Sulla responsabilità degli Internet Service Provider (ISP)

Corresponsabilità (contributory infringement) nella violazione del copyright a carico dell’internet provider

L’appello del 5 Distretto 09.10.2024, No. 23-50162, UMG Recordings, Capitol Records ed altre majorts della musica c. Grande Communications Network, decide un caso di corrsponsabilità di tipo P2P, confermando la condanna di prim grado (nell’an, non nel quantum),

Nel caso specifico la correpopnsabilità non era contestabile, dato che l’ISP era stato notiziato della violazione e nulla ha fatto.

Ma cìè staa battaglia comunque su due dei quattro requisiti di legge (<< Plaintiffs had to show (1) that Plaintiffs own or have exclusive control over valid copyrights and (2) that those copyrights were directly infringed by Grande’s subscribers. See BWP Media USA, 852 F.3d at 439. To further prove that Grande was secondarily liable for its subscribers’ conduct, Plaintiffs had to demonstrate (3) that Grande had knowledge of its subscribers’ infringing activity and (4) that Grande induced, caused, or materially contributed to that activity>>): precisamente sul 2 e sul 4. Nessuna invece sul n. 3, implicitamente ammmettendosi la willful blindness.

Qui contano spt. le tattiche di forensics: (1) ad es col software Audible Magic: Plaintiffs’ trade association, the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.
(“RIAA”), used an industry-standard software program called Audible
Magic—which forensically analyzes the contents of digital audio files to
determine if those files match the contents of files in a database that contains
authorized authentic copies of Plaintiffs’ sound recordings—to verify that
Rightscorp in fact downloaded each work at issue,.

(2) Oppure col soggetto terzo incaricato da esse di indagini, Rightscorp: .

“To crack down on copyright infringement, third-party companies
have developed technologies to infiltrate BitTorrent and identify infringing
users by their IP addresses. One such company is Rightscorp, Inc.
(“Rightscorp”). Rightscorp’s proprietary technology:
• Interacts with BitTorrent users and obtains their agree-
ment to distribute unauthorized copies of copyrighted
works
• Records the relevant available details of that agreement,
such as the user’s IP address and what the infringed
content is
• Cross-references the user’s IP address against publicly
available databases to identify which ISP is affiliated
with that IP address
• Generates and sends infringement notices to the rele-
vant ISPs so that they can identify their infringing sub-
scribers and take appropriate action; and
• Frequently reconnects with the identified infringing IP
addresses and downloads copies of the copyrighted
works at issue directly from those users
In other words, Rightscorp identifies infringing conduct on
BitTorrent by engaging with BitTorrent users, documents that conduct, and
uses the information available to it to notify ISPs of its findings so that the
ISP can take appropriate action”.

Sintesi finale:

