libertà di espressione – Pagina 2

La pagina del gruppo Facebook dell’Amministrazione Comunale costituisce “designated public forum” ai fini della libertà di parola

Secondo la corte di Seattle-WA , 21 nov. 2021,Case 2:21-cv-01264-MJP , Kimksey ed altri c. comune di Sammamish, la pagina del gruppo Facebook, costituito dal Comune di Sammamish per dialogare di temi istituzionali con i cittadini, costituisce <designated public forum> (all’interno della nota tripartizione comnprendente pure <zpublic forum> e <limited public forum>).

Infatti da un lato non c’è censura preventiva e dall’altro i commenti off topic son spesso stati tollerati

Pertanto si applica lo strictg scrutiny nel giudizio sulla legittimità della censura : il quale viene superato solo <<it furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest>>

La ragione per cui si trattava di post <fuori tema -off topic-> non è tale: per cui la sua censura è illegittima

(notizia della sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Ancora sulla (al momento impossibile da ottenere) qualificazione delle piattaforme social come State Actors ai fini del Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola)

Altra sentenza (d’appello stavolta) che rigetta la domadna vs. Facebook (rectius, Meta) basata sul fatto che illegalmente filtrerebbe/censurerebbe i post o rimuoverebbe gli account , violando il Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola).

Questo diritto spetta solo verso lo Stato o verso chi agisce in suo nome o assieme ad esso.

Si tratta della sentenza di appello del 9° circuito (su impugnazione di una sentenza californiana confermata) , emessa il 22.11.2021, No. 20-17489 , D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05546-RS, Atkinson c. Meta-Zuckerberg.

Sono riproposte dall’utente (e la Corte partitamente rigetta) tutte le consuete e note causae petendi in tema. Nulla di nuovo ma un utile loro ripasso.

Inoltre la Corte conferma pure l’applicazione del safe harbour ex 230 CDA.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Quattro causae petendi relative al First Amendment/libertà di parola per contrastare la sospensione dell’account Youtube, ma nessuna accolta

Interessante sentenza californiana sulla solita questione della libertà di parola (First Amendement) asseritamente violata da sospensione dell’account su social media (politicamente di destra) da parte di una state action.

Si tratta della corte distrettuale di S. Josè, Californa, 19 ottobre 2021, Case No. 20-cv-07502-BLF, Doe c. Google,.

Sono azionate quattro causae petendi, tutte rigettate visto che nessuna è applicabile alla censura/content moderation di Youtube:

1) Public function: curiosamente l’attore e la corte invocano in senso reciprocamente opposto il noto precedente Prager Univ. c. Google del 2020.

2) Compulsion: <<Rep. Adam Schiff and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and an October 2020 House Resolution, which “have pressed Big Tech” into censoring political speech with threats of limiting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) and other penalties.>>. Alquanto inverosimile (è però la più lungamente argometnata)

3) joint action: <<Joint action is present where the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). Further, a private defendant must be a “willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Joint action requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between private and public actors. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).>.

Per gli attori la joint action theory starebbe in un <<Twitter exchange between Rep. Schiff and YouTube CEO Susan Wojnicki in which Ms. Wojnicki states, “We appreciate your partnership and will continue to consult with Members of Congress as we address the evolving issues around #COVID19.” FAC, Ex. E at 1; Opp. at 10-15. Plaintiffs argue that this Twitter exchange shows Defendants and the federal government were in an “admitted partnership.”>>. Allegazione un pò leggerina.

4) Governmental nexus: ricorre quando c’è << “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005>>. (sembra assai simile alla prcedente).

Non avendo accolto alcuna di quesrta, non affronta il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, p. 12. Curioso l’rodine logico : il criterio della ragine più liquidqa avrebbe potuto a rigttare (nel merito) con tale norma.

(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Diritto di parola nei confronti della comunità locale che vuole far togliere dei post da Instagram

Interessante, atipico ed inquietante caso deciso nel Wisconsin il 24.09.2021, ase No. 20-cv-0620-bhl, Cohoon v. Konrath-Klump.

Un ragazza (Amyiah cohon) si ammala di Covid19: nonostante un test negativo, i medici glielo indicano come probabile, essendo agli inizi della pandemia ed essendo probabilmente ancor poco preciso). Posta su instagram in due occasioni successive delle foto, che la rappresentano malata ed anzi con ossigenatori.

