27.1 sulla opponibilità , concetto giuridico spesso sfuggente.

Dato il chiaro dettato normativo sui consensi, è irrilevante ragionare sulla opponibilità. Però, se proprio residuasse del dubbio, un contratto opponibile all’acquirente lo deve essere anche nel senso di poter prescindere dal suo consenso per registrarlo.

Marcel opportunamente ricorda i vantaggi della registrazione del contratto, offrendo pure il link alle guidelines dell’Ufficio sul punto.

L’intelligenza artificiale DABUS del dr. Thaler non può essere inventore secondo il patent act inglese

La Supreme Court con sentenza 20 dicembre 2023 ne caso [2023] UKSC 49 , Thaler v. Comptroller dell’Ufficio (v. qui pure il Press Summary) conferma che DABUS non può essere titolare delle invenzini, non potendo qualificarsi come “inventor”.

A cascata, nemmeno dr. Thaler può esserlo. A parte ciò, nemmeno può vantare in titolo di acquisto derivativo da chicchessia, secondo la dettagliatqa formulazine della legge UK.

<<In my judgment, the position taken by the Comptroller on this issue is entirely correct. The structure and content of sections 7 and 13 of the Act, on their own and in the context of the Act as a whole, permit only one interpretation: an inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person: it is a machine and on the factual assumption underpinning these proceedings, created or generated the technical advances disclosed in the applications on its own. Here I use the term “technical advance” rather than “invention”, and the terms “create” or “generate” rather than “devise” or “invent” deliberately to avoid prejudging the first issue we have to decide. But it is indisputable that DABUS is a machine, not a person (whether natural or legal), and I do not understand Dr Thaler to suggest otherwise.

Section 130 of the 1977 Act provides that the term “inventor” has the meaning ascribed to it by section 7. As we have seen, section 7(3) provides that “inventor” in relation to an invention means the actual deviser of the invention. There is no suggestion that “deviser” here has anything other than its ordinary meaning, that is to say, a person who devises a new and non-obvious product or process (the invention) which is capable of industrial application and may be protected under the patent system.

This interpretation is also consistent with the scheme of section 7 to which I have already referred. Hence an application for a patent may be made by any person (section 7(1)). And there is a rebuttable presumption that the person making the application is entitled to be granted the patent (section 7(4)).

A patent may be granted only to a person falling in one of the three categories of persons set out in section 7(2), however. The primary person to whom a patent may be granted is the inventor (section 7(2)(a)). But in preference to the inventor, it may be granted to a person or persons mentioned in section 7(2)(b), or to the successor or successors in title of any person mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) (section 7(2)(c)) – again being persons with legal personality, although not necessarily natural persons – for they may include, for example, a corporate employer>> (§§ 56-59).

(notizia e link di Henry P Yang su IPKat)

Anche da noi il cpi menziona l'<inventore> e l'<autore dell’invenzione> (art. 62-63-64 e spt. il 63.2, 83, 160.3.c) etc.)

Esclusa la confondibilità dei marchi BIOTRON e BIOTRON

Il 2° Board of Appeal EUIPO 28.11.2023, case R 1656/2023-2,BIOTROP PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A c. CIFO srl, la esclude nella seguente fattispecie

Conclude così’:

<<A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between
the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks
and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between
those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks,
and vice versa.
40 Nonetheless, the principle of interdependence is not intended to apply mechanically.
Therefore, while it is true that, by virtue of the principle of interdependence, a lesser degree
of similarity between the goods or services covered may be offset by a greater degree of
similarity between the marks, conversely there is nothing to prevent a finding that, in view
of the circumstances of a particular case, there is no likelihood of confusion, even where
identical goods are involved and there is a weak degree of similarity between the marks at
issue (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs. EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 96).
41 The goods and services are similar to an average and low degree. The signs are visually,
phonetically and conceptually similar to a low degree. The relevant public will show a
high level of attention at the time of purchase.
42 The differences between the signs, arising from their respective endings and the figurative
representation of the contested sign, are not negligible in the overall impression created by
the marks, especially for a public with a higher level of attention. Accordingly, they are
able to compensate for the visual, phonetic and even conceptual similarities that result from
the presence, at the beginning, of the term ‘BIO’, and the string of letters ‘t-r-o’ common
to all the signs (05/10/2020, T-602/19, NATURANOVE, EU:T:2020:463, § 74).
43 It should be stressed that the similarity between the marks at issue created by their prefix
‘bio’ carries very limited weight, if any, in the context of the global assessment of the
likelihood of confusion. Owing to the lack of distinctive character of that prefix, it cannot
be perceived as an indication of commercial origin. The relevant public’s attention will, as
a result, naturally focus more on the elements which differentiate the signs at issue and, in
particular, on the suffixes ‘tron’ in the earlier marks and ‘trop’ in the contested mark and
on the figurative elements in that mark (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs.
EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 101).
44 In this respect, it would be against the rationale of the EUTMR to give too much
importance in the assessment of a likelihood of confusion to non-distinctive elements. It
would be inappropriate if a proprietor of a trade mark composed of figurative and/or verbal
elements, where each of them taken alone or in combination are non-distinctive, were in
the position to successfully claim a likelihood of confusion based on the presence of one of these elements in the other sign. This would result in unduly broad protection for
descriptive and non-distinctive elements, which would prohibit other competitors from
using the same descriptive and non-distinctive elements as components of their trade
marks, especially if the use of such a term is in accordance with honest practice in
commercial matters (18/09/2013, R 1462/2012-G, ULTIMATE GREENS / ULTIMATE
NUTRITION, § 62).
45 It follows that excessive protection of marks consisting of elements which, as in the present
case, have weak distinctive character, if any, in relation to the goods or services at issue,
could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law, if, in the
context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the mere presence of such
elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking
into account the remainder of the specific factors in the present case (18/01/2023,
T-443/21, YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL (fig.)/ yoga ALLIANCE (fig.),
EU:T:2023:7, § 117-118)>>.

Lasciua ad es perplessi uil § 29 : <<Furthermore, the mere fact that the marks at issue are composed of the same number of letters, some of which coincide, is not decisive. Since the alphabet is made up of a limited number of letters, which, moreover, are not all used with the same frequency, it is inevitable that many words will have the same number of letters and even share some of them, but they cannot, for that reason alone, be regarded as visually similar. In addition, the public is not, in general, aware of the exact number of letters in a word mark and, consequently, will not notice, in the majority of cases, that two conflicting marks have the same number of letters (03/05/2023, T-459/22, Laboratorios Ern, SA vs. EUIPO, EU:T:2023:237, § 63)>>.

TAle limitatezza va superata cambiando radicalmente i. segno: non c’è era obbligo di legge di adottare quello de quo.

Infine, per il Board c’è affinità tra la produzione di certi beni e il servizio di retail dei medesimi (così almeno interpretererei il primo punto, non chiarissimo): <<23.Indeed, generally, retail services concerning the sale of particular goods are similar to these particular goods [cioè alla loro produzione? o vendita all’ingrosso?]. Although the nature, purpose and method of use of these goods and services are not the same, they present some similarities, as they are complementary and the services are generally offered through the same trade channels (where the goods are offered for sale) and they target the same public (24/09/2008, T-116/06, ‘O Store’, EU:T:2008:399, § 60)>>.

(segnalazione e link di Marcel Pemsel inIPJKat , critico sulla decisione)

Il marchio tridimendsionale costituito da design con valore artistico: la SC si pronuncia sul (l’ennesima lite nel) caso Piaggio v. ZHEJIANG ZHONGNENG INDUSTRY GROUP

Cass. sez. 1 del 28 novembre 2023 n. 33.100, rel,. Ioffrida, affronta tre importanti questioni, in una delle più interessanti vertenze IP degli ultimi anni:

Questo il marchio Piaggio, costituito dal frontale dello scooter:

“TRIDIMENSIONALE IL MARCHIO CONSISTE NELLA RAPPRESENTAZIONE TRIDIMENSIONALE DI UNO SCOOTER. LA RAPPRESENTAZIONE È FORNITA IN 5 VISTE ORTOGONALI E 1 PROSPETTICA, COME DA ALLEGATO” (dal fascicolo)

V. qui il fascicolo in TMview.

Tre , si diceva, son le questioni affrontate:

1) se vi sia o meno valore sostanziale nella forma, tale da render invalido il marchio ex art. 9.1.c) cpi,

2) il rapporto tra tale giudizio e l’eventuale artisticità dell’oggetto ex art. 2 n. 10 l. aut.

3) l’individuazione del segno su cui rendere il giudizio di contraffazine, tenuto conto che il frotnale è leggermente variato più volte nel corso degli anni.