<< The evidence at trial demonstrated that Grande provided its
subscribers with the tools necessary to infringe (i.e., high-speed internet
access) and that Grande’s subscribers used those tools to infringe Plaintiffs’
copyrights.14 See BMG, 881 F.3d at 306-08. Based on the consistency of the
trial evidence, the district court determined that there was “no question that
[Grande] intentionally continued to provide Internet service” to its
infringing subscribers.
Grande’s affirmative choice to continue providing its services to
known infringing subscribers—rather than taking simple measures to
prevent infringement—distinguishes this case from Cobbler Nevada, LLC v.
Gonzales, 901 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2018), on which Grande relies. There, the
Ninth Circuit considered a claim alleging that a subscriber of internet
services who received infringement notices failed to “secure, police and protect” his account from third parties who used his internet access to
infringe. Cobbler, 901 F.3d at 1145-46. The direct infringers were never
identified. See id. at 1145 n.1. Because the pleading premised liability
exclusively on the subscriber’s failure to take action against unknown third-
party infringers, it was insufficient to state a claim. See id. at 1147-49. Here,
Plaintiffs proved at trial that Grande knew (or was willfully blind to) the
identities of its infringing subscribers based on Rightscorp’s notices, which
informed Grande of specific IP addresses of subscribers engaging in
infringing conduct. But Grande made the choice to continue providing
services to them anyway, rather than taking simple measures to prevent
infringement. Additionally, Cobbler addressed only inducement liability
under Grokster; it did not opine on the evidence required for establishing
material contribution. See id. The court in Cobbler rejected the plaintiff’s
invitation to create “an affirmative duty for private internet subscribers to
actively monitor their internet service for infringement,” id. at 1149; it did
not absolve ISPs like Grande that continue providing services to known
infringing subscribers.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Grande had a simple measure
available to it to prevent further damages to copyrighted works (i.e.,
terminating repeat infringing subscribers), but that Grande never took it. On
appeal, Grande and its amici make a policy argument—that terminating
internet services is not a simple measure, but instead a “draconian
overreaction” that is a “drastic and overbroad remedy”—but a reasonable
jury could, and did, find that Grande had basic measures, including
termination, available to it. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1172. And because
Grande does not dispute any of the evidence on which Plaintiffs relied to
prove material contribution, there is no basis to conclude a reasonable jury
lacked sufficient evidence to reach that conclusion.

In sum, because (1) intentionally providing material contribution to
infringement is a valid basis for contributory liability; (2) an ISP’s continued
provision of internet services to known infringing subscribers, without taking
simple measures to prevent infringement, constitutes material contribution;
and (3) the evidence at trial was sufficient to show that Grande engaged in
precisely that conduct, there is no basis to reverse the jury’s verdict that
Grande is liable for contributory infringement >>.

Interessante infine è la riduzine del quantum, dovendosi determinare il danno statutory non per singolo brano ma per albums., Ma ciò dipende da specifica norma del 17 US Code § 504 (“for the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work”).

(Notizia e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

L’algoritmo di Tiktok , decidendo il feed degli utenti,. fa si che la piattaforma sia corresponsabile dei loro conteuti

Eric Goldman ci informa sull’appello del 3 circuito n. 22-3061,TAWAINNA ANDERSON, v. TIKTOK, INC.; BYTEDANCE, INC, 27.08.2024. relativo ad uno dei purtroppo frequenti demenziali video di challenge, che spingono giovani e giovanissimi a sfide pericolosissime (asfissia)

Per il collegio, il fatto che il newsfeed sia governato da TikTok fa si che i materiali caricati siano attribuibili non solo all’utente, ma anche a Tik Tok, ai fini del safe harbour ex §230 CDA.

Si tratta quindi non di third-party speech ma di first-party speech.

Tesi che, dice il 3 Circ. , è confermata dalla sentenza della Corte Suprema Moody v. NetChoice, LLC del 2024, per la quale spetta alle piattaforme la tutela del diritto di parola: ne sopportino allora le coerenti conseguenze circa il § 230 CDA.

DA noi l’art. 6 del DSA (reg. UE 2022/2065) ha diversa formulazione: irresponsabilità per “informazioni memorizzate su richiesta di un destinatario”, purchè non sappia o rimuova immediatamente.

Ma il tema si pone lo stesso, alla luce della copiosa giurisprudenza nazionale ed europea sul punto, pur legata alla precedenti disposizioni (d lgs 70 del 2003 e dir. UE 2000/31) (v concetto di hosting provider “attivo”)

Ancora sulla responsabilità degli internet provider per le violazioni copyright dei loro utenti (con un cenno a Twitter v. Taamneh della Corte Suprema USA, 2023)

Approfondita sentenza (segnalata e linkata da Eric Goldman, che va sempre ringraziato) US BANKRUPTCY COURT-SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, In re: FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, et al., Reorganized Debtors, Case No. 20-22476 (MG), del 27 marzo 2024.