La comunità locale si spaventa, non avendo ancora avuto all’epoca alcun caso, e tramite lo sceriffo chiede che vengano rimosse . Lo sceriffo avanza la richeista in modo deciso, addirittura ventilando la possibilità che operi una sanzione penale detentiva in caso di rifiuto.

La ragazza però agisce in giudizio chiedendo: (1) a declaratory judgment establishing that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights, and (2) an injunction enjoining Defendants from citing her or her parents for disorderly conduct, arresting them, jailing them, or threatening any of the above, for future posts on social media about her scare with COVID-19. (ECF No. 3 at 1.).

La corte accoglie la prima domanda ma rigetta la seconda.

Il punto qui interssante è l’allegata violazione del primo emendamento (liberà di parola) data dalla condotta dello sceriffo, quando tentò (troppo) energicamente di persuadere la ragazza e i suoi genitori a rimuovere i posts, per il panico creato nella comunicà locale

Ecco il passsaggio rilevante: <<Even if short and often grammatically scurrilous, social media posts do not fall outside the ambit of the First Amendment. To the contrary, they are exactly what the First Amendment seeks to protect. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (explaining that social media is often the “principal source[] for . . . speaking and listening in the modern public square”). In the eyes of the law, when Amyiah Cohoon took to Instagram, she was no different than John F. Tinker wearing his black armband in the halls of the Des Moines public schools, or Paul Robert Cohen donning his “Fuck the Draft” jacket in the corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse, and her speech deserved the same degree of protection. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. by & through Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (2021) (holding that a student’s social media posts containing derogatory remarks about her school’s cheerleading team were protected by the First Amendment).

But Defendants disagree. In their view, Amyiah forfeited her constitutional protection when she published a post that caused concern in the community and led to an influx of phone calls to the Westfield School District and Marquette County Health Department. (ECF No. 17 at 13.) According to Sheriff Konrath, this was akin to “screaming fire in a crowded movie theater.” (ECF No. 1-9 at 1.) Even setting aside that the popular movie theater analogy actually referred to “falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic,” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added), Defendants’ argument still fails. While content-based speech restrictions are permissible in limited circumstances (incitement, obscenity, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, etc.), the Supreme Court “has rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . based on an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’” U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). Labeling censorship societally beneficial does not render it lawful. If it did, nearly all censorship would evade First Amendment scrutiny. Defendants may have preferred to keep Marquette County residents ignorant to the possibility of COVID-19 in their community for a while longer, so they could avoid having to field calls from concerned citizens, but that preference did not give them authority to hunt down and eradicate inconvenient Instagram posts. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (holding that speech is protected against censorship or punishment unless likely to produce “a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest”). Amyiah’s post is not captured by any of the categorical exceptions to the First Amendment, so this Court will not balance the social utility of curtailing it against its government-assigned value. But Defendants persist. They cast Amyiah’s characterization of her illness as a lie, insisting that because she ultimately tested negative, she was prohibited from publicly proclaiming that she had beaten COVID-19. But the very doctors who tested her also informed her that she may have had COVID-19 in spite of the negative test. Her Instagram posts were, therefore, at worst, incomplete. The notion that the long arm of the government—redaction pen in hand—can extend to this sort of incomplete speech is plainly wrong. The Marquette County Sheriff had no more ability to silence Amyiah’s posts than it would to silence the many talking heads on cable news, who routinely pronounce one-sided hot takes on the issues of the day, purposefully ignoring any inconvenient facts that might disrupt their preferred narratives. Indeed, even if Amyiah’s posts had been untruthful, no court has ever suggested that noncommercial false speech is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720. The Supreme Court has emphasized: “[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society.” Id. at 727. The government here had every opportunity to counter Amyiah’s speech, but it opted instead to engage in the objectionable practice of censorship. Because her Instagram post was undoubtedly protected by the First Amendment, the Court finds that Amyiah has satisfied the first element of her retaliation claim. >>+

Il punto centrale difensivo è dunque: In their view, Amyiah forfeited her constitutional protection when she published a post that caused concern in the community and led to an influx of phone calls to the Westfield School District and Marquette County Health Department. (ECF No. 17 at 13.) According to Sheriff Konrath, this was akin to “screaming fire in a crowded movie theater.” .