Sub 1) la SC (§ 3.6) accoglie la tesi dei produttore cinese : il valore sostanziale non significa “decisivo” o “prevalente”: basta che contribuisca in qualche modo alla scelta di acqisto.

Ci pare tesi errata: il termine “sostanziale” significa assai di più di quanto afferma la SC.

Irrilevante la giurisprudenza europea che non può violare la cristallina portata semantica del lemma.

sub 2): stante la sostanziale sovrapponibilià tra valore sostnziale (art. 9.c cpi) e valore artistico (art. 2.10 l. aut.) , <<ne consegue che, il riconoscimento di un valore artistico alla forma di un prodotto quale opera di design, ai fini della tutela secondo la l.d.a., – per essere la (Omissis) addirittura divenuta, per effetto di numerosi riconoscimenti da parte dell’ambiente artistico, non meramente industriale (quali anche le innumerevoli presenze in “film, pubblicità, fotografie, che hanno come protagonista un mito”, pag. 29 della sentenza impugnata), “un’icona simbolo del costume e del design artistico italiano”, comporta, di regola, che la stessa forma dia al prodotto quel “valore sostanziale” che osta alla registrazione della forma come marchio>> (§ 3.9).

Il giudizio è affrettato visto che son diversi i consumatori/utenti nei due casi.

Inoltre non viene considerato il fattore tempo: prima che il segno di forma sia “iconico”, il marchio può essere stato depositato validamente.

sub 3) è il punto più complesso sia in teoria che in fatto. La SC ravvisa unicità del segno su cui operare il giudizio contraffattorio (conterebbe una sua concezine astratta, astorica), pur in presenza di (modesto) variare nel corso degli anni (§ 4,3). E’ questine difficile, implicante anche un approccio di teoria estetica e sulla quale non mi pronuncio. CErto non accoglierla porrebbe problemi pratici assai significativi, allalue dell’evoluzione graduale ma costante del frontale nel corso del tempo.

Pertanto rinvia ad altra sezione della CdA di Torino

E’ grave, infine, circa la tecnica redazionale, che i nostri giudici si ostinino nel non inserire la riproduzione completas (qui non c’è nemmeno una minimale) dei segni o dei prodotti incausa : vanifica la ratio della pubbliczione della sentenza ,. consistente nel permettere il controllo pubblico e democratico della stessa.

E’ lacuna che dovrebbe essere colmata.

Ancora sul marchio di forma Lego

rrr — disegno del marchio di forma presente in sentenza

Trib. UE 6 dicembre 2023 , T-297/22, BB Services v. EUIPO-Lego, afferma la validità comer marchio di forma del segno tridimensionsale sopra rappresentato.

Era stata azionata la violazione dell’art. 7.1.e) sub i) (forma del prodotto) e sub ii) (forma necessaria per ottenere un risultato tecnico) Reg. 2017/1001.

La chiave di volta sta nel fatto che , secondo la interpretazione del Trib., per aversi tale nullità bisogna che tutti gli elementi della forma siano volti a riprodurre il prodotto o ad ottenere un risultato tecnico. Quindi, se anche un solo elemento è sganciato da questa necessità, la fattiaspecie astratta non si applica e il marchio è valido

Sub i) :

<< 72 Infatti, le caratteristiche essenziali che derivano dal tenone sulla testa, dalle mani a gancio e dai fori sotto i piedi e sul retro delle gambe della figurina controversa possono essere dedotte dal marchio contestato, tenuto conto della sua rappresentazione grafica, ma anche da altri elementi d’informazione, in particolare dalla conoscenza che ha il pubblico del sistema di costruzione modulare dell’interveniente, come si evince dai documenti versati nel fascicolo dalla ricorrente (v. punti 27, 53 e 54 supra), nei limiti in cui questi sono ricollegabili ai motivi e agli argomenti da essa esposti dinanzi al Tribunale (v. punto 21 supra), e che è altresì un fatto notorio (v. punto 55 supra).

73 Si deve pertanto ritenere che il tenone sulla testa, i ganci sulle mani e i fori sul retro delle gambe e sotto i piedi della figurina di cui trattasi costituiscano caratteristiche essenziali del marchio contestato, tenuto conto della sua natura di «figurina da costruzione incastrabile». Tali elementi risultano importanti per la compatibilità di tale figurina e per la sua idoneità ad essere assemblata con altri prodotti.