Si v. spt. :

-sub III.A, p. 13 ss, “Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement Is a Well-Established Doctrine”;

– sub III.B “Purpose and Effect of DMCA § 512”, 24 ss.

– sub III.D “Twitter Did Not Silently Rewrite Well-Established Jurisprudence on Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement” p. 31 ss sul rapporto tra la disciplina delle violazioni copyright e la importante sentenza della Corte Suprema Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471 (2023).

Di quest’ultima riporto due passaggi dal Syllabus iniziale:

– la causa petendi degli attori contro Twitter (e Facebook e Google):

<< Plaintiffs allege that defendants aided and abetted ISIS in the
following ways: First, they provided social-media platforms, which are
generally available to the internet-using public; ISIS was able to up-
load content to those platforms and connect with third parties on them.
Second, defendants’ recommendation algorithms matched ISIS-re-
lated content to users most likely to be interested in that content. And,
third, defendants knew that ISIS was uploading this content but took
insufficient steps to ensure that its content was removed. Plaintiffs do
not allege that ISIS or Masharipov used defendants’ platforms to plan
or coordinate the Reina attack. Nor do plaintiffs allege that defend-
ants gave ISIS any special treatment or words of encouragement. Nor
is there reason to think that defendants carefully screened any content
before allowing users to upload it onto their platforms>>

– La risposta della SCOTUS:

<<None of plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that defendants culpably “associate[d themselves] with” the Reina attack, “participate[d] in it as
something that [they] wishe[d] to bring about,” or sought “by [their]
action to make it succeed.” Nye & Nissen, 336 U. S., at 619 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Defendants’ mere creation of their media
platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones,
or the internet generally. And defendants’ recommendation algorithms are merely part of the infrastructure through which all the content on their platforms is filtered. Moreover, the algorithms have been presented as agnostic as to the nature of the content. At bottom, the allegations here rest less on affirmative misconduct and more on passive nonfeasance. To impose aiding-and-abetting liability for passive nonfeasance, plaintiffs must make a strong showing of assistance and scienter. Plaintiffs fail to do so.
First, the relationship between defendants and the Reina attack is
highly attenuated. Plaintiffs make no allegations that defendants’ relationship with ISIS was significantly different from their arm’s
length, passive, and largely indifferent relationship with most users.
And their relationship with the Reina attack is even further removed,
given the lack of allegations connecting the Reina attack with ISIS’ use
of these platforms. Second, plaintiffs provide no reason to think that
defendants were consciously trying to help or otherwise participate in
the Reina attack, and they point to no actions that would normally
support an aiding-and-abetting claim.
Plaintiffs’ complaint rests heavily on defendants’ failure to act; yet
plaintiffs identify no duty that would require defendants or other communication-providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the service for illicit ends. Even if
such a duty existed in this case, it would not transform defendants’
distant inaction into knowing and substantial assistance that could
establish aiding and abetting the Reina attack. And the expansive
scope of plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily hold defendants liable as
having aided and abetted each and every ISIS terrorist act committed
anywhere in the world. The allegations plaintiffs make here are not
the type of pervasive, systemic, and culpable assistance to a series of
terrorist activities that could be described as aiding and abetting each
terrorist act by ISIS.
In this case, the failure to allege that the platforms here do more
than transmit information by billions of people—most of whom use the
platforms for interactions that once took place via mail, on the phone,
or in public areas—is insufficient to state a claim that defendants
knowingly gave substantial assistance and thereby aided and abetted
ISIS’ acts. A contrary conclusion would effectively hold any sort of
communications provider liable for any sort of wrongdoing merely for
knowing that the wrongdoers were using its services and failing to stop
them. That would run roughshod over the typical limits on tort liability and unmoor aiding and abetting from culpability>>.

La norma asseritamente violata dalle piattaforme era il 18 U.S. Code § 2333 (d) (2), secondo cui : <<2) Liability.— In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of the date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism>>.