Implausibile e irricevibile difesa da parte dei due sceriffi/sergenti. Il conflitto tra il diritto di informare della gravità del morbo in arrivo, parlando di se, e l’esigenza di tranquillità della comunità locale che verrebbe incrinata dalla circolazione delle foto , come se non parlarne potesse fermarlo. Da qui l’aggettivo inquietante all’inizio del post: sarebbe grave un esito opposto.

Il giudice accoglie la domanda di Amyiah (sul punto 1).

Interessante è poi il ragionamento sulla adverse action (cioè l’inibizione del diritti di parola9 a p. 7 ss., consistita nella eccessiva pressione da parte dello sceriffo (da noi non sarebbe reato? Abuso di ufficio? Violenza privata? Minaccia?)

Il deepfake gode della libertà di parola protetta dal Primo Emendamento? No, secondo un recente studio

La risposta è negativa per Blitz, DEEPFAKES AND OTHER NON–TESTIMONIAL FALSEHOODS:WHEN IS BELIEF MANIPULATION (NOT)FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH?, Yale Journal of Law & TechnologyVolume 23, Fall 2020, p. 160 ss.

Conclusioni: <<Is all such deception protected by the First Amendment? If not, does it at least protect the deepfake video on the ground that video is now a recognized medium of expression? My argument in this article is that it does not. Video is, of course, in many circumstances, a medium of artistic expression, and deepfake technology can play a role in such artistic expression. Not only it is a tool for professional filmmakers to tell fictional stories. It is a means by which authors canvisually illustrate or embellish their arguments. But my argument here has been that video doesn’t always serve as a vessel for an author’s ideas. It has long served as a record of what a camera captured rather than as a picture and storyteller orargument–maker wishes to show us. First Amendment law should leave government with room to preserve this non–testimonialfunction of video>>, p. 299-300.

Il che non significa che manchino di protezione ex 1st Em. in assoluto: <<The same deepfake that deceives an audience in one context, after all, can educate and entertain it in another. The same deepfake that is viewed as evidence external to a speaker might, at another time, be seen as a vessel for a speaker’sexpression. Deepfakes are thus in a First Amendment middle ground—one where courts should seek to protect them when and to the extent they are expressive, but let government expose them as deepfakes when they pose as genuine camera footage.>>, ivi

Studente vs. ente scolastico: il diritto di critica nel campus arriva alla Suprema Corte USA

La Suprema corte statunitense si occupa di un singolare caso di diritto di parola di uno studente verso la propria scuola (Supreme Court MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT v. B. L., n. 20-255, 23.06.2021: vedila qui).

Era capitato che la studentessa BL fosse stata escluso dal ruolo ambito nella cheerleaders squad e che le fosse stato offerto un altro ruolo , non gradito e non accettato.

Sucessivamente, arrabbviata, BL aveva caricato su Snapchat dei post critici verso la scuola: <<that weekend, B. L. and a friend visited the Cocoa Hut, a local convenience store. There, B. L. used her smartphone to post two photos on Snapchat, a social media applicationthat allows users to post photos and videos that disappear after a set period of time. B. L. posted the images to herSnapchat “story,” a feature of the application that allowsany person in the user’s “friend” group (B. L. had about 250 “friends”) to view the images for a 24 hour period. The first image B. L. posted showed B. L. and a friend with middle fingers raised; it bore the caption: “Fuck schoolfuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” App. 20. The second image was blank but for a caption, which read: “Lovehow me and [another student] get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter to anyone else?” The caption also contained an upside-down smiley-face emoji. Id., at 21. B. L.’s Snapchat “friends” included other Mahanoy AreaHigh School students, some of whom also belonged to the cheerleading squad. At least one of them, using a separatecellphone, took pictures of B. L.’s posts and shared them with other members of the cheerleading squad. One of the students who received these photos showed them to her mother (who was a cheerleading squad coach), and the im–ages spread. That week, several cheerleaders and other students approached the cheerleading coaches “visibly up–set” about B. L.’s posts. Id., at 83–84. Questions about the posts persisted during an Algebra class taught by one of thetwo coaches. Id., at 83>>

Segue sanzione da parte della scuola , consistente nella sospensione della sua partecipazione a tutte le attività di quel tipo.

La ragazza e la famiglia impugnano giudizialmente.

la SC dice che il diritto di parola esiste anche per lo studente e lo fa prevalere.

