“clickwrap” – Lorenzo Albertini

Conclusione del patto arbitrale a modifica del rapporto in essere: tra clickwrap e browsewrap agreement

Il distretto nord della california, 8 settembre 2022, Case 4:22-cv-00422-PJH , Alkutkar c. Bumble, affronta una frequente , ma non per questo poco interessante, fattispecie.

Azionata dall’utente una domanda di inadempiumento verso la piattaforma Bumble (sito di conoscenze e incontri) si vede eccepire la clausola di arbitrato: la quale sarebbe stata approvata in corso di rapporto a seguito di 1) notifica via email e soprattutto 2) di finestra di pop up . -c.d. blocker card- che onerava l’utente di accettar per proseguire . Onere bloccante e finestra che come sempre conteneva un link al nuovo testo del contratto aggiornato, ma che già essa riassumeva la più importante modifica (l’arbitrato appunto).

V. lo screenshot del pop up in sentenza (ma tratto dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman):

Ebbene, per la corte la email (simile al browsewrap) non dà prova di accettazione (p. 11) , ma il pop up con i I AGREE (simile al clickwrap) si.

I dati di Bumble infatti dicono che dopo questo pop up l’utente continuò ad usare i suoi servizi , per cui è presumibile che l’avesse vista e accettata (l’utente lo negava).

Ciò per tre motivi:

1) l’unicità delle credenziali,

2) gli accessi successivi rpesuppongono logicamente/informaticamente accettazione: <<plaintiff’s access and use of the app is a demonstrable consequence of
his assent to the updated Terms. Bumble’s records show that all users were shown the
Blocker Card the first time they signed into the app after January 19, 2021. Wong Decl.
¶ 16 (Dkt. 36-1 at 6-7). The declarations of Bumble’s affiliated engineers make clear that
the Blocker Card functions in a straightforward fashion: it “prevents Bumble users from
accessing or using the Bumble app unless they click on the orange-colored button>>

3) << Lastly, the timeline of events indicates that plaintiff clicked his assent through the
Blocker Card. On January 18, 2021, the Terms governing use of the Bumble app were
updated to include an Arbitration Agreement. Chheena Decl. ¶ 7 (Dkt. 30-1 at 3). On the
same day, the Blocker Card was implemented into the app for existing users, requiring
assent to the updated Terms to access the app the first time a user signed in after
January 18. Chheena Decl. ¶ 11 (Dkt. 30-1 at 3-4); Wong Decl. ¶ 12 (Dkt. 36-1 at 4).
Plaintiff reports that the first time he signed into the app after January 18, 2021, was in
March 2021. Alkutkar Decl., May 14, 2021, ¶ 5 (Dkt. 32-2 at 2). This corresponds neatly
with Bumble’s records, which show that he accessed and used the app on March 4,
2021. Wong Decl. ¶ 18 (Dkt. 36-1 at 7). On that date, plaintiff added new photos to his
profile and swiped on other user profiles, activities that might correspond with a user’s
first time accessing the app following a hiatus. Wong Decl. ¶ 18 (Dkt. 36-1 at 7). Plaintiff
additionally accessed and used the app on March 5, 7, and 11, activities only achievable
following clicking assent on the Blocker Card. Id., ¶ 18. Indeed, plaintiff would not have
been able to purchase the premium features that are the subject of this suit in March,
August, and September 2021 unless he clicked to accept the updated Terms and
Arbitration Agreement. Id., at ¶ 18 >>

In altre più brevi parole <<Bumble has shown that plaintiff used unique credentials to access the app on March 4, 2021, that his access and use of the app on that date was a demonstrable a consequence of his assent to the updated Terms because he only could have done so by clicking through the Blocker Card, and that the timeline of events indicates that plaintiff clicked his assent to the updated Terms. These facts are similar to those found sufficient to authenticate an electronic signature in Ngo, 2018 WL 6618316, at *6, and they are sufficient to authenticate an electronic signature here. Bumble thus establishes by a preponderance of evidence that clicking through the Blocker Card was “the act of” plaintiff necessary to show that he electronically signed and agreed to the updated Terms, including the Arbitration Agreement. >>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

L’accettazione delle Terms of Service di Dropbox tramite il c.d. browsewrap non è valido

Secondo il distretto nord della California Case 4:20-cv-07908-HSG con sentenza 29 giugno 2022, Sifuentes c. Dropbox, l’accettazione tramite decisione di continuare a navigare non è sufficiente per far ritenere <voluta> una clausola arbitrale contenuta nelle TOS (terms of service).

In particolare, il privato ricosncoe di aver accettato le TOS iniziali del 2011, ma non -tra le molte modifiche successive- quella del 2014, che aveva inserito una clausola arbitrale:

<< To show that Plaintiff had inquiry notice, Defendant must show that he was provided
reasonably conspicuous notice of the contract terms and unambiguously manifested his assent.
See Berman, 30 F.4th at 856 . “[O]nline providers have complete control over the design of their
websites,” and therefore have the responsibility to put users on notice of the terms to which they
wish to bind consumers. Id. at 857 (citations omitted).