Trib. Roma sulla responsabilità del provider per materuiali caricati dagli utenti

Eleonora Rosati su IPKat ci notizia di (e ci linka a) due sentenza 2023 di Trib. Roma sez. spec. impr. sull’oggetto, entrambe tra RTI (attore) e una piattaforma di hosting files (Vimeo e V Kontacte).

Le domande sono respinte, alla luce del precedente della Corte di Giustizia Cyando del 2021.

Si tratta di :

– Trib. Roma 07.04.2023 n. 5700/2023, RG 59780/2017, Giudice rel. Picaro, RTI c. Vimeo;

– Trib. Roma 12.10.2023 n. 14531/2023, RG 4341/2027, giud. rel.: Cavaliere, RTI v. V Kontakte;

Per Rosati la lettura del pcedente europeo è errata.

Qui io solo evidenzio che i) civilisticamente non ha dignità giuridica da noi la distinzine tra responsabilità primaria e secondaria/indiretta nel caso di materiali illeciti caricati dagli utenti e ii) il safe harbour copre ogni responsabilità da esso conseguente.

Il punto più importante è che, per perdere il safe harbour, bisogna che il provider avesse contezza dell’esistenza degli specifici illeciti azionati, non di una loro generica possibilità.

Altra questione poi è quella del livello di dettaglio della denuncia al provider da parte del titolare dei diritti. Per il Trib. deve essere elevato: ed è esatto, stante il principio per cui onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit , regola processuale che va applicata anche alla denuncia de qua (nè c’è ragione per caricare il provider di attività faticose e incerte, a meno che tali non siano più per ragioni ad es. di avanzamento tecnologico).

Access provider responsabile per le violazioni di copyright dei suoi utenti: non vicariously bensì contributory

Così l’analitica e interessante Sony, Arista, Warner Bros ed altri v. Cox Communications , 4° circuito d’ appello, n. 21.-1168, 20.02.2024 , promossa dalle major dell’industria culturale contro un access provider:

<<A defendant may be held vicariously liable for a third party’s copyright infringement if the defendant “[1] profits directly from the infringement and [2] has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer.”>>

– I –

Vicarious liability:

<<As these cases illustrate, the crux of the financial benefit inquiry is whether a causal relationship exists between the infringing activity and a financial benefit to the defendant.
If copyright infringement draws customers to the defendant’s service or incentivizes them to pay more for their service, that financial benefit may be profit from infringement. See, e.g., EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2016).
But in every case, the financial benefit to the defendant must flow directly from the third party’s acts of infringement to establish vicarious liability. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 & n.9; Nelson-Salabes, 284 F.3d at 513.
To prove vicarious liability, therefore, Sony had to show that Cox profited from its
subscribers’ infringing download and distribution of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs. It did not.
The district court thought it was enough that Cox repeatedly declined to terminate infringing subscribers’ internet service in order to continue collecting their monthly fees.
Evidence showed that, when deciding whether to terminate a subscriber for repeat infringement, Cox considered the subscriber’s monthly payments. See, e.g., J.A. 1499 (“This customer will likely fail again, but let’s give him one more chan[c]e. [H]e pays 317.63 a month.”). To the district court, this demonstrated the requisite connection between the customers’ continued infringement and Cox’s financial gain.
We disagree. The continued payment of monthly fees for internet service, even by repeat infringers, was not a financial benefit flowing directly from the copyright infringement itself. As Cox points out, subscribers paid a flat monthly fee for their internet access no matter what they did online. Indeed, Cox would receive the same monthly fees even if all of its subscribers stopped infringing. Cox’s financial interest in retaining subscriptions to its internet service did not give it a financial interest in its subscribers’ myriad online activities, whether acts of copyright infringement or any other unlawful acts.
An internet service provider would necessariily lose money if it canceled subscriptions, but that demonstrates only that the service provider profits directly from the sale of internet access. Vicarious liability, on the other hand, demands proof that the defendant profits directly from the acts of infringement for which it is being held accountable>>

