Donald Trump – Lorenzo Albertini

Altra conferma (d’appello) che Twitter non è “State actor”, per cui nei suoi confronti non opera la protezione costituzionale del diritto di parola

Altra conferma che le piattaforme digitali non sono State actors ai fini della protezione da Primo Emendamento: così Appello del 9 circuito, Rutenberg. c. Twitter e Dorsey , 18 05.2022, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00548-YGR.

Motivazione breve , che conferma il primo grado:

<< The district court properly dismissed Rutenberg’s First Amendment claim: She did not allege sufficient facts to infer that the defendants (collectively, “Twitter” or “the company”) engaged in state action when the company moderated or suspended the former President’s Twitter account. The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause “prohibits the government—not a private party—from abridging speech.” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Dismissal was proper because the complaint lacked “a cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]” to state a plausible claim for relief. Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 604 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Rutenberg offers insufficient facts to infer the “close nexus” between Twitter’s conduct on the one hand and the government on the other, which is required to find that Twitter’s conduct constituted state action. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). To the contrary, Rutenberg acknowledges that Twitter exercised its own “discretion and authority” in moderating President Trump’s account, and that Twitter acted as President Trump’s “opponent” in doing so. Twitter was not a “willful participant” in any “joint activity” with the President, and its conduct was not state action. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Rutenberg’s contention that Twitter “abused” a delegation of authority when it moderated President Trump’s account is of no moment. This “abuse of authority” doctrine “does not apply” where, as here, “the
challenged action is undertaken by a private party rather than a state official.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940). Indeed, it would be “ironic” to conclude that Twitter’s imposition of sanctions against a public official—sanctions the official “steadfastly opposed”—is state action. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). >>

E del resto non ci fu alcuna delega dal presidente Trump a Tw. (chissà cosa aveva allegato l’attrice!!): << Similarly, President Trump did not delegate a “public function” to Twitter within the meaning of Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929. The relevant function here—moderating speech on the Twitter platform—is not “an activity that only governmental entities have traditionally performed.” Id. at 1930; see also id. (“[M]erely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function . . . .”); Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998 (moderation of content on video-streaming platform was not a “public function”) >>

Si noti che l’attrice si doleva della rimozione ingiustificata dell’account Tw. non proprio ma del presidente Trump.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Azione in corte di Trump contro i colossi digitali che lo esclusero dai social (ancora su social networks e Primo Emendamento)

Techdirt.com pubblica l’atto di citazione di Trump 7 luglio 2021 contro Facebook (Fb) che nei mesi scorsi lo bannò. E’ una class action.

Il link diretto è qui .

L’atto è interessante e qui ricordo solo alcuni punti sull’annosa questione del rapporto social networks/primo emendamento.

Nella introduction c’è la sintesi di tutta l’allegazione, pp. 1-4.

A p. 6 ss trovi descrizione del funzionamneot di Fb e dei social: interessa spt. l’allegazione di coordinamento tra Fb e Tw, § 34 e la piattaforma CENTRA per il monitoraggio degli utenti completo cioè anche circa la loro attività su altre piattaforme , § 36 ss. .

Alle parti III-IV-V l’allegazione sul coordinamenot (anche forzoso, sub III, § 56) tra Stato Federale e piattaforme. Il che vale a preparare il punto centrale seguente: l’azione di Fb costituisce <State action> e dunque non può censurare il free speech:

<<In censoring the specific speech at issue in this lawsuit and deplatforming Plaintiff, Defendants were acting in concert with federal officials, including officials at the CDC and the Biden transition team. 151.As such, Defendants’ censorship activities amount to state action. 152.Defendants’ censoring the Plaintiff’s Facebook account, as well as those Putative Class Members, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it eliminates the Plaintiffs and Class Member’s participation in a public forum and the right to communicate to others their content and point of view. 153.Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes viewpoint and content-based restrictions on the Plaintiffs’ and Putative Class Members’ access to information, views, and content otherwise available to the general public. 154.Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members violates the First Amendment because it imposes a prior restraint on free speech and has a chilling effect on social media Users and non-Users alike. 155.Defendants’ blocking of the Individual and Class Plaintiffs from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and content-based restriction on the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members’ ability to petition the government for redress of grievances. 156.Defendants’ censorship of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and content-based restriction on their ability to speak and the public’s right to hear and respond. 157.Defendants’ blocking the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates their First Amendment rights to free speech. 158.Defendants’ censoring of Plaintiff by banning Plaintiff from his Facebook account while exercising his free speech as President of the United States was an egregious violation of the First Amendment.>> (al § 159 ss sul ruolo di Zuckerberg personalmente).