Defendant acknowledges that between
2011 and 2019 it modified its terms of service no less than twelve times, and contends that it sent
an email to Plaintiff in 2014 explaining the addition of a mandatory arbitration clause. Reply at 9.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff could not use the service until he indicated
his assent, that he would have been advised of new terms and conditions while using Defendant’s
services, or that Defendant ever tracked whether Plaintiff had opened its email.

Even if the email
alone could be considered “reasonably conspicuous notice,” Plaintiff took no action to
unambiguously manifest his assent. See Berman, 30 F.4th at 856 (requiring the consumer to
“take[] some action, such as clicking a button or checking a box” in order to form an enforceable
contract under inquiry notice theory).
Defendant essentially argues that it contracted for the right to change the terms at will
because the 2011 TOS contains a provision stating that Defendant “may revise these Terms from
time to time” and that continuing to use the service constitutes agreement to any revised terms.
See Reply at 6; Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit E. Defendant’s argument misses the point. Given the complete lack of evidence of notice within Defendant’s service itself, Plaintiff’s ongoing use of the service is irrelevant to determining whether he had actual or constructive notice of the post-
2011 terms of service.

Moreover, the 2011 TOS essentially disavows any obligation to alert
Plaintiff to changes: “If a revision, in our sole discretion, is material we will notify you (for
example via email to the email address associated with your account.” See Dkt. No. 40-1 Exhibit E. But Ninth Circuit law is clear that it is a website owner’s duty to show clear notice and assent.
The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
Plaintiff had actual or inquiry notice of the updated terms of service. See Norcia, LLC, 845 F.3d
at 1283. Without actual or inquiry notice, there was no manifestation of mutual assent, and the
later terms of service do not impose an enforceable agreement to arbitrate>>.

Poco sopra sul cd browsewrap agreement:

<< Plaintiff denies that he agreed to the later terms of service that added mandatory arbitration provisions. Opp. at 1. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that Plaintiff assented to the subsequent versions by continuing to use Defendant’s service. Dkt. No. 47 at 7; see also Dkt. No. 40 at 9 n.2. Assent by continued use of a web service is a traditional feature of browsewrap agreements. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176 (“The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the user can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists.”) (citation omitted). “Courts are more reluctant to enforce browsewrap agreements because consumers are frequently left unaware that contractual terms were even offered, much less that continued use of the website will be deemed to manifest acceptance of those terms.” Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2022). >>

Sulla conclusione del contratto via shrinkwraps o browsewraps v le riflessioni critiche di Lemley, Mark A., The Benefit of the Bargain (August 8, 2022). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 575, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4184946 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4184946

Sulla conclusione (mancata) di contratto on line con Uber

La corte suprema del Maine ritiene non concluso il contratto on-line di modifica delle condizioni generali originarie: modifica volta ad introdurre una pattuizione di arbitrato.

Si tratta di MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT del 27.01.20222, Decision: 2022 ME 8, docket: Cum-21-117 , Sarchi v. Uber.

La corte inizia con un un’interessante esposizione dei quattro quattro tipi di conclusione on line (browsewrap, clickwrap, scrollwrap, and sign–in wrap; p. 11 ss ai §§ 18 ss).

Afferma poi che il contratto sub iudice è <<characterized as a sign-in wrap agreement because, rather than requiring an affirmative manifestation of assent by the user, it informs the user that she is assenting to the Terms by creating an Uber rider account>>. Ricorda però che la modalità è diversa per i drivers: <<in contrast, Uber’s registration process for drivers involves a clickwrap agreement in which the user must affirmatively signify agreement with the terms.>> (§ 30).

Ricorda ancora che deve esserci stata sia la notifica della modifica che la sua accettazione (two step inquiry; § 25 ss) .

Nel caso de quo, infine, è però mancata già la notifica (reasonable notice): << The first step focuses on whether a user had reasonable notice of the online contract terms “consider[ing] the perspective of a reasonably prudent . . . user” of online technology. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77 …. Whether an interface provides reasonable notice of the terms of an online contract does not necessarily turn on the classification of the agreement as a scrollwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, or sign-in wrap agreement; rather, it is essentially a function of how likely the terms and conditions themselves, or a hyperlink to them, are to come to the attention of the reasonably prudent user. [¶27] The requirement of reasonable notice is necessarily satisfied if the user has actual notice of the terms, either by reviewing them or by otherwise interacting with them, such as by having to scroll through them. See Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1049>>

