Sulla responsabilità degli Internet Service Provider (ISP) – Pagina 5

Google non è responsabile per la presenza di app ad uso illecito nel suo play-store, stante il safe harbour ex 230 CDA

Un ex ambasciatore statunitense, di religione ebraica, chiede l’accetameonto di responsabilità di Google perchè permette la presenza sul PlayStore di un social (Telegram) notoriamente usato -anche- da estremisti autori di propaganda antisemita.

In particollare afferma che G. non fa rispetare la propria policy vincolante i creatori di app sullo Store.

La corte californiana U.S. D C NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA , SAN JOSE DIVISION, Case No. 21-cv-00570-BLF, Ginsberg c .Google, 18.02.2022, però ,accoglie l’eccezione di safe harbour ex 230 CDA sollevata da Google.

Dei tre requisiti chiesti allo scopo (che sia un service provider; che sia chiamato come Publisher; che si tratti di informazione di terzi), è il secondo quello di solito più litigato.

Ma giustamente la corte lo ravvisa anche in questo caso: <<In the present case, Plaintiffs’ claims are akin to the negligence claim that the Barnes court found to be barred by Section 230. Plaintiffs’ theory is that by creating and publishing guidelines for app developers, Google undertook to enforce those guidelines with due care, and can be liable for failing to do so with respect to Telegram. As in Barnes, however, the undertaking that Google allegedly failed to perform with due care was removing offending content from the Play Store.
“But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103. Plaintiffs in the present case do not allege the existence of a contract – or indeed any interaction – between themselves and Google. Plaintiffs do not allege that Ambassador Ginsberg purchased his smartphone from Google or that he downloaded Telegram or any other app from the Play Store. Thus, the Barnes court’s rationale for finding that Section 230 did not bar Barnes’ promissory estoppel claim is not applicable here.>>

(notizia a link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Safe harbour ex 230 CDA per Armslist, piattaforma per vendita on line di armi? Questione dubbia

Due corti statunitensi negano il safe harbour ex 230 CDA alla piattaforma di vendita di armi Armslist , non trattandosi di azioni in cui son considerati editori/publisher/speaker .

Si trattava di responsabilità consguente ad uccisioni cagionate tramite armi da fuoco acquistate su Armslist: la quale sarebbe stata negligente nel permettere tale commercio incontrollato, avendo implementato un software inadeguato alla base del proprio marketplace.

Si tratta di due tribunali del Wisconsin, east. dis.:

1) BAUER and ESTATE OF PAUL BAUER v. ARMSLIST, del 19.11.2021, caso 20-cv-215-pp, sub V.B: <<The court does not mean to imply that §230(c) never can provide protection from liability for entities like Armslist. But that protection is not, as Armslist has argued, a broad grant of immunity. It is a fact-based inquiry. For example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Craigslist’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. The court recounted that “[a]lmost in passing, ” the plaintiff had alleged that Craiglist was liable for violations of the Fair Housing Act because although it had not created the discriminatory posts, it had “caused” the discriminatory third-party posts to be made. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671. Emphasizing that Craigslist was not the author of the discriminatory posts, the Seventh Circuit found that the only causal connection between Craigslist and the discriminatory posts was the fact that “no one could post a discriminatory ad if craiglist did not offer a forum.” Id. The court stated that “[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.” Id. at 671-72. For that reason, the court concluded that “given § 230(c)(1) [the plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 672.

The plaintiffs in this case have not raised claims of defamation or obscenity or copyright infringement—the types of claims that would require the court to determine whether Armslist is a “publisher” or “speaker” of content, rather than a provider of an interactive computer service that hosts content created by third parties. None of the nine claims in the second amended complaint challenge the content of ads posted on the Armslist.com website—not even Caldwell’s ad. The plaintiffs have alleged that Armslist should have structured the website differently—should have included safeguards and screening/monitoring provisions, should have been aware of the activity of individuals like Caldwell, should have implemented measures that would prevent illegal firearms dealers from using the website to sell guns without a license.