– II –

<<We turn next to contributory infringement. Under this theory, “‘one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another’ is liable for the infringement, too.”>>

<<The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Sony, showed more than mere failure to prevent infringement. The jury saw evidence that Cox knew of specific instances of repeat copyright infringement occurring on its network, that Cox traced those instances to specific users, and that Cox chose to continue providing monthly internet access to those users despite believing the online infringement would continue because it wanted to avoid losing revenue. Sony presented extensive evidence about Cox’s increasingly liberal policies and procedures for responding to reported infringement on its
network, which Sony characterized as ensuring that infringement would recur. And the jury reasonably could have interpreted internal Cox emails and chats as displaying contempt for laws intended to curb online infringement. To be sure, Cox’s antiinfringement efforts and its claimed success at deterring repeat infringement are also in the record. But we do not weigh the evidence at this juncture. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Cox materially contributed to copyright infringement occurring on its network and that its conduct was culpable. Therefore we may not disturb the jury’s verdict finding Cox liable for contributory copyright infringement>>

(notizia e link dal blogi di Eric Goldman)

Appello Roma conferma la responsabilità di Vimeo quale hosting provider attivo nella lite con RTI

Sta già quasi scemando l’attenzione verso il tema della responsabilità del provider per gli illeciti commessi dagli utenti tramite la sua piattaforma.

Francesca Santoro su Altalex ci notizia di Trib. Roma n. 6532/2023 del 12/10/2023, RG n. 5367/2019, Vimeo c. RTI, rel. Tucci.

La corte segue l’orientamento dominante basato sulla infruibilità dell’esenzione da parte dell’hosting cd attivo, fatto proprio da Cass. 7708 del 2019.

Che però non convince: la correponsabilità è regolata dalla’rt. 2055 cc per cui la colpa deve riguardare le singole opere azionate. A meno di aprire ad un dolo eventuale o colpa con previsione: ma va argomentato in tale senso.

Più interessnte è il cenno alle techniche di fingerpringing , DA INQAUDRASRE APPUNTO NELLA FAttispecie di responsabilità aquiliana. Solo che per far scattare l’esenzione ex art- 16 d lgs 70-2003 bisogna provare che era “effettivamente a conoscenza”: e non si può dire che, prima della diffida, Vimeo lo era o meglio che, adottando questa o quella misura, lo sarebbe certametne stato (misure adottabili ma fino a che livello di costo, poi? Tema difficile: è come per le misure di sicurezze a carico delle banche. Solo che queste rischiano un inadempimento verso i correntisti/controparti contrattuali, mentre Vimeo rischia l’illecito aquiliano: e c’è differenza tra i due casi per la soglia di costo, se -nell’ipotesi contrattuale -nulla è stato patutito ?).

Violazione di copyright (fornendo link a opere protette) da parte della piattaforma

Eric Goldman posta un commento (dandone pure il link, che segue, al testo) a US Appels Court del 10 circuito 16 ottobre 2023, caso No. 21-4128, Greer v. Moon e Kiwi Farms.

Si tratta di azione contro la pericolosissima piattaforma Kiwi Farms che nel caso permise l’upload da parte di terzi di materiale in violazione di copyright.

IL punto giuridico è se ricorra o meno un suo contributory infringement e in particolare l’elemento della material coontribution: cioè del terzo dei tre richiesti dalla giurisprudenza usa (“Mr. Greer had to plausibly allege: (1) his copyrighted work was directly infringed by a third party, (2) Mr. Moon and Kiwi Farms “kn[ew] of the infringement,” and (3) Mr. Moon and Kiwi Farms “cause[d] or materially contribute[d] to [third parties’] infringing activities.” Diversey, 738 F.3d at 1204.9 We address each in turn“).

