§ 512 digital millenium copyright act

Differenza tra non applicabilità dello safe harbour e affermazione di responsabilità

La corte distrettuale del Wisconsin -western dist.- 31.03.2023, caso No. 21-cv-320-wmc, Hopson + Bluetype c. Google + Does 1 e 2, ha ben chiara la differenza tra i due concetti: che non sia invocabile il safe harbour non significa che ricorra in positivo responsabilità (anche se di fatto sarà probabile).

Non altrettanto chiara ce l’hanno alcuni nostri opininisti (dottrina e giurisprudenza).

Nel caso si trattava del safe harbour per il copyright in caso di procedura da notice and take down e in particolare da asserita vioalzione della procedura che avrebbe dovuto condurre google a “rimettere su” i materiali in precedenza “tirati giu” (§ 512.g) del DMCA).

<<Here, plaintiffs allege that defendant Google failed to comply with § 512(g)’s
strictures by: (1) redacting contact information from the original takedown notices; (2) failing to restore the disputed content within 10 to 14 business days of receiving plaintiffs’ counter notices; and (3) failing to forward plaintiffs’ counter notices to the senders of the takedown notices. As Google points out, however, its alleged failure to comply with § 512(g) does not create direct liability for any violation of plaintiffs’ rights. It merely denies Google a safe harbor defense should plaintiffs bring some other claim against the ISP for removing allegedly infringing material, such as a state contract or tort law claim. Martin, 2017 WL 11665339, at *3-4 (§ 512(g) does not create any affirmative cause of action; it
creates a defense to liability); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (holding plaintiffs may sue under a federal statue only where there is an express or implied private right of action). So, even if Google did not follow the procedure entitling it to a safe harbor defense in this case, the effect is disqualifying it from that defense, not creating liability under § 512(g) of the DMCA for violating plaintiffs’ rights.>>

Ancora nulla circa tale procedura in UE: gli artt. 16-17 del DSA reg. UE 2022/2065 non ne parlano (pare lasciarla all’autonomia contrattuale) e nemmeno lo fa la dir. specifica sul copyright, art. 17 dir. UE 790/2019.

(notizia e link dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright consistite in ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright date da ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma. Così US distr. court southern district of Florida 16 maggio 2023, Case No. 21-21698-Civ-GAYLES/TORRES, Athos overseas ltc c. Youtube-Google.

domanda attorea:

According to Plaintiff, Defendants are liable under direct and secondary infringement theories for YouTube’s failure to prevent the systematic re-posting of Plaintiff’s copyrighted movies to its platform. Plaintiff contends that YouTube has turned a blind eye to rampant infringement of Athos’ copyrights by refusing to employ proprietary video-detection software to block or remove from its website potentially infringing clips, and not just clips specifically identified by URL in Plaintiff’s DMCA takedown notices. In essence, Plaintiff argues that evidence of YouTube’s advanced video detection software, in conjunction with the thousands of takedown notices Athos has tendered upon YouTube, give rise to genuine issues of fact as to whether Defendants have forfeited the DMCA’s safe harbor protections.

Domanda rigettata: il provider non pèerde il suo safe harbour ex 17 US code § 512 per assenbza dell’element soggettivo:

<<Indeed, in Viacom the Second Circuit rejected identical arguments to the ones asserted here by Athos, which were presented in a lawsuit brought by various television networks against YouTube for the unauthorized display of approximately 79,000 video clips that appeared on the website between 2005 and 2008. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26. Among other things, the Viacom plaintiffs argued that the manner in which YouTube employed its automated video identification tools—including liming its access certain users—removed the ISP from the safe harbor. Id. at 40–41. Yet, the court unequivocally rejected plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that the invocation of YouTube’s technology as a source of disqualifying knowledge must be assessed in conjunction with the express mandate of § 512(m) that “provides that safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on ‘a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity[.]’”9 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1))>>

poi:

<<Plaintiff conflates two concepts that are separate and distinct in the context of YouTube’s copyright protection software: automated video matches and actual infringements. As explained by YouTube’s copyright management tools representative, software-identified video matches are not necessarily tantamount to copyright infringements. [D.E. 137-7, 74:21–25]. Rather, the software detects code, audio, or visual cues that may match those of a copyrighted work, and presents those matches to the owner for inspection. Thus, while YouTube systems may be well equipped to detect video matches, the software does not necessarily have the capacity to detect copyright infringements. See id. Further, the accuracy of these automatically identified matches depends on a wide range of factors and variable. [Id. at 75:1–10, 108:2–110:17, 113:3–114:25]. That is why users, not YouTube, are required to make all determinations as to the infringing nature of software selected matches. [Id.].
Second, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence showing that YouTube, through its employees, ever came into contact, reviewed, or interacted in any way with any of the purportedly identified video matches for which Athos was allegedly required to send subsequent DMCA takedown notices (i.e., the clips-in-suit). As explained by YouTube’s product manager, the processes of uploading, fingerprinting, scanning, and identifying video matches is fully automated, involving minimal to no human interaction in the part of YouTube. [Id. at 68:22–69:18, 118:17–119]. The record shows that upon upload of a video to YouTube, a chain of algorithmic processes is triggered, including the automated scanning and matching of potentially overlapping content. If the software detects potential matches, that list of matches is automatically directed towards the copyright owner, by being displayed inside the user’s YouTube interface. [Id. at 68:22–70:25]. Therefore, the record only reflects that YouTube does not rely on human involvement during this specific phase of the scanning and matching detection process, and Plaintiff does not proffer any evidence showing otherwise>>.

sintesi:

<<As the relevant case law makes clear, evidence of the technologies that ISPs independently employ to enhance copyright enforcement within their system cannot form the basis for ascribing disqualifying knowledge of unreported infringing items to the ISP. Such a conception of knowledge would contradict the plain mandate of § 512(m), “would eviscerate the required specificity of notice[,] . . . and would put the provider to the factual search forbidden by § 512(m).” Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. Thus, we find that Athos’ theory that specific knowledge of non-noticed infringing clips can be ascribed to Defendants by virtue of YouTube’s copyright management tools fails as a matter of law>>.

Notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman

L’azione di danno ex § 512.f Copyright Act concerne solo l’abuso di copyright, non di marchio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CV 22-4355-JFW(JEMx), del 21 aprile 2023, Yuga Labs, Inc. -v- Ripps, et al., decide una lite su marchio in causa promossa dal titolare del NFT “Bored Ape” contro un visual artist (Ripps) che lo critica: Ripps is a visual artist and creative designer who purports to create artwork that comments in the boundaries between art, the internet, and commerce. According to Defendants, Yuga has deliberately embedded racist, neo-Nazi, and alt-right dog whistles in the BAYC NFTs and associated projects.3 Beginning in approximately November 2021, Ripps began criticizing Yuga’s use of these purported racist, neo-Nazi, and alt-right dog whistles through his Twitter and Instagram profiles, podcasts, cooperation with investigative journalists, and by creating the website gordongoner.com.

Y. manda allora richieste di notice and take down (NATD) per marchio spt. ma anche per dir. di autrore.

R. reagisce azionando la disposizione nel titolo.
Ma la corte -delle 25 richieste NATD- esamina solo quelle (quattro) che hanno portato al take down e solo quelli di copyrigjht (una), non quelle su marchio (tre). Del resto il tenore della norma è inequivoco.

E rigetta l’eccezione (o dom. riconvenzionale?): With respect to the only DMCA notice that resulted in the takedown of Defendants’ content,
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the notice contains a material misrepresentation that
resulted in the takedown of Defendants’ content or that Yuga acted in bad faith in submitting the
takedown notice. Although Defendants argue that Yuga does not have a copyright registration for
the Ape Skull logo that was the subject of the DMCA takedown notice, a registration is not required
to own a copyright. Instead, a copyright exists at the moment copyrightable material is fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139
S.Ct. 881, 887 (2019); see also Feist v. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) (holding that for a work to be copyrightable, it only needs to possess “some minimal degree
of creativity”). Moreover, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that a logo can receive both
trademark and copyright protection. See, e.g., Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., 1995 WL 621832 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 16, 1995).

