La Corte Suprema USA (SCOTUS) , nella persona del giudice Thomas (poi: JT), interviene sul § 230 CDA
Lo fa però solo per rigettare un’istanza di writ of certiorari (revisione di un caso già deciso da corte inferiore )
Si tratta di SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., MALWAREBYTES, INC. v. ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA, LLC, ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 19–1284. Decided October 13, 2020 .
NOn è chiarisisma la fattispecie concreta: il caso coinvolge <Enigma Software Group USA and Mal-warebytes, two competitors that provide software to enable individuals to filter unwanted content, such as content pos-ing security risks. Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging that Malwarebytes engaged in anticompetitive conduct by reconfiguring its products to make it difficult for consumers to download and use Enigma products. In its defense, Mal-warebytes invoked a provision of §230 that states that a computer service provider cannot be held liable for providing tools “to restrict access to material” that it “considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” §230(c)(2).> p .1 Non si capisce quale sia stata esattamente la condotta impeditiva del convenuto Malware, tale per cui questi possa aver inbvocato il § 230 CDA.
In ogni caso, essendo stata proposta una azione per anticompetitive conduct, il § 230 non si applica: lo disse il 9° circuito e lo conferma ora JT (po. 1)
In ogni caso JT ricorda a p. 2- 3 la storia e la ratio del §230. Ricorda che in 24 anni, mai è stato portato all’attenzione di SCOTUS
Poi muove quattro critiche alla interpretazione sempre più ampia che le Corti ne hanno dato:
1) l’immunità non è più solo per publisher e speaker, ma viene estesa anche ai distributors (contrariamente alla tradizione precedente), sub I.A;
2) l’immunità non è più solo per i contenuti forniti da terzi, ma -alla fine- anche per i conteuti propri del provider, dato che hanno ristretto l’ambito applicativo della disposizione sul developer (che impedisce di invocare l’esimente ex 230.f.3), sub B: <Under this interpretation, a company can solicit thousands of potentially defamatory statements, “selec[t] and edi[t] . . . for publication” several of those statements, add commentary, and then feature the final product promi-nently over other submissions—all while enjoying immun-ity. .Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings … (interpreting “de-velopment” narrowly to “preserv[e] the broad immunity th[at §230] provides for website operators’ exercise of tradi-tional publisher functions”). To say that editing a state-ment and adding commentary in this context does not“creat[e] or develo[p]” the final product, even in part, is dubious>
3) il safe harbour del § 230.c.1 (per cui nulla rischia il provider che disabilita o rimuove in buona fede) è interpretato troppo ampiamente sotto il profilo soggettivo (buona fede/mala fede). Secondo la giusta interpretazione letterale, <taken together, both provisions in §230(c) most naturally read to protect companies when they unknowingly decline to exercise editorial functions to edit or remove third-party content, §230(c)(1), and when they decide to ex-ercise those editorial functions in good faith>. Costruendo invece la disposizone ampiamente <to protect any decision to edit or remove content, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1105 (CA9 2009), courts have curtailed the limits Congress placed on decisions to remove content, see eventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, *3 (MD Fla., Feb. 8, 2017) (rejecting the interpretation that§230(c)(1) protects removal decisions because it would “swallo[w] the more specific immunity in (c)(2)”). With no limits on an Internet company’s discretion to take down material, §230 now apparently protects companies who racially discriminate in removing content. >, sub C.
4) infine le corti hanno pure esteso il §230 <to protect companies from a broad array of traditional product-defect claims. In one case, for example, several victims of human traffickingalleged that an Internet company that allowed users to post classified ads for “Escorts” deliberately structured its web-site to facilitate illegal human trafficking. > (sub I.D; seguono altri esempi).
Tuttavia, precisa JT, ridurre l’area del safe harbour, non priva i convenuti di difesa. Semplicemente ciò < would give plaintiffs a chance to raise their claims in the first place. Plaintiffs still must prove the merits of their cases, and some claims will un-doubtedly fail. Moreover, States and the Federal Govern-ment are free to update their liability laws to make them more appropriate for an Internet-driven society. >, II , p. 9-10.