Nel caso specifico la piattafroma non solo non rimosse il materiale, anzi dichiarandolo apertamente, ma pure irrise la vittima (tra l’altro affetta da facial paralysis)

Ecco il passaggio:

<<When Mr. Greer discovered the book had been copied and placed in a Google Drive on Kiwi Farms, he “sent Mr. Moon requests to have his book removed . . . .” RI.18. Mr. Moon pointedly refused these requests. RI.18. In fact, instead of honoring the requests, Mr. Moon posted his email exchange with Mr. Greer to Kiwi Farms, belittling Mr. Greer’s attempt to protect his copyrighted material without resort to litigation. RI.18–19.
After the email request, Kiwi Farms users continued to upload audio recordings of Mr. Greer’s book, followed by digital copies of his song. When Mr. Greer discovered the song on Kiwi Farms, he sent Mr. Moon a takedown notice under the DMCA. Mr. Moon not only refused to follow the DMCA’s process for removal and protection of infringing copies, he “published [the] DMCA request onto [Kiwi Farms],” along with Mr. Greer’s “private contact information.” RI.22. Mr. Moon then “emailed Greer . . . and derided him for using a template for his DMCA request” and confirmed “he would not be removing Greer’s copyrighted materials.” RI.23. Following Mr. Moon’s mocking refusal to remove Mr. Greer’s book and his song, Kiwi Farms users “have continued to exploit Greer’s copyrighted material,” including two additional songs and a screenplay. RI.23>>.

Violazioni di copyright e vicarious liability di eBay

Il prof. Eric Goldman nel suo blog dà notizia del Trib. Del Maine Case 2:22-cv-00284-LEW del 28 luglio 2023, Okolita v. Amazon Walmart eBay , su allegata coviolazione da parte di dette piattaforme dei diritti sulle sue fotografie.

La domanda è rigettata tranne che in un punto che sarà approfondito : per la vicarious liability .

Ecco il passaggio:

<<Homing in on eBay’s right and ability to supervise and control infringing activity conducted on its online marketplace, Ms. Okolita alleges in her third claim that eBay is liable to her for failing to stop and/or prevent ongoing incidents of infringement of her copyrights.

To be vicariously liable for infringement, the facts need to demonstrate that eBay profited from the direct infringement of third-party users of its services “while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. This final claim satisfies the plausibility standard. It does so because the law suggests the need for consideration of the qualitative nature of eBay’s response to Ms. Okolita’s takedown requests and eBay’s knowledge and understanding of the infringers’ conduct on its online marketplace. In the context of a motion to dismiss, a plausible claim is viable and an examination of the quality of eBay’s response to Ms. Okolita’s takedown requests is suited for a summary judgment record or trial. Moreover, to the extent eBay premises its motion to dismiss on the copyright safe harbor found in § 512(c), that entails a separate inquiry that arises in the context of an affirmative defense. Although the current record establishes that eBay has a § 512(c) policy (on paper) and that eBay did remove content that infringed Ms. Okolita’s copyright(s), I am not persuaded that a review of Ms.
Okolita’s FAC and its attachments makes it obvious that eBay is sheltered by the safe harbor>>.

Da noi una domanda analoga difficilemente avrebbe successo in base all’art. 6.2 del Digital serices act reg.- Ue 2022/2065 (2. Il paragrafo 1 non si applica se il destinatario del servizio agisce sotto l’autorità o il controllo del prestatore). Almeno in una interpretazione testuale: ma non ne è escluso affatto un esito opposto con interpretazione estensiva

Il 230 CDA salva Amazon dall’accusa di corresponsabile di recensioni diffamatorie contro un venditore del suo marketplace

La recensione diffamatoria (lievemente, per vero: sciarpa Burberry’s asseritamenye non autentica) non può vedere Amazon correposanbilòe perchè oepra il safe harbour citato.

