Categoria: Diritto di parola – libertà di manifestazione del proprio pensiero

Copyright, fair use, diritto di parola e diritto vs. la piattaforma di conoscere il soggetto che diffonde anonimamente post satirici

Chi carica post vagamente satirici con fotografie ritraenti un private-equity billionaire in comapgian di ragazze, compie delle stesse un fair use, quindi non rientrante nel copyright sulle foto stesse.

Ne segue che il diritto di far cadere l’anonimato non gli spetta,   perchè <<has not made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement>>, secondo l’interprteazione del § 512.h DMCA “Subpoena To Identify Infringer”.

E’ del resto chiaro che i sei tweet satirici ACCOMPAFGNATORI DELLE FOto,  erano espressione del diritto di parola/critica: << The six tweets flagged by Bayside are best interpreted as vaguely satirical commentary criticizing the opulent lifestyle of wealthy investors generally (and Brian Sheth, specifically). For example, one tweet reads: “Good morning from Mrs. Brian Sheth #2. Life is good when you’re a 44-year old private equity billionaire.” The tweet accuses Brian Sheth of having a mistress and links his infidelity to the broader class of “private equity billionaires,” suggesting that wealth (or working in private equity) corrupts. Unmasking MoneyBags thus risks exposing him to “economic or official retaliation” by Sheth or his associates. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). And MoneyBags’s interest in anonymity is heightened further by his other tweets, which discuss issues of political importance such as sexual harassment, tax enforcement, and corporate regulations>> (Brian Seth è il milionario e Bayside il soggetto reclamante diritto di autore sulle foto, forse ricollegabile allo stesso Seth).

Così il distretto nord della California 21 giugno 2022, Case 4:20-mc-80214-VC , IN RE DMCA § 512(H) SUBPOENA TO TWITTER, INC., di cui dà notizia www.eef.org in un’inteessante fattispecie all’intersezione tra copyright , privacy e diritto di parola.

Il motore di ricerca di Google potrebbe essere un common carrier, però non è una public utility

Questa in sintesi è l’insegnamento della Corte di common pleas, Delaware county, Ohio, State of Ohio c. Google, 24.05.2022, di cui dà notizia il blog del prof. Eric Goldman.

Si noti la differenza tra common carrier e public utility nella common law: la seconda è necessariamente anche un common carrier , mentre non è vero il contrario.

Non è public utility perchè, in mancanza di vincolo di legge , non c’è un diritto alle prestazione del motore di ricerca, dice la Corte , p.14-15.

Del resto , aggiunge, per quanto importante, esso non costituisce un <life-essential service>. Infatti i concorrenti (Bing, Ask, Duck and go) , per quanto ben minori, comunque riempirebbero subito il vuoto lasciato da Google qualora cessasse l’erogaizone del servizio di search engine

Quanto , infine, alla questione del se tali qualifiche comportino un vincolo incostituzionale perchè lesivo della libertà di impresa di Google da intendere come diritto di parola/free speecch  (editorial judgment, cooperto da Primo Emendamenot), la Corte non si pronuncia (sub IV).

L’editorial judgment delle piattafrome social , in quanto esercizio del diritto di parola, è coperto dal Primo Emendamento

E’ stata data la notizia circa la sentenza di appello 23 maggio 2022 dell’11 circuito, USCA11 Case: 21-12355 , Netchoice LLc e altri c. ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA (link fornito da varie fonti), circa la legittimità di una legge della Florida regolante e vincolante in vario modo le piattaforme social.

Soprattuto tre son i vincoli contestati:

i) restrizioni sulla content-moderation, ( p. 10);

ii) obblighi di disclosure (p. 12);

iii) obbligo di  fornire i dati all’utente in caso di deplatforming  (p. 13; disposzione invero molti interessante e probabilmente da accogliere, visti i recenti casi italiani di distruzioni immotivate del materiale postato negli anni dall’utente medesimo)

La corte di appello dell’11° circuito, adita dalle piattaforme la ritiene sostanzialmente incostituzionale, in quanto troppo inibente la freedom of speech tutelata dal Primo Emendamento.

