Sulla responsabilità degli Internet Service Provider (ISP) – Pagina 2

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright consistite in ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright date da ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma. Così US distr. court southern district of Florida 16 maggio 2023, Case No. 21-21698-Civ-GAYLES/TORRES, Athos overseas ltc c. Youtube-Google.

domanda attorea:

According to Plaintiff, Defendants are liable under direct and secondary infringement theories for YouTube’s failure to prevent the systematic re-posting of Plaintiff’s copyrighted movies to its platform. Plaintiff contends that YouTube has turned a blind eye to rampant infringement of Athos’ copyrights by refusing to employ proprietary video-detection software to block or remove from its website potentially infringing clips, and not just clips specifically identified by URL in Plaintiff’s DMCA takedown notices. In essence, Plaintiff argues that evidence of YouTube’s advanced video detection software, in conjunction with the thousands of takedown notices Athos has tendered upon YouTube, give rise to genuine issues of fact as to whether Defendants have forfeited the DMCA’s safe harbor protections.

Domanda rigettata: il provider non pèerde il suo safe harbour ex 17 US code § 512 per assenbza dell’element soggettivo:

<<Indeed, in Viacom the Second Circuit rejected identical arguments to the ones asserted here by Athos, which were presented in a lawsuit brought by various television networks against YouTube for the unauthorized display of approximately 79,000 video clips that appeared on the website between 2005 and 2008. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26. Among other things, the Viacom plaintiffs argued that the manner in which YouTube employed its automated video identification tools—including liming its access certain users—removed the ISP from the safe harbor. Id. at 40–41. Yet, the court unequivocally rejected plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that the invocation of YouTube’s technology as a source of disqualifying knowledge must be assessed in conjunction with the express mandate of § 512(m) that “provides that safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on ‘a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity[.]’”9 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1))>>

poi:

<<Plaintiff conflates two concepts that are separate and distinct in the context of YouTube’s copyright protection software: automated video matches and actual infringements. As explained by YouTube’s copyright management tools representative, software-identified video matches are not necessarily tantamount to copyright infringements. [D.E. 137-7, 74:21–25]. Rather, the software detects code, audio, or visual cues that may match those of a copyrighted work, and presents those matches to the owner for inspection. Thus, while YouTube systems may be well equipped to detect video matches, the software does not necessarily have the capacity to detect copyright infringements. See id. Further, the accuracy of these automatically identified matches depends on a wide range of factors and variable. [Id. at 75:1–10, 108:2–110:17, 113:3–114:25]. That is why users, not YouTube, are required to make all determinations as to the infringing nature of software selected matches. [Id.].
Second, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence showing that YouTube, through its employees, ever came into contact, reviewed, or interacted in any way with any of the purportedly identified video matches for which Athos was allegedly required to send subsequent DMCA takedown notices (i.e., the clips-in-suit). As explained by YouTube’s product manager, the processes of uploading, fingerprinting, scanning, and identifying video matches is fully automated, involving minimal to no human interaction in the part of YouTube. [Id. at 68:22–69:18, 118:17–119]. The record shows that upon upload of a video to YouTube, a chain of algorithmic processes is triggered, including the automated scanning and matching of potentially overlapping content. If the software detects potential matches, that list of matches is automatically directed towards the copyright owner, by being displayed inside the user’s YouTube interface. [Id. at 68:22–70:25]. Therefore, the record only reflects that YouTube does not rely on human involvement during this specific phase of the scanning and matching detection process, and Plaintiff does not proffer any evidence showing otherwise>>.

sintesi:

<<As the relevant case law makes clear, evidence of the technologies that ISPs independently employ to enhance copyright enforcement within their system cannot form the basis for ascribing disqualifying knowledge of unreported infringing items to the ISP. Such a conception of knowledge would contradict the plain mandate of § 512(m), “would eviscerate the required specificity of notice[,] . . . and would put the provider to the factual search forbidden by § 512(m).” Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. Thus, we find that Athos’ theory that specific knowledge of non-noticed infringing clips can be ascribed to Defendants by virtue of YouTube’s copyright management tools fails as a matter of law>>.

Notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman

L’embedding non costituisce comunicazione al pubblico però non permette la difesa del safe harbour ex § 512DMCA

Il giudice Barlow della Utah District Court, 2 maggio 2023, caso 2:21-cv-00567-DBB-JCB, decide un’interessante lite sull’embedding.

Attore è il gestore dei diritti su alcune foto eseguite da Annie Leibovitz. Convenuti sono i gestori di un sito che le aveva “riprodotte” con la tecnica dell’embedding (cioè non con riproduzine stabile sul proprio server).

Il giudice applica il c.d server test del noto caso Perfect 10 Inc. v. Google del 2006 così sintetizzato: <<Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Google’s unauthorized display of thumbnail and full-sized images violated the copyright holder’s rights. The court first defined an image as a work “that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression . . . when embodied (i.e., stored) in a computer’s server (or hard disk, or other storage device).” The court defined “display” as an individual’s action “to show a copy . . ., either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process ….”>>.

Quindi rigetta la domanda nel caso dell’embedding sottopostogli :

<<The court finds Trunk Archive’s policy arguments insufficient to put aside the “server” test. Contrary to Trunk Archive’s claims, “practically every court outside the Ninth Circuit” has not “expressed doubt that the use of embedding is a defense to infringement.” Perfect 10 supplies a broad test. The court did not limit its holding to search engines or the specific way that Google utilized inline links. Indeed, Trunk Archive does not elucidate an appreciable difference between embedding technology and inline linking. “While appearances can slightly vary, the technology is still an HTML code directing content outside of a webpage to appear seamlessly on the webpage itself.” The court in Perfect 10 did not find infringement even though Google had integrated full-size images on its search results. Here, CBM Defendants also integrated (embedded) the images onto their website.(…) Besides, embedding redirects a user to the source of the content-in this case, an image hosted by a third-party server. The copyright holder could still seek relief from that server. In no way has the holder “surrender[ed] control over how, when, and by whom their work is subsequently shown.” To guard against infringement, the holder could take down the image or employ restrictions such as paywalls. Similarly, the holder could utilize “metadata tagging or visible digital watermarks to provide better protection.” (…)( In sum, Trunk Archive has not persuaded the court to ignore the “server” test. Without more, the court cannot find that CBM Defendants are barred from asserting the “embedding” defense. The court denies in part Trunk Archive’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings.>>

Inoltre, viene negato il safe harbour in oggetto, perchè non ricorre il caso del mero storage su server proprio di materiali altrui, previsto ex lege. Infatti l’embedding era stato creato dai convenuti , prendendo i materiali da server altrui: quindi non ricorreva la passività ma l’attività , detto in breve

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman)

Il motore di ricerca è corresponsabile per associazioni indesiderate ma errate in caso di omonimia?

La risposta è negativa nel diritto USA, dato che Microsoft è coperta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA:

Così , confermando il 1° grado, la 1st District court of appeal della Florida, Nos. 1D21-3629 + 1D22-1321 (Consolidated for disposition) del 10 maggio 2023, White c. DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS, ed altri.

fatto:

Mr. White sued various nonresident defendants for damages in tort resulting from an episode of a reality/crime television show entitled “Evil Lives Here.” Mr. White alleged that beginning with the first broadcast of the episode “I Invited Him In” in August 2018, he was injured by the broadcasting of the episode about a serial killer in New York also named Nathaniel White. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, the defamatory episode used Mr. White’s photograph from a decades-old incarceration by the Florida Department of Corrections. Mr. White alleged that this misuse of his photo during the program gave viewers the impression that he and the New York serial killer with the same name were the same person thereby damaging Mr. White.

Diritto :

