Seconda bocciatura del mega compenso di Musk accordatogli dal board di Tesla da parte del medesimo giudice della corte del Delaware

Richard J. Tornetta v. Elon Musk et al.Court of chancery of Delaware 2 dicembre 2024m C.A. No. 2018-0408-KSJM, giudice McCORMICK, C.

Ecco i quattro motivi supportanti la decisione, come li riassume all’inizio della stessa il giudice:

<<The motion to revise is denied. The large and talented group of defense firms
got creative with the ratification argument, but their unprecedented theories go
against multiple strains of settled law. There are at least four fatal flaws. First, the
defendants have no procedural ground for flipping the outcome of an adverse post-trial decision based on evidence they created after trial. Second, common-law ratification is an affirmative defense that must be timely raised, which means that, at a minimum, it cannot be raised for the first time after the post-trial opinion. Third, what the defendants call “common law ratification” has no basis in the common law— a stockholder vote standing alone cannot ratify a conflicted-controller transaction. Fourth, even if a stockholder vote could have a ratifying effect, it could not do so here due to multiple, material misstatements in the proxy statement. Each of these defects standing alone defeats the motion to revise>>

Quelli interssanti sono il 3 ° (sub C, p. 34 ss) e soprattutto il 4° (sub D, P. 41 SS) : ratifica invalda perchè senza basi nel common law e comunque perchè i soci erano disinformati (inesattezze nella delega di voto)

Riporto solo ciè che Tesla aveva detto ai suoi soci:

<<• Their vote could “extinguish claims for breach of fiduciary duty by
authorizing an act that otherwise would constitute a breach.”166
• “[T]he deficiencies, including disclosure deficiencies, procedural
deficiencies, and breaches of fiduciary duty, identified by the Delaware
Court in connection with the Board and our stockholders’ original
approval of the 2018 CEO Performance Award should be ratified and
remedied and any wrongs found by the Delaware Court in connection
with the 2018 CEO Performance award should be cured.”167
• “[I]f the 2018 CEO Performance Award is ratified, those options will be
restored to Mr. Musk. As a result, Mr. Tornetta may not be considered
to have rendered the ‘benefit’ to Tesla through his lawsuit that is
claimed by his attorneys.”168
• And “a new stockholder vote allows the disclosure deficiencies found by
the Tornetta court to be corrected, among other things>>.

Ebbene, dice il giudice, “All of this is materially false or misleading”.

Importasnti studiosi di diritto societario usa pensano che i giudici del Delaware siano diventasti un pò troppo pro minoranze e troppo poco pro amministratori:  ad es. Jonathan Macey e Stephen M. Bainbridge.

Di quest’ultimo v. il suo post 2 dicembre 2024 sulla seconda sentenza qui ricordata.

Dichiarato nullo l’accordo per il compenso di Musk in Tesla e il conseguente acquisto di quote

La Court of Chancery del Delaware 30.01.2024 , Tornetta v. Musk ed altri, C.A. No. 2018-0408-KSJM, dichiara nullo (rescission) l’accordo 2018 sul compenso di Musk  perchè eccessivo : o meglio M. non ha provato che era fair: <Defendants bore the burden of proving fair price. Given the conflicting testimony concerning the projections, Defendants failed to prove the factual predicate for their argument that all the milestones were “ambitious” and difficult to achieve. This argument does not support a finding of fair price>, p. 187.

Irrilevante il consenso degli azionisti, non essendo stati adeguatamente informati: <<Defendants argue that disinterested stockholder approval is “compelling evidence” that the price was fair.899 The stockholder vote is one component of the fair price analysis, but whether the vote represents a form of market evidence that can support a certain price depends on the sufficiency of the disclosure. Generally, a stockholder vote is only “compelling evidence” of fairness absent a disclosure violation.900 The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger held that an uninformed stockholder vote is totally “meaningless.”901 Under Weinberger, therefore, the stockholder vote is a meaningless indicator as to fair price. In SolarCity III, the high court took a more nuanced approach, affording a stockholder vote some weight despite a deficient proxy statement where the key issue was SolarCity’s value. The high court noted that there was significant public information available concerning that issue, “SolarCity traded in an efficient market,” and a strong independent fiduciary positively affected the process.902 Defendants did not establish those facts here.   Because the stockholder vote was not fully informed, it does not support a finding of fair price“, p. 190-191.

Rigettata l’eccezione di -in sostanza- arricchimento senza causa: le azioni già detenute son più che sufficienti. “Defendants argue that rescission is a harsh consequence that would leave Musk uncompensated. But Musk’s preexisting equity stake provided him tens of billions of dollars for his efforts. And Defendants have not offered a viable alternative short of leaving the Grant intact

Il punto più interessante è quello degli aspetti pratici di corporate governance e cioè della supremazia di Musk nel Board: nessuno ha seriamente negoziato il compenso da vera controparte, limitandosi invece a supinamente ratificarlo. V. il § “2.Boardroom And Managerial Supremacy” a p. . 115 ss.

Ad es. <<Based on this list alone, it could be said that Musk wields unusually expansive managerial authority, equaling or even exceeding the imperial CEOs of the 1960s>>, p. 121 (v. il rif. ai SuperstarCEOs p. 121 ss).

Oppure: <<The references to “supine servants” and “an overweening master” is hyperbolic, and no doubt deliberately so to give emphasis to the difficulty of the standard. But it hits home here. There is no greater evidence of Musk’s status as a transaction-specific controller than the Board’s posture toward Musk during the process that led to the Grant. Put simply, neither the Compensation Committee nor the Board acted in the best interests of the Company when negotiating Musk’s compensation plan. In fact, there is barely any evidence of negotiations at all. Rather than negotiate against Musk with the mindset of a third party, the Compensation Committee worked alongside him, almost as an advisory body.   Multiple aspects of the process reveal Musk’s control over it, including the timeline, the absence of negotiations over the magnitude of the Grant or its other terms, and the committee’s failure to conduct a benchmarking analysis. In the end, the key witnesses said it all by effectively admitting that they did not view the process as an arm’s length negotiation>>, 128-129.