In declining to dismiss the complaint on §230(c) grounds, the court in Webber v. Armslist recently stated that because the plaintiff in that case had alleged “negligence and public nuisance based on Defendants’ affirmative conduct, ” it appeared that “§ 230 is not even relevant to this case.” Webber v. Armslist, No. 20-cv-1526, 2021 WL 5206580, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2021). This court agrees. Section 230 does not immunize Armslist from suit and the court will not dismiss the complaint on that basis.>>

2) Webber v. Armslist, del 9 novembre 2021, caso 20-C-1526, più dettagliata sul punto: <<But even if § 230 applies to this type of case, Plaintiff’s claims do not seek to treat Defendants as the “publisher or speaker” of the post in question. Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for their “role in developing or co-developing [their] own content.” Dkt. No. 13 at 18. Specifically, Plaintiff faults Defendants for failing to prohibit criminals from accessing or buying firearms through Armslist.com; actively encouraging, assisting, and facilitating illegal firearms transactions through their various design decisions; failing to require greater details from users, such as providing credit-card verified evidence of users’ identities; failing to require that sellers certify under oath that they are legal purchasers; and failing to provide regularly updated information regarding applicable firearms laws to its users, among many other things. Compl. at ¶ 165. In essence, the complaint “focuses primarily on Armslist’s own conduct in creating the high-risk gun market and its dangerous features, ” not on the post in question. Dkt. No. 13 at 23. This type of claim, then, does not seek to treat Defendants as the “publisher or speaker” of the post that led to Schmidt’s killer obtaining a firearm; rather, it seeks to hold Defendants liable for their own misconduct in negligently and recklessly creating a service that facilitates the illegal sale of firearms. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). For these reasons, the Court concludes that § 230 does not immunize Defendants from liability in this case>>.

Viene però osservato dal prof. Eric Goldman (da cui ho tratto notizia e link alle sentenze), che la corte suprema del Wisconsin nel 2019 in Daniel v. Armslist aveva invece concesso il safe harbour

Sempre il prof. Goldman con post 16 luglio 2023 ora ci aggiorna su altra decisione relAtiva ad Armslist (Webber v. Armslist)

Ancora su responsabilità per violazione di privacy/right of publicity etc. da parte dei redattori di annuari (yearbooks) e safe harbour ex § 230.

Ancora sul tema in oggetto e ancora (giusto) rigetto dell’eccezine di safe harbour ex § 230 CDA.

Si tratta di filone giudiziario di una certa consistenza , di cui avevo dato conto qui e qui.

1) BONILLA v. ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS INC. de 7 dic. 2021 No. 20-C-07390, Colrte ND Illinois, eastern division : <<Ancestry argues that each of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because Ancestry is immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). The CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The CDA applies to online forums that serve as “a mere passive conduit for disseminating (actionable) statements.” Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016). Because affirmative defenses such as CDA immunity frequently turn on facts not before the court at the pleading stage, dismissal is appropriate only when the factual allegations in the complaint unambiguously establish all the elements of the defense. See Siegel v. Zoominfo Techs., LLC, 2021 WL 4306148, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2021) citing Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016)

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint includes allegations that Ancestry created records of Plaintiffs reflecting the information from the yearbook record, and uses that information to entice potential customers to subscribe to its services. Plaintiff also alleges that non-users are shown a limited version of the record (including a low resolution photograph) with a promotional pop-up advertisement promising access to Plaintiff’s identity and likeness if they sign up for a paid subscription. Dkt. 29 at ¶¶38-46. Ancestry recasts Plaintiff’s claims on the “mere reposting” of yearbook records, which is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations that Ancestry uses those records and the likeness/identity to sell subscription services beyond his individual yearbook record. These allegations, taken as true, do not establish that Ancestry is a “passive conduit” that should receive immunity under the CDA. Plaintiff has alleged that Ancestry collected and organized records and subsequently used Plaintiff’s and the putative class members’ names, likenesses, and identities in these records they curated for commercial gain. See Krause v. Rocketreach, LLC, 2021 WL 4282700 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021) (rejecting CDA immunity argument where complaint allegations did not establish affirmative defense); see also Lukis v. Whitepages, Inc., 454 F.Supp.3d 746, 763 (N.D. Ill. 2020)>>.