77 Si deve concludere che, se è vero che la commissione di ricorso ha correttamente ritenuto che le caratteristiche considerate al punto 51 della decisione impugnata fossero caratteristiche essenziali del marchio contestato, essa ha invece commesso un errore di valutazione omettendo di considerare essenziali le caratteristiche supplementari asserite dalla ricorrente, ossia il tenone sulla testa, i ganci alle mani e i fori sul retro delle gambe e sotto i piedi>>.

Sub ii) :

<<156 Pertanto, l’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, lettera e), ii), del regolamento n. 40/94 non può applicarsi qualora vi sia almeno una caratteristica essenziale della forma che non è necessaria per ottenere un risultato tecnico, di modo che il marchio contestato non è costituito «esclusivamente» dalla forma necessaria per ottenere un risultato tecnico (v. punti 121 e 122 supra).

157 Nel caso di specie, la forma controversa è quindi suscettibile di tutela come marchio dell’Unione europea se almeno una delle sue caratteristiche essenziali non deriva direttamente dal risultato tecnico della natura incastrabile o della modularità del prodotto considerato in quanto figurina da costruzione incastrabile. Per inciso, va notato che i risultati non tecnici del prodotto considerato come figurina giocattolo sono irrilevanti ai fini dell’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, lettera e), ii), del regolamento n. 40/94 e non possono impedire la registrazione del marchio contestato.

158 Orbene, è giocoforza rilevare che la forma cilindrica o «a botte» della testa della figurina controversa non discende direttamente dal risultato tecnico di assemblaggio e di incastro di una figurina da costruzione incastrabile nel sistema di costruzione modulare dell’interveniente. Lo stesso dicasi per la forma corta e rettangolare del collo e per la forma trapezoidale, piatta e angolare del busto, nonché per la forma specifica delle braccia con le mani e per quella delle gambe con i piedi.

159 Infatti, le caratteristiche ornamentali e di fantasia menzionate ai punti da 51 a 54 della decisione impugnata (v. punti 64 e 78 supra) ed elencate al precedente punto 158, derivano dalla libertà dell’ideatore della figurina giocattolo e della figurina da costruzione incastrabile. Mentre la presenza di fattezze umane e di dispositivi di assemblaggio è fondamentalmente richiesta dalla duplice natura del prodotto, vi è una notevole libertà per quanto riguarda la configurazione di tali elementi.

160 La commissione di ricorso, ai punti 53 e 84 della decisione impugnata, ha quindi giustamente ritenuto, in sostanza, che tali caratteristiche essenziali, data la loro natura ornamentale e di fantasia, potessero essere modificate e configurate con, in linea di principio, una notevole libertà di progettazione.

165 La valutazione della commissione di ricorso non contrasta neppure con l’interesse sotteso all’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, lettera e), ii), del regolamento n. 40/94, che consiste nell’evitare che il diritto dei marchi si traduca nel concedere a un’impresa un monopolio su soluzioni tecniche o caratteristiche funzionali di un prodotto (v. punto 101 supra). La commissione di ricorso ha tenuto in debito conto tale interesse al punto 84 della decisione impugnata (v. punto 160 supra). Il marchio contestato non rende impossibile, per i concorrenti, l’immissione sul mercato di figurine che presentano caratteristiche tipiche di tale categoria di giocattoli. Non impedisce neppure la distribuzione di figurine di diversa concezione compatibili con il sistema di costruzione modulare dell’interveniente. Come rilevato, in sostanza, dalla commissione di ricorso al punto 53 della medesima decisione, esiste un’ampia libertà di progettazione per figurine del genere>>.

l’analisi del Tribunale è alquanto approfondita, per cui sarà da tenere in considerazione per chi si occuperà del tema .

La Court of Appeal inglese sulla creatività come artistic work di una graphic user interface

Si reclama il diritto di autore sul lavoro grafico sottostante (GUIs: graphical user interfaces), creato tramite uso di un software:

La corte di appello 20.11.2023, [2023] EWCA Civ 1354 – Case No: CA-2023-000920, THJ SYSTEMS LIMITED – OPTIONNET LLP Claimants copntro DANIEL SHERIDAN-SHERIDAN OPTIONS MENTORING CORPORATION ravvisa la creatività.