La setnnza è itnerssante però anche -soprattutto.- per il profili di mnarchio e concorrenza sleale circa l’uso dell’NFT.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

La denuncia di elusione dellle protezioni non èp coperta dal 17 U.S. Code § 512 (DMCA) Misrepresentations

La responsabilità del denunciante per aver dolosamente affermato la contraffazione altrui non riguarda il semplice dire che c’è stata elusione delle misure di protezione.

Così la district court of Connecticut 30 settembre 2022, Case 3:20-cv-01602-SRU , Yout c. The Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (the “RIAA”), in un azione di accertament negativo proposta da iun fornire di servizi che permettono il downloading di audiovisivi su Youtube , nonostante questi siano offerti solo in streaming non downloadibile (con il YouTube’s Rolling Cypher).

<< Section 512(f) has is limited to misrepresentations of copyright infringement. See Twelve
Inches Around Corp. v. Cisco Sys., 2009 WL 928077, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (“While
Section 512(f) is not explicitly limited to misrepresentation of copyright infringement, it requires
that the misrepresentation be ‘under [Section 512],’ which deals exclusively with copyright
infringement, and sets forth in great detail when and how an internet service provider can be
liable for copyright infringement”); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (“Section 512 only penalizes copyright holders for knowingly
materially misrepresenting ‘that material or activity is infringing.’ It does not provide a cause of
action for knowingly materially misrepresenting [other claims].”); accord Rossi v. Motion
Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth that a section
512(f) cause of action is an “expressly limited cause of action for improper infringement
notifications”).
Here, Yout has failed to plead a plausible claim for relief under section 512(f) because it
has only alleged that the RIAA knowingly misrepresented that Yout’s software circumvents the
YouTube technological measures, not that Yout is infringing certain copyrighted works. See
SAC, Doc. No. 45, at 28 ¶¶ 138-140. Although the circumvention notices sent by the RIAA
superficially resemble take down notices under section 512(c), the notices do not identify any copyrighted works and accordingly are incapable of being misrepresentations under section 512.
See id. at 28 ¶¶ 136-137. Yout attempts to remedy this deficiency by alleging that the RIAA’s
circumvention notices amount to an allegation of secondary copyright infringement and that
Yout’s customers interpreted the notices as alleged copyright infringement. See SAC, Doc. No.
45, at 27 ¶¶ 136-137. But Yout’s arguments are not persuasive, because the notices stated that
YouTube’s technological measure (therein, “rolling cipher”) “protects [the RIAA’s] members’
works on YouTube from unauthorized copying/downloading,” not that Yout itself was infringing
the copyrighted works. Id. at 28 ¶ 137.
Furthermore, even assuming that the RIAA’s notices constituted an allegation of
secondary copyright infringement, Yout has provided no case law that suggests that such an
allegation could result in a violation of section 512(f), nor have I found any caselaw suggesting
so. I decline to credit that claim.
Moreover, I agree with the RIAA that Yout alleges no facts suggesting that the RIAA
“knowingly” misrepresented the nature of Yout’s service. To do so, a defendant must have
actual knowledge that it is making a misrepresentation of fact. Cabell v. Zimmerman, 2010 WL
996007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010). But, again, Yout alleges no facts suggesting that the
RIAA “knowingly” misrepresented the nature of Yout’s service. Ningbo Mizhihe I&E Co., Ltd.
v. Does 1-200, 2020 WL 2086216, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (dismissing a Section 512(f)
claim where “there [wa]s insufficient material in the pleadings to support the inference that [the
p]laintiff knew their copyrights were not enforceable”); Cabell, 2010 WL 996007, at *4
(dismissing a Section 512(f) claim where the complaint “allege[d] no facts from which a court
could find it facially plausible that Defendant knew it was misrepresenting the facts when it
wrote to YouTube”).
Because section 512(f) only covers knowing misrepresentations of copyright
infringement and not circumvention of a technological measure, I grant the RIAA’s motion to
dismiss Yout’s 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) claim >>

Interpretazione di assai dubbia esattezza.