2) CALLAHAN v. PEOPLECONNECT, INC. Case No. 20-cv-09203-EMC. del 1.11.2021 , Tribunale del N.D. California. , molto più dettagliata , che valorizza la notevole differenza tra l’annuario in cartaceo a diffusione limitata e la sua messa on line: <<in the instant case, the Court concludes that, at the very least, there is a question of fact as to whether a reasonable person in the position of PeopleConnect (the service provider) would conclude that the yearbook authors/publishers (the information content providers) intended the yearbooks to be published on the internet. As Plaintiffs point out, the yearbooks at issue were published in the 1990s and early 2000s when “[t]he Internet was in its infancy and social media did not exist.” Opp’n at 5. Moreover, there is a difference between publishing a yearbook for a school or local community and publishing a yearbook on the internet where the audience is far broader. Thus, it would be hard to conclude that, as a matter of law, PeopleConnect is a publisher of information provided by another information content provider and is thus entitled to immunity under the CDA.

PeopleConnect’s reliance on Judge Beeler’s Ancestry decisions is unavailing. In Ancestry II, Judge Beeler indicated that, under Batzel, it was reasonable for Ancestry to believe that the yearbooks at issue were being provided to it for publication on the Internet, but Judge Beeler’s ruling appears to turn on her view that an information content provider could be people or entities other than the yearbook author/publisher. See Ancestry II, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112036, at *17-18 (stating that, “whether the yearbooks were donated by other former students or obtained from other sources, Ancestry is demonstrably not the content creator and instead is publishing third-party content provided to it for publication”; “[n]othing in Batzel requires the original creator’s permission for publication”). But that view is not consistent with the express definition of “information content provider” under the CDA; an information content provider is one who created or developed the information at issue. In the instant case, the yearbook authors/publishers are the only ones who meet that criteria.

At the hearing, PeopleConnect suggested that a service provider should be allowed to assume that the person or entity who provided the information to the service provider was the creator or developer of the information.⁶ Such an approach, however, would be contrary to Batzel which focuses on the reasonable perception of the service provider. PeopleConnect fails to explain why a service provider should not be held accountable if, e.g., it is obvious that the person or entity providing information to the service provider is not the creator or developer of the information. In such a situation, if it is obvious that the person or entity providing the information is not the creator or developer of the information, then the service provider “is the one making the affirmative decision to publish, and so . . . contributes materially to [the] allegedly unlawful dissemination” of the information[;] [it] is thus properly deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171.

In the instant case, it is obvious that the yearbook users/purchasers were not the creators or developers of the yearbooks. Instead, the yearbook authors/publishers were the content providers. PeopleConnect cannot claim the benefit of CDA immunity, absent a reasonable basis to believe that the yearbook authors/publishers intended for there to be publication on the Internet. This presents a question of fact that cannot be resolved at the 12(b)(6) phase of proceedings>>.

Ancora sulla (al momento impossibile da ottenere) qualificazione delle piattaforme social come State Actors ai fini del Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola)

Altra sentenza (d’appello stavolta) che rigetta la domadna vs. Facebook (rectius, Meta) basata sul fatto che illegalmente filtrerebbe/censurerebbe i post o rimuoverebbe gli account , violando il Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola).

Questo diritto spetta solo verso lo Stato o verso chi agisce in suo nome o assieme ad esso.

Si tratta della sentenza di appello del 9° circuito (su impugnazione di una sentenza californiana confermata) , emessa il 22.11.2021, No. 20-17489 , D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05546-RS, Atkinson c. Meta-Zuckerberg.

Sono riproposte dall’utente (e la Corte partitamente rigetta) tutte le consuete e note causae petendi in tema. Nulla di nuovo ma un utile loro ripasso.

Inoltre la Corte conferma pure l’applicazione del safe harbour ex 230 CDA.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Responsabilità di Facebook e Tik Tok per omesso controllo dell’ingresso di post persecutori nell’account di un utente (e per abusiva rimozione dell’account)?

No ,naturalmente (secondo il diritto USa), stante il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA (si censura anche l’aver Tik Tok rimosso l’account)

Così la corte del distretto est del Missouri 22.11.2021, Case: 4:21-cv-01046-JAR, Winter e altroi c FAcebook e tik Tok e Dolan .