La ravvisa non però secondo la tradizionale concezione inglese dello “skill and labour” , come aveva fatto il giudice in primo grado: << I am satisfied that the work of creating the look and functionality of interface including the arrangements of the tables and graphs did involve the exercise of sufficient skill and labour for the result to amount to an artistic work>>. § 21

La ravvisa invece secondo il concetto del diritto UE , elaborato dalla sentenza Infopaq del 2009 da parte della Corte di Giustizia (<< “… original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation”>>, § 15):

<<23 In my judgment the Defendants are right that the judge did not apply the correct test, which I have set out in paragraph 16 above. This is not because of his reference to “functionality” in [214], which appears to be a slip of the pen having regard to what he went on to say in the last sentence of [215]. It is because the test he applied was that of “skill and labour”, which was the test applied by the English courts prior to Infopaq, including in Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch), [2006] RPC 3 and Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), [2006] RPC 14, and not the test of “author’s own intellectual creation” laid down by the Court of Justice. As can be seen from cases such as Football Dataco and Funke Medien, these two tests are not the same, and the European test is more demanding; although Painer establishes that even a simple portrait photograph may satisfy it in an appropriate case. In fairness to the judge, I should make it clear that he was not referred to any of the relevant case law on this question (although the Defendants cited BSA, they did so in relation to a different issue).

It follows that this Court must re-assess the originality of the R & P Charts applying the correct test. Before turning to consider the evidence, it is important to make five points. First, the test is an objective one. Secondly, the test is not one of artistic merit: section 4(1)(a) of the 1988 Act expressly provides that graphic works qualify as artistic works “irrespective of artistic quality”, and nothing in the case law of the CJEU suggests otherwise. Thirdly, the burden of proof lies on the Claimants. Fourthly, particularly given that we are concerned with graphic works, a key item of evidence is the works themselves. Fifthly, as counsel for the Defendants rightly emphasised, the functionality of the Software is irrelevant to this question. The enquiry concerns the visual appearance of the R & P Charts. Given the informative purpose of the R & P Charts, the visual appearance is primarily a matter of the layout of the R & P Charts.

It can be seen from the example of the R & P Charts reproduced above, particularly when enlarged, that the various component parts of the image have been laid out with some care. Mr Mitchell has designed the display so as to cram quite a large amount of information into a single screen. Moreover, he has made choices as to what to put where, including such matters as which commands to put into the ribbon and in what order. He also selected what fonts and colours to use.

When one turns to Mr Mitchell’s evidence, his statement that “the look and feel of it is my brainchild” was not challenged. Nor were his statements that “[e]verything is original” and “everything on there is my design” because, although he had sourced components from a library, he had put them “into various locations”. The cross-examiner used the analogy of building something from Lego bricks, and in my view the analogy is a good one. As the Court of Justice held in BSA at [48], “the national court must take account, inter alia, of the specific arrangement or configuration of all the components which form part of the graphic user interface”. Mr Mitchell did not enlarge upon the choices he had made, but he was not asked about this. Nor was it put to Mr Mitchell that the visual appearance of the R & P Charts was dictated by technical considerations, rules or other constraints which left no room for creative freedom. Nor did the Defendants adduce any evidence to contradict Mr Mitchell’s evidence, such as similar graphical user interfaces produced by third parties. As the judge observed, the evidence was limited, but nevertheless it was all one way.

It is plain that the degree of visual creativity which went into the R & P Charts was low. But that does not mean that there was no creativity at all. The consequence of the low degree of creativity is that the scope of protection conferred by copyright in the R & P Charts is correspondingly narrow, so that only a close copy would infringe: see Infopaq at [45]-[48]. (It is sometimes suggested that Painer at [95]-[98] is authority to the contrary, but all that passage establishes is that the protection conferred by copyright on portrait photographs as a category is not inferior to that enjoyed by other categories of works, including other kinds of photographs.) It does not mean that the R & P Charts are not protected by copyright at all, which would have the consequence that even an identical copy would not infringe.

I therefore conclude that, even though the judge applied the wrong test, he was correct to find that the R & P Charts were original. I would therefore dismiss the Defendants’ appeal, save that I would restrict the declaration made by the judge to the R & P Charts>>.

(notizia e link a Bailii da Jeremy Blum e Toby Headdon in Kluwer Copyright law).

Diritto di marchio vs. diritto alla parodia del marchio stesso : la lite sul marchio VANS

Lisa Ramsey su Twitter (X) segnala un articolo da Bloomberg law che offre il link all‘Appello del 2 circuito 5 dicembre 2023, docket No. 22-1006, Vans v. MSCHF.