The persons who posted the information on the eight URLs provided by Mr. White were the “information content providers” and Microsoft was the “interactive service provider” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) and (3). See Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that a search engine falls within the definition of interactive computer service); see also In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W. 3d 80, 90 (Tex. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (“The ‘national consensus’ . . . is that ‘all claims’ against internet companies ‘stemming from their publication of information created by third parties’ effectively treat the defendants as publishers and are barred.”). “By presenting Internet search results to users in a relevant manner, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft facilitate the operations of every website on the internet. The CDA was enacted precisely to prevent these types of interactions from creating civil liability for the Providers.” Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 276, 283 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., 925 F.3d at 1265.
In Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014), the state law defamation claim was “properly dismissed” as “preempted under § 230(c)(1)” since Google, like Microsoft here, merely hosted the content created by other providers through search services. Here, as to Microsoft’s search engine service, the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment finding Microsoft immune from Mr. White’s defamation claim by operation of Section 230 since Microsoft did not publish any defamatory statement.
Mr. White argues that even if Microsoft is immune for any defamation occurring by way of its internet search engine, Microsoft is still liable as a service that streamed the subject episode. Mr. White points to the two letters from Microsoft in support of his argument. For two reasons, we do not reach whether an internet streaming service is an “interactive service provider” immunized from suit for defamation by Section 230.
First, the trial court could not consider the letters in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The letters were not referenced in Mr. White’s written response to Microsoft’s motion. They were only in the record in response to a different defendant’s motion for a protective order. So the trial court could disregard the letters in ruling on Microsoft’s motion. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(5); Lloyd S. Meisels, P.A. v. Dobrofsky, 341 So. 3d 1131, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Without the two letters, Mr. White has no argument that Microsoft was a publisher of the episode.
Second, even considering the two letters referenced by Mr. White, they do not show that Microsoft acted as anything but an interactive computer service. That the subject episode was possibly accessible for streaming via a Microsoft search platform does not mean that Microsoft participated in streaming or publishing the episode

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

L’azione di danno ex § 512.f Copyright Act concerne solo l’abuso di copyright, non di marchio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CV 22-4355-JFW(JEMx), del 21 aprile 2023, Yuga Labs, Inc. -v- Ripps, et al., decide una lite su marchio in causa promossa dal titolare del NFT “Bored Ape” contro un visual artist (Ripps) che lo critica: Ripps is a visual artist and creative designer who purports to create artwork that comments in the boundaries between art, the internet, and commerce. According to Defendants, Yuga has deliberately embedded racist, neo-Nazi, and alt-right dog whistles in the BAYC NFTs and associated projects.3 Beginning in approximately November 2021, Ripps began criticizing Yuga’s use of these purported racist, neo-Nazi, and alt-right dog whistles through his Twitter and Instagram profiles, podcasts, cooperation with investigative journalists, and by creating the website gordongoner.com.

Y. manda allora richieste di notice and take down (NATD) per marchio spt. ma anche per dir. di autrore.

R. reagisce azionando la disposizione nel titolo.
Ma la corte -delle 25 richieste NATD- esamina solo quelle (quattro) che hanno portato al take down e solo quelli di copyrigjht (una), non quelle su marchio (tre). Del resto il tenore della norma è inequivoco.

E rigetta l’eccezione (o dom. riconvenzionale?): With respect to the only DMCA notice that resulted in the takedown of Defendants’ content,
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the notice contains a material misrepresentation that
resulted in the takedown of Defendants’ content or that Yuga acted in bad faith in submitting the
takedown notice. Although Defendants argue that Yuga does not have a copyright registration for
the Ape Skull logo that was the subject of the DMCA takedown notice, a registration is not required
to own a copyright. Instead, a copyright exists at the moment copyrightable material is fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139
S.Ct. 881, 887 (2019); see also Feist v. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) (holding that for a work to be copyrightable, it only needs to possess “some minimal degree
of creativity”). Moreover, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that a logo can receive both
trademark and copyright protection. See, e.g., Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., 1995 WL 621832 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 16, 1995).

La setnnza è itnerssante però anche -soprattutto.- per il profili di mnarchio e concorrenza sleale circa l’uso dell’NFT.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Responsabilità del Registrar di domain names per l’uso illecito del dominio da parte del nuovo assegnatario? Si applica il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA?

L’appello del 9° circuito 3 febbrio 2023, No. 21-16182, Scotts Rigby v. Godaddy, sull’uso indebito del nome di dominio “scottrigsbyfoundation.org;” dato a un terzo e divenuto sito di giochi d’azzardo.

dal Summary iniziale:

<<When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay
GoDaddy, a domain name registrar, the renewal fee for
scottrigsbyfoundation.org, a third party registered the thenavailable domain name and used it for a gambling
information site. (…)
The panel held that Rigsby could not satisfy the “use in
commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis
GoDaddy because the “use” in question was being carried
out by a third-party gambling site, not GoDaddy, and Rigsby
therefore did not state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). As
to the Lanham Act claim, the panel further held that Rigsby
could not overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which limits
the secondary liability of domain name registrars and
registries for the act of registering a domain name. The
panel concluded that Rigsby did not plausibly allege that
GoDaddy registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name
with a bad faith intent to profit, nor did he plausibly allege
that GoDaddy’s alleged wrongful conduct surpassed mere
registration activity>>

E sorpttutto sul § 230 CDA , che protegge da molte domande:

<<The panel held that § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which immunizes providers of interactive
computer services against liability arising from content
created by third parties, shielded GoDaddy from liability for
Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity,
trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer
Fraud Act.

The panel held that immunity under § 230
applies when the provider is an interactive computer
services, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or
speaker, and the information is provided by another
information content provider.

Agreeing with other circuits,
the panel held that domain name registrars and website
hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the definition of
an interactive computer service.

In addition, GoDaddy was
not a publisher of scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and it was not
acting as an information content provider.>>

Il reclamo cautelare milanese nella lite sui servizi DNS di Cloudfare , promossa dalle major titolari di copyright

Torrent Freak dà il link alla molto interessante ordinanza milanese (decisa il 22.09.2022 e dep. 4 novembre 2022, parrebbe) che decide il reclamo cautelare Cloudfare c. Sony-Warner-Universal Music, RG 29411/2022, rel. Tarantola.

Il reclamo di Cloudfare (C.) è rigettato e , parrebbe, a ragione.

Alcuni punti:

E’ confermata la giurisdizione italiana ex art. 7.1 sub 2) reg. 1215/2012 (anche se non è chiaro perchè, dato che la disposizione si applica a chi è domiciliato in uno stato UE e viene convenuto in altro stto ue: ma C. è di diritto usa)
il diritto è riscontrato in capo alle major ex art. 99 bis l. aut.
le condotte addebitate son sufficientemente individuate. Si tratta del servizio di domain name system (DNS) che risolve i nomi in stringhe IP. Esso si affianca agli ordinari servizi di access provider, servendo spesso per anonimizzare l’accesso . Di fatto è noto a tutti che tramite il dns di C. si riesce ad eludere i blocchi imposti agli (e attuati dagli) internet access provider.
per dare un inibitoria, non serve che l’inibito sia corresponsabile civilmente della vioalzione: basta che sia strumento per l’accesso a server ospitanti materiali illeciti. Gli artt. 14-17 del d. gls. 70 del 2003 sono chiarissimi (norme mai citate dal giudice, però!).

Nè c’è alcun dubbio che che C. sia un internet provider (caching, art. 15 d. lgs. 70/2003).

non è chiaro il rapporto tra i siti convenuti in causa e C., che nega ne esistano (assai dubbio: perchè mai dovrebbe interporsi tra i siti stessi e l’utenza? Chi le dà incarico e chi la paga?)
venendo confermata la cautela di prima istanza, è confermato che l’inibitoria concerne pure i siti c.d. alias (cioè quelli creati in aggiutna per eludere e che reindirizzano automaticametne le richiesta ai siti originari bloccati)
le difficoltà esecutive dell’ordine : è il punto più interessante a livello teorico, anche se richeiderebbe approfondimenti processuali . Per il giudice non contano, dovendosi risolverle ex art. 669 duodecies cpc. : << Non è al riguardo configurabile alcun onere preventivo a carico delle parti ricorrenti, né alcun obbligo in capo all’AG all’atto della pronuncia dell’ordine cautelare, di descrivere le specifiche modalità tecniche di esecuzione dell’ordine, ove – ritenuta la sussistenza dell’attività che è ordinato inibirsi – è la parte cui è rivolto l’ordine inibitorio che potrà rappresentare eventuali difficoltà tecniche nell’ambito dello specifico procedimento ex art. 669 duocecies cpc (peraltro già instaurato, come evincibile dagli atti). >> ,

iL PUNTO è come detto assai stimolante anche se meritevole di approfondimento. A parte che la natura sostitutiva del reclamo porterebbe alla competenza proprio del giudiuce del reclamo, l’attuaizone avviene sì sotto il controllo del giudice, purchè un minimum sia indicato nel provvedimento. E allora può questo limitarsi a dire “filtra tutte le richeiste di accesso a questo o quel sito”? tocca al convenuto chiedere lumi, dice il giudice. OK, ma se è volonteroso; e se non lo è? Penalità di mora? E come può controllare il vincitore la corretta attuazione?

