Tag: keyword advertising

Keyword advertising e avvedutezza del consumatore medio online nel diritto dei marchi

L’appello del 9 circuito n. 23-16060 del 22.10.2024, Lerner&Rowe v. Brown Engstrand&Shely decide una lite per violazione di marchio tra due studi legali avvenuta tramite keyword advertising (k.a.).

Il Panel non affronta le legittimità di quest’ultimo strumento secondo la legge marchi, limitandosi a dire che non ricorre confondibilità tra gli esiti della ricerca Google e il nome/i segno dello studio attore.

Rigetta quindi la domanda.

E’ infatti assai  fiducioso sull’avvedutezza dell’utente medio di internet:

<<Google’s search engine is so ubiquitous that we can be confident that the reasonably prudent online shopper is familiar with its layout and function, knows that it orders results based on relevance to the search term, and understands that it produces sponsored links along with organic search results. Moreover, in this case, the relevant consumers specifically typed in “Lerner & Rowe” as a search term, suggesting that they would be even more discerning of the results they received. Therefore, because this case involves shopping on Google by using the precise trademark at issue, this factor weighs in favor of ALG.>>

E poi:

<The district court was correct to conclude that this is one of the rare trademark infringement cases susceptible to summary judgment. The generally sophisticated nature of online shoppers, the evidence demonstrating that there is not an appreciable number of consumers who would find ALG’s use of the mark confusing, and the clarity of Google’s search results pages, convince us that ALG’s use of the “Lerner & Rowe” mark is not likely to cause consumer confusion.>>.

Del che c’è da dubitare, come avverte Eric Goldman (dal cui blog prendo notizia della e link alla sentenza)

L’opinione concorrente di  J. Desai invece esamina se il k.a. costituisca “uso del marchio”. Ricorda un importante precedente del 2011 del 9 ciruito, che rispose in senso affermativo: ma ora intende rovesciarlo,  perchè non esatto.

<<Whether an action, like bidding
on keywords, that involves no display or presentation of a
mark whatsoever satisfies the “use in commerce” definition.
In other words, does a buyer of advertising keywords who
bids on certain terms and phrases “use” its competitor’s
mark when bidding on it?
In Network Automation, we answered, yes. 638 F.3d at
1144–45. But we provided no analysis to support this
holding, id. at 1145, and we relied on cases with
meaningfully different facts. >>

Chiede quindi un riesame della questione.

Nel keyword search advertisement il mero acquisto del nome altrui non è violazione di marchio

App. del 2 circuito 08.10.2024, 1-800 contacts inc. d. Jand inc. afferma quanto nel titolo.

<<As outlined above, three components to a search advertising campaign are
relevant for our analysis of whether 1-800 has sufficiently alleged trademark
infringement by Warby Parker: first, the defendant’s purchase of a competitor’s
marks as keywords; second, the ads placed on the search results page for the
competitor’s marks; and third, the defendant’s landing webpage to which its ads
are linked. Thus, the central question in this case is whether 1-800 has sufficiently alleged a likelihood of confusion arising from Warby Parker’s use of 1-800’s Marks (i.e., 1800 Contacts,” “1 800 Contacts,” “1800contacts.com,” and “1800contacts”) in the keyword bidding process, the search ads, and/or the linked landing webpage. (….)
Further, in the search advertising context, an alleged infringer’s
purchase of a keyword comprising a competitor’s trademark constitutes a “use in
commerce” of such trademark under the Lanham Act. See Rescuecom Corp., 562
F.3d at 127 (holding that complaint regarding Google’s AdWord’s
recommendation of plaintiff’s trademark to plaintiff’s competitors “adequately
plead[ed] a use in commerce” under the Lanham Act)
(…)
1-800 alleges that Warby Parker made an infringing use of 1-800’s Marks in
the first component of its search advertising campaign: the keyword purchase.
However, as described above, the mere act of purchasing a competitor’s
trademarks as keywords in the search advertising context does not constitute
trademark infringement or unfair competition. See id. at 130. Warby Parker’s
purchase of 1-800’s Marks, standing alone, does not infringe 1-800’s Marks because “a defendant must do more than use another’s mark in commerce to violate the Lanham Act.” Id. The statute requires a showing that the defendant’s use caused consumer confusion. (….)