Ne segue che il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA è incostituzionale:

<<167.Congress cannot lawfully induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 US 455, 465 (1973). 168.Section 230(c)(2) is therefore unconstitutional on its face, and Section 230(c)(1) is likewise unconstitutional insofar as it has interpreted to immunize social media companies for action they take to censor constitutionally protected speech. 169.Section 230(c)(2) on its face, as well as Section 230(c)(1) when interpreted as described above, are also subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny as content- and viewpoint-based regulations authorizing and encouraging large social media companies to censor constitutionally protected speech on the basis of its supposedly objectionable content and viewpoint. See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).170.Such heightened scrutiny cannot be satisfied here because Section 230 is not narrowly tailored, but rather a blank check issued to private companies holding unprecedented power over the content of public discourse to censor constitutionally protected speech with impunity, resulting in a grave threat to the freedom of expression and to democracy itself; because the word “objectionable” in Section 230 is so ill-defined, vague and capacious that it results in systematic viewpoint-based censorship of political speech, rather than merely the protection of children from obscene or sexually explicit speech as was its original intent; because Section 230 purports to immunize social media companies for censoring speech on the basis of viewpoint, not merely content; because Section 230 has turned a handful of private behemoth companies into “ministries of truth” and into the arbiters of what information and viewpoints can and cannot be uttered or heard by hundreds of millions of Americans; and because the legitimate interests behind Section 230 could have been served through far less speech-restrictive measures. 171.Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, seeks a declaration that Section 230(c)(1) and (c)(2) are unconstitutional insofar as they purport to immunize from liability social media companies and other Internet platforms for actions they take to censor constitutionally protected speech>>.

Come annunciato, ha fatto partire anche analoghe azioni verso Twitter e verso Google/Youtube e rispettivi amministratori delegati (rispettivi link offerti da www.theverge.com) .

Il silenziamento di Tik Tok da parte dell’amministrazione USA è ora sospeso in toto

Avevo notiziato della sospensione dell’ordine esecutivo (E.O.) che ordinava la cessazione dei servizi di TikTok negli USA: v. mio post 03.10.2020 Il silenziamento di Tik Tok da parte dell’amministrazione US è sospeso in via cautelare .

La sospensione era parziale.

Ora la stessa corte sospende in toto, con sconfitta quindi completa per l’amministrazione Trump. Soprattutto, la legge invocata dall’E.O. di Trump non permette di censurare le informazioni e i flussi informativi, mentre è proprio ciò che vuol fare l’E.O.: << the Court looks to the government’s stated goals to identify the regulatory objects of the Secretary’s prohibitions on TikTok. And again, those intended objects include stopping the exportation of data (which the government itself defines as“text, images, video, and audio”) to China and stopping the importation of propaganda into the United States. … As those regulatory objects are “informational materials”—pictures, art, and films are included in the statutory definition itself—the Secretary’s prohibitions are efforts to control, through indirect (or mediate) means, the flow of information materials>>, p. 24.

Si tratta di UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 07.12.2020, TIKTOK inc. e altri c. Donal J. Trump President of the United States, e altri, civil case n° 1:20-cv-02658 (CJN).

Il silenziamento di Tik Tok da parte dell’amministrazione US è sospeso in via cautelare

La UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 27.09.2020, Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02658(CJN), Tiktok e altri c. Trump e altri, in via cautelare ha concesso l’inibitoria del provedimento “soppressivo” di Tiktok emesso nell’estate 2020 dal presidente Trump (notizia sempre presa dal blog di Eric Goldman).