La sentenza poi offre dettagli tecnici approfonditi sul se Youtube impedisca i download con misure di protezione in senso tecnico ai sensi del copyright e cioè ai sensi del 17 US Code § 1201 (v. § 2 2. The Yout Service, p 2 segg.).

Stante la normativa italiana (tit. II ter l. autore, artt. 102 quater e quinquies), la motivaizone è di sicuro interesse anche per noi

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Conflitto tra diritto di parola e diritto di autore : una particolare ma interessante fattispecie decisa a favore del primo

Tizio , restando anonimo con l’account @CallMeMoneyBags , critica su Twitter un tale Brian Sheth, a private-equity billionaire, postando messaggi e foto di lui.

Una società di couinicazione , però , quale sedicente titolare dei diritti sulle foto , chiede a Twitter di dargli il nome ex 17 §512.h US CODE.

Il giudice rigetta accogliendo la difesa di Twitter e facendoo prevalere il diritto di parola (di critica, di satira etc.) , anche perchè l’attore non è riuscito a fugare il sospetto di essere veicolo soceitario a disposizione del medesimo sig. Seth.

Così Il distretto nord della California21 giugno 2022, Case 4:20-mc-80214-VC , IN RE DMCA § 512(H) SUBPOENA TO TWITTER, INC.

This is where the mystery surrounding Bayside makes a difference. If the Court were assured that Bayside had no connection to Brian Sheth, a limited disclosure subject to a protective order could perhaps be appropriate. But the circumstances of this subpoena are suspicious. As far as the Court can tell, Bayside was not formed until the month that the tweets about Sheth were posted on Twitter. It appears that Bayside had never registered any copyrights until the registration of these six photographs, which happened after the tweets were posted. And there appears to be no information publicly available about Bayside’s principals, staff, physical location, formation, or purposes.

Given all the unknowns, at oral argument the Court offered Bayside an opportunity to
supplement the record with an evidentiary hearing or additional documentation. Bayside
declined, stating that it preferred the motion to be adjudicated on the current record. There would
perhaps be some benefit in insisting on an evidentiary hearing to explore the circumstances
behind this subpoena—to explore whether Bayside and its counsel are abusing the judicial
process in an effort to discover MoneyBags’s identity for reasons having nothing to do with
copyright law. Perhaps that hearing could even result in an award of attorney’s fees for Twitter.

Il rapporto tra dirito di autore e diritti fondamentali antagonisti è ormai largamentit tratto anche da noi anzi in tutto il copyright europeo.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Copyright, fair use, diritto di parola e diritto vs. la piattaforma di conoscere il soggetto che diffonde anonimamente post satirici

Chi carica post vagamente satirici con fotografie ritraenti un private-equity billionaire in comapgian di ragazze, compie delle stesse un fair use, quindi non rientrante nel copyright sulle foto stesse.

Ne segue che il diritto di far cadere l’anonimato non gli spetta, perchè <<has not made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement>>, secondo l’interprteazione del § 512.h DMCA “Subpoena To Identify Infringer”.

E’ del resto chiaro che i sei tweet satirici ACCOMPAFGNATORI DELLE FOto, erano espressione del diritto di parola/critica: << The six tweets flagged by Bayside are best interpreted as vaguely satirical commentary criticizing the opulent lifestyle of wealthy investors generally (and Brian Sheth, specifically). For example, one tweet reads: “Good morning from Mrs. Brian Sheth #2. Life is good when you’re a 44-year old private equity billionaire.” The tweet accuses Brian Sheth of having a mistress and links his infidelity to the broader class of “private equity billionaires,” suggesting that wealth (or working in private equity) corrupts. Unmasking MoneyBags thus risks exposing him to “economic or official retaliation” by Sheth or his associates. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). And MoneyBags’s interest in anonymity is heightened further by his other tweets, which discuss issues of political importance such as sexual harassment, tax enforcement, and corporate regulations>> (Brian Seth è il milionario e Bayside il soggetto reclamante diritto di autore sulle foto, forse ricollegabile allo stesso Seth).