we conclude that 1-800 has failed to sufficiently plead that Warby Parker’s advertising plan was likely to confuse consumers at any point in the sales process because 1-800 does not claim that Warby Parker actually used the former’s Marks other than by buying them as keywords in the search engine auctions, and such use alone does not create a likelihood of consumer confusion>>

analoga soluzione probabilmente anche in base al nostro art. 20.2 cpi.-

La sentenza poi passa ad esaminare la confondibilità delle “landing pages”, negandola.

(notizia e link da Eric Goldman blog)

Domanda di contraffazione di marchio rigettata nonostante l’uguaglianza del marchio usato nel keyword advertising

la us distr. court East. dist. of Kentucky-Lexingtom del 24 agosto 2023, Case: 5:23-cv-00232-DCR, Nursing CE Central c. Colibri , rigetta (al momento) la domanda della prima nonostante la seconda avesse usato il marchio denominativo “Nursing CE Central” della prima nel Google advertising e nonostante un rapporto di piena concorrenza (servizi di formazione e consulenza per infermiere).

Ma i consueti sei fattori per la confondibiità portano la corte a rigettare la domanda, nonsotante l’ulteriore elemento del public interest giocasse a favore dell’attore.

(segnalazione e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Lite in tema di marchi per keyword advertising tra studi legali dell’Arizona

Distr. Court of Arizona 8 maggio 2023, Case 2:21-cv-01540-DG, Lerner & Rowe PC,
v. Brown Engstrand & Shely LLC, et al.:

<<The three relevant screenshots produced by Plaintiff show clear labeling of Defendants’ entry, using Defendants’ name and prominently labelled as an “Ad,” and with no use of Plaintiff’s trademark or confusingly similar language or content.

Reasonably savvy Internet users with a strong incentive to select the right lawyer would not be confused by these clearly labeled ads into believing that Defendants were Plaintiff.

Plaintiff produces no survey evidence showing a likelihood of confusion, and its evidence that, at most, 0.215% of all consumers exposed to Defendants’ ads were in fact confused by them is simply not enough to show a likelihood. Two-tenths of one percent is not an appreciable or significant portion of consumers exposed to Defendants’ keyword-generated ads. Plaintiff does have a strong mark, but no reasonable jury viewing Plaintiff’s thin evidence could find that potential clients viewing Defendants’ clearly labeled ads are likely to be confused into thinking Defendants were in fact Plaintiff.
The 25 irrelevant screenshots produced by Plaintiff – screenshots taken during a time when Defendants’ were not buying Plaintiff’s name as a keyword – reinforce the Court’s conclusion. Each of the irrelevant screenshots was produced by searching for “lerner & rowe,” “lerner rowe,” or a variation of these words. Doc. 68-3.

And even though Defendants had not purchased Plaintiff’s name as a keyword, Defendants’ ads appeared in the search results along with ads for other personal injury law firms.

Google’s algorithm apparently called up similar law firms when a specific law firm was searched for. See, e.g., Doc. 57-6 at 15 (including an ad for azinjuredworker.com), 17 (getlawyersnow.com and palumbowolfe.com), 18 (arjashahlaw.com), 20 (getlawyersnow.com), 22 (hutzler law.com), 28 (larryhparkerphoenix.com). These screenshots show what Internet users find when searching on Google for Lerner & Rowe – ads for a variety of law firms.

As with all searches on Google, the consumer then must scroll through the returns to decide which entries are worth clicking on.