Il presupposto , importante, è che le piattafforme sono soggetti privati titolari appunto dei diritti da First Amendement: <<The question at the core of this appeal is whether the Facebooks and Twitters of the world—indisputably “private actors” with First Amendment rights—are engaged in constitutionally protected expressive activity when they moderate and curate the content that they disseminate on their platforms. The State of Florida insists that they aren’t, and it has enacted a first-of-its-kind law to combat what some of its proponents perceive to be a concerted effort by “the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley” to “silenc[e]” “conservative” speech in favor of a “radical leftist” agenda. To that end, the new law would, among other things, prohibit certain social-media companies from “deplatforming” political candidates under any circumstances, prioritizing or deprioritizing any post or message “by or about” a candidate, and, more broadly, removing anything posted by a “journalistic enterprise” based on its content. USCA11 Case: 21-12355 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 3 of 674 Opinion of the Court 21-12355

We hold that it is substantially likely that social-media companies—even the biggest ones—are “private actors” whose rights the First Amendment protects, Manhattan Cmty., 139 S. Ct. at 1926, that their so-called “content-moderation” decisions constitute protected exercises of editorial judgment, and that the provisions of the new Florida law that restrict large platforms’ ability to engage in content moderation unconstitutionally burden that prerogative. We further conclude that it is substantially likely that one of the law’s particularly onerous disclosure provisions—which would require covered platforms to provide a “thorough rationale” for each and every content-moderation decision they make—violates the First Amendment.

Accordingly, we hold that the companies are entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of those provisions. Because we think it unlikely that the law’s remaining (and far less burdensome) disclosure provisions violate the First Amendment, we hold that the companies are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief with respect to them>>

Sul conflitto tra editorial judgment/diritto di free speech in capo alle piattaforme social, da una parte, e diritto dello stato di chiedere conto dei criteri seguiti nella content moderation, dall’altro,  v. l’interessante saggio “Rereading Herbert v. Lando” di E. Douek-G. Lakier, 26 maggio 2022 , richiamante la cit. decisione della Suprema Corte del 1979.

Sulla legge della Florida v. Calvert, First Amendment Battles over Anti-Deplatforming Statutes: Examining Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo’s Relevance for Today’s Online Social Media Platform Cases, NY Univ. law review-online, aprile 2022.

Altra conferma (d’appello) che Twitter non è “State actor”, per cui nei suoi confronti non opera la protezione costituzionale del diritto di parola

Altra conferma che le piattaforme digitali non sono State actors ai fini della protezione da Primo  Emendamento: così Appello del 9 circuito, Rutenberg. c. Twitter e Dorsey , 18 05.2022, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00548-YGR.

Motivazione breve , che conferma il primo grado:

<< The district court properly dismissed Rutenberg’s First Amendment claim: She did not allege sufficient facts to infer that the defendants (collectively, “Twitter” or “the company”) engaged in state action when the company moderated or suspended the former President’s Twitter account. The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause “prohibits the government—not a private party—from abridging speech.” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Dismissal was proper because the complaint lacked “a cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]” to state a  plausible claim for relief. Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 604 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Rutenberg offers insufficient facts to infer the “close nexus” between Twitter’s conduct on the one hand and the government on the other, which is required to find that Twitter’s conduct constituted state action. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). To the contrary, Rutenberg acknowledges that Twitter exercised its own “discretion and authority” in moderating President Trump’s account, and that Twitter acted as President Trump’s “opponent” in doing so. Twitter was not a “willful participant” in any “joint activity” with the President, and its conduct was not state action. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Rutenberg’s contention that Twitter “abused” a delegation of authority when it moderated President Trump’s account is of no moment. This “abuse of authority” doctrine “does not apply” where, as here, “the
challenged action is undertaken by a private party rather than a state official.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940). Indeed, it would be “ironic” to conclude that Twitter’s imposition of sanctions against a public official—sanctions the official “steadfastly opposed”—is state action. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). >>

E del resto non ci fu alcuna delega dal presidente Trump a Tw. (chissà cosa aveva allegato l’attrice!!): << Similarly, President Trump did not delegate a “public function” to Twitter within the meaning of Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929. The relevant function here—moderating speech on the Twitter platform—is not “an activity that only governmental entities have traditionally performed.” Id. at 1930; see also id. (“[M]erely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function . . . .”); Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998 (moderation of content on video-streaming platform was not a “public function”) >>

Si noti che l’attrice si doleva della rimozione ingiustificata dell’account Tw. non proprio ma del presidente Trump.

(notizia  e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

La senatrice Warren chiede ad Amazon di modificare il suo algoritmo per combattere la misinformation: è inibizione del diritto di parola a carico delle pubblicazioni contrarie al mainstream e da ciò penalizzate?