In particolare il problema sta nel rinvio ad altra pagina tramite hyper link, troppo poco visibile: <<all of the observations about the Uber registration interface for riders in Cullinane and Kauders that led those courts to decide that Uber had not provided reasonable notice of its terms apply fully here. The appearance of the hyperlink to the Terms, specifically the lack of underlining and the muted gray coloring, means that it is not obviously identifiable as a hyperlink. The sequence in which it appears during the registration process renders it less likely to draw the user’s attention. Its placement on the screen, particularly in light of the more prominent features on the same page, renders it relatively inconspicuous. Based on the totality of the features of the Uber interface that Sarchi utilized in registering—the focus on entering payment information rather than on the Terms; the small, lowercase font in which the notice and the Terms appeared; and the lightly outlined box containing the link to the Terms that did not have the appearance of a hyperlink or a clickable button—we conclude that the Uber interface Sarchi used to register failed to provide a prudent user with reasonable notice of the Terms. >>

Conclude osservando che, anche ritenendo perfetta la notifica, sarebbe comunque assente un’adeguata manifestazione di assenso: ciò per la non sufficientemente limpida serie di passaggi (pulsanti da premere sullo schermo) allo scopo predisposti da Uber, § 37 ss.

Sentenza dettagliata ed interessante anche per eventuali liti nel ns. ordinamento.

(notizia e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Consenso online al trattamento dati espresso nella modalità “sign-in wrap”

La piattaforma di pagamenti Stripe chiede il consenso al trattamento dati con modalità “sign-in wrap”.

La corte del nord califormia ne esamina (brevemente) la validità ed è per la positiva (US Dis. C. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 28.07.2021, Case No.4:20–cv–08196–YGR, Silver e altri c. Stripe inc.).

Premessa: << Internet users can form online contract, and therefore consent, in a variety of ways. See Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 3d 728, 763 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing different forms of online contracts). The Ninth Circuit recognizes three main types of contracts formed on the internet: “clickwrap”, “browsewrap”, and “sign-in wrap” agreements. “Clickwrap” agreements require website users to click on an “I agree” box after they are presented with a list of terms and conditions. Id. “Browsewrap” agreements do not require the express consent, but instead operate by placing a hyperlink with the governing terms and conditions at the bottom of the website. Id. In “browsewrap” agreements, a user gives consent just by using the website. Id. “Sign-in-wrap” agreements are those that present a screen that states that acceptance of a separate agreement is
required before a user can access an internet product or service. Id.

The Ninth Circuit requires that online contracts put a website user on actual or inquiry notice of its terms. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014). In doing so, the notice must be conspicuous, that is it must put “a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the contracts.” Id. Whether a user has such inquiry notice “depends on the design and content of the website and the agreement’s webpage.” Id >>.

Il contratto allora è valido <<if a plaintiff is provided with an opportunity to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink,” and it is “sufficient to
require a user to affirmatively accept the terms, even if the terms are not presented on the same page as the acceptance button as long as the user has access to the terms of service.” Moretti v. Hertz Corp., No. C 13–02972 JSW, 2014 WL 1410432, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014); In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (user agreement enforceable where user had to “take some action— a click of a dual-purpose box— from which assent might be inferred”). >>

Nel caso specifico <<no dispute exists that Instacart utilized a “sign-in wrap” agreement. Instacart’s purchase checkout page required plaintiffs to agree to Instacart’s terms of service and privacy policy whenever they placed an order. Plaintiffs admit that they were presented with the checkout screen as they completed their Instacart orders. (FAC ¶¶ 59, 72, 84, 97, 110.)>>

Segue riproduzione di uno screenshot della schermata da cui appare chiaramente che l’intermediario è Stripe (Instacart) : l’acquirente non può allora in buona fede sostenere di aver pensato che l’unico contraente fosse il venditore (anzichè pure Stripe/Instacart).

La cui policy sul punto è allora approvata: << The Court finds Instacart’s privacy policy conspicuous and obvious for several reasons. First, the hyperlink to the privacy policy is displayed in a bright green font against a white background, which stands out from most of the surrounding text. Further, the hyperlink to the
privacy policy is located close to the “place order” button, thus it is hard for a user placing an order to miss it. The bold font alerting consumers to the amount of the charge hold placed on their card calls additional attention to the area where Instacart’s privacy policy is located. There is nothing about the text that makes it inconspicuous or nonobvious.
The Court finds that a reasonably prudent user would have been aware of Instacart’s privacy policy when placing an order. This finding comports with other courts that have found similar “sign-in wrap” agreements to be valid Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75-76 (2d. Cir. 2017) (“the existence of the terms was reasonably communicated to the user”) (collecting cases); see also Peter v. DoorDash, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 580, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2020). Based thereon, the Court finds that during checkout, plaintiffs were “provided with an opportunity to review the terms” of the privacy policy. Crawford v. Beachbody, LLC, No. 14cv1583– GPC(KSC), 2014 WL 6606563, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014). They were required to take an affirmative step—clicking the “Place Order” button—to acknowledge that they were agreeing to the terms of the privacy policy. They were told the consequences that would follow from clicking the button, including their acceptance of the privacy policy. Plaintiffs decided to place an order after being made aware of the privacy policy. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs consented to Instacart’s privacy policy each time they placed an order. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 >>