Because Defendants’ entries use their name and are clearly labeled “Ad,” the consumers would know they are seeing an ad for another law firm, as would be true with the other firms seen in the screenshots. The Internet user would then, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “skip from site to site, ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.” Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1179. This is not confusion; this is typical Internet searching. And because “the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely confusion, not mere diversion,” Plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149>>, P. 19-20.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

(Broad) keyword adverstising

il blog del prof. Goldman Eric  dà notizia di altra sentenza che accerta violazione di marchio tramite inserzione keyword advertising: per la precisione “broad match keyword” cioè una frase più ampia e non la singola parola di interesse.

Nel caso Allied Modular building system, violando il marchio del concorrente Porta-Fab corporation, scelse la frase “Buy Portafab Today– WeManufacture/Install Direct”.

Qui la violazione è palese dato che c’è pure la frase di contorno che crea confuxione.

Così ha deciso la Dist. court of central district do california CASE NO. 8:20-cv-01778-JLS-JDE del 24 luglio 2022, Porta-Fab c. Allied Modular etc .,

Keyword advertising: il paragone tra i marchi in conflitto va fatto col marchio reale dell’inserzionista, non con quello del competitor da lui utilizzato

Nellla sempre attuale fattispecie di keyword advertising (k.a.) , su cui c’è ampia giurisprudenza anche nazionale, interviene il Trib. del distretto sud di New York, 27 giugno 2022, Case 1:21-cv-06966-PKC , 1-800 Contacts inc. c. JAND, INC. d/b/a WARBY PARKER.

Il secondo usa nel k.a. il nome “1800 contacts” (sono aziende nel setore delle lenti a contatto) e il primo tenta di censurarlo, anche perchè la landing page del’inserzionista sarebbe confusoria.

La corte rigetta con decisione interessante,  data la buona analisi dei fattori da considerare per emettere il giudizio di confondibilità per il diritto usa.

Le parti non contestano che l’uso nel k.a. costituisca “uso” secondo il Lanham Act, p. 7.

Qui iunteressa il punto logicamente seguente, quello della confondiblità. Infatti è forse non scontato quanto afferma la corte e cioè che  il paragone tra marchi va fatto col marchio reale dell’inserzionista, non con quello del competitor (attore in causa) che egli usa nel keyword advertising: per cui i marchi sono confondibilissimi, essendo sostanzialmente uguali. <<Second, as to the similarity of the marks, the Court concludes that the marks at issue are substantially different. Although 1-800 Contacts submits that “the marks used by the parties are identical” because Warby Parker and 1-800 Contacts are both using the 1-800 Contacts Marks, this is not the relevant analysis for determining the likelihood of consumer confusion in the context of search term advertising. While Warby Parker “uses” the 1-800 Contacts Marks by bidding on search results for the marks, the crux of 1-800 Contacts’s claims here is that after the search results for the 1-800 Contacts Marks are displayed to the consumer, there is an appreciable number of consumers who cannot discern, either before or after clicking Case 1:21-cv-06966-PKC Document 40 Filed 06/27/22 Page 10 of 18 on the paid links to Warby Parker’s website, that the contacts being sold by Warby Parker on their website are actually unrelated to 1-800 Contacts or the 1800contacts.com website.
In this context, the marks to be compared are the 1-800 Contacts Marks and the “Warby Parker” mark. In so comparing, the Court notes that the 1-800 Contacts Marks at issue are all variants of “1-800 Contacts,” presented in the format of a toll-free number emphasizing one specific product: contact lenses. In contrast, “Warby Parker” lacks any references to a phone number (or numbers generally) or a specific product. Finally, as the parties themselves note, 1-800 Contacts is strongly associated with only contact lenses, while Warby Parker is strongly associated with eyewear, such as eyeglasses and sunglasses. The “History” page of the Warby Parker website, cited in the Complaint also emphasizes Warby Parker’s sale of eyewear. (Compl. ¶ 49.) >>

La corte nega poi la confondibilità nella landing page del convenuto, ove il suo marchio sarebbe apposto in modo sufficientemente visibile.