Il Presidente con executive order (EO) 6 agosto 2020 n. 13942, sulla base di precedente EO 13873 dell’anno prima, e dei poteri conferiti dall’International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”),50 US Code §§ 1701-1708, bannò Tiktok (di proprietà cinese) sulla base di questi rischi alla sicurezza nazionale:

<<The President determined that TikTok “automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users, including internet and other network activity information such aslocation data and browsing and search histories.” … The President concluded that TikTok’s foreign ownership and data collection pose a risk thatthe Chinese CommunistParty (“CCP”) can “access …Americans’ personal and proprietary information—potentially allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage.” … He also concluded that there is a risk of the CCP using TikTok to “censor[]content that the[CCP] deems politically sensitive,” id., and “for disinformation campaigns that benefit the [CCP], such as when TikTok videos spread debunked conspiracy theories about the origins of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus.>>.

Seguì l’atto amministrativo del Segretario della difesa., determinativo degli atti specificamente vietati. Si tratta di cinque atti ricordati nella decisione, il primo dei quali sarebbe dovuto etrare in vigore il giorno stesso della decisione alle ore 11.59 p.m. (p. 2).

Tik Tok impugnò, chiedendo di sospendere la misura in via cautelare. Allo scopo doveva dimostrare che << (1) it has a likelihood of succeeding on the merits, (2) it faces irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue,(3) the balance of equities favors relief, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest>>.

Vediamo cosa dice il giudice sul punto 1.

Detto IEEPA contiene sì i poteri per dichiarare emergenze nazionali e proibire rapporti con l’estero, ma sottoposti a due limiti:

<<the “authority granted to the President…does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly” either

(a) the importation or exportation of “information or informational materials”; or

(b) “personal communication[s], which do [] not involve a transfer of anything of value.” 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1), (3)>>

Il giudice californiano ritiene che Tiktok concerna informational materials, pp. 9-13.,

Egli ritiene pure che vengano così inibite le personal communications. Secondo l”azienza <the prohibitions “will destroy this online community, first by requiring the removal of TikTok from … U.S. app stores, and, when the remaining Prohibitions come into effect on November 12, 2020, shutting down TikTok entirely.” >, p. 13.

Ha buon gioco il governo nel dire che vi circolano notizie commerciali : è vero, solo che ve ne sono anche un enormità di natura solo privata con no economic value at all, p. 13.

Si noti che quanto al fumus boni iuris è quello appena esposto il ragionamento che sorregge la decisione: non viene invece applicata la freedom of speech protetta dal Primo Emendamento

Quanto al requisito sub 2 (irreparable harm), secondo il giudice l’azienda l’ha provato., In particolare <Plaintiffs have demonstrated that, absent injunctive relief, they will suffer irreparable harm. It is undisputed that as of the date of the TikTok Order, TikTok was one of the fastest growing apps in the United States, adding 424,000 new users each day. … Barring TikTok from U.S. app stores would, of course, have the immediate and direct effect of halting the influx of new users, likely driving those users to alternative platforms and eroding TikTok’s competitive position. Id. In fact, TikTok has proffered unrebutted evidence that uncertainty in TikTok’s future availability has already driven, and will continue to drive, content creators and fans to other platforms. … The nature of social media is also such that users are unlikely to return to platforms that they have abandoned. See id.Thus, if the first prohibition were to take effect tonight but was later held to be unlawful, TikTok would not be able to recover the harm to its user base. … Plaintiffs have also proffered evidence that they have been harmed, and will continue to be harmed, by the erosion of TikTok’s attractiveness as a commercial partner. ….. TikTok’s business relies on commercial partners and advertisers that work with it because of its robust user base and popularity as a video-and information-sharing platform. .. .Finally, TikTok has shown that, in the absence of injunctive relief, it will be unable to recruit and retain employees to build—or even maintain—its business. … The Secretary’s prohibitions, including the prohibitionsscheduled to take effect tonight, will inflict irreparable economic and reputationalharm on Plaintiffs. This factor therefore weighs in favor of granting preliminary relief.>

Così il giudice ha concesso l’injunction

Chiusura di un social (WeChat) e Primo Emendamento (freedom of speech)

E’ noto che il Presidente Trump con executive order n. 13943 del 6 agosto 2020 ha ordinato la chisura del social WeChat, in quanto di provenienza cinese (appartiene a Tencent) e dunque pericoloso per la sicurezza nazionale (viene citato anche quello n. 13873 del 15 maggio 2019).