I post “fastidiosi” di Dolan nell’account di Winter non sono stati filtrati adeguatamente da F. che viene citato in giudizio da W..

Ma la corte , al solito, rigetta per il cit. § 230.

Dei tre requisiti (che sia un provider; che si tratti di notizie di terzi; che l’attore lo tratti come publisher o speaker) è sempre il terzo il più ineressante, dipendendo dala prospettazione attorea. La quale talora genera dubbi , ma non qui. Esattametne la corte ravvisa anche il predetto terzo requisito:

<<Lastly, Plaintiffs are clearly seeking to treat Facebook and TikTok as publishers. (See Doc. No. 16 at 5-6; Doc. No. 24 at 5). Under § 230, a cause of action “treat[s]” an entity as a “publisher” if it would hold an entity responsible for “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792. Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook and TikTok liable for not removing the content/accounts posted/held by Dolan and her group, which they find objectionable.

The decision whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content are traditional editorial functions of a publisher. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“Indeed, the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content – the very actions for which Klayman seeks to hold Facebook liable.”).

Plaintiffs also seek to hold TikTok liable for removing their social media accounts from its platform, yet courts have found that § 230(c)(1) immunity also applies to the situation where a plaintiff objects to the removal of his or her own content. See Wilson, 2020 WL 3410349, at *12 (citing cases).

In opposition to Facebook and TikTok’s motions, Plaintiffs argue that by failing to follow their own Community Standards and taking down content that violates those standards, both Facebook and TikTok have acted in “bad faith” and thus cannot be protected under § 230(c)(2), the “Good Samaritan” provision of the CDA. (Doc. No. 16 at 6-7; Doc. No. 24 at 6-7). Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing in that it ignores the fact that Facebook and TikTok are claiming immunity under § 230(c)(1), which contains no “good faith” requirement. E. Coast Test Prep LLC v. Allnurses.com, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 952, 964 (D. Minn. 2018), aff’d, 971 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2020).

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on a misconception about the purpose of the Good Samaritan provision. It was inserted not to diminish the broad general immunity provided by § 230(c)(1), but to assure it is not diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher functions. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (Section 230 was designed “to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services” without fear they would incur liability as a result.). In this respect, the CDA was a response to cases such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), in which an ISP was found liable for defamatory statements posted by third parties because it had voluntarily screened and edited some offensive content, and so was considered a “publisher.” Id. at *4. “Section 230(c)(1) was meant to undo the perverse incentives created by this reasoning, which effectively penalized providers for monitoring content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. As TikTok aptly notes, Plaintiffs’ complaint about selective enforcement of content standards is precisely the type of claim Congress intended to preempt in § 230(c)(1>>

Anche la domanda ex tort of negligence è rigettata: non c’era specifoco duty of care di F. verso l’attore. Tale non erano le sue Community Standards , altrimenti il safa harbour sarebbe vano: <<To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the promulgation of Community Standards gives rise to a state-law duty of care in publishing, that argument has been rejected. “[S]tate law cannot predicate liability for publishing decisions on the mere existence of the very relationship that Congress immunized from suit.” Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359-60. The CDA “allows [computer service providers] to establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Green, 318 F.3d at 723).

Again, “[n]one of this means … that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages [will] escape accountability.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. It means only that, if Plaintiffs take issue with the posts and accounts of Dolan and her group, their legal remedy is against Dolan as the content provider, and not against Facebook and TikTok as the publisher>>.

(notizie e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Interessante sentenza dagli USA sulla chiusura immotivata da parte di Facebook dell’account di un’utente

Si tratta della corte del nord california 12 noiv. 2021, 21–cv–04573–EMC , King v-. Facebbok (dal blog di Eric Goldman).

Il provveidmento interessa, dato che la chiusura immotivata di account FB pare non sia così rara.

L’attrice avanza varie domande (una basata sul § 230.c.2.A CDA : incomprensibile, visto che , la disposizione esime da responsabilità anzichè comminarla!, p. 4 segg.)