Il keyword advertsing illecito (perchè riproducente un marchio altrui) è perseguibile tramite il diritto proprietario?

la risposta è negativa secondo la Corte Suprema della Georgia, 15.02.2’022, S21G0798, EDIBLE IP, LLC v. GOOGLE, LLC.

Edible (poi: E.) , accortasi che alcuni suoi marchi sono concessi da Google (G.) a terzi tramite la pratica del keyword advertising, cita G. per violazine non già della disciplina di marchio bensì di quella proprietario/dominicale: <Civil Theft of Personal Property> e <conversion> (appropriazione di risorse altrui, all’incirca).

Tale causa petendi apparentemente ingegnosa (essendo stata infruttuosa la precedente basata sul diritto dei marchi) viene però rigettata in tutti i gradi di giudizio.

Secondo la S.C. , assente rischio di confusione o di inganno, il marchio (come pure il goodwill) non ha tutela. Nè si può considerarlo oggetto della disciplina relativo al furto (theft).

<<Under each of these statutes, it is clear that trade names are only protected from use by others to the extent that such use is deceptive or there is a likelihood of confusion by the public.>>, p. 13.

Cioè la SC non dice che la disciplina si applica solo alle res, corporali, bensì  cbe tra le risorse , riservate dalla legge al titolare del marchio e solo per le quali dunque si può discorrere di <furto> o <appropriazione>, figura il proibire l’uso di terzi confusorio o decettivo: non vi figura invece la pretesa che i terzi si astengano in modalità più ampie.

<<Here, Edible IP has not alleged that Google’s use of the “Edible Arrangements” trade name in its keyword advertising program causes any confusion, and in fact, has disclaimed in the complaint that it is “seek[ing] any . . . relief for any consumer confusion.” Thus, we see no basis in Georgia statutory law for Edible IP’s claim that Google has appropriated the “Edible Arrangements” trade name simply by using it in Google’s algorithms and keyword advertising programs.

The common law likewise does not provide a basis for Edible IP’s civil theft claim. Under the common law, a cause of action based on the use of a trademark or trade name has also generally beenpredicated on either an intent to cause consumer confusion or the likelihood of creating confusion or misunderstanding.>>

Da noi con l’istituto del marchio rinomato, che prescinde dalla confondibilità, le cose forse sarebbero potute andare diversamente: se non fosse che la disciplina  di marchio è  speciale rispetto a quella di diritto civile comune e quindi difficilmente integrabile analogicamene con quest’ultima.

Per non dire che il furto e l’appropriazione indebita (art. 624 e 646 c.pen.) e le azioni a difesa della proprietà (nel c.c. ) paiono applicarsi solo alle res/cose  intese nel senso di entità fisiche.

(notizia elink alla setenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Marchi , keyword advertising e confondibilità

Lo studio legale JIM ADLER (che usa chiamarsi The Texas Hammer!) , specialista in risarcimento del danno alla persona, nota che un  centro di liquidazione sinistri ha acquisto il suo nome nel c.d keyword advertising tramite motori di ricerca e gli fa causa, invocando la violazione della legge marchi.

In primo grado non ha successo ma in appello si: v. l’appello del 5 circuito 10.08.2021, Case: 20-10936 , Jim S. Adler PC +1 c. McNeil Consultants, L.L.C ed altri.

Si trattava di un c.d. click to call advertisment (porta ad un call center): <If a user clicks on the advertisement using a mobile phone, the advertisement  causes the user’s phone to make a call rather than visit a website. McNeil’s  representatives answer the telephone using a generic greeting. The complaint alleges that the ads “keep confused consumers, who were specifically searching for Jim Adler and the Adler Firm, on the phone and talking to [McNeil’s] employees as long as possible in a bait-and-switch effort to build rapport with the consumer and ultimately convince [the consumer] to engage lawyers referred through [McNeil] instead.”>.