Tre sono le peculiarità del diritto di intervneto della scuola: <<First, a school will rarely stand in loco parentis when a student speaks off cam–pus. Second, from the student speaker’s perspective, regulations of off-campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech, include all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day.That means courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regu–late off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot en–gage in that kind of speech at all. Third, the school itself has an inter–est in protecting a student’s unpopular expression, especially when the expression takes place off campus, because America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy>>, p. 6-8

Applicando ciò al caso de quo, il diritto di parola e di critica della studentessa prevale: la sospensione dalla squadra è ingiustificata.

La volgarità delle espressioni di critica non è di ostacolo: << Putting aside the vulgar lan–guage, the listener would hear criticism, of the team, the team’s coaches, and the school—in a word or two, criticism of the rules of a community of which B. L. forms a part. This criticism did not involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection. B. L.’s posts, while crude, did not amount to fighting words. See Chap–linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). And while B. L. used vulgarity, her speech was not obscene as thisCourt has understood that term. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 19–20 (1971). To the contrary, B. L. uttered the kind of pure speech to which, were she an adult, the First Amendment would provide strong protection. See id., at 24; cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 461 (2011) (First Amendment protects “even hurtful speech on public issuesto ensure that we do not stifle public debate”)…. Consider too when, where, and how B. L. spoke. Her posts appeared outside of school hours from a location out–side the school. She did not identify the school in her postsor target any member of the school community with vulgaror abusive language. B. L. also transmitted her speechthrough a personal cellphone, to an audience consisting ofher private circle of Snapchat friends. These features of her speech, while risking transmission to the school itself, none–theless (for reasons we have just explained, supra, at 7–8)diminish the school’s interest in punishing B. L.’s utter–ance>>, p. 8-9

E sul l’interesse della scuola a proibire l’uso di linguaggio volgare ? Ha tutela assai ridotta in condotte tenute al di fuori del campus: <<The school’s interest in teaching good manners and conse–quently in punishing the use of vulgar language aimed at part of the school community is weakened considerably by the fact that B. L. spoke outside the school on her own time. B. L. spoke under circumstances where the school did not stand in loco parentis. And the vul–garity in B. L.’s posts encompassed a message of criticism. In addition, the school has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent students from using vulgarity outside the classroom. Pp. 9–10. (4)The school’s interest in preventing disruption is not supportedby the record, which shows that discussion of the matter took, at most,5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class “for just a couple of days” and thatsome members of the cheerleading team were “upset” about the con–tent of B. L.’s Snapchats. App. 82–83. This alone does not satisfy Tinker’s demanding standards. Pp. 10–11.(5)Likewise, there is little to suggest a substantial interferencein, or disruption of, the school’s efforts to maintain cohesion on theschool cheerleading squad. P. 11.>> (dal Syllabus)

Opinione dissenziente del giudice Thomas, che vede non rispettata -senza giustificazione- la regola giurisprudenziale, per cui <<A school can regulate speech when it occurs off campus, so long as ithas a proximate tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs>>, p. 4.. Egli precis che è vero che certe corti hanno fatto affermazioni <<that, if read in isolation, could suggest that schools had no authority at all to regu–late off-campus speech. E.g., Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, 297 (1877) (Norton, J., joined by a majority of the court, concurring) (“neither the teacher nor directors have the au–thority to follow [a student home], and govern his conduct while under the parental eye” because that would “super–sede entirely parental authority”). But, these courts made it clear that the rule against regulating off-campus speechapplied only when that speech was “nowise connected with the management or successful operation of the school.” King v. Jefferson City School Bd., 71 Mo. 628, 630 (1880)(distinguishing Dritt); accord, Lander, 32 Vt., at 120–121 (similar)>>, ivi

Questione interessante. Nonostante l’apparentente banalità dei fatti (esclusione dai cheerleaders teams; bisognerebbe però calarsi nella realtà locale per capire l’importanza di ciò nella società statunitense) , il diritto di critica viene tutelato anche in relazione ad essi.

Primo Emendamento, Twitter e account Twitter del Presidente Trump

Nell’impugnazione della rimozione fatta da Trump su suoi follower Twitter, la Suprema Corte USA ha dismesso il caso, essendo nel frattempo cambiato il Presidente (perchè mai? per cessata materia del contendere?).