Così il distretto nord della California 21 giugno 2022, Case 4:20-mc-80214-VC , IN RE DMCA § 512(H) SUBPOENA TO TWITTER, INC., di cui dà notizia www.eef.org in un’inteessante fattispecie all’intersezione tra copyright , privacy e diritto di parola.

Asserita violazione di copyright da parte di Pinterest rigettata per l’operatività del safe harbour ex 512.c DMCA

Un fotografo lamenta la riproduzione illecita di sue fotografie in Pinterest (P.).

Precisamente lamenta non il fatto che altri utenti le carichino o le appuntino o lo faccia P. (verosimilmente ci sarà licenza concordata con/imposta da P. a proprio favore); bensì il fatto che P. le proponga nei feed altrui in abbinamento ad inserzioni pubblicitarie.

P. eccepisce il safe harbour ex § 512.c DMCA.

Il distretto nord della California decide la lite con provvedimento 3 maggio 2022, Davis c. PinterestCase 4:19-cv-07650-HSG , rigettando la domanda per l’esimente predetta.

la sentenza pare corretta, alla luce del tenore delle disposizoni di legge. L’attore aveva invece eccepito la mancanza tra gli altri del requisito dello storage dei materiali altrui .

La sentenza è ineressante perchè esamina il funzionamento di P.

Dice, poi, che manca la prova per cui P. modifichierebbe il lavoro artistico inserendovi pubblicità: infatti i due newsfeed (pins degli utenti e inserzioni pubblicitarie) sono prodotti da due distinti algoritmi, pp.19-20 e 23/4.

Non c’è violazione di copyright: To the extent that Plaintiff suggests tracking user activity through algorithms or displaying advertising on the platform is somehow copyright infringement, he offers no support for this novel theory.5 See, e.g., Dkt. No. 176 at 7 (“The undisputed evidence is that the users never asked to be tracked using the Variants that Pinterest created from Plaintiff’s Works . . . .”). Copyright infringement requires Plaintiff to establish that Pinterest “violate[d] at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). Neither tracking users’ activity nor displaying advertising near Plaintiff’s works violates Plaintiff’s exclusive rights. But even if this did constitute infringing activity, such conduct would still fall within § 512(c)’s protection., p. 23.

Esamina anhe il grado di dettaglio cui è tenuto l’attore nell’individuare le vioalzioni: tutte le 51 foto azionate o alcune solo, a titolo di esempio (III.A.i, p. 9)? Vecchia questione anche da noi in tema di responsabilità degli internet provider …

Infine manca pure il financial benefit, che deve essere provato relativamene alle vioalzioni specificamente azionate e non -in generale – relativametne al modello di business del convenuto (altra vecchia questione nazionale …). Si badi però che nel diritto usa il requisito è espressamente preevisto.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

(Cor)Responsabilità di Youtube per violazione di copyright commessa da un suo utente

Il consueto problema della qualificazione giuridica della piattaforma Youtube in caso di violazione di copyright è affrontato dalla Southern District Court di New TYork, 21.03.22, Buisiness Casual v. Youtube, caso 21-cv-3610 (JGK).

Tre le causae petendi azionate.

Il direct infringement è escluso per insufficiente allegazione/prova dell’elemento soggettivo richeisto dalla common law, p. 8 ss

Più interessante è che per la Corte , oltre a ciò, esso è escluso a causa della licenza pretesa da Youtube per chi carica materiali propri, come noto. Essa infatti impedirebbbe di ravvisare contraffazione in Y.

L’attore tenta di eludere tale esito (<<Business Casual contends that the License does not cover the conduct at issue here because the License does not grant any rights “to an unrelated third party, like TV-Novosti, to do whatever it pleases with Business Casual’s content.”>>): ma per la Corte la licenza è sufficientemente ampia da coprire le condotte sub iudice di Y., p. 12.