Si tatta di infatti proprio del ruolo di publisher/speaker previsto dala legge. Nè può ravvisarsi un contributo attivo di Amazon nell’aver stabilito le regole della sua piattaforma, come vorrebbe il diffamato: il noto caso Roommates è malamente invocato.

Caso alquanto facile.

Così l‘appello del 11 circuito 12 giugn 2023, No. 22-11725, MxCall+1 c. Zotos + Amazon:

<<In that case, Roommates.com published a profile page for each subscriber seeking housing on its website. See id. at 1165. Each profile had drop-down menu on which subscribers seeking housing had to specify whether there are currently straight males, gay males, straight females, or lesbians living at the dwelling. This information was then displayed on the website, and Room-mates.com used this information to channel subscribers away from the listings that were not compatible with the subscriber’s prefer-ences. See id. The Ninth Circuit determined that Roommates.com was an information content provider (along with the subscribers seeking housing on the website) because it helped develop the in-formation at least in part. Id. (“By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of prepopulated answers, Room-mate[s.com] . . . becomes the developer, at least in part, of that in-formation.”).
Roommates.com is not applicable, as the complaint here al-leges that Ms. Zotos wrote the review in its entirety. See generally D.E. 1. Amazon did not create or develop the defamatory review even in part—unlike Roommates.com, which curated the allegedly discriminatory dropdown options and required the subscribers to choose one. There are no allegations that suggest Amazon helped develop the allegedly defamatory review.
The plaintiffs seek to hold Amazon liable for failing to take down Ms. Zotos’ review, which is exactly the kind of claim that is immunized by the CDA—one that treats Amazon as the publisher of that information. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See also D.E. 1 at 5 (“Amazon . . . refused to remove the libelous statements posted by Defendant Zotos”). “Lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider [like Amazon] liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional edi-torial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content—are barred.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the claims against Amazon>>.

(notizia e link dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)

Differenza tra non applicabilità dello safe harbour e affermazione di responsabilità

La corte distrettuale del Wisconsin -western dist.- 31.03.2023, caso No. 21-cv-320-wmc, Hopson + Bluetype c. Google + Does 1 e 2, ha ben chiara la differenza tra i due concetti: che non sia invocabile il safe harbour non significa che ricorra in positivo responsabilità (anche se di fatto sarà probabile).

Non altrettanto chiara ce l’hanno alcuni nostri opininisti (dottrina e giurisprudenza).

Nel caso si trattava del safe harbour per il copyright in caso di procedura da notice and take down e in particolare da asserita vioalzione della procedura che avrebbe dovuto condurre google a “rimettere su” i materiali in precedenza “tirati giu” (§ 512.g) del DMCA).

<<Here, plaintiffs allege that defendant Google failed to comply with § 512(g)’s
strictures by: (1) redacting contact information from the original takedown notices; (2) failing to restore the disputed content within 10 to 14 business days of receiving plaintiffs’ counter notices; and (3) failing to forward plaintiffs’ counter notices to the senders of the takedown notices. As Google points out, however, its alleged failure to comply with § 512(g) does not create direct liability for any violation of plaintiffs’ rights. It merely denies Google a safe harbor defense should plaintiffs bring some other claim against the ISP for removing allegedly infringing material, such as a state contract or tort law claim. Martin, 2017 WL 11665339, at *3-4 (§ 512(g) does not create any affirmative cause of action; it
creates a defense to liability); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (holding plaintiffs may sue under a federal statue only where there is an express or implied private right of action). So, even if Google did not follow the procedure entitling it to a safe harbor defense in this case, the effect is disqualifying it from that defense, not creating liability under § 512(g) of the DMCA for violating plaintiffs’ rights.>>

Ancora nulla circa tale procedura in UE: gli artt. 16-17 del DSA reg. UE 2022/2065 non ne parlano (pare lasciarla all’autonomia contrattuale) e nemmeno lo fa la dir. specifica sul copyright, art. 17 dir. UE 790/2019.

(notizia e link dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)