Affronta in via sommaria il tema il Western District of Washington at Seattle, 9 maggio 2022, Case No. 2:21-cv-01508-BJR, giudice Barbara Rothstein, Kennedy e altri c. Elizabeth Warren (in proprio e nella funzione) (v. qui la pagina sul caso in CourtListener)

Il libro inibito era <<The Truth About COVID-19>>.

EW scrisse ad Amazon lamentando che favoriva la misinformation in tema di covid.-19 .

Concludeva la lettera by “ask[ing] [Amazon to] perform an immediate review of [its] algorithms and, within 14 days, provide both a public report . . . and a plan to modify these algorithms.” Id. at 5. The letter also asked Amazon to respond to four questions about its search algorithms and “Best Seller” labels, so that Sen. Warren could “fully understand Amazon’s role in facilitating misinformation about COVID-19 and its actions to address the issue.” Id. at 5-6.

Il libro era stato messo in vendita su Amazon e Barnes§Noble , che -dopo la pubblicità data alla lettera- lo esclusero dalle vendite oppure in modo opaco ne diminuirono la visibilità (overtly demoting, downgrading, or otherwise suppressing The Truth About COVID-19” without informing Plaintiffs. )

Essi citano allora EW per farle ritirare la lettera e inibirle simili condotte in futuro.

La Corte -prevedibilmente- rigetta. A nulla serve il precedente Bantham Books del 1963 invocato dagli attori, ove la censura era stata assai chiara, e analizzato dalla Corte. p. 7-8

First, the “thinly veiled threats” in Bantam Books were very thinly veiled. The commission’s notices were “phrased virtually as orders” and made explicit reference to the attorney general, the police, and the possibility of criminal prosecution. Id. at 67-68. Here, Defendant Warren’s alleged threat is derived primarily from her statements that the circulation of The Truth About COVID-19 was “potentially unlawful” and that COVID-19 misinformation has “led to untold illnesses and death.” Dkt. 8, Exh. A, at 1- 2; see Dkt. 7 at 10-17. Plaintiffs argue that booksellers could interpret these statements as threatening them with “legal liability for wrongful death or homicide.” Plaintiffs will have difficulty establishing that this is a reasonable or likely interpretation of Defendant Warren’s letter. The two noted phrases are not in the same paragraph and, even if they were, equating them to an accusation of homicide requires a vivid imagination. Furthermore, the vast majority of Defendant Warren’s letter is dedicated to persuasion—by arguing, for example, that “[o]ther major technology companies have recognized their role in propagating misinformation” and, unlike Amazon, taken steps to address it. Dk.8, Exh. A, at 5.

Next, Defendant Warren is far removed from the power to legally punish booksellers for continuing to sell The Truth About COVID-19. Although Plaintiffs are correct that “the fact that a public-official defendant lacks direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over a plaintiff [or third-party publisher] . . . is not necessarily dispositive,” that does not mean it will not be dispositive in most cases. Dkt. 7 at 11 (citing Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 230).

(…) Put another way, the threat of legal sanctions can act as an unlawful restriction on speech, but a threat will only be perceived as such if there is a realistic chance the threatened action can be carried out. Plaintiffs are unlikely to successfully demonstrate that the booksellers reasonably perceived Defendant Warren’s letter as a threat. Cf. id. at 68 (“The Commission’s notices [were]
phrased virtually as orders [and] reasonably understood to be such by the distributor . . . .”).

In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Defendant Warren’s letter constitutes a prior restraint on speech.

Il fumus boni iuris dunque non viene ravvisato: condivisibilmente , direi.

Altra negata violazione del Primo Emendamento a seguito di blocco di account Twitter per Covid-19 misinformation

Non passa nemmeno qui la domanda di violazione del Primo Emendamento per blocco dell’account Twitter, basata su State action costituita da ingerenze/coercizioni del governo  verso la piattaforma.

Si tratta del Distretto sud dell’Ohio – Eastern division,  Case No. 2:22-cv-1776, 05.05.2022, MARK CHANGIZI c. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.

