Diritto di parola – libertà di manifestazione del proprio pensiero – Pagina 5

Ritwittare aggiungendo commenti diffamatori non è protetto dal safe harbour ex 230 CDA

Byrne è citato per diffamazione da Us Dominion (azienda usa che fornisce software per la gestione dei processi elettorali) per dichiaraizoni e tweet offensivi.

Egli cerca l’esimente del safe harbour ex 230 CDA ma gli va male: è infatti content provider.

Il mero twittare un link (a materiale diffamatorio) pootrebbe esserne coperto: ma non i commenti accompagnatori.

Così il Trib. del District of Columbia 20.04.4022, Case 1:21-cv-02131-CJN, US Dominion v. Byrne: <<A so-called “information content provider” does not enjoy immunity under § 230. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Any “person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service” qualifies as an “information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Bennett, 882 F.3d at 1166 (noting a dividing line between service and content in that ‘interactive computer service’ providers—which are generally eligible for CDA section 230 immunity—and ‘information content provider[s],’ which are not entitled to immunity”).
While § 230 may provide immunity for someone who merely shares a link on Twitter, Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Opinion Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2015), it does not immunize someone for making additional remarks that are allegedly defamatory, see La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2020). Here, Byrne stated that he “vouch[ed] for” the evidence proving that Dominion had a connection to China. See Compl. ¶ 153(m). Byrne’s alleged statements accompanying the retweet therefore fall outside the ambit of § 230 immunity>>.

Questione non difficile: che il mero caricamente di un link sia protetto, è questione interessante; che invece i commenti accompagnatori ingiuriosi rendano l’autore un content provider, è certo.

I social media, utilizzati da un politico locale per attività ufficiali, costituiscono “public forum”, soggetto alla libertà di parola ex Primo Emendamento (ennesima conferma)

Il Tribunale NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION cofnerma che la pagina Facebook di un consigliere circoscrizionale (Alderman) del 45° Ward di Chcago (v. l’elenco qui) è public forum. Quindi soggetta alla lbiertà di parola costituzionale sicchè la censura da aprte deel Consigliere dei post sgraditi non è ammessa, tranne i strettissimi limiti ricosciuti dalla giurisprudenza.

Si tratta della decisione 10.02.2022, PETE CZOSNYKA, et al. v. JAMES GARDINER, Alderman of the 45th Ward of the City of Chicago,Case: 1:21-cv-03240 .

<<In his motion, Alderman Gardiner argues that plaintiffs have insufficiently alleged that hisFacebook Page is a public forum, especially because Facebook is a private entity. The SeventhCircuit has held that public forums are “locations or channels of communication that thegovernment opens for use by the public for expressive activity.” Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 869(7th Cir. 2011).

Indeed, federal courts have “extended public speech protection to less traditional,designated public forums.” One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2019).The Supreme Court discussed similar conceptions of less traditional public forums in Packingham,which addressed the issue of a lack of access to public forums in our “cyber age,” specifically socialmedia. See Packingham v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).The Supreme Court provides guidance in determining whether a designated forum has beenintentionally created by the government, including (1) the “policy and practice of the government”and (2) “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Cornelius v.NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).

Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to address this issue, other Circuit Courts have reliedon Cornelius’ expressive activity factor when examining whether social media platforms canconstitute a public forum. For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that expressive activity can bewhen one “intentionally open[s] the public comment section” and invites commentary, noticeablymarked by an interactive component of (say) a Facebook Page, “on [any] issue, request, criticism,complement or just …thoughts.” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2019), asamended (Jan. 9, 2019).

Similarly, the Second Circuit has ruled in the context of Twitter (ananalogous social media platform), that blocking an account from certain users prevents expressiveCase: 1:21-cv-03240 Document #: 39 Filed: 02/10/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:1854conduct. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019)(“The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assumingoffice, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactivefeatures accessible to the public without limitation.”).

Thus, based on Packingham and the Cornelius factors, federal courts have concluded that whenthe government or a government official uses a social media account for official business, theinteractive portions of the social media platforms are public forums for First Amendment purposes. See Davison, 912 F.3d at 682; Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 237; Felts v. Reed, 504 F.Supp.3d978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2020); One Wisconsin, 354 F.Supp. 3d at 953. The Court agrees with thispersuasive authority.

Correspondingly, the fact that the government only has temporary control over theFacebook Page and that the government does not own the social media platform is not determinativeof whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum inrelation to the First Amendment. See Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 235. Specifically,control is not determined based on private or public ownership, but instead on the government’sexercise of control over the relevant aspects of the social media platformI>>.

Sentenza breve e dall’esito scontato.