Ma ha ritenuto di esprimere una concurring opinion il giudice Thomas, 05 aprile 2021, caso n° 20-197 (seconda parte del documento linkato).

Egli dubita della applicabilità del Primo Emendamento all’impedimento del diritto di parola, trattandosi di parte privata (nel caso di azione verso Twitter, naturalmente), ad es. p. 3 e 11.

Propone una doppia possibilità regolatoria per le grandi piattaforme: common carrier, p. 4 o public accomodation, p. 6

Infine ipotizza l’incostituzionalità del safe harbour ex § 230 CDA perchè reprimerebbe le leggi statali che proteggono il free spech dalla censura privata: nota 5 p. 11.

Qui intendo solo riportare le sue parole circa gli argomenti, che talora si sentono, per cui non è obbligatorio usare i servizi della piattarforme (potendo usare quelli tradizionali, sottinteso), per cui sarebbe errata l’analogia con un common carrier:

<<It changes nothing that these platforms are not the sole means for distributing speech or information. A person always could choose to avoid the toll bridge or train and instead swim the Charles River or hike the Oregon Trail. But in assessing whether a company exercises substantial market power, what matters is whether the alternatives are comparable. For many of today’s digital platforms, nothing is>>, p. 8.

Ben detto, giudice Thomas!

Rimozione di pubblicità (già concordata) da giornale e state action doctrine: la rimozione è legittima, mancando state action

La pubblicità politica su giornale di provincia, a seguito di contratto, può essere rimossa qualora ci si accorga che viola la policy del gioranle stesso, senza che ciò violi il Prmo Emendamento.

Infatti il giornale non è Stato nè suo organo nè public forum.

Nel caso specifico un soggetto aveva concordato una pubblicità politica sul giornale The Astorian (dell’omonima piccola città dell’Oregon-USA) per due candidati a successive elezioni locali. La pubblicità venne poi rimossa perchè il soggetto, pur avendo inizialmente accettato di far inserire la precisazione che si trattava di <paid advetisment>, non aveva invece accettato la sucessiva richiesta di inserire anche il proprio nome e indirizzo o telefono (informazione richeista ddall’advertisment policy del giornale).

Si tratta di U.S. D.C. dell’Oregon, 8 marzo 2021, Case No. 3:20-cv-01865-SB, Plotkin c. “The Astorian” ed altri.

In Discussion-I.A, il giudice ricorda i principi generali sulla free speech clause del 1° Emendamento.

Poi in particolare così ragiona <<Defendants argue that The Astorian acted as a private entity—not a state actor—when it removed Plotkin’s advertisement from its publication, and therefore Plotkin’s allegations fail to meet the threshold required to prove that Defendants’ actions violated the First Amendment.

The Court agrees.

Like the public access television channel in Halleck, here a newspaper does not perform a traditional or exclusive government function. See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929 (“The relevant function in this case is operation of public access channels on a cable system. That function has not traditionally and exclusively been performed by government.”); see also Brunette v. Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cnty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a newspaper “was not liable as a state actor” under any of the plaintiff’s state action theories); Byers v. The Reg. Guard, No. CV 04-438-HU, 2004 WL 1615220, at *1 (D. Or. July 19, 2004) (dismissing civil rights claims against the Eugene Register Guard in light of “the absence of an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law”).

On the contrary, a press free and independent from the government is a basic tenet of our democracy. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-56 (discussing the history of the press and how the separation between the government and the press is necessary to allow for “the free expression of views”).

Thus, Defendants are not state actors and Plotkin’s constitutional claims have no merit. >>

Nemmeno funziona la difesa del public forum.

<Plotkin attempts to salvage his claims by arguing that the dispositive issue here is not whether The Astorian is a state actor, but whether The Astorian’s creation of a public forum prevents it from limiting Plotkin’s speech under the First Amendment. (Pl.’s Resp. at 2-3; Pl.’s *6 Surreply at 2.)

The Supreme Court has rejected that argument, holding that when a private entity “provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor.” Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930 (rejecting the same argument Plotkin raises here, because “[t]hat analysis mistakenly ignores the threshold state-action question”); see also Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 997 (“YouTube may be a paradigmatic public square on the Internet, but it is ‘not transformed’ into a state actor solely by ‘provid[ing] a forum for speech'” (quoting Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930, 1934)); Belknap v. Alphabet, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2020 WL 7049088, at *3 (D. Or. 2020) (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has explained that private entities who provide the public a forum for speech, including YouTube and Google, are not analogous to private entities who perform all the necessary municipal functions.”) (simplified).