Il caso è intreressante , affrontando un tema di attualità: il rapporto tra diritto di marchio e quello di parodia, da inserire nel diritto alla libetà di parola.

Il problema nasce quando il secondo è esercitato da imprenditori (anche gli artisti allora possono esserlo ed anzi lo sono nel diritto della concorrenza): c’è infatti il sospetto che vogliano lucrare sulla notorietà altrui.

La corte fa qui prevalere il diritto di marchio, appellandosi alla sentenza Supreme Court del 2023 Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC e a un precedente imprtante in del 2 circuito Rogers v. Grimaldi dek 1989 per cui la parodia va bene solo se e fino a che non generi confondibilità:

<<The Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s forecloses MSCHF’s argument
that Wavy Baby’s parodic message merits higher First Amendment scrutiny under Rogers. As the Court held, even if a defendant uses a mark to parody the
trademark holder’s product, Rogers does not apply if the mark is used “‘at least in
part’ for ‘source identification.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc.,
v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
Here, MSCHF used Vans’ marks in much the same way that VIP Products
used Jack Daniel’s marks—as source identifiers. As discussed above and
illustrated below, VIP Products used the Jack Daniel’s bottle size, distinctive
squared-off shape, and black and white stylized text to invoke an image of Jack
Daniel’s famous whiskey bottle.
Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. 148–49.
Likewise, MSCHF’s design evoked myriad elements of the Old Skool
trademarks and trade dress. Among other things, MSCHF incorporates, with
distortions, the Old Skool black and white color scheme, the side stripe, the
perforated sole, the logo on the heel, the logo on the footbed, and the packaging.
See Part I, above. MSCHF included its own branding on the label and heel of the
Wavy Baby sneaker, just as VIP Products placed its logo on the toy’s hangtag. But
even the design of the MSCHF logo evokes the Old Skool logo. And unlike VIP
Products, MSCHF did not include a disclaimer disassociating it from Vans or Old
Skool shoes. See Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 150 (noting the dog toy included a
disclaimer that read: “This product is not affiliated with Jack Daniel Distillery”).
A trademark is used as a “source identifier” when it is used “to identify or
brand a defendant’s goods or services” or to indicate the “‘source or origin’ of a
product.” Id. at 156 (alterations adopted). MSCHF used Vans’ trademarks—
particularly its red and white logo—to brand its own products, which constitutes
“quintessential ‘trademark use’” subject to the Lanham Act. Id. at 155 (citation
omitted); see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812–13
(mechanic’s use of Harley-Davidson’s bar and shield motif in his logo, despite
the “humorous[]” message, was traditional trademark use subject to the
likelihood of confusion analysis).
Moreover, although MSCHF did not purport to sell the Wavy Baby under
the Vans brand, it admitted to “start[ing]” with Vans’ marks because “[n]o other
shoe embodies the dichotomies—niche and mass taste, functional and trendy,
utilitarian and frivolous—as perfectly as the Old Skool.” Jt. App’x at 353. In
other words, MSCHF sought to benefit from the “good will” that Vans—as the
source of the Old Skool and its distinctive marks—had generated over a decades-
long period. See Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 156. Notwithstanding the Wavy Baby’s
expressive content, MSCHF used Vans’ trademarks in a source-identifying
manner. Accordingly, the district court was correct when it applied the
traditional likelihood-of-confusion test instead of applying the Rogers test>>.

La composizione del conflitto di interssi è ragionevole: ok alla parodia e alla libertà di espressine, ma in termini chiari e non equivoci (cioè senza alcun rischio di confondibilità).

La parodia come interesse antagonista della privativa di marchio è tema ancora non affrontato sistematicamente.

Pur se non espressamente previsto (art. 14 dir. 2015/2436; a differenza dal diritto di autore: dir. 29-2001 art. 5.3.k), è però in generale da ammettere. Resta il compito di individuarne i confini e cioè di conciliarlo con il diritto di marchio.

Il marchio TEAM USA per gioielli, abbigliamento, borse, è sufficientemente distintivo

Marcel Pemsel su IPkat ci notizia della decisione 14.,11.2023 del 4 board of appeal EUIPO case R 1128/2023-4, .United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, circa la distintività del marchiio denominativo TEAM USA poer prodotti in classe 14, 18, 21 e 25.

In primo grado la domanda di registrazione è respinta ma è accolta in appello.