Ancora, a fronte di una incomprensibile causa petendi dell’attore circa il non sufficientemente motivato ricorso di Y. al safe harbour ex § 512 DMCA, la Corte rigetta, precisando -in breve ma esattamente- la costruzione giuridica del safe harbour: <<The DMCA safe harbors provide potential defenses against copyright infringement claims where, but for the safe harbors, the plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action against the defendant for copyright infringement>>, p. 13

Infine son rigettate pure le causae petendi del concorso nell’illecito, contributory infringement, e della respooonsabilità vicaria, vicarious infringement, 14-15.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Il legale che invia ad Amazon l’istanza di notice and take down non commette diffamazione

interessante fattispecie concreta decisa dalla Corte dell’Illinois, east. divis., 11 marzo 2022, No. 21 C 3648, The Sunny Factory, LLC v. Chen, 2.

Il legale di un impresa titolare di copyright intima ad Amazon la rimozione dei prodotti di un’azienda presente nel suo marketplace, che asseritamente violerebbero il diritto della cliente.

Amazon rimuove e il terzo “rimosso” cita in giudizio i legali per diffamazione , tortious interference (perdite pesanti nelle vendite) e dolosa misrepresentation ai sensi del § 512.f del DMCA.

La lite viene però decisa in modo sfavolevole all’azienda intimata e attrice nel presente processo, essenzialmente per mancanza dell’elememto soggettivo (dolo o malizia a secodna dei casi)in capo ai legali convenuti.

Da segnalare che per il diritto usa c’è un privilegio a favore dei legali che agiscano per conto dei clienti quando mandano diffide nel corso di una lite, sia per diffamazione che per tortious interference, p. 5 e rispett. 7.

Strano aver lasciato per ultima la questione del DMCA , che probabilmente era la prima in ordine logico: negando la responsabilità in base a tale dispisizone, diventava poi assai dfifficile, forse impossibile, ravvisarne in base a diverso titolo

(sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Copyright su personaggi in 3D, fair use e counterclaim per misrepresentations ex § 512.d DMCA

Interessante caso di violazione di diritto di autore su personaggi animati in 3D, regolarmente registrati (come da diritto usa) deciso dal Distretto nord della California, 25.02.2022, Case 3:21-cv-06536-EMC, Moonbug c. Babybus. La sentenza riporta esempi grafici a colori messi a paragone.

La domanda di violazine viene contrastata con l’eccezione di fair use e conseguemente di abuso dello strumento di notice and take down (misrepresentations), previsto dalla norma di cui al titolo.

La somiglianza dei personaggi è notevole.

Il fair use non è concesso: <In sum, none of the four fair use factors tip in Babybus’s favor. Indeed, the first, second and fourth factors weigh decisively against Babybus. And, as to the third factor, despite the fact that Babybus already amended its affirmative defenses once and the Court provided Babybus with two opportunities to supplement the record with examples of videos that support its fair use defense after this motion was fully briefed and argued, Babybus still has not presented any arguments and allegations that tip the third factor in its favor. Even if the Court were to overlook Babybus’s failure to do so despite multiple opportunities, and assumed arguendo that Babybus could allege facts indicating that its copying was insubstantial, that would merely demonstrate one factor tips towards Babybus. Any such hypothetical showing would still be outweighed by the fact that the other three factors weigh conclusively against Babybus. Accordingly, the Court strikes Babybus’s fair use defense because it is implausible

Di conseguenza pure l’illecito da misrepresetnations a Youtube è negato, pur dopo approfondito esame delle allegazini del convenuto: Babybus fails to allege any specific misrepresentations in Moonbug’s DMCA takedown notices in its supplemental filings and identification of six exemplary videos. Cf. Docket No. 56,
63. It simply relies on the argument that Moonbug’s DMCA notices fail on the merits of their assertions of infringement because “there are no protectable similarities in protectable elements between these videos and the videos in Moonbug’s catalogue.” Docket No. 63 at 3. The claims of copyright infringement were not frivolous. Thus, Babybus’s allegations do not plausibly demonstrate the first element of its § 512(f) counterclaim — that Moonbug made material misrepresentations in its DMCA takedown notices filed with YouTube