In questo caso però  la domanda era stata avanzata solo verso il servizio sanitario nazionale HHS, non verso Twitter : <<Plaintiffs thus accuse HHS of “instrumentalizing” or “commandeering” Twitter to both censor and “chill” online criticism of the government’s pandemic response—activity which they assert infringed (and, in some respect, continues to infringe) (1) their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution, (2) the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 264(a). They now seek a range of declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction which requires HHS to both retract the RFI and abstain “from enforcing coercive policies or conditions that exert pressure upon Twitter and other technology companies to censor users.”>>

Qui interessa solo quella basata sul Primo Emendamento .  Il giudice non ne accerta alcuna vioalzione , alla luce della carenza di prova di coerzcizione di HHS verso Twitter e , sicchè non viene ravvisata State action : << To that end, the Court agrees with HHS that its efforts to confront COVID-19 misinformation, as alleged, do not “reasonably” constitute an exercise of “coercive power” over Twitter. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. Thus, because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not pass muster under the “state compulsion” framework, and because they do not make any colorable argument that any other exception to the state-action doctrine applies, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim fails>>, p 28

C’è da chiedersi se non ci sia responsabilità professionale per il legale che consigli simili azioni , dato il fermo e contrario orientamento giurisprudenziale (erano state però avanzate anche altre domande giudiziali, oltre a quella basata sul 1° Emend.)

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Altro rigetto di domanda per presunta violazione del Primo Emendamento a seguito di blocco di account Facebook e Twitter

Implacabile la giurisprudenza USA nel continuare ad affermare che la protezione costituzionale del diritto di parola è concessa solo verso lo Stato o organi pubblici,  non verso privati (quali sono i pur giganteschi social media).

Ora è la volta del Distretto Nord della California a firma del giudice Breyer con provv. 5 maggio 2022, Case 3:22-cv-00737-CRB , Hart. c. Facebook e altri , a seguito di blocco dell’account per ripetuta disinformazione soprattutto in tema di covid-19.

Misinformazione che violava i terms of service (Facebook:  forbade users from sharing “anything . . . [t]hat is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory, or fraudulent.”; Twitter: prohibits using “Twitter’s services to share false or misleading information about COVID-19 which may lead to harm.”).

In particolare sono rigettate le due modalità prospettate dall’attore, evidentemente per superare il dettato costituzionale e la sua interpretazione corrente. Infatti non ricorre nè la cd joint action (tra privato e potere pubblico; v. nota 4 << It is still more difficult to understand how general legislative debates, such as those surrounding Section 230, could provide a President with coercive power over a private company sufficient to confer state action>>) nè la government coercicion, pp. 9-15.

Allo scopo, l’attore aveva citato pure il presidente Biden e il responsabile sanitario Murphy in proprio.  In particolare aveva allegato che <<Biden and Murthy “directed” social media platforms to make four changes: (1) to “measure and publicly share the impact of misinformation on their platform”; (2) to “create a robust enforcement strategy that bridges their properties and provides transparency about the rules”; (3) to “take faster action against harmful posts” because “information travels quite quickly on social media platforms”; and (4) to “promote quality information in their feed algorithm.” Id. ¶¶ 14-17. Hart also alleges that Biden directed Murthy to create a 22-page advisory with “instructions on how social media companies should remove posts with which Murthy and Biden disagree.” Id. ¶ 18.  Finally, Hart alleges that Biden “threatened” social media companies who do not comply by “publicly shaming and humiliating them, stating, ‘They’re killing people”)>>.

Da noi per fortuna l’art. 2 Cost. si applica pacificamente pure verso i soggetti privati.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Ancora sul diritto di parola vs. Twitter : non c’è violazione del Primo emendamento poichè non è State Actor (sul caso Trump c. Twitter)

Altra decisione nella lite Trump e altri c. Twitter (Distr. Nord della California , 6 maggio 2022, case 3:21-cv-08378-JD ) prodotta dalla nota censura  operata da Tw. contro il primo.

Anche qui va male all’ex presidente: Tw. no è State ACtor in alcun modo e dunque egli non può appellarsi al diritto di parola del Primo Emendamento.

Notare l’inziale understatement del collegio: <<Plaintiffs are not starting from a position of strength. Twitter is a private company, and “the First Amendment applies only to governmental abridgements of speech, and not to alleged abridgements by private companies>>.

<<Plaintiffs’ only hope of stating a First Amendment claim is to plausibly allege that Twitter was in effect operating as the government under the “state-action doctrine.” This doctrine provides that, in some situations, “governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints>>.

<< The salient question under the state action doctrine is whether “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right” is “fairly attributable to the State.” >>

Si pensi che, circa la prova della state action nel caso specifico ,  <<in plaintiffs’ view, these account actions were the result of coercion by members of Congress affiliated with the Democratic Party>>!!

E’ pure rigettata la domadna di esame della costituzionalità del § 230 CDA perchè manca la injury richiesta allo scopo

Il blocco dell’account Twitter per post ingannevoli o fuorvianti (misleading) è coperto dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il distretto nord della California con provv. 29.04.2022, No. C 21-09818 WHA, Berenson v. Twitter, decide la domanda giudiziale allegante un illegittimo blocco dell’account per post fuorvianti (misleading) dopo la nuova Twitter policy five-strike in tema di covid 19.

E la rigetta, riconoscendo il safe harbour ex § 230.c.2.a del CDA.

A nulla valgono le allegazioni attoree intorno alla mancanza di buona fede in Twitter: << With the exception of the claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, all claims in this action are barred by 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(2)(A), which provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of — any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” For an internet platform like Twitter, Section 230 precludes liability for removing content and preventing content from being posted that the platform finds would cause its users harm, such as misinformation regarding COVID-19. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the leadup to his account suspension do not provide a sufficient factual underpinning for his conclusion Twitter lacked good faith. Twitter constructed a robust five-strike COVID-19 misinformation policy and, even if it applied those strikes in error, that alone would not show bad faith. Rather, the allegations are consistent with Twitter’s good faith effort to respond to clearly objectionable content posted by users on its platform. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (Judge Stewart D. Aaron)>>.

Invece non  rientrano nella citata esimente (quindi la causa prosegue su quelle) le domande basate su violazione contrattuale e promissory estoppel.

La domanda basata sulla vioalzione del diritto di parola è pure respinta per il solito motivo della mancanza di state action, essendo Tw. un  ente privato: <<Aside from Section 230, plaintiff fails to even state a First Amendment claim. The free speech clause only prohibits government abridgement of speech — plaintiff concedes Twitter is a private company (Compl. ¶15). Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). Twitter’s actions here, moreover, do not constitute state action under the joint action test because the combination of (1) the shift in Twitter’s enforcement position, and (2) general cajoling from various federal officials regarding misinformation on social media platforms do not plausibly assert Twitter conspired or was otherwise a willful participant in government action. See Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2020).  For the same reasons, plaintiff has not alleged state action under the governmental nexus test either, which is generally subsumed by the joint action test. Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 995 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013). Twitter “may be a paradigmatic public square on the Internet, but it is not transformed into a state actor solely by providing a forum for speech.” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up, quotation omitted). >>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric goldman)

Altra conferma (d’appello) che Facebook non è “state actor” e che dunque l’arbitraria rimozione di post non viola il Primo Emendamento

SEcondo l’orientamento dominante il diritto di parola non ha la tutela costituzionale del 1 Emendamento quando la sua inibizione provenga da soggetto privato, quale il filtraggio operato dalle piattaforme digitali.

A tale orientameno si adegua l’Appello del secondo circuito 27.04.2022, Brock v. Zuckerberg e altri, 21-1796-cv .

Motivazione leggera e non particolarmente interessante.

Di fronte alla duplice causa petendi <<two principal arguments as to why the removal of his Facebook posts constituted state action: (1) Facebook was a publicly held company [sic!]; and (2) Facebook was the equivalent of a “public square” or “public forum.” >>, la Corte rigetta.

In particolare osserva:

<< Although Brock alleged some facts, construed liberally, as to his first argument, it clearly fails as a matter of law.   “The management of a corporation is not a public function; and a state’s permission for a corporation to organize itself in a particular manner is not the delegation of governmental authority.” Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003).

As to Brock’s assertion that Facebook is a public square, he failed to make any non-conclusory factual allegations to support that claim.   Instead, the amended complaint merely repeats the legal conclusion that Facebook is a public forum and public square. While we construe pro se complaints liberally, legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations,” Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of Brock’s conclusory allegations “nudged” his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Brock conclusorily asserted for
the first time that Facebook is a state actor because it performs the traditional public function of delivering mail. Brock did not raise this argument on appeal or challenge the district court’s conclusion that he cannot “avoid the state action
question” by analogizing “Facebook’s provision of an online messaging service to
the government’s traditional provision of mail services through the United States
Postal Service,” App’x at 188–89.

It is well settled in the Second Circuit “that issues not discussed in an appellate brief will normally be deemed abandoned.” Beatty v. United States, 293 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (“When a litigant – including a pro se litigant – raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, the issue is abandoned.”).  And although “[a]n abandoned claim may nevertheless be considered if manifest injustice would otherwise result,” Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2002), such circumstances are not present here; Brock’s complaint and opposition below is devoid of any facts that would support a conclusion that Facebook has assumed a heretofore exclusively public function>>.

E’ assorbita la censura sul § 230 CDA ,.

E’ noto che da noi, invece, la tutela dei diritti fondamentali ex art. 2 Cost. opera anche nelle relazioni tra soggetti privati.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)