<<18 The mark for which protection is sought consists of the expression ‘TEAM USA’. The
examiner held that the entire European Union public would understand this expression as
having the following meaning: a group of players representing the United States of
America in a competitive game or sport, which as such is not contested by the IR holder.
19 The examiner, based on the dictionary definitions of the terms ‘TEAM’ and ‘USA’,
assumed that the expression ‘TEAM USA’ was a banal statement indicating information
about an aspect of the goods in question namely that the goods for which protection is
sought may be either used by a group of USA players during a competition, or be
distributed as promotional products or sold during competitions and/or sporting event>>

Ed ecco il dissenso :

<<22 Indeed, the examiner’s reasoning that since all the goods in question can either be used by
a group of US players during a competition or be distributed and sold during competitions
and/or sporting events, the mark for which protection is sought would be perceived by the
relevant consumer as a non-distinctive indication of an aspect of the goods and not as an
indication of their commercial origin cannot be followed. The Board also fails to
understand why the perception of the sign ‘TEAM USA’ as ‘an indication of the
provenance of a group of players’ prevents it from being able to function as a commercial
badge of origin for the goods concerned.
23 The expression ‘TEAM USA’ does not convey any concrete information evoking the
goods in question, namely jewellery items, backpacks and bags, mugs, glasses and water
bottles, as well as clothing articles. None of the examples given by the examiner can
demonstrate that the expression ‘TEAM USA’ is perceived by the relevant public as a non-
distinctive, frequently used or banal statement for jewellery items in Class 14, mugs,
glasses and empty water bottles in Class 21, backpacks and bags in Class 18 or clothing
articles in Class 25.
24 The expression ‘TEAM USA’ as a whole has the minimum degree of distinctiveness
required under Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR for the goods concerned. The registration of a sign
as a trade mark is not subject to the establishment of a certain level of creativity or artistic
imagination on the part of the IR holder, but to the sole ability of the sign to individualise
the goods of the IR holder in relation to those offered by its competitors (24/03/2021,
T-93/20, Windsor-castle, EU:T:2021:164, § 22). The mark for which protection is sought
allows the relevant consumer to distinguish the goods concerned from those of other
undertakings without conducting any analytical examination and without paying particular
attention.
25 The internet links provided by the examiner insofar as they use the expression ‘TEAM
USA’ as a whole refer to the team of top players representing the USA at particular sports
events. The name of a sports team is not excluded, in principle, from the signs capable of
constituting a European Union trade mark, as it follows from Article 4 EUTMR. In this
particular context, the mark ‘TEAM USA’ is likely to be used for goods that are typical
merchandising and souvenir articles, and therefore to designate that they are manufactured,
marketed or supplied under the control of the IR holder, to which responsibility for their
quality can be attributed. The mere affixing of the mark for which protection is sought on
the goods in question enables those goods to be distinguished from other merchandising
and souvenir articles sold or provided by other undertakings (06/09/2018, C‑488/16 P,
NEUSCHWANSTEIN, EU:C:2018:673, § 65-66; 05/07/2016, T‑167/15,
NEUSCHWANSTEIN, EU:T:2016:391, § 43).
26 Thus, the mere fact that the mark for which protection is sought may represent or coincide
with the name of a sports team, in this case the team of top players representing the USA
at particular sports events, does not preclude, as such, its registration. The need to keep a
certain sign free for competitors is, in principle, not an interest protected under
Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR, but rather of other absolute grounds, such as Articles 7(1)(c), (d)
or (e) EUTMR. As regards names, and this could apply also to the name of a sports team,
the interest not to monopolise a name independently of its distinctive character is not an
interest protected under Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR (16/09/2004, C‑404/02, Nichols,
EU:C:2004:538, § 31).
27 The examiner provided no other reason, nor can the Board see why the mark for which
protection is sought should be considered to be lacking distinctive character for the goods
in question. The sign does not lack distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR>>

La decisione pare tutto sommato condivisibile.

Pemsel non la pensa così: <<In this sense, the sign ‘TEAM USA’ either describes that a team based in the US is responsible for the goods in question or that the goods are meant for people supporting the USA. Both meanings appear to be non-distinctive. The fact that they are rather vague is not decisive (see e.g. T-81/13 at para. 20)>>

Al contrrio il segno non pare evocare alcuna assunzione di responsabilità in capo a chicchessia per i beni nè allusioni ad una qualche oggettiva (e non solo creata dal marketing) idoneità per i tifosi USA