Più interssante sarebbe chiedersi:

1) quando la pagina Fb del politico diventa solo privata e non più soggetta al 1° Emend.? Deve mancare di ogni e qualunque riferimento all’attività politico/amministrativa?

2) quale sarebbe da noi la valutazione giuridica di un caso analogo?

(notizia della sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Post offensivi/osceni sui social e diritto di parola: protezione ridotta, se non assente

Il Tribunale del Colorado , 31.1.2022, Case 1:20-cv-01977-PAB-KMT, Sgaggio c. De Young e altri, decide sulla domanda presentata da un utente Facebook contro il Dipartimento di Polizia di Woodland Park , che lo aveva bannato dalla pagina Facebook del dipartimenot stesso per post ingiuriosi.

L’azione era basata sul Primo Emednamento (libertà di parola).

Si trattava dunque certo di State Actor. Però i post erano offensivi o addirittura osceni: e per essi la tutela del Diritto di Parola è ridotta, se non assente.

I post erano: << a) He posted the link to the Woodland Park Video and stated, “You target sick kids to get your overtime pay.. [sic] That’s why you are a pig.”

b). He posted ,“Why did you punk ass pigs remove my post. This is a pubic [sic] forum. I’m going to sue the chief of police, the city of Woodland Park, and whatever punk ass bitch remove my post. Your actions are unconstitutional and violation of federal law 18 usc 241,242.. [sic] see you pigs in Federal court..”

c. He posted the link to the Woodland Park Video and stated, “You target sick children to Enrich [sic] officers [yellow police officer emoji] with overtime pay.. [sic] dirty ass cops.”

d. He stated, “Tyler Pope they violate the constitution daily. All too stupid to understand the oath they took. We the people will bring these terrorists into federal court.” (Ex. D, Pl. Dep. Ex. 12 at 1–2; Ex. E, Pl. Dep. at 106:3–6, 198:13–16.)>>

La corte rigetta appunto affermando la riduzione/assenza di protezione , quando ricorra obscenity, senza che ciò costituisca discriminazione: <<The restrictions on Plaintiff’s speech in this case do not run afoul of the First Amendment. He alleges that his freedom of speech was infringed because of the actions Defendant De Young and someone allegedly at the City took restricting his ability to post on certain Facebook pages after he used indecent and obscene language.

Plaintiff used the words “pig,” “terrorist,” “ass,” and “bitch” to refer to the police, and he baselessly and inaccurately accused the police of targeting sick children for personal profit.

The evidence indicates there were policies in place prohibiting the use of indecent and obscene language and that Plaintiff’s speech violated such policies. There is no genuine dispute of material fact that two other individuals who also responded on the Police Department’s page with criticism of the warrant’s execution that were articulated with non-obscene language and, thus, not in violation of policy and did not have their posts removed.

Thus, the evidence clearly establishes that the restrictions occurred solely because of Plaintiff’s indecent and obscenity language, not because Defendant De Young or the City were trying to censor Plaintiff’s posts about the warrant.>>

E poi: <<Plaintiff’s argument that these words are not obscene or indecent (Resp. at 6–7) goes against common sense. “Punk ass bitch” is not a literary turn of phrase. (Id. at 7.) Moreover, it is inaccurate to refer to the police as “terrorists” (id.), when there is no dispute that the execution of the search warrant was lawful. (Undisputed Facts, ¶ 1. ( ……) Plaintiff’s argument that these words are not obscene or indecent (Resp. at 6–7) goes against common sense. “Punk ass bitch” is not a literary turn of phrase. (Id. at 7.) Moreover, it is inaccurate to refer to the police as “terrorists” (id.), when there is no dispute that the execution of the search warrant was lawful. (Undisputed Facts, ¶ 1.>>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Ancora (male) per la tesi delle piattaforme come State Actors: sul diritto di parola verso un ente privato

Dei soggetti/gruppi no-vax gestiscono account e canali su Facebook e su Youtube.

Secondo le rispettive policy , però, vengono chiusi, per i contenuti disinformativi in tema sanitario

Allora i titolari ricorrono azionando il dirito di parola che oin bnase al 1 emendamento della costituizione usa non è mai inibibile dallo Stato.

Le piattaforme però sono gestite da imprese private, non dallo Stato; e solo contro questo il primo emendamento è azionabile.

L’azione è per vero estesa anche verso soggetti diversi, quando però vi sia dietro sempre lo Stato. Ma non è il caso delle piattaforme.

Il distretto nord della california (31.01.2021, Case 4:20-cv-09456-JST, Informed Consent Action Network and founder Del Bigtree (collectively “ICAN”) c. Youtue altri) conferma l’orietnamento di gran lunga prevalente secondo cui le piattaforme non costituiscono State Actors (anche se di dubbia esattezza rigettando una possibile interpretazione storco-teleologico-evolutiva della norma costituzionale).