Il comando cautelare era: <<adottare immediatamente le più opportune misure tecniche al fine di inibire a tutti i destinatari dei propri servizi l’accesso ai servizi denominati “kickasstorrents.to”, “limetorrents.pro” e “ilcorsaronero.pro”, inibendo la risoluzione DNS dei nomi a dominio “kickasstorrents.to”, “limetorrents.pro”, “ilcorsaronero.pro”, sia in quanto tali che preceduti dal prefisso www, nonché inibito alla resistente la risoluzione DNS di qualsiasi nome a dominio (denominato “alias”) – che costituisca una variazione dei predetti DNS di primo, secondo, terzo e quarto livello – attraverso i quali i servizi illeciti attualmente accessibili attraverso i predetti nomi a dominio possano continuare ad essere disponibili, a condizione che i nuovi alias siano soggettivamente e oggettivamente riferiti ai suddetti servizi illeciti>>.

SAfe harbour ex § 230 CDa per danni da database informativo su privati messo in vendita?

Dice di no l’appello del 4 circuito n. 21-1678, TYRONE HENDERSON, SR e altri c. THE SOURCE FOR PUBLIC DATA, L.P. (dal distretto est della Virginia)

Attività dei convenuti:

<< Public Data’s business is providing third parties with information about individuals.
Plaintiffs allege that it involves four steps.
First, Public Data acquires public records, such as criminal and civil records, voting
records, driving information, and professional licensing. These records come from various
local, state, and federal authorities (and other businesses that have already collected those
records).
Second, Public Data “parses” the collected information and puts it into a proprietary
format. This can include taking steps to “reformat and alter” the raw documents, putting
them “into a layout or presentation [Public Data] believe[s] is more user-friendly.” J.A.
16. For criminal records, Public Data “distill[s]” the data subject’s criminal history into
“glib statements,” “strip[s] out or suppress[es] all identifying information relating to the
charges,” and then “replace[s] this information with [its] own internally created summaries
of the charges, bereft of any detail.” J.A. 30.
Third, Public Data creates a database of all this information which it then
“publishes” on the website PublicData.com. Public Data does not look for or fix
inaccuracies in the database, and the website disclaims any responsibility for inaccurate
information. Public Data also does not respond to requests to correct or remove inaccurate
information from the database.
Fourth, Public Data sells access to the database, “disbursing [the] information . . .
for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” J.A. 19. All things told,
Plaintiffs allege that Public Data sells 50 million consumer searches and reports per year.
Public Data knows that traffic includes some buyers using its data and reports to check
creditworthiness and some performing background checks for employment pURPOSE >>

La domanda di danno è basata su violazioni di alcune disposizioni del Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), anche ma non solo di tipo data protection.

L’invocazione del safe harbout è rigettata su due dei tre requisiti di legge.

RAvvisata la qualità di internet provider, è però negato sia (per alcuni claims) che venisse trattaato come publisher o speaker sia (per altri claims) che le infomazioni fossero di terzi.

Analisi dettagliata ma forse nell’esito poco condivisibile.

Le informazioni erano pur sempre tutte di terzi, solo che il convenuto le formattava in modalità più fruibili ai propri scopi (magari con qualche omissione …)-

Soprattutto, dir che non erano trattati come puiblisher/speaker è dubbio.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

La denuncia di elusione dellle protezioni non èp coperta dal 17 U.S. Code § 512 (DMCA) Misrepresentations

La responsabilità del denunciante per aver dolosamente affermato la contraffazione altrui non riguarda il semplice dire che c’è stata elusione delle misure di protezione.

Così la district court of Connecticut 30 settembre 2022, Case 3:20-cv-01602-SRU , Yout c. The Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (the “RIAA”), in un azione di accertament negativo proposta da iun fornire di servizi che permettono il downloading di audiovisivi su Youtube , nonostante questi siano offerti solo in streaming non downloadibile (con il YouTube’s Rolling Cypher).