Qui ricordo la domanda sub E, p. 10 ss basata sulla violazione contrattuale ex fide bona e correttezza.

Rigettata quella sulla distruzione di contenuto (sub 1: non condivisibelmente però: se manca obbligo specifico per F. di conservare, quanto meno la buona fede impone di dare congruo preavviso della prossima distruzione), viene accolta quella sulla mancanza di motivazione,. sub 2, p. 12 ss

F. si basa sulla pattuita clausola <<If we determine that you have clearly, seriously or repeatedly breached our Terms or Policies, including in particular our Community Standards, we may suspend or permanently disable access to your account.>> per affermare che aveva piena discrezionalità

Il giudice ha buon gioco però nel dire che non è così: <<Notably, the Terms of Service did not include language providing that Facebook had “sole discretion” to act. Compare, e.g., Chen v. PayPal, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 5th 559, 570-71 (2021) (noting that contract provisions allowed “PayPal to place a hold on a payment or on a certain amount in a seller’s account when it ‘believes there may be a high level of risk’ associated with a transaction or the account[,] [a]nd per the express terms of the contract, it may do so ‘at its sole discretion’”; although plaintiffs alleged that “‘there was never any high level of risk associated with any of the accounts of any’ appellants, . . . this ignores that the user agreement makes the decision to place a hold PayPal’s decision – and PayPal’s alone”).

Moreover, by providing a standard by which to evaluate whether an account should be disabled, the Terms of Service suggest that Facebook’s discretion to disable an account is to be guided by the articulated factors and cannot be entirely arbitrary. Cf. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Ins., 467 U.S. 340, 349, 351 (1984) (stating that the “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action . . . may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent” – i.e., “whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme’”).

At the very least, there is a strong argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes ome limitation on the exercise of discretion so as to not entirely eviscerate users’ rights>>

Inoltre (sub 3, p. 14) quanto meot una spiegazione era dovuta. (i passaggi sub 2 e il 3 si sovrappontgono)

In breve sono ritenute illegittime la disbilitgazione e la mancanza di motivazione (che si soprappongono, come appena detto: la reciproca distinzione concettuale richiederebbe troppo spazio e tempo)

Da ultimo, l’ovvia eccezione di safe harbour ex § 230.c.1 CDA <Treatment of publisher or speaker> copre la disabilitazione ma non la mancata spiegazione (p. 22).

Sul secondo punto c’è poco da discutere: il giudice ha ragione.

Più difficile rispondere sul primo, importante nella pratica, dato che qualunque disabilitazione costituirà -dal punto del disabilitato- una violazione di contratto.

Il giudice dà ragione a F.: il fatto che esista un patto, non toglie a F. il safe harbour : <<although Ms. King’s position is not without any merit, she has glossed over the nature of the “promise” that Facebook made in its Terms of Service. In the Terms of Service, Facebook simply stated that it would use its discretion to determine whether an account should be disabled based on certain standards. The Court is not convinced that Facebook’s statement that it would exercise its publishing discretion constitutes a waiver of the CDA immunity based on publishing discretion. In other words, all that Facebook did here was to incorporate into the contract (the Terms of Service) its right to act as a publisher. This by itself is not enough to take Facebook outside of the protection the CDA gives to “‘paradigmatic editorial decisions not to publish particular content.’” Murphy, 60 Cal. App. 5th at 29. Unlike the very specific one-time promise made in Barnes, the promise relied upon here is indistinguishable from “‘paradigmatic editorial decisions not to publish particular content.’” Id. It makes little sense from the perspective of policy underpinning the CDA to strip Facebook of otherwise applicable CDA immunity simply because Facebook stated its discretion as a publisher in its Terms of Service>>.

Decisione forse esatta sul punto specifico, ma servirebbe analisi ulteriore.

Corresponsabilità delle puiattaforme digitali per la strage di Orlando (Florida, USA) del 2016? No

Nella strage di Orlando USA del 2016 Omar Mateen uccise 49 persone e ne ferì 53 con un fucile semiautomatico, inneggiando all’ISIS.