I requisiti della fattispecie di violazione sono indicati alle pp. 6/7.

Il punto più interessante è che nella fattispecie concreta l’uso del marchio ADLER da parte del convenuto non è visibile ai consumatori, p. 10.

La corte di appello però non ritien tale caratteristica decisiva: la visibilità/riconoscibilità non è necesaria per accogliere la domanda di contraffazione e il precedente invocato non porta l’effetto voluto dai convenuti: <<In support of its conclusion that the use of a trademark must be visible to a consumer, the district court2 relied on 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com,  Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242–49 (10th Cir. 2013). In that case, though, the Tenth  Circuit explicitly avoided deciding whether a Lanham Act claim requires that  the use of a trademark be visible to the consumer. The district court in the  case had observed that a user who sees sponsored advertisements has no way  of knowing whether the defendant reserved a trademark or a generic term.  Id. at 1242–43. The district court explained that “it would be anomalous to  hold a competitor liable simply because it purchased a trademarked keyword  when the advertisement generated by the keyword is the exact same from a  consumer’s perspective as one generated by a generic keyword.” Id. at 1243.

The Tenth Circuit noted that the argument had “some attraction”  but then stated that “if confusion does indeed arise, the advertiser’s choice  of keyword may make a difference to the infringement analysis even if the  consumer cannot discern that choice.” Id. The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning reflects that the absence of the trademark could be one but not the only factor to consider in evaluating the likelihood of confusion. Ultimately, that court concluded that it “need not resolve the matter because 1–800’s directinfringement claim fails for lack of adequate evidence of initial-interest  confusion.” Id. 

We conclude that whether an advertisement incorporates a trademark  that is visible to the consumer is a relevant but not dispositive factor in  determining a likelihood of confusion in search-engine advertising cases>>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

L’uso del marchio/nome commerciale altrui nel keyword advertising costituisce “furto di proprietà”?

Edible IP cita Google presso una corte delle Georgia per quattro causae petendi in relazione all’uso del suo nome commerciale (“Edible Arrangements”) all’interno del suo keyword advertising(.

Ques’ultimo è la pubbicità tramite asta di Google sui termini ai fini dell’elenco dei risultati sponsorizzati della ricerca: di quelli “sponsorizzati”, non di quelli “naturali” (che nulla hanno di naturale, essendo frutto di precisi, studiatissimi e continuamente modificati algoritimi).

Ricordo qui solo la prima causa petendi, “theft of property”, secondo il codice della Georgia: <<Any owner of personal property shall be authorized to bring a civil action to recover damages from any person who willfully damages the owner’s personal property or who commits a theft as defined in Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 16 involving the owner’s personal property>> ( O.C.G.A. § 51-10-6 ).

Però la corte di appello , 2nd division, 29.01.2021, caso  A20A1594, EDIBLE IP, LLC v. GOOGLE, LLC, rigetta tutte le domande , tra cui quella basata sul cit. furto di porprietà, pp. 4-7.

Infatti l’allegazione di proprieà intellettuale sul termine non permette di ravvisare furto, per quanto possa essere creativa l’allegazione del difensore: <<Creative pleading cannot convert Google’s advertising program into a theft by taking. Edible IP has not alleged that it has a proprietary interest in Google’s search results pages or any right to control the advertising on those pages. It claims only that it ownsthe intellectual property associated with “Edible Arrangements.” The alleged “sale” of that term for advertising placement does not constitute theft.>>, p. 6/7.

La proprietà  intellettuale (PI), diremmo noi, non può essere qualificata come proprietà di cose, di res, nemmeno di energie. Vecchia questione quella del se alla PI possano applicarsi le regole dominicali di origina romane.

A me pare di si , in linea di principio: anche se non indiscriinatamente bensì solo dopo una attenta estensione analogica.

Resta da capire perchè non abbia azionato la tutela specifica per i marchi.

(notizia e link alla sentenza presi dal blog di Eric Goldman)