<< Section 512(f) has is limited to misrepresentations of copyright infringement. See Twelve
Inches Around Corp. v. Cisco Sys., 2009 WL 928077, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (“While
Section 512(f) is not explicitly limited to misrepresentation of copyright infringement, it requires
that the misrepresentation be ‘under [Section 512],’ which deals exclusively with copyright
infringement, and sets forth in great detail when and how an internet service provider can be
liable for copyright infringement”); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (“Section 512 only penalizes copyright holders for knowingly
materially misrepresenting ‘that material or activity is infringing.’ It does not provide a cause of
action for knowingly materially misrepresenting [other claims].”); accord Rossi v. Motion
Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth that a section
512(f) cause of action is an “expressly limited cause of action for improper infringement
notifications”).
Here, Yout has failed to plead a plausible claim for relief under section 512(f) because it
has only alleged that the RIAA knowingly misrepresented that Yout’s software circumvents the
YouTube technological measures, not that Yout is infringing certain copyrighted works. See
SAC, Doc. No. 45, at 28 ¶¶ 138-140. Although the circumvention notices sent by the RIAA
superficially resemble take down notices under section 512(c), the notices do not identify any copyrighted works and accordingly are incapable of being misrepresentations under section 512.
See id. at 28 ¶¶ 136-137. Yout attempts to remedy this deficiency by alleging that the RIAA’s
circumvention notices amount to an allegation of secondary copyright infringement and that
Yout’s customers interpreted the notices as alleged copyright infringement. See SAC, Doc. No.
45, at 27 ¶¶ 136-137. But Yout’s arguments are not persuasive, because the notices stated that
YouTube’s technological measure (therein, “rolling cipher”) “protects [the RIAA’s] members’
works on YouTube from unauthorized copying/downloading,” not that Yout itself was infringing
the copyrighted works. Id. at 28 ¶ 137.
Furthermore, even assuming that the RIAA’s notices constituted an allegation of
secondary copyright infringement, Yout has provided no case law that suggests that such an
allegation could result in a violation of section 512(f), nor have I found any caselaw suggesting
so. I decline to credit that claim.
Moreover, I agree with the RIAA that Yout alleges no facts suggesting that the RIAA
“knowingly” misrepresented the nature of Yout’s service. To do so, a defendant must have
actual knowledge that it is making a misrepresentation of fact. Cabell v. Zimmerman, 2010 WL
996007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010). But, again, Yout alleges no facts suggesting that the
RIAA “knowingly” misrepresented the nature of Yout’s service. Ningbo Mizhihe I&E Co., Ltd.
v. Does 1-200, 2020 WL 2086216, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (dismissing a Section 512(f)
claim where “there [wa]s insufficient material in the pleadings to support the inference that [the
p]laintiff knew their copyrights were not enforceable”); Cabell, 2010 WL 996007, at *4
(dismissing a Section 512(f) claim where the complaint “allege[d] no facts from which a court
could find it facially plausible that Defendant knew it was misrepresenting the facts when it
wrote to YouTube”).
Because section 512(f) only covers knowing misrepresentations of copyright
infringement and not circumvention of a technological measure, I grant the RIAA’s motion to
dismiss Yout’s 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) claim >>

Interpretazione di assai dubbia esattezza.

La sentenza poi offre dettagli tecnici approfonditi sul se Youtube impedisca i download con misure di protezione in senso tecnico ai sensi del copyright e cioè ai sensi del 17 US Code § 1201 (v. § 2 2. The Yout Service, p 2 segg.).

Stante la normativa italiana (tit. II ter l. autore, artt. 102 quater e quinquies), la motivaizone è di sicuro interesse anche per noi

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Discriminazione e safe harbour ex § 230 Cda in Facebook

LA Eastern district of Pennsylvania 30.09.2022 Case 2:21-cv-05325-JHS D , Amro Ealansari c. Meta, rigtta la domanda volta a censurare presunta discriminazione da parte di Facebook verso materiali islamici ivi caricati.

E’ rigettata sia nel merito , non avendo provato discrimnazione nè che F. sia public accomodation (secondo il Civil Rights Act), sia in via pregiudiziale per l’esimente ex § 230 CDA.