La comunità chinese-speaking statunitense nell’agosto 2020 lha impugnato perchè incostituzionale ed ora un giudice californiano (S. Francisco) l’accoglie in via cautelare: si tratta del provvedimento UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 19 settembre 2020, U.S. WECHAT USERS ALLIANCE et al. v. DONALD J. TRUMP et al., caso No. 20-cv-05910-LB.

L’atto esecutivo , determinativo delle prohibited transactions, è del 18 settembre 2020.

Vdiam cosa dice sul punto della vilazine del First Amendment

<< 1 – Likelihood of Success on the Merits: First Amendment

The plaintiffs contend that the prohibited transactions will result in shutting down WeChat, a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S. that is effectively their only means of communication with their community. This, they say, is a prior restraint on their speech that does not survive strict scrutiny. Also, even if the effect of the prohibited transactions is a content-neutral time-place-or-manner restriction, it does not survive intermediate scrutiny because the effective ban on WeChat use is not narrowly tailored to address the government’s significant interest in national security. The government does not meaningfully contest through evidence that the effect of the prohibited transactions will be to shut down WeChat (perhaps because the Secretary conceded the point) and instead contends that its content-neutral restrictions are based on national-security concerns and survive intermediate scrutiny. On this record, the plaintiffs have shown serious questions going to the merits of their First Amendment claim that the Secretary’s prohibited transactions effectively eliminate the plaintiffs’ key platform for communication, slow or eliminate discourse, and are the equivalent of censorship of speech or a prior restraint on it. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–59 (1994) (a city’s barring all signs — except for signs identifying the residence, “for sale” signs, and signs warning of safety hazards — violated the city residents’ right to free speech).

The government — while recognizing that foreclosing “‘an entire medium of public expression’” is constitutionally problematic — makes the pragmatic argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication. But the plaintiffs establish through declarations that there are no viable substitute platforms or apps for the Chinese-speaking and Chinese-American community.

The government counters that shutting down WeChat does not foreclose communications for the plaintiffs, pointing to several declarations showing the plaintiffs’ efforts to switch to new platforms or apps. But the plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that WeChat is effectively the only means of communication for many in the community, not only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no options other than WeChat.

The plaintiffs also have shown serious questions going to the merits of the First Amendment claim even if — as the government contends — the Secretary’s identification of prohibited transactions (1) is a content-neutral regulation, (2) does not reflect the government’s preference or aversion to the speech, and (3) is subject to intermediate scrutiny. A content-neutral, time-place-or-manner restriction survives intermediate scrutiny if it (1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication. (…). To be narrowly tailored, the restriction must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. Unlike a content-based restriction of speech, it “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the governments interests. But the government still may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not advance its goals.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S 464, 486 (2014) (cleaned up).

Certainly the government’s overarching national-security interest is significant. But on this record — while the government has established that China’s activities raise significant national-security concerns — it has put in scant little evidence that its effective ban of WeChat for all U.S. users addresses those concerns. And, as the plaintiffs point out, there are obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat from government devices, as Australia has done, or taking other steps to address data security.

The government cited two cases to support its contention that “preventing or limiting” WeChat use advances the WeChat Executive Order’s essential purpose to reduce WeChat’s collection of data from U.S. users.64See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ) (upholding FCC’s ban on credit agency’s sale of consumers’ personal financial data because it was the only means of preventing the harm of disseminating personal data); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding criminal charge under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for selling a tool that allowed a user to remove copying restrictions from Adobe files and thereby engage in copyright infringement by duplicating eBooks; targeting tool sellers and banning tool sales was reasonably necessary to avoid copyright infringement and protect digital privacy). The speech interests at stake in these cases — a credit agency’s sale of consumer data and targeting unlawful copying — are not equivalent to the denial of speech that attends the complete ban of WeChat for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking U.S. users. On this limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of substitute channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791>>.

Vedremo cosa succederà con l’ancor più importante social Tik Tok.