As a private entity, The Astorian is free to create a public forum subject to its own editorial discretion without running afoul of the First Amendment. See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930 (“The private entity may thus exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum.”); cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (holding that a privately-owned newspaper “is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising” and “[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper . . . constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment.”). Accordingly, Defendants did not violate Plotkin’s First Amendment 7 rights.>>

Pco sopra la corte aveva ricordato che <<A private entity may be a state actor when “the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function[.]” Id. (citation omitted). “It is ‘not enough’ that the relevant function is something that a government has ‘exercised . . . in the past, or still does’ or ‘that the function serves the public good or the public interest in some way.'” Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 997 (quoting Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928-29).>> e che però <<The Supreme Court “has stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that category.” Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929 (citing the examples of running elections or operating a company town) (citations omitted). Further, “[t]he Court has ruled that a variety of functions do not fall into that category, including, for example: running sports associations and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating nursing homes, providing special education, representing indigent criminal defendants, resolving private disputes, and supplying electricity.” Id. (citations omitted). *5 Further, “merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints.” Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.>>.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Privacy, libertà di informazione e copyright nel caso Meghan Markle c. Daily Mail

Si pronuncia l’Alta Corte inglese sul caso Meghan Markle (MM) c. Daily Mail e Mail on Sunday (poi anche : l’Editore).

Precisamente si tratta di HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST, The Duchess of Sussex c. Associated Newspapers Limited, 11.02.2021, [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch) Case No: IL-2019-000110 .

Di fronte alla pubblicazione non autorizzata da parte del Mail della propria lettera al proprio genitore (i rapporti non erano facili) , MM cita l’editore per violazione di privacy e di copyright., § 61

I fatti sono esposti ai §§ 1 ss.

PRIVACY

Le difese dell’Editore sono:
<<It maintains that the contents of the Letter were not private or confidential as alleged, and that the claimant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Further or alternatively, any privacy interest she enjoyed was slight, and outweighed by the need to protect the rights of her father and the public at large. The defendant’s pleaded case is diffuse and hard to summarise. But prominent features are contentions that, even if the claimant might otherwise have had any privacy rights in respect of the Letter,

(1) such rights were (a) limited, given the legitimate public interest in the activities of the Royal family and the claimant’s status as a “high-ranking member” of that family, and (b) destroyed, weakened or compromised by (i) her knowledge of her father’s propensity to speak to the media about their relationship, (ii) the fact that publication of the existence and contents of the Letter was lawful in the US, (iii) her own conduct in causing, authorising, or intending publicity about the Letter and/or her relationship with her father more generally, and/or (iv) the publication of information about the Letter;

(2) the People Article gave a misleading account of the father-daughter relationship, the Letter and Mr Markle’s letter in response, such that (in all the circumstances) public disclosure of the contents of the Letter in the Mail Articles was justified to protect the rights and interests of Mr Markle and the public at large>> (§ 6).

Si noti sub 2) : il Mail pretende di fondare la liceità della pubblicazione di ampi brani (v. sotto) della lettera, per corregere l’errore in cui potrebbe cadere il pubblico in base a precedente pubblicazione (da parte di altro gionale: The People) di un articolo sul rapporto padre figlia, a suo dire distorcente la verità.

Ai §§ 28 ss i fondamenti del diritto alla privacy.

Al § 45 il testo integrale della lettera e al § 46 di quello della replica (di tre righe) del padre a MM.

A § 47 ss trovi la pubblicazione pretesamente distorcente del People.

Che esista un diritto alla privacy sulla lettera è esaminato a accertato ai §§ 64-95 <<Stage one: reasonable expectation of privacy>>).

Punto interessante è quello per chui è irrilevante l’inclinazione del padre (destinatario della missiva) a violare la privacy altrui: <<But even assuming the facts to be as pleaded, they are not capable of defeating the claimant’s case that, objectively speaking, she had a right to expect her father to keep the contents of the Letter private. A person’s rights against another are not defeated by the prospect that those rights may be ignored or violated. A high level of risk-taking might be capable of affecting the assessment of damages, but does not excuse an intrusion into privacy: see Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) [2008] EMLR 20 [225-226] (Eady J).>>, § 78.

Affermazione importante e condivisibile.