Le vittime proposero domanda giudiziale contro Twitter Google e Facebook sia in base Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333(a) & (d)(2) (è respponsabile chi , by facilitating his access to radical jihadist and ISIS-sponsored content in the months and years leading up to the shooting) sia per legge statale, avendo cagionato negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.

La cit. legge ATA imposes civil liability on “any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed . . . an act of international terrorism,” provided that the “act of international terrorism” is “committed, planned, or authorized” by a designated “foreign terrorist organization.”

Nega ogni responsabilità in capo alle piattaforme (confermando la sentenza di primo grado della Florida) la corte d’appello dell’11° circuito 27.09.2021, No. 20-11283 , Colon ed altri c. Twitter-Facebook-Google.

La prima domanda è respinta sia perchè non si trattò di terrorismo internazionale (pur se reclamato dal’lISIS), come richiede la cit legge, sia perchè non fu una foreign terroristic organization a commetterlo (ma un c.d. lupo solitario).

Ma soprattutto è rigettata la seconda domanda (negligenza nel causare danni e decdessi) : gli attori non hanno superato la prova della proximate causation circa il ruolo delle puiattaforme, sub IV.A, p. 21 ss

La corte parla si del nesso di causalità ma in astratto e in base ai precedenti, senza applicarlo al ruolo delle piattaforme nella commissione di delitti.

La corte stranamente non menziona il safe harbour ex 230 CDA che avrebbe potuto essere invocato (cosa che quasi certanente le piattafirme avranno fatto)

(notizia e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

La responsabilità degli internet provider per violazioni IP: quella della piattaforma Cloudfare è negata

Secondo i titolari di diritto di autore su vestiti da nozze l’avvalersi della piattaforma Cloudfare per vendere prodotti contraffatti fa sorgere anche responsabilità di questa.

Lo nega la corte del nord Californa Case 3:19-cv-01356-VC del 6 ottobre 2021, MON CHERI BRIDALS c. Cloudfare.

secondo gli attori, <Cloudflare contributes to the underlying copyright infringement by providing infringers with caching, content delivery, and security services.>
Ma il controibutory infringement ricorre solo se <it “(1) has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement>.

la corte osserva: <Simply providing services to a copyright infringer does not qualify as a “material contribution.” Id. at 797–98. Rather, liability in the internet context follows where a party “facilitate[s] access” to infringing websites in such a way that “significantly magnif[ies]” the underlying infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). A party can also materially contribute to copyright infringement by acting as “an essential step in the infringement process.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Visa International, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). >

Pertanto rigetta la domanda.

1 – Gli attori non hanno dato prova per cui una giuria possa dire <that Cloudflare’s performance-improvement services materially contribute to copyright infringement. The plaintiffs’ only evidence of the effects of these services is promotional material from Cloudflare’s website touting the benefits of its services. These general statements do not speak to the effects of Cloudflare on the direct infringement at issue here. For example, the plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that faster load times (assuming they were faster) would be likely to lead to significantly more infringement than would occur without Cloudflare. Without such evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Cloudflare “significantly magnif[ies]” the underlying infringement. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1172. Nor are Cloudflare’s services an “essential step in the infringement process.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, 658 F.3d at 944. If Cloudflare were to remove the infringing material from its cache, the copyrighted image would still be visible to the user; removing material from a cache without removing it from the hosting server would not prevent the direct infringement from occurring. >

La questione della specificità (v. parole in rosso) è importante -spesso decisiva- anche nel ns. ordinameto sul medesimo problema.

nè Clouddfare rende più difficile l’0individuazione della contraffazione: <Cloudflare’s security services also do not materially contribute to infringement. From the perspective of a user accessing the infringing websites, these services make no difference. Cloudflare’s security services do impact the ability of third parties to identify a website’s hosting provider and the IP address of the server on which it resides. If Cloudflare’s provision of these services made it more difficult for a third party to report incidents of infringement to the web host as part of an effort to get the underlying content taken down, perhaps it could be liable for contributory infringement. But here, the parties agree that Cloudflare informs complainants of the identity of the host in response to receiving a copyright complaint, in addition to forwarding the complaint along to the host provider>.