Il concetto di state action è declinabile in quattro modi: <<The Ninth Circuit has “recognize[d] at least four different criteria, or tests, used to identify state action: (1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) government compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The inquiry to determine whether a private entity is acting through the state is “necessarily fact–bound.”>>

Nessuno dei due azionati (sub 2 e sub 3) viene però ravvisato dal giudice.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Altra decisione per cui Twitter non è State actor (nè è ravvisabile joint action con organi statali)

Un avvocato statunitense, divenuto acceso sostenitore di Trump, si vede etichettati in modo sfavolrevole (labeled) suoi post su Twitter e poi sospeso l’account in via definitiva.

Agisce allora contro Twitter (ed altri organi pubblici USA di alto livello con cui avrebbe commesso conspiracy) facendo valere il diritto di parola/free speech.

L’ovvia eccezione di inesistenza di ogni state action nella condotta di Twitter viene però accolta.

Viene respinta pure la qualifica di <joint action> Stato/Twitter: il relativo test cheide “whether the state has `so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity“, sub III.A.1 (qualifica esaminata in dettaglio).

Si tratta del Tribunale del Nord California, 10.01.2022, Case No. 21-cv-07063-CRB. , ROGAN O’HANDLEY v. ALEX PADILLA, et al., Defendants.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

L’editore può mantenere l’anonimato sugli autori di post critici verso esponenti politici, pubblicati nella sezione commenti del sito web

Sentenza importante della CEDU essenzialmente sull’art. 10 della Covenzione che recita così: <<“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”>>

Si tratta di Corte E.D.U. 7 dicembre 2021 , ricorso 39378/15, STANDARD VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH v. AUSTRIA.

L’editore non può dire che si tratta di fonte giornalistica, protetta da confidentiality, dato che i post dei lettori erano destinati non ai giornalisti ma al pubblico, § 71.

Purtuttavia l’anonimato è giustificato ugualmente perchè , dopo bilanciamento, è necessario per manterere un ambiente democratico vibrante e proteggere gli autori da possibili ritorsioni: <<the Court has no doubt that an obligation to disclose the data of authors of online comments could deter them from contributing to debate and therefore lead to a chilling effect among users posting in forums in general. This affects, indirectly, also the applicant company’s right as a media company to freedom of press. It invites users to comment on its articles in order to further discussion on its journalistic work (see paragraphs 5 and 65 above). To achieve this goal, it allows authors of comments to use usernames (see paragraph 7 above); upon registration, users are informed that their data will not be seen publicly and will only be disclosed if required by law (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The forums’ rules dictate that certain content is not accepted, and that comments are screened by a keyword system, may be subject to a manual review and will be deleted if they are not in line with the rules (see paragraphs 7-12 above).>>, § 74

E poi , circa il bilanciamento intorno alla necessità in una società democratica di cui al cit. art. 10, omesso dalle corti di impugnazione che avevano immotivatametne ritenute prevalente il diritto degli “offesi” a conoscere il nome dell’offensore: <<95. (…) However, even a prima facie examination requires some reasoning and balancing. In the instant case, the lack of any balancing between the opposing interests (see paragraph 94 above) overlooks the function of anonymity as a means of avoiding reprisals or unwanted attention and thus the role of anonymity in promoting the free flow of opinions, ideas and information, in particular if political speech is concerned which is not hate speech or otherwise clearly unlawful. In view of the fact that no visible weight was given to these aspects, the Court cannot agree with the Government’s submission that the Supreme Court struck a fair balance between opposing interests in respect of the question of fundamental rights (see paragraph 60 above).

96.The Court finds that in the absence of any balancing of those interests the decisions of the appeal courts and of the Supreme Court were not supported by relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference [la comunicaizone dei nomi]. It follows that the interference was not in fact “necessary in a democratic society”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

97. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention>>.

La pagina del gruppo Facebook dell’Amministrazione Comunale costituisce “designated public forum” ai fini della libertà di parola

Secondo la corte di Seattle-WA , 21 nov. 2021,Case 2:21-cv-01264-MJP , Kimksey ed altri c. comune di Sammamish, la pagina del gruppo Facebook, costituito dal Comune di Sammamish per dialogare di temi istituzionali con i cittadini, costituisce <designated public forum> (all’interno della nota tripartizione comnprendente pure <zpublic forum> e <limited public forum>).