Al § 86 (e § 98) l’affermzione (scontata) per cui la pubblicizzazione di alcuni aspetti della propria vita non autorizza i terzi a pubblicizzarne altri: il controllo riamane in toto in capo all’interessato.

Lo stage 2 , § 96 ss, esamina il bilanciamento con la liberà di espressione, tra cui quella di correggere false impressioni nel pubblico (punto centrale: § 104).

La risposta è negativa nel caso de quo: la pretesa correzione tramite la pubblicazione di quasi metà lettera di un eventuale errore di minima entità è sproporzionata (§ 120)

La conclusione è dunque questa:

<<The claimant [cioè MM] had a reasonable expectation that the contents of the Letter would remain private. The Mail Articles interfered with that reasonable expectation. The only tenable justification for any such interference was to correct some inaccuracies about the Letter contained in the People Article. On an objective review of the Articles in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that, save to the very limited extent I have identified, the disclosures made were not a necessary or proportionate means of serving that purpose. For the most part they did not serve that purpose at all. Taken as a whole the disclosures were manifestly excessive and hence unlawful. There is no prospect that a different judgment would be reached after a trial. The interference with freedom of expression which those conclusions represent is a necessary and proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of protecting the claimant’s privacy.>>, § 128.

Sul copyright la quesrtione più interssante è l’eccezione di carenza di legittimazione attiva, dato che la lettera sarebbe stata scritta non da MM (o da lei sola) ma da quattro membri dell’Ufficio segretariale di Kensington Palace Communications Team, (the “Palace Four”), in realtà poi da uno solo d iquesti, Mr. Knauf.

Resta invece assodato che ricorra la originnalità, § 139-149, ove riepilogo delle principali teorie e dei principali precedenti anche europei (si noti che le allegazioni processuali distinguono tra la lettera realmente inviata e una sua previa Electronic Draft, che è quella in realtà azionata in causa, § 136)..

Pure la violazione del copyright è accertata, vista la copiatura di 585 parole su 1250 ( § 150).

Sono respinti due motivi di legittimuità della pubblicazione (fair dealing in news reporting, data la concorenza all’eventuale sfruttamento del diritto di autore da parte di MM, e un altro, § 152-158).

Infine la titolarità, § 159 ss

Che dei quattro ve ne sia uno che collaborò, Mr Knauf, pare probabile (§ 135-138), anche se non in solitaria ma semmai come coautore.

Ma su questo proseguirà il processo, § 169-170.

Commento sostanzialmente favorevole da parte dell’ex direttore del Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, in It will come as a surprise to some, but even Meghan has a right to her privacy del 14.02.2021.

Linkedin non è uno state-actor e dunque non è soggetto al Primo Emendamento

Lo dichiara la DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION, Perez c. Linkedin, 9 ottobre 2020, caso NO. 4:20-cv-2188 .

Il sig. Perez aveva più di 7.000 connessioni su Linkedin (poi , L.).

Nel maggio 2020 L. gli rimuove molti post e restringe l’accesso al suo account, a seguito di sue violazioni dei terms of use.

Perez ricorre per violazione del Primo Emendamento (libertà di espressione).

E’ noto che il Primo Emendamento sotto il profilo letterale è invocabile solo contro lo Stato o chi agisce per suo conto: la sua applicabilità in via analogica ai social media è controversa.

La corte texana rimane nel mainstream e rigetta la domanda: <It is true that “the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.” … ; see also Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (“the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used non discriminatorily for private purposes only.”). The First Amendment does not apply to private parties, including online service providers and social networking sites. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996)>, § 2 p. 5

Rigetta anche una non chiara (diversa? subordinata?) domanda di applicazione di un diritto al Free Speech sganciato dal Primo emednamento: la Corte non vede base normativa, § 6.

la Corte infine ritiene valida la clausola di competenza teritoriale posta da L., per cui competente è solo il Norhern District of California, San Jose Division.

Va osservato che la motivazione è sostanzialmente inesistente: peccato, stante la importanza del tema ( si v. il mio saggio “La responsabilità civile degli internet service provider per i materiali caricati dagli utenti (con qualche considerazione sul ruolo di gatekeepers della comunicazione)“, § 20 , spt. p. 172 ss)

Peccato anche che non siano stati esplicitate le pretese violazioni ai terms of use,

(prendo la notizia della sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)