Nulla di particolarmente interessante e innovativo

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman)

Azione contrattuale contro Facebook parzialmente protetta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il distreto nord della Californa 21 .09.2022 , CASE NO. 22-cv-02366-RS, Shared.com c. Meta, affronta il tema della invocabilità del porto sicuro ex § 230 CDA nel caso venga azionata responsabilità contrattuale di tipo editoriale del PROVIDER per materiali non propri.

Nel caso ricorreva anche un contratto di pubblicità dell’utente con Facebook, tipo assai diffuso e al centro delle vendite digitali odierne.

Fatti: << Shared is a partnership based out of Ontario, Canada that “creates and publishes original,
timely, and entertaining [online] content.” Dkt. 21 ¶ 9. In addition to its own website, Plaintiff also
operated a series of Facebook pages from 2006 to 2020. During this period, Shared avers that its
pages amassed approximately 25 million Facebook followers, helped in part by its substantial
engagement with Facebook’s “advertising ecosystem.” This engagement occurred in two ways.
First, Shared directly purchased “self-serve ads,” which helped drive traffic to Shared.com and
Shared’s Facebook pages.

Second, Shared participated in a monetization program called “Instant
Articles,” in which articles from Shared.com would be embedded into and operate within the
Facebook news feed; Facebook would then embed ads from other businesses into those articles
and give Shared a portion of the ad revenue. Shared “invested heavily in content creation” and
retained personnel and software specifically to help it maximize its impact on the social media
platform. Id. ¶ 19.
Friction between Shared and Facebook began in 2018. Shared states that it lost access to
Instant Articles on at least three occasions between April and November of that year. Importantly,
Shared received no advance notice that it would lose access. This was contrary to Shared’s averred
understanding of the Facebook Audience Network Terms (“the FAN Terms”), which provide that
“[Facebook] may change, withdraw, or discontinue [access to Instant Articles] in its sole
discretion and [Facebook] will use good faith efforts to provide Publisher with notice of the
same.” Id. ¶ 22; accord Dkt. 21-5. Shared asserts that “notice,” as provided in the FAN Terms,
obliges Facebook to provide advance notice of a forthcoming loss of access, rather than after-thefact notice. (…)>.

Facebook (F.) poi sospese l’account e impedì il funzionamento del programma di advertisment

Alla domanda giudiziale, F. (anzi Meta) si difende preliminarmente con il safe harbour, quale decisione editoriale e quindi libera:

LA CORTE: << Defendant is only partially correct. Plaintiff raises three claims involving Defendant’s
decision to suspend Plaintiff’s access to its Facebook accounts and thus “terminate [its] ability to
reach its followers”: one for conversion, one for breach of contract, and one for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Dkt. 21, ¶¶ 54–63, 110–12, 119. Shared
claims that, contrary to the Facebook Terms of Service, Defendant suspended Shared’s access to
its Facebook pages without first determining whether it had “clearly, seriously or repeatedly
breached [Facebook’s] Terms or Policies>>.

E poi: << At bottom, these claims seek to hold Defendant liable
for its decision to remove third-party content from Facebook. This is a quintessential editorial
decision of the type that is “perforce immune under section 230.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
(quoting Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–
71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Ninth Circuit courts have reached this conclusion on numerous
occasions. See, e.g., King v. Facebook, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 3d 776, 795 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Atkinson
v. Facebook Inc., 20-cv-05546-RS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020); Fed. Agency of News LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1306–07 (N.D. Cal. 2019). To the extent Facebook’s Terms
of Service outline a set of criteria for suspending accounts (i.e., when accounts have “clearly,
seriously, or repeatedly” breached Facebook’s policies), this simply restates Meta’s ability to
exercise editorial discretion. Such a restatement does not, thereby, waive Defendant’s section
230(c)(1) immunity. See King, 572 F. Supp. 3d at 795. Allowing Plaintiff to reframe the harm as
one of lost data, rather than suspended access, would simply authorize a convenient shortcut
through section 230’s robust liability limitations by way of clever pleading. Surely this cannot be
what Congress would have intended. As such, these claims must be dismissed. >>

In breve, che i materiali di cui si contesta la rimozione siano dell’attore/contraente (anzichè di un utente terzo come nei più frequenti casi di diffamazione), nulla sposta: il safe harbour sempre si applica, ricorrendo i requisiti previsti dal § 230 CDA