Infatti da un lato non c’è censura preventiva e dall’altro i commenti off topic son spesso stati tollerati

Pertanto si applica lo strictg scrutiny nel giudizio sulla legittimità della censura : il quale viene superato solo <<it furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest>>

La ragione per cui si trattava di post <fuori tema -off topic-> non è tale: per cui la sua censura è illegittima

(notizia della sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Ancora sulla (al momento impossibile da ottenere) qualificazione delle piattaforme social come State Actors ai fini del Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola)

Altra sentenza (d’appello stavolta) che rigetta la domadna vs. Facebook (rectius, Meta) basata sul fatto che illegalmente filtrerebbe/censurerebbe i post o rimuoverebbe gli account , violando il Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola).

Questo diritto spetta solo verso lo Stato o verso chi agisce in suo nome o assieme ad esso.

Si tratta della sentenza di appello del 9° circuito (su impugnazione di una sentenza californiana confermata) , emessa il 22.11.2021, No. 20-17489 , D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05546-RS, Atkinson c. Meta-Zuckerberg.

Sono riproposte dall’utente (e la Corte partitamente rigetta) tutte le consuete e note causae petendi in tema. Nulla di nuovo ma un utile loro ripasso.

Inoltre la Corte conferma pure l’applicazione del safe harbour ex 230 CDA.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Altri rigetti di domande verso le piattaforme: non sono State Actors

Altri due precedenti che negano illecito delle piattaforme vs. l’utente.

Uno lo nega in una domanda contro Linkedin per sospensione dell’account (Perez c. Linkedin , Corte d’applelo 9 circuito 18.11.2021, D.C. No. 5:20–cv–07238–EJD): provvedimento brevissimo, praticamente immotivato (la causa petendi era il primo emendamento)

L’altro lo nega in una domanda contro Youtube per violazione di privacy, non avendola difesa da attacchi informatici al suo account e da conseguente harassment a se e alla famiglia (Sescey c. Youtube, Easter district od Pennsylvania, 18.11.2021, Case 2:21-cv-03311-GJP). La norma azionata era il noto paragragfo 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concedente azione per violazione di diritti costituzionali

Motivazione qui appena più significativa: <<Based on the Complaint’s allegations, it appears the named Defendants – a private social media company and its legal department – are not subject to liability under Section 1983. Cf. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal of a First Amendment claim because YouTube was a private entity and not a state actor); see also Rutenburg v. Twitter, Inc., No. 21–0548, 2021 WL 1338958, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2021) (“Federal courts have uniformly rejected attempts to treat similar social media companies [such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Google] as state actors under Section 1983.”) (collecting cases). Sescey does not allege Defendants are state actors or that they had any connection to a state, county, or local governmental entity. Her Complaint does not allege any facts to show a “close nexus” between the private behavior of YouTube and its legal department and the state itself such that the challenged action here can fairly be treated as an action of the state. Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339. None of Sescey’s allegations support an inference that Defendants are anything other than a privately–run social media company and its internal legal department>>

Si noti spt. il riferimento al caso Prager University.

(notizia e link alle sentenze dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Quattro causae petendi relative al First Amendment/libertà di parola per contrastare la sospensione dell’account Youtube, ma nessuna accolta

Interessante sentenza californiana sulla solita questione della libertà di parola (First Amendement) asseritamente violata da sospensione dell’account su social media (politicamente di destra) da parte di una state action.

Si tratta della corte distrettuale di S. Josè, Californa, 19 ottobre 2021, Case No. 20-cv-07502-BLF, Doe c. Google,.

Sono azionate quattro causae petendi, tutte rigettate visto che nessuna è applicabile alla censura/content moderation di Youtube:

1) Public function: curiosamente l’attore e la corte invocano in senso reciprocamente opposto il noto precedente Prager Univ. c. Google del 2020.

2) Compulsion: <<Rep. Adam Schiff and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and an October 2020 House Resolution, which “have pressed Big Tech” into censoring political speech with threats of limiting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) and other penalties.>>. Alquanto inverosimile (è però la più lungamente argometnata)

3) joint action: <<Joint action is present where the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). Further, a private defendant must be a “willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Joint action requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between private and public actors. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).>.

Per gli attori la joint action theory starebbe in un <<Twitter exchange between Rep. Schiff and YouTube CEO Susan Wojnicki in which Ms. Wojnicki states, “We appreciate your partnership and will continue to consult with Members of Congress as we address the evolving issues around #COVID19.” FAC, Ex. E at 1; Opp. at 10-15. Plaintiffs argue that this Twitter exchange shows Defendants and the federal government were in an “admitted partnership.”>>. Allegazione un pò leggerina.

4) Governmental nexus: ricorre quando c’è << “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005>>. (sembra assai simile alla prcedente).

Non avendo accolto alcuna di quesrta, non affronta il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, p. 12. Curioso l’rodine logico : il criterio della ragine più liquidqa avrebbe potuto a rigttare (nel merito) con tale norma.

(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)