Stranamente non si menziona la preliminare di rito (o pregiudiziale di merito?) della carenza di azione ex saharbour § 230 CDA: pareva invocabile.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

La proprietà intellettuale, cui non si applica il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, comprende pure il right of publicity

Una giornalista vede la propria immagine riprodotta illecitamente in Facebook e nel social Imgur, cui portava un link presente in Reddit.

Cita tute le piattaforme per violazione del right of publicity (r.o.f.) ma queste invocano il § 230 CDA.

Il quale però non si applica alla intellectual property (IP) (§ 230.e.2).

Per le piattaforme il right of publicity è altro dall ‘ IP e dunque il safe harbour può operre.

La pensa allo stesso modo il giudice di primo grado.

Per la corte di appello del 3° circuito, invece, vi rientra appieno: quindi il safe harbour non opera (sentenza Hepp c. Facebook, Reddit, Imgur e altri, N° 20–2725 & 2885, 23.09.2021)

I dizionari -legali e non- alla voce <intellectual property> indirettamente comprendono il r.o.f. (p. 18-19): spt. perchè vi includono i marchi, cui il r.o.f. va assimilato.

(sub D infine il collegio si premura di chiarire che non ci saranno conseguenze disastrose da questa presa di posizine, apparentemente contro la comunicazione in internet via piattaforme)

(testo e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Raccolta, a fini di successiva vendita, di informazioni personali altrui: right of publicity e safe harbour ex 230 CDA

La corte distrettuale del Nord California, 16.08.2021, 21–cv–01418–EMC , Cat Brooks e altri c. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION (poi, TR), decide la lite iniziata dai primi per raccolta e sucessiva vendita a terzi di loro dati personali.

Il colosso dell’informazione TR , data broker, raccoglieva e vendeva informazioni altrui a imprese interessate (si tratta della piattaforma CLEAR).

Precisamente: Thomson Reuters “aggregates both public and non–public information about millions of people” to create “detailed cradle–to–grave dossiers on each person, including names, photographs, criminal history, relatives, associates, financial information, and employment information.” See Docket No. 1–1 (Compl.) ⁋ 2. Other than publicly available information on social networks, blogs, and even chat rooms, Thomson Reuters also pulls “information from third–party data brokers and law enforcement agencies that are not available to the general public, including live cell phone records, location data from billions of license plate detections, real–time booking information from thousands of facilities, and millions of historical arrest records and intake photos.”

1) Tra le vari causae petendi, considero il right of publicity.

La domanda è rigettata non tanto perchè non ricorra l’uso (come allegato da TR) , quanto perchè non ricorre l'<Appropriation of Plaintiffs’ Name or Likeness For A Commercial Advantage>: Although the publishing of Plaintiffs’ most private and intimate information for profit might be a gross invasion of their privacy, it is not a misappropriation of their name or likeness to advertise or promote a separate product or servic, p. 8.

2) safe harbour ex § 230 CDA, invocato da TR

Dei tre requisiti necessari (“(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content
provider.” ), TR non ha provato la ricorrenza del 2 e del 3.

Quanto al 2, la giurisprudenza insegna che <<a plaintiff seeks to treat an interactive computer service as a “publisher or speaker” under § 230(c)(1) only when it is asking that service to “review[], edit[], and decid[e] whether to publish or withdraw from publication third–party content.” Id. (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold Thomson Reuters liable “as the publisher or speaker” because they are not asking it to monitor third–party content; they are asking to moderate its own conten>>

Quanto al requisito 3, l’informazione non è fornita da terzi ma da TR: the “information” at issue here—the dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal information—is not “provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). In Roomates.com, the panel explained that § 230 was passed by Congress to “immunize[] providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.” 521 F.3d at 1162 (emphasis added). The whole point was to allow those providers to “perform some editing on user–generated content without thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or delete. In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user–generated content, not the creation of content.” Id. at 1163 (emphases added). Here, there is no user–generated content—Thomson Reuters generates all the dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal information that is posted on the CLEAR platform. See Compl. ⁋⁋ 1–3. In other words, Thomson Reuter is the “information content provider” of the CLEAR dossiers because it is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” those dossiers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). It is nothing like the paradigm of an interactive computer service